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Abstract 
 
In 2011 five days of rioting spread across many English towns and cities. 
David Cameron, then UK Prime Minister, described these events as 
‘criminality, pure and simple’, inhibiting serious examination of what happened 
and justifying harsh punitive sentences for rioters. This thesis explains and 
counters the naïve individualism that underpins the discourse of ‘criminality’; 
but further argues that such discursive acts are representative of a broader 
problem within the social order that is causally implicated the violence in 
2011.  
In contrast to the popular and sociological approach of analysing the singular 
‘riot’, ‘riot actions’ are conceptualised as the foci of analysis, and in turn 
argued as acts of resistance generated by the organisation and practice of 
power within the social order. Thus riot actions are conceptualised and 
function as a symptom and entry point by which analysis can better get under 
the skin of the social order and understand its failing.  
Arguing for violent acts against the police as symptomatic of the social order’s 
failure, the thesis examines instances of these in the 2011 and 1980s riots. 
The thesis explores and compares the involvement of race, exclusion, social 
identity, and police during and across these periods. It further examines how 
neoliberal forms of exclusion have shaped the possibilities of riotous actions, 
before performing a situational analysis of video footage of the 2011 riots.  
To facilitate this approach the thesis develops a theory of action/resistance 
through an account of the production of agency. The theory connects 
Bourdieu’s theorisation of habitus and disposition, utilises an expressive 
understanding of shame and self-esteem, and Butler’s notion of 
performativity. Thus we seek to understand how structured experiences, in 
particular social and economic exclusion, become meaningful to those 
excluded, and how this shapes violent acts as meaningful performances.  
The thesis argues that resistance is generated through power relations, which 
amongst many rioters, are failing to reproduce the sense of self-worth 
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required for identification with and engagement in, the social order. From this 
standpoint, then, riotous resistance cannot be explained as distinct from the 
social order, which shapes agency’s ‘necessary scene’, but as rational and 
emotional responses to it.  
The emergence of neoliberalism and individualism in the 1970s and 1980s 
created an epistemological and thus ontological shift, reshaping how 
disrespect and disempowerment is experienced and understood by excluded 
groups. These shifts or emergences have diminished the capacity of socially 
and economically excluded groups to generate Politicised identities and forms 
of resistance. Consequently, rather than ‘criminality’ - a moral condemnation - 
the 1980s and 2011, saw an increasing emergence of individualised - rather 
than Politicised - forms of resistance against the social and political order. 
Individualised resistance to power within the social order is ‘performed’ 
through short-term goals that momentarily re- arrange these power relations 
with regards to the self and police. In these behaviours, structurally produced 
shame and anger are expressed, social identities are formed and realised 
through a common complaint and goal, and the self achieves value through 
attacking or confounding the police. 
 
Definitions 
The terms ‘riot’, ‘the rioters’, ‘unrest’, and ‘disorder’ all have problems. ‘Riot’, 
implies a single event, alongside picking up normative connotations of chaotic 
and criminal behaviour. ‘Disorder’ implies irrationality through a lack of order, 
and positions riot actions in a negative comparison to the dominant group’s 
accepted norms of behaviour. ‘Unrest’ perhaps has similar connotations, 
implying a disruption to the normal, peaceful state of affairs, and thus misses 
the possibility that the events witnessed are an escalation. All these terms will 
be employed for lack of better, common terms, but function as 
interchangeable and simply as identifiers of the subject matter.  
The thesis draws on a distinction between ‘political’ and ‘Political’. This will be 
elaborated in the thesis, however for the sake of reference they are defined 
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here. The capitalised ‘Political’ refers to all relations of power that shape and 
structure social existence, such as the distribution of resources. Thus one can 
be Politicised in that they have an understanding of themselves and their 
action within these relations. The term ‘political’ refers to the conventional 
understanding of voting, protesting and so forth, but it will be argued functions 
normatively to justify certain types of action as acceptable. This enables a 
distinction to be made between concepts of protestors and rioters. To protest 
is to speak to the legitimated political sphere and articulate a claim for 
change. A rioter is not ‘political’ because they do not speak to the political 
sphere but against it; nevertheless, rioters can be Politicised in that they have 
a structural understanding of the causes of their actions. 
‘Violence’ is an important term to the thesis and should simply be noted that 
here it only refers to the intentional aim of physical causing harm to another 
being, although attacks on police property will also be discussed. This is not 
to say acts of destruction of objects are not violent, rather, that violence 
against a person (the police) is simply the focus of the thesis. 
Finally, ‘race’ and ‘class’ are also important terms for the thesis. The concept 
of ‘race’ does not refer to any biological, or indeed ‘trait’ of any individual or 
group. Rather ‘race’ and ‘class’ denote two particular forms of social practice: 
firstly, they refers to a cognitive structure that enables and frames affective 
prejudice and discriminatory behaviours (or forms of disrespect) based on 
perceived differences; secondly, these concepts may also be similarly 
employed as a form of identification, and thus may be utilised to internalise 
disrespect or resist it (Hall et al., 1980). Ethnicity, while a problematic term, is 
used simply to locate the subject of topic with regards to the topic of race.  
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Five Days in August 
In August 2011 rioting broke out across the country causing millions of 
pounds worth of damage, injuries to many police and public, and the arrest 
and prosecution of thousands of rioters. The violence emerged during a 
protest in Tottenham, north London, over the death of a young, black man, 
Mark Duggan, at the hands of police. Duggan had been shot and killed during 
a police operation on the 4th of August. Disbelief in the police account in which 
Duggan supposedly shot at police, and disrespectful treatment of Duggan’s 
family, prompted a protest march by family and friends. On the 6th of August 
the march began from Broadwater Farm estate to Tottenham police station on 
the main high street, Tottenham High Road.  
It was from this protest that the first instances of violence would emerge, 
resulting in clashes between the public and police, along with the destruction 
of police and commercial property. Through social media and television news 
it became apparent that the police were struggling to maintain their control 
over the streets (HAC, 2011: 28; MPS, 2012).1 This perception enabled the 
disorder to emerge in other areas resulting in looting, vandalism, and violent 
clashes with police around Tottenham’s borough of Haringey on the 6th of 
August.  
On the 7th, violence, vandalism, and looting again emerged, this time in five of 
London’s boroughs (Guardian & LSE, 2011 MPS, 2012: 14; THO, 2011), 
before on the 8th and 9th saw similar instances in 22 of London’s 32 boroughs, 
as well as outside the capital in towns and cities around England, including 
Birmingham, Bristol, Liverpool, Manchester, Leeds, Nottingham and many 
more, seeing some form of collective violence. However, by the 10th of 
August, the last day on which rioting occurred, the disorder was petering out, 
with only a few isolated occurrences around the country. 																																																								1	Referring to reports published by the Home Affairs Committee and the Metropolitan Police 
Service	
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During these five days an estimated 13,000 to 15,000 individuals (RCVP, 
2011: 11) attacked police, vandalised and burnt public and private property, 
and looted a variety of stores, from high end electronic retailers, to designer 
brand and high street clothing stores, even to pound stores. In London alone, 
up to 16,000 police officers were reportedly deployed on the 9th of August 
(MPS, 2012: 17) and damages and losses to business were estimated to be 
around the £300 million mark (Dodd, 2011).  
 1.1.1. Framing ‘The Riot’ 
Unsurprisingly, the dramatic nature of the events meant images plastered 
television and social media screens showing rioters framed by burning 
vehicles, buildings ablaze, high streets littered with broken glass and 
overturned bins. News articles described scenes in which “hordes of 
balaclava-clad yobs stormed shops, setting fire to businesses 
indiscriminately” (Wardrop, 2011). Little reflection was needed. When control 
had been regained the response of politicians and media was to condemn 
and seek to punish these violent and immoral thugs and opportunists: they 
needed to be taught a lesson (e.g. Gabbat, 2011; Hastings, 2011).  
The problem was framed as one of a ‘feral underclass’ (Clarke, 2011); young, 
violent men clad in hoods, bandanas, and tracksuits, only out for themselves. 
The serving Prime Minister, David Cameron was unequivocal: “This is 
criminality, pure and simple, it has to be confronted and defeated” 
(Cameron(a), 2011). Of course, the conservative panic over society’s moral 
breakdown was not the only issue on the agenda.  
News media criticised the police’s responses for standing back and observing 
greedy rioters. This was not the fault of the brave individual officers, but rather 
the culture of political correctness (PC) and fear of being seen as racist had 
hamstrung the brave bobbies (Green, 2011; MailOnline(b), 2011). Thus, the 
PC culture had enabled the immoral mob to take what they pleased from hard 
working business owners. What was needed to solve the moral breakdown 
was tough and harsh action. 
The discourse was turned into practice and the penal arm of the state was 
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‘empowered’ to act in a way that its police could not have. All night courts 
were run to facilitate the large number of cases, and the justice system was 
harsh, not to mention potentially illegal as politicians allegedly interfered with 
the judicial process (Baird, 2011). Those rioters who were caught received 
‘severe’ sentences often for minor involvement, with one barrister criticising 
the courts as suffering from a ‘collective hysteria’ (BBC(a), 2011).  
 1.1.2 Consumer Riots? 
One of the principle arguments made about the disorder in 2011 is that they 
were ‘consumer riots’ (Bauman, 2011; Treadwell et al., 2013; Moxon, 2011; 
Zizek, 2011). These draw on the fact that much of the rioting appeared to be 
the looting of consumer goods, and in particular than many rioters took the 
opportunity to steal designer or fashionable brands. The argument was made 
that rioters had been taught to desire these brands as a means to achieve 
status and self-worth; yet these rioters were economically excluded. 
While it is certainly the case that these arguments hit on something relevant to 
the disorder in 2011, they also have arguably produced misleading and 
homogenising conclusions. For instance, data on recorded crime revealed 
that 51% of crime was recorded against commercial premises (THO, 2011: 4). 
Alongside media accounts of widespread looting, this seems to have justified 
the notion that it was all about consumerism. However, the media accounts 
are notoriously unreliable, picking up on the most dramatic incidents or 
shaping the narrative to fit their political ideology.  
Moreover, the figure that also reveals that almost half of recorded crime was 
not against commercial premises. Indeed, of these not all were looted  (e.g. 
Reicher & Stott, 2011 64-68%). Platts-Fowler (2013) also points out that the 
category of ‘looting’ conflates a number of potentially different social 
meanings, such as material gain, status related acts, and expressions of 
resentment towards and/or power over authorities; as one man from the 1992 
LA riots put it: It wasn’t a matter of ‘I got something for free’. It was a matter of 
‘I’m taking from the white man. How do you like us now?” (Reicher & Stott, 
2011; 44%). 
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Simply put, while clearly looting played an important part, to describe 2011 as 
‘consumer riots’ is simplifying, homogenising and inaccurate. Indeed, one 
could argue that emphasising the looting, particularly with regards to the 
luxury and branded goods often targeted, enabled an easier moral judgement 
of ‘the rioters’ through their ‘greedy’ and apparently apolitical behaviour.  
 1.1.3.Criminality: Repression or Resolution? 
So did the government resolve the issues and causes behind the riots? Did it 
even try to understand what happened? The answer would appear to be no. 
Thus, whether one can simply ‘confront and defeat’ behaviour and thus 
resolve the causes of the riots through imprisonment is certainly up for 
question. More worrying was the complete absence of will to explore and 
understand what had prompted the violence: “It was common or garden 
thieving, robbing and looting. And we don’t need an inquiry to tell us that” 
(Cameron, cited in Platts-Fowler, 2013: 18).  
Indeed, assertions that rioters were greedy individuals out for themselves, 
handily ignore that the police were explicitly and repeatedly targeted during 
the violence, or that complaints about aggressive and disrespectful policing by 
rioters might be worth noting (Guardian & LSE, 2011; Morrell et al., 2011), But 
the police were not the only consideration that seemed swept under the 
carpet.  
In the weeks and months after, data continued to emerge revealing that both 
areas and participants were disproportionately from poverty (Guardian & LSE, 
2011; Morrell et al., 2011; MoJ, 2011b; THO, 2011). In turn, race and racism 
were implicated through the disproportionate involvement of young black men; 
this in turn, appeared to connect and corroborate the complaints about police 
alongside data that revealed the disproportionate targeting black people by 
police (Guardian & LSE, 2011; MoJ, 2011b).  
For the coalition government however, none of this was relevant because the 
riots were not political. They were not about the recently implemented ‘cuts’ to 
public and youth services, they were not about ‘poverty’, and they were not 
about ‘racism’. It was about ‘behaviour’, ‘indifference to right and wrong’, and 
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an ‘absence of self restraint’ (Cameron, 2011b). In fact the only data 
Conservative politicians appeared to draw on was that the majority of 
arrestees had criminal convictions.  
This appeared selective to say the least, not only because all evidence that 
might question the ‘criminality’ thesis was neglected, but as Ball and Drury 
(2012) point out, the data was heavily skewed. The police were making the 
majority of their arrests by identifying individuals through prior criminal records 
and CCTV. In other words, it was not that all rioters were criminals, but that 
the rioters who were the easiest to identify, locate and arrest, were those with 
criminal records. 
 1.1.4. Criminality, Power and the Social Order 
What the response to the rioting in 2011 represents is not a search for 
understanding and resolution, but an attempt at concealment and repression. 
However, to assume the discourse of ‘criminality’ is only an attempt to conceal 
is to misunderstand the on-going relation between rioting and the social order. 
For Foucault, “politics is the continuation of war by other means” (2004: 15). 
In other words, the social order is a particular organisation of power and 
distribution of resources established in the first instance through the exercise 
of violence, and maintained through politics. It is the war of rich and poor, the 
powerful and weak, the haves and have-nots.  
This may be a particularly dramatic framing, and politics is not necessarily 
always about domination, but there is some truth in this. The social order is a 
hierarchy that seems particularly resistant to significant change. The current 
free market capitalist ideology, despite rhetoric of freedom and democracy, 
has seen inequality soaring to Dickensian standards (Tyler, 2013: 7).  
Although often thought of emotional, irresponsible outbursts, this thesis will 
seek to show that rioting is actually a contest occurring within the social order, 
a form of resistance to the exercise of power. In Foucault’s (2004) terms, the 
riot is a moment when the underlying conflict that politics seeks to conceal 
breaches the surface of the social order, and power and privilege responds by 
seeking to protect itself.  
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‘Criminality’ then is not simply a response to the riot but part of a relation that 
produces the riot. It is an example of power seeking to reproduce itself in the 
face of a threat. It is an act that seeks to delegitimise challenges and justify 
the organisation of power and privilege through condemnation. And it is a 
discursive act that, because of the potential threat to its legitimacy, seeks to 
shore up and justify its capacity to command and to use violence against 
those so condemned (Arendt, 1970: 40-1). Thus, to understand the violence 
in 2011 we cannot just look at the actions of the rioters, nor can we treat 
‘criminality’ as simply a response to these events; rather we must understand 
both the events and discourses as a process and outcome of the social order. 
 1.1.5. Overcoming Criminality 
What we require then is a way to analyse the violence, to counter the 
discourse of ‘criminality’, and to expose the relations that are producing the 
conflict. Of course, there are many who have sought to do this and one 
popular explanation emerged in my own interactions at conferences, on social 
media, and in some journalistic and academic analyses.  
To generalise and simplify, a little unfairly, these arguments framed the rioting 
as ‘political action’, if not necessarily well articulated (e.g. Penny, 2011; 
Guardian & LSE, 2011; Stott & Reicher, 2011). However, this is not the 
solution we are looking for. The problem with these accounts is not that they 
lack evidence, rather the contrary. What is the problem is how they seek, to 
different extents, to frame this evidence by engaging in a game set by those in 
power.  
To argue that the riots were ‘political’ is to respond to ‘criminality’ in its own 
terms, and set by the neoliberal logic of individualism. ‘Criminality’ focuses on 
‘behaviour’ rather than cause, utilising naïve logics of ‘free will’ to present 
rioters, not as having genuine discontent produced by their position in the 
social order, but as immoral and selfish (Tyler, 2013; Wacquant, 2010). The 
problem is that political-criminal debate is a game of legitimation not 
exploration, relying on notions of acceptable types of articulation and action in 
order to dismiss claims for justice and change. By engaging in this debate one 
seek to fit the rioters’ actions within a framework that shows them as ‘rational’ 
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and acceptable (Akram, 2014: 382).  
Thus to argue for riots as political action is to engage in a losing battle: “Riots 
are, by definition, improvised and chaotic. They do not present a “finished 
thesis” and it is absurd to judge them in terms of political coherence” 
(Millington, 2016: 713). Thus, when rioters do not articulate themselves in a 
clear manner, or when their actions seem not to have strategic goals, or when 
they use violence, they are easily framed as immoral, selfish, and ‘criminal’. 
Moreover, claims of ‘political action’ in the face of looting consumer goods, 
enables an easy dismissals by those who seek to defend the status quo: 
“These riots were not about government cuts: they were directed at high 
street stores, not Parliament” (Cameron, 2011(b)). 
‘Criminality’ emphasises the action itself, not the structural cause of that 
action; and thus riotous actions are dismissed not by the whether there may 
be a cause for discontent, but simply by how discontent is expressed. What is 
required is that we move beyond the implicit and normative values in these 
terms, and understand how ‘rationality’ and thus the so called ‘criminal’ 
actions of rioters are something produced through social structure. 
 1.1.6. Overcoming ‘The Riot’ 
As this discussion has implied, rioting cannot be understood adequately 
without locating as within the relations and processes of power of a social 
order. This leads us to problems with the concept of ‘the riot’. Brubaker and 
Cooper (2000), when talking of identity, warn of the dangers of utilising 
categories of practice in analysis; that is those concepts generated in and 
through everyday use for the purpose of subjective narratives. For instance, 
because someone identifies as part of the ‘working class’ does not mean that 
an actual group exists that can be clearly and coherently identified. Nor does 
it necessitate that working class means the same thing for all those who 
identify as part of it.  
‘Riot’ is a category of practice. Observers have shaped the concept in order to 
make sense of a series of often surprising, temporally limited, violent actions 
that threatens the social order of which they are part. Thus, when Le Bon first 
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talked of ‘the crowd’ (1996: 56), he could not help but imbue it with his class-
based fears of the unwashed ‘masses’ and the threat they posed to the social 
hierarchy from which he benefitted. Indeed, during the 18th Century, ‘riot’ and 
‘mob’ were generally applied to ‘any unlawful assembly or hostile activity’ 
violent or not (Gilmore, 1993: 17).  
‘The riot’, or notions of the ‘mob’ have been defined in contrast to what they 
are not; thus it is disorder in contrast to order, violent in contrast to peaceful, 
and criminal in contrast to political. It has sought to define the violence before 
analysing it and from the position of power, leading to assumptions that riots 
constitute irrational action and temporally limited ‘outbursts’ (Smelser, 1962). 
In defending the social order, like ‘criminality’, the concept of ‘the riot’ closes 
off paths necessary to situating the actions of rioters in their appropriate 
context. 
This is not to say that no one has developed useful theories or nuanced and 
insightful accounts of rioting, however, but unless we reject the concept of ‘the 
riot’ as the focus on analysis we will always be limited. The problem is the 
forms of behaviour that constitute ‘the riot’ are symptoms of the social order’s 
failure to generate the norms and behaviours necessary to reproduce itself. 
The violence itself constitutes a rupture in the skin of the social order, a 
moment when an underlying illness is revealed. To seek to analyse that 
rupture alone is to miss the point: we can start with the symptom, but we must 
go beneath the skin. 
 
1.2. The Thesis 
The aim of this thesis is in part to contribute to political and sociological 
approaches and understanding of ‘riots’. Of course, the point is not to analyse 
‘the 2011 riots’, but rather to develop a theoretical approach that enables the 
analyst to use instances of rioting as a means to understand the failure of 
society to reproduce itself. The primary action selected here is the violence 
against the police. This is because the emphasis on ‘criminality’, and indeed 
on looting and consumerism has tended to push this aspect of the rioting into 
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the background (Newburn et al., 2016(a): 7).  
Moreover, it should also be acknowledged that the police are not an isolated 
actor, but rather are part of the machinery of the state and representatives 
and authorities of the social order (Bland et al., 2001; Loader, 1997). Thus 
their role and position and the resulting trust and legitimacy, or lack thereof, 
sits in a non-linear relation of effect with the social order itself. Consequently, 
attacks on the police are not simply connected to the police, but are tied in 
with the broader structure and power relations within society. The violence 
against the police then, functions as an access point to follow the causal 
tendrils out into failure within the broader social order.  
Through the analysis of riot actions as forms of resistance, we step out into 
the social order, and in particular the emergence of neoliberalism and 
individualism. These factors have shaped the extent and manner in which 
social and economic exclusion occurs, resulting in shifting stereotypes of the 
super-exploited group away from explicit racism, to moral categories of 
‘underclass’ and ‘criminality’. In turn, while the police function as a focus of ire 
in the rioting, they are only the tip of the iceberg: a tangible and visible means 
by which the social order as a whole disrespects and excludes those it 
stereotypes. 
 2.1 Chapter Structure 
Chapter 2 provides a discussion of the methodological approach and issues, 
and also gives an idea of how the research shaped the understanding to be 
developed here. The thesis takes a mixed method approach to explore and 
connect a wide range of factors, utilising ethnographic work, quantitative data 
and qualitative research on the riots, reports and secondary data on social 
and economic policy and police practice. Chapter 3 ‘Riots or Resistance’ 
will review the literature around both riots in general and the 2011 riots, noting 
the problematic framing through the concept of the riot. 
The review of theories and literature sets up the theoretical discussion in 
Chapter 4 ‘A Theory of Resistance’. To move past ‘criminality’ and ‘riot’ 
theories, a theory of resistance will be developed. One of the key factors to 
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countering the discourse of criminality will be to demonstrate how resistance 
that appears ‘apolitical’ is driven by discontent, which in turn is generated 
through the structure of society.  
I will principally utilise Bourdieu’s (2000) understanding of structure or 
capitals, Scheff’s (2000) theorisation of shame, Honneth’s (1995) concept of 
disrespect and struggle, and Butler’s (2004) notion of performativity. The 
theory of resistance will argue that the social structure becomes meaningful 
through emotions, in particular the way it shapes experiences as shameful 
and creates the conditions of agency. This will enable us to better understand 
both the riot actions and their production evolving together, and reveal the 
Political nature of ‘criminality’. Moreover, by acknowledging these broader 
boundaries or connections, we can also learn by extending beyond the 
immediate instance of rioting in 2011, and examining similar forms of 
resistance occurring during the rioting of the 1980s. 
We begin the substantive analysis of riots in Chapter 5 ‘Anti-Police Riots’, 
which realises the critique of ‘the riot’ demonstrating that 2011 was not a 
singular event, but connected to the 1980s riots. By examining these two riots 
together the thesis will note both the similarities in types of action and context, 
the role of race, and social and economic context. Specifically it will note the 
similarities in the attacks on and perception of the police, exploring why this 
might be so.  
This leads us to Chapter 6 ‘Fucking Up The Feds: The Politics of 
Criminality’ in which we examine and breakdown the changing form of 
resistance and power during the 1980s and 2011 violence. Here we observe a 
shift in the 1980s away from Politicised understandings and identities oriented 
to positive notions of ‘black’, towards individualised forms of resistance. The 
notion of ‘individualised resistance’ is developed to account for the production 
of apparently ‘apolitical’ behaviour by the social order, and connects this to 
the emergence of neoliberalism. 
Chapter 7 ‘Neoliberalism: the Expansion of Disrespect’ makes the 
argument that while riots have always been a response to exclusion, the 
individualised resistance we see emerging in the 1980s and becoming the 
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principle form in 2011 is the consequence of a particular historical moment 
and, for lack of better term, ideology. The chapter examines how 
Neoliberalism has expanded disrespect and disempowerment through social 
and economic exclusion, and more importantly, shaped the way these are 
experienced and can be responded to through the new ‘underclass’ 
stereotype, and limiting the possibility of resistance through an individualistic 
ontology. It further highlights how the structuring of education and 
employment for those underprivileged, produces shame and encourages the 
rejection of and resistance to the legitimated social order.  
Chapter 8 ‘Keeping the Order: Stop and Searching the Underclass’, 
reconnects us to the role of the police, how they become a prime target for 
collective violence, and how they are implicated in the social order’s 
production of resistance and violence. This occurs though the circular relation 
of disrespect and disempowerment, over-policing and resistance. This feeds 
forwards into the performative and expressive violence against them. 
Chapter 9 ‘Performative Violence: Overcoming Disrespect and 
Disempowerment in 2011’ uses the novel method of ‘situational analysis’ 
(Collins, 2008) using video footage to bring together the discussion and 
counter the notion of ‘criminality’ through the reading of rioters actions within 
the situational dynamics. What this analysis reveals is that rioters responded 
to power relations that were producing disrespect, utilising the police as a 
means to perform a new social order in which they were dominant. 
Chapter 10 ‘Resisting Neoliberalism: The Youth Project in Hackney’ 
offers a preliminary discussion of the way out of this reinforcing cycle of 
exclusion and disrespect through a discussion of how a youth project in 
Hackney sought to deal with these issues. It argues that central to overcoming 
the problems dismissed and concealed as criminality, is an emotional 
understanding of practice in education and employment. However, it also 
argues that what is lacking throughout society is the structural or Politicised 
understandings and identities necessary to break the cycle and enable the 
social order to adequately reproduce itself. 
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2. Methods: Framing and Conducting the Research 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The initial project began as an analysis of the 2011 riots, however, as the 
introduction revealed, this has changed. While initially the project had been 
conceptualised as exploring the 2011 riots through data and ethnographic 
research, this became impossible. Theoretically, as has been pointed to, 
general approaches to riots are problematic, while interviewing rioters was a 
particularly difficult task, not only for myself, but apparently for others in a 
similar positions.  
Thus a new approach was required that utilised multiple methods and foci of 
analysis, with the aim of understanding the problem within the social order 
that riot actions represent. Of course, analyses of riots have been conducted 
before without recourse to the rioters’ voices themselves, and instead sought 
to understand sets of relations or conditions related to the riots, such as the 
community, social and economic exclusion, involvement with crime, or 
interactions and perceptions on the police (e.g. Keith, 1993; Lea & Young, 
1982). Thus an exploration of the communities, relations, and conditions can, 
in and of itself, prove invaluable to understanding why rioting emerged.  
In turn, the riots of 2011 provided quantitative data produced by the state, with 
three major reports commissioned into the riots, as well as some academic 
and other investigations that managed to speak to the rioters. These reports 
provide a limited account of rioters’ voices, complaints, perspectives, and 
values. The benefit of this is that we can reinforce and move beyond from 
identifying blunt factors (poverty, crime, ethnicity, police-community relations 
etc.) to develop an understanding of how these have impacted upon 
individuals, and provide a more nuanced understanding of the relation 
between social context and the situations of riots. This connects us to the 
broader social analysis in which we use findings from the analysis of riot 
actions to explore through ethnographic work and secondary research, and 
how riot actions emerge from and respond to the social order.  
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Finally, while access to riots as they happened has largely been impossible 
without the luck of being present, the development and proliferation of 
recording technology alongside the internet has meant that researchers can 
now access and analyse the actions of rioters. However, proponents of this 
method (Collins, 2008; Nassauer, 2012) argue that this method alone can 
explain acts of violence. The method is employed differently here.  
Thus I also carry out a situational analysis of the attacks on, or confrontations 
with, the police. Yet, rather than in isolation, this method will be used to bring 
other forms of research together through analysing acts of resistance. This 
enables us to understand the actions of rioters within the larger context that is 
largely to some extent excluded in analyses of riots, and to provide a more 
grounded counter-narrative to the discourse of criminality. However, to begin I 
will discuss the practical problems I had regarding contacting rioters. This will 
lead into the approach taken to mitigate these problems, a discussion on the 
principle sources of data on the 2011 riots, the situational analysis, and finally 
the ethnographic aspect of the research. 
 
2.2. A Lack of Rioters 
The most obvious means to achieve nuanced understandings of the contexts 
within which the riots are seated is ethnographic research focused on rioters, 
their values, logics, and perceptions and feeling with regards to the police, 
understood as embedded within their social context. The initial aim was to try 
to make contact with rioters through multiple routes. My first attempt was to 
make direct contact with prosecuted rioters through the justice system; 
however, the freedom of information request made to the Ministry of Justice 
was rejected due to the personal nature of information.  
Another direct contact approach that I employed was to search the media and 
internet for details of any involved, and through personal contacts who knew 
rioters. For the few rioters that I managed to obtain enough details to be able 
to locate, there was no response to my attempts to contact them. Similarly, I 
also spoke to personal contacts (friends, former colleagues) in London, one of 
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which initially informed me he knew three rioters who would be willing to be 
interviewed. However, before the interviews occurred they changed their 
mind, which my contact stated, was to do with the risk of prosecution. 
The final method I employed was to make contact with individuals or 
institutions involved in the communities that experienced rioting, with the aim 
of talking to them, but also that they may be able to initiate contact between 
myself and rioters. However, despite emailing, phoning, or turning up to many 
private or council run organisations around London, from youth organisations 
to those working with gangs or disadvantaged young people, the majority of 
my attempts were ignored while the rest were rejected on the contentious 
nature of the research and risk of prosecution for the interviewees. While I did 
find some people willing to speak to me, the only partial success (in contact, 
but not in gaining interviews with rioters) came from the youth project 
discussed below. 
Indeed, contact with rioters was extremely difficult, which I realised was a 
problem many in similar positions to myself were having. Through a personal 
contact I was given the email of one of the researchers who interviewed 
rioters for the Reading the Riots project, and who was now engaged in her 
own PhD project on the same topic. I contacted her explaining the problems I 
was having, to which she responded that despite her previous position she 
was also unable to gain interviews with rioters, and had also received a 
number of enquiries from students and researchers having similar issues to 
myself. It appeared that despite the initial willingness of rioters to speak to the 
media and researchers, as time had gone by there was an increasing refusal 
to do so. 
The partial success with regards to contacting rioters came in 2015, with a 
youth project on a housing estate in Hackney, north London, which would 
ultimately provide the majority of my data – although not through rioter 
interviews. Initial contact was made with Polly (black, 30s), one of the 
managers, simply by turning up at their administrative base and explaining 
what I was doing. Initially she proved resistant, yet upon offering to volunteer 
for the project Polly agreed to allow me access. She informed me that four 
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young men at the project had participated in the 2011 riots, however, she also 
warned that I might not get any interviews, and described how Channel 4 
News had come to the project to interview the young people about the 2011 
riots. The young people attending the project, as a group, had refused to 
speak to them, and the reporters left empty handed.  
Polly introduced me to one rioter (black, male, 19) in the middle of the 
common room surrounded by other young people, and asked the young man 
to talk to me about the riots before leaving us to talk. However, it quickly 
became clear he did not want to speak to me; as soon as the riots were 
mentioned his expression shifted to what I thought was annoyance and 
exasperation. After a few moments of trying to speak to him, with the aim of 
getting an informal conversation going, all I had received was monosyllabic 
answers, until he stated it began in Tottenham and that I should go and look 
there (in other words, politely telling me to go away). Realising he would 
remain unwilling to talk to me, I thanked him and left him alone. 
This formed the start of my realisation that the problem was more than the risk 
of prosecution, but in part a lack of trust, and also that people generally, often 
did not want to talk about the riots. Upon being informed that I was 
researching the 2011 riots, Carla, one of the founders, asked sarcastically, ‘so 
you’re here to write your book?’ The implication was that I was only interested 
in what I could gain for myself. A second young man, Mark (black, early 20s) 
who volunteered at the project and had attended at a younger age, did result 
in an interview. Yet despite agreeing to be interviewed, he made the same 
expression of annoyance when the riots were mentioned, and it was clear that 
he did not trust me.  
Mark was not particularly forthcoming, nevertheless, he did offer insight into 
his worldview, albeit without much elaboration and further revealed a mistrust 
of me. Although Polly had not make it clear if Mark had rioted I had the 
impression this was the case, however, given the above context and that he 
had not mentioned it himself, I decided not to push the issue of his 
involvement. Nevertheless, this interview was useful because as Wolcott 
(1999) argues, and we will see below, a lack of trust that inhibits an interview 
	 29	
is not without meaning, especially when considered in the context of whom 
the interviewee perceives the interviewer to be. 
In time, I perceived that there were three issues inhibiting my research into 
the riots. Firstly, and most obviously, was the risk of prosecution to rioters. 
Secondly, by the time my research commenced there appeared to be a 
feeling of exasperation related to outside interest in the riots amongst people 
from communities that saw rioting. This, I felt, was based on a perception that 
the riots had been over-discussed and that this was all anyone such as myself 
wanted to speak to them about. Finally, and underpinning the latter, I also felt 
there was a view that people ‘like me’ – researchers, journalists, of white and 
middle class appearance – were only interested in these communities when 
something bad happens, such as the riots. In other words, I was seen as an 
outsider and was not to be trusted based on previous experiences with others 
‘like me’, who had only taken what they needed.  
2.3. Re-Framing the Thesis – Data  
The question then became how to re-frame the research to circumvent this 
problem. Despite the difficulties I discovered, there does exist significant data 
on the riots, albeit not without problems. Firstly, there is the publically 
available quantitative and basic demographic data on those rioters arrested 
and prosecuted, on the types of backgrounds and areas that these rioters 
came from, and those areas that experienced rioting. The first problem is that 
the data on participants is partial and cannot be taken as representative, and 
neither does it breakdown who attacked the police. Nevertheless, I am not 
seeking representivity, only common and significant factors; therefore, simply 
in an absolute sense, the data on rioters does reveal information about a 
significant number of those who were involved and provides us with an idea of 
the ‘faces in the crowd’ (Keith, 1993: 97).  
 2.3.1. Quantitative Data  
The overwhelming majority of quantitative data derives from the Home Office 
(THO, 2011) and the Ministry of Justice (MoJ(a), 2012), who compiled their 
information regarding individuals arrested and reported crimes, and those 
	 30	
prosecuted, respectively. The Home Office report was produced in October 
2011, and thus represents an immediate response to the desire for 
information about the riots and rioters. However, while it offers the most 
comprehensive view of crimes recorded, regarding arrests it can only be 
considered partial as many had not been processed through the courts, some 
would not be, and arrests were on-going. The Ministry of Justice’s report was 
produced in the following year, allowing for a greater amount of riot (3,103) 
cases to be brought before the courts and therefore represents more reliable 
and conclusive data as the evidence against those arrested could be 
assessed (MoJ(a), 2012: 4).2 
2.3.2. Reports and Research 
In addition to the state produced data, there were three major reports 
published on the 2011 riots along with excerpts of interviews with rioters. The 
Guardian and London School of Economic (2011) published Reading the 
Riots study. This was perhaps the most comprehensive report and provides 
the most substantial evidential base. Utilising quantitative-qualitative mix the 
research sought to understand and explain why the riots had occurred. It 
consisted of a mixed methods approach by a large team of researchers and 
analysts, utilising quantitative and qualitative data, involving over 270 rioters, 
many of whom had not been arrested for involvement. Their aim was 
saturation with regards to obtaining interviewees, and importantly, despite the 
methods of rioter identification (i.e. most were not contacted through the 
justice system) the report states that the demographic make-up of their 
																																																								2	However, the report acknowledges that only 85% (2,646) of these had reached a conclusion 
at the point of publication, and 16% of those concluded were either dismissed or acquitted 
(MoJ(a), 2012: 4). Yet these dismissed or unfinished cases remain included in the data, thus 
what the report’s figures reveal should be understood as only indicative. A further problem 
that will be discussed later is the lack of breakdown or comparison between demographics 
and ‘crimes’ committed. Most relevant here is that there is only one figure provided regarding 
the targeting of the police, which is that it constituted 6% of all crimes recorded (THO, 2011: 
4). I made a freedom of information request to the Ministry of Justice regarding the 
demographics of those arrested for these acts, but was refused due to the cost exceeding the 
limit set for such requests. 	
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interviewees runs broadly parallel to state produced data, thus strengthening 
the value of utilising state produced evidence. 
One of the most useful aspects of the report was the publication of excerpts of 
their interviews with rioters (found in a number of articles published in The 
Guardian by either Carter, Clifton, Lewis, Newburn, or Prasad, all published in 
2011). However, rather than complete interviews, these either relate to a 
certain issue/topic (i.e. gangs or stop and search) and thus group together 
quotes from a number of different rioters, or form ‘rioter profiles’: a number of 
quotes from a particular rioter that the study found representative of a 
common perspective or complaint amongst rioters.  
While obviously useful, and we can take such quotes as representative of a 
broader perspective than simply that of the particular individual, there clearly 
are some limits. Specifically, if we are seeking to understand a particular rioter 
there may be relevant information not published, or the profile may have 
focused on looting, for instance, and we cannot know whether the same rioter 
was involved in attacking the police. I did contact the study through the LSE to 
enquire about access to full transcripts, however, this was refused as they 
were still using the data to publish. 
Morrell, Scott, McNiesh, and Webster (2011) also produced The August Riots 
in England Understanding the Involvement of Young People, a report for The 
National Centre for Social Research. The authors conducted a mixed 
research programme looking at young people’s involvement and their 
perspectives on the riots. Their research employed some statistical analysis 
on those arrested, analysis of dynamics occurring in areas where rioting took 
place, and case studies of five areas in which rioting occurred alongside two 
unaffected areas, that functioned both as control groups as well as providing a 
comparative aspect.  
In the qualitative component, interviews were conducted with around 30 
young individuals per area (206 overall), seeking a rough split with regards to 
ethnicity, gender, and age, relative to the location’s diversity. Where possible, 
group discussions/interviews were also conducted with young people and also 
‘community stakeholders’ (51 individuals). For the unaffected areas, the 
	 32	
authors spoke with 54 individuals in 6 focus groups (ibid: 11). 
Of the three reports this appeared the most theoretically adroit (although it 
does not set out its theoretical perspective), looking at factors and relations 
that appeared to encourage or inhibit participation, rather than focusing simply 
on what the rioters stated. The authors further note that explanations of 
behaviour given by participants are often partial and perhaps biased; to 
counter this they sought to combine such explanations with descriptions and 
logics of others, including both participant and non-participant young people, 
as well as ‘community stakeholders’ who brought in relevant experiences 
from, and understandings of the communities. 
Another major report was carried out by the Riots, Communities, and Victims 
Panel (from hereon, and sourced as RCVP) established by the government 
and entitled 5 Days in August (RCVP, 2011 10-11) which held meetings with a 
number of communities that had experienced rioting about what they saw as 
the issues behind the rioting, combining this with some statistical analysis of 
the riots. Of the three reports I found this one the most problematic as it does 
not considers how it frames or utilises the data, or consider issues such a 
partiality, with regards to how and from whom data was gathered, and 
ultimately leads the report to make some broad assumptions.  
This mixture of reports and state produced data created opportunities for 
insight, in that I could get an idea of the types and backgrounds of individuals 
that had participated, and some idea of the situations and social contexts. In 
turn, the reports highlighted local knowledge and opinions, and gave the 
principle sources of rioters’ voices along with claimed motivations and causes 
of participation, as well as access to logics and values through their 
descriptions of the riots, again connecting us to the broader social context. 
Nevertheless, there are also problems with this information.  
The first of which is that the basic demographic data provided by the reports 
in conjunction with the voices of rioters is limited at best to basic categories, 
and sometimes not all information is given. Furthermore, with the partial 
exception of The National Centre for Social Research (Morrell et al., 2011), 
the interviews and exploration of the data appear to have focused on ‘the 
	 33	
riots’ (i.e. what happened and what rioters did), their complaints, and 
motivations to riot. Thus, what is neglected is in depth study of relations that 
stretch out beyond the riot.  
Nevertheless, the reports are useful in that they can corroborate aspects of 
the state produced data, as well as providing information other than in a blunt 
numerical form. Furthermore, all can be seen to largely agree in their findings, 
highlighting certain issues that could be used to frame the focus of the 
ethnographic research. However, it should be noted that the RCVP (2011) 
problematically makes the assumption that anti-police sentiment was largely 
only relevant in Tottenham, whereas rioting beyond this was about looting (as 
will be shown, this is a rather large simplification and contradicted by a 
number of forms of evidence).  
Newburn et al. (2016 (a) & (b)) produced academic articles which explore the 
perspectives and motives of rioters utilising the data of Reading the Riots, of 
which Newburn was one of the lead investigators, and thus had full access to 
the transcripts. These articles support the general findings of Reading the 
Riots, but provide a fuller, and more theoretically developed account. 
The most substantive ethnographic research from academia (interviewing 
over 30 male rioters from London and Birmingham, most of these connections 
were made during the riots at which the researchers were present) comes 
from social psychology (Treadwell, Briggs, Winlow, and Hall, 2013). In 
contrast to the major reports, the authors argued for consumerism being the 
primary cause, and against the importance of police to the rioting. However, 
this again neglects a significant amount of evidence to the contrary.  
Consequently, although it would of course provide more rigorous data if I had 
been able to speak to rioters, there is significant evidence that can be utilised 
to garner an understanding of ‘faces in the crowd’ (Keith, 1993) and to 
connect the situation to the social context, or the particular sets of practices 
and relations between rioters and the police, law, and social and economic 
exclusion. 
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2.4. Re-Framing the Thesis – Video Footage 
One other means which helps us to diminish the partial lack of voices from the 
rioters, as well as providing a valid approach in and of itself, comes from the 
proliferation of video recording on smart phones, and websites such as 
YouTube for posting videos. Consequently, journalists or members of the 
public recorded some events in the 2011 riots, giving visual and some audio 
access to moments of the riots as they occurred. Video footage enables the 
researcher to look for expressions, body language, actions, alongside who is 
doing what and to whom, in order to garner some understanding of what 
occurred and how events progressed (Collins, 2008; Nassauer, 2012).  
Previously then, the only methods available to researchers were ethnographic 
and quantitative gathering of data, post riot. These methods are still important 
as video footage has its limitations. The principle issue with situational 
analyses is that the researcher will have to interpret actions and expressions, 
and without other forms of data regarding who the individual is and how they 
think to inform these interpretations, will ultimately risk making assumptions 
based on the researcher’s perspective. Thus the approach taken here has 
been to develop an understanding through forms of data in conjunction with 
the video footage. 
There are of course some other limitations relating to the process of 
recording, not least that the video capture of events is not systematic. In turn, 
sometimes footage is edited or cut by those posting online, and due to the 
partial and sporadic nature of the recordings, all of which firstly makes 
providing a chronological account difficult.  
Similarly, the events that are recorded by public observers are potentially the 
most dramatic and interesting moments, and may exclude what else was 
occurring in the area and more broadly across the country. This potentially 
creates ‘unknowns’ as to whether the events are representative, what was 
included or excluded by the frame and focus of the cameraperson, and indeed 
those posting may not always give information as to where the recording 
occurred. However, in the chapter utilising the video footage I will argue that 
we can mitigate some of these concerns. 
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Considering my own role in choosing the data, I cannot help but make certain 
selections and therefore define what is observed, whilst exclude certain 
interpretations and events. However, the aim is not to provide a 
comprehensive account of everything that occurred in 2011, but principally to 
show the development of violence against the police in Hackney, and to 
highlight relevant and reoccurring actions and behaviours within the 
confrontations. It should be noted furthermore, that I did not simply select the 
footage and then move onto ethnographic research, but rather, my 
understanding of the footage and social context developed in tandem. 
In terms of selection, my first approach was simply to view as many videos as 
I could locate through the internet, mostly on YouTube, but also on other 
sites. Following the initial search I began to select the footage by area. I 
sought to identify areas in the events happened where possible; sometimes 
this was information given with the posted footage and on others I sought 
features that identified locations (e.g. road names, shops) before locating 
them through Google Maps.  
Relevance and similarity between different events was also a factor when 
considering footage beyond Hackney (i.e. type of interaction with the police, 
how the encounter played out, displays and types of action). However, the 
type of rioter was not a factor in selection due to the fact that in almost every 
video I came across those attacking the police held similar demographic 
markers – principally young men, often dressed in hoodies or tracksuits, and 
disproportionately black although with a significant amount of white 
participants. 
Overall, I estimate I viewed well over 100 different scenes of rioting, noted 
relevance, and at later points returned, selected and recorded 15 pieces of 
footage (many containing multiple scenes) for the analysis. My numbering of 
the videos relates primarily to the chronological ordering of Hackney and then 
largely by their appearance in the chapter. I have also included a map of Mare 
Street highlighting where incidents in the footage occurred, and photos from 
the 2011 riots all of which are stills of the footage, which serve simply to give 
the reader a fuller idea of the situation.  
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For the primary selection I obviously focused on those videos that showed 
conflict or confrontations with the police, while I also managed to locate 
footage that captured confrontational moments between rioters and police 
prior to the outbreak of violence in Hackney. Within the selection of conflict 
between rioters and police, I also looked for commonalities in behaviour; so 
for instance, I use a number of pieces of footage3 in which rioters involved 
displayed similar body language or expressions towards police.  
The point in taking this tack is, again, not to examine the riots as a whole, nor 
even state that this explains the attacks on the police as a whole, but to 
explore how the attacks on the police emerge in resistance to the organisation 
of power in the social order. This is important evidence in part because they 
show moments in which the social order ruptured, and allows us to analyse 
actions as socially meaningful and produced (Bourdieu, 1985; 2003; Butler, 
2011), rather than as simple ‘criminality’.  
In addition, the benefit of a situational analysis is that it provides a form of 
evidence that is in some ways more reliable than others. In one sense, simply 
by bringing in visual accounts of the riots we counter the hegemonic media 
representations of these acts. Furthermore, while statistical data is notoriously 
open to interpretation, and statements and claims of rioters and communities 
are vulnerable to dismissal under the logic of post-hoc justifications (e.g. 
Zizek, 2011), the attacks on the police are of the moment – this is what 
happened and how.  
This is not to say there is no interpretation of the footage, but rather, we can 
observe the actions of rioters as ‘performance’. Judith Butler’s (2011) notion of 
‘performativity’ is particularly useful with regards to performing situational 
analysis through video footage. Butler’s concept forwards that actions are 
normative in that actors respond to a structural understanding of who one 
should be and how. However, similar to what Paul Willis (1990: 10) termed 
‘symbolic work’, all action is also productive, an act of power so to speak, 
which can change those understandings and identities by acting on and 																																																								3	In Hackney and Camden in North London, Woolwich in south London, Ealing in west 
London, and one unidentified location.	
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through the organisation of power.  
The notion of performativity conceives of structure as power-relations as per 
Foucault (2004); Butler (2011) is interested in how gender roles are 
constructed and imposed, and how this power comes into play through an 
individual’s actions, which both play out and play with these roles. Social 
structure is inscribed in bodies through action; by performing these identities 
the actor both re-inscribes the social structure, and becomes that identity 
through a display to themselves and others that ‘this is what I am’.  
In other words, the actions visible in the footage are in part symbolic, and tell 
us about the social structure they respond with and to. By developing an 
understanding of the actors, their actions become discernable or legible. 
Whether it be violence, gestures, or emotional displays, these function as 
expressions in the moment which draw from and reshape the social structure 
or power relations they emerge from. In other words, this advances on Collins’ 
(2008) use of emotions by understanding agency as possible because of the 
social structure.  
Here then the performance of actions through power represents and reveals 
Bourdieu’s (2000; 2003) dispositions – cognitively framed, affective drives, 
shaped through prior experiences relating to one’s social position in the world. 
In each action the individual expresses their affective response shaped by the 
prior experience, either to reproduce it in some way, or to overcome it. As 
‘performativity’ indicates, these actions make sense and are expressed 
through a cultural and normative repertoire: “everyday gestures are [cultural 
performances] because they signify everyday identity to others and for 
ourselves” (Chambers & Carver, 2008: 43).  
To analyse video footage of the rioting then we need to understand the 
actions as performance with power. A performance draws on experiences and 
their emotional content, and relies on certain roles and relationships with 
those they are performing with, in order to express these emotions. By 
examining and understanding who the rioters are? Who are they acting with? 
How do they perceive the other? What do they do? And what do they seek to 
achieve? We can explore how structure inheres in action, and develop an 
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account as to how the social order is implicated in resistance to it. 
 
2.5. Ethnography – Going Beyond the Riots 
As we will see, for those that we know were involved significant amounts 
came from impoverished and over-policed areas, which also formed the 
majority of areas that saw rioting. The majority of research took place in the 
boroughs of Hackney and Haringey (which includes Tottenham) both of which 
fit these area profiles, and as the data and footage will show, both saw 
significant amounts of rioting. The two other interviews I conducted and 
gained through personal contacts both came from areas (Bromley and 
Peckham, south London) that had similar profiles and also saw rioting in 
2011.  
While Tottenham is important because this is where the riots began, Hackney 
also saw rioting on the third day, including a significant amount of anti-police 
action. However, while the focus on Hackney in the video footage was due to 
available sources, this coincided nicely with the ethnographic research. 
Combined with the relevance of these areas to providing a context to the riots, 
I have also lived in Haringey (Tottenham’s borough), north London for over 
five years, enabling easy (geographical) access to both Tottenham and 
Hackney for research purposes (my current location sits close to the border 
between Haringey and Hackney, while prior to this I lived roughly a mile away 
from Broadwater Farm and two miles from Tottenham).  
2.5.1. The Youth Project 
As noted the majority of research occurred at a youth project in Hackney, in 
an area called Stoke Newington. The same area was part of Michael Keith’s 
(1993) research in the 1980s, due to rioting occurring in the area and the 
history of antagonistic and confrontational relations between the black 
community and the police. The area appears to have seen a significant drop 
in crime and poverty, comparing my experience there with Keith’s descriptions 
(I was told that it would have been very risky for me to enter the estate alone 
5-10 years ago), likely due in part to rapid gentrification in Hackney.  
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Nevertheless, despite being located in a now ‘trendy’ part of Hackney, the 
project is located on a largely poor estate built after the Second World War. 
The estate is comprised mostly of small blocks of red brick terraces or 
concrete flats, while the youth project’s space forms part of a community 
centre at the base of a tower block. The project itself has a small, rather 
dilapidated, outside concrete space where the younger children sometimes 
play.  
After entering through the foyer, the office stands to the right, followed by its 
two main rooms ahead and to the left. One of these rooms is mostly used for 
events or classes while the other forms the main common room. The main 
part of the common room holds a table tennis and a pool table, along with an 
Xbox, seats and sofas. The far end of the room branches out like a T into two 
sections, one section forms a small kitchen where meals are cooked each 
evening, while on the other side is a study area with a few computers, 
however, prior to my research the building had been broken into and these 
had been stolen. 
All the volunteers and workers were from Hackney, many of whom attended 
the project at a younger age. All were either black or mixed ethnicity, aged 
between late teens to around 50, and a roughly equal mix of genders. The 
young people were again from the local area, roughly equal in terms of 
gender, but slightly more diverse with the majority being black, but also some 
white from differing ethnic backgrounds.  
The project was set up in the early 1990s by Jane and Carla, two black 
women, both now in their early 50s. Jane and Carla began the project by 
speaking to police in order to identify young people who were involved in 
crime before making contact. After gaining a level of trust with these young 
people, they managed to start an informal youth club using sheds on an 
estate in Hackney. This would later evolve in to the youth project, which took 
on charity status and was founded in the late 1990s. Jane seems to be the 
principle driving force of the two; her daughter Polly, who now is one of the 
principle managers, described how Jane had been in a gang by the age of 10, 
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but as an adult managed to train for and become a youth worker in the 1980s 
with the aim of helping young people avoid the route that she took.  
When I visited in 2015, the project was in some respects a simple youth club, 
giving space to young people aged between 10 and 19 (although the project 
has also stated 21 on some of its media) to hang around, chat, and play 
games. I had no research-based interaction with anyone under the age of 18 
other than simply being present and observing (and at all points during my 
research there were youth workers present), and only interacted with younger 
individuals when playing pool or participating in a group activities.  
At the project’s height in the early 2000s it ran three sites around Hackney, 
the largest having around 60-70 young people attending each night. However, 
due to cuts in funding and the increased privatisation of funding routes, the 
project is now limited to one site for the young people and a small 
administrative office. It gains use of the property through Hackney council 
which also utilises it for other youth organisations, whilst the majority of its 
funding is now achieved through charities and private organisations. During 
my time there the number of young people varied, but I would estimate that 
usually there were between 15 to 25, and most of the time had 3-4 youth 
workers present, although this could occasionally vary in either direction. 
Workers were checked under the Disclosure and Barring Service, and trained 
to ‘Safeguarding’ standards to protect the young people and children. 
2.5.2. Research with the Project 
The research at the youth project consisted of interviews and participant 
observation over a period of 6 months attending usually twice a week. My 
time was mostly spent in the common room, observing how young people 
interacted with each other and the youth workers, as well as informal chats in 
which I talked with the youth workers, while interviews were conducted in the 
office. All interviews conducted were with youth workers, in part because 
there was a general sense of suspicion and resistance to engaging with me 
amongst the young people, although this did decrease after some time and 
occasionally played pool with them.  
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My choice to attend twice a week was largely shaped by consideration for the 
youth workers. For instance, while Polly was always willing, generous, and 
interested, she was also a single mother as well as the manager for the 
project, and thus was exceptionally busy. Despite being my first contact, she 
was one of the last people I managed to interview and did so despite having 
her two young children waiting to leave for home. Polly was not an exception, 
even those without the responsibilities of parenthood continuously had to deal 
with other issues, tasks, or speak to and interact with the young people. Thus 
my time there was clearly an unneeded distraction and I did not wish either to 
become a nuisance, or damage the already precarious acceptance of my 
presence. This in turn meant that instead of ‘interviews’ 4  I generally 
proceeded to have informal chats when the workers were not too busy.  
The value of the project to the thesis is that it was situated in a poor estate in 
Hackney and four young people present had been involved in the 2011 riots, 
and thus it offered access to a microcosm of the social order and values that 
occur in deprived areas of Hackney, and were tangibly linked to the riots. 
While the project did not discriminate in terms of who could attend, many of 
the attendees had problems which included social and economic exclusion 
(e.g. from poor families, failing in formal education, single parents, parental 
and sometimes personal drug problems) and some had involvement in crime 
and violence. Indeed, its role or aim was described to me by one volunteer as 
‘keeping kids on the straight and narrow’, and thus sought to help children 
with their home and personal lives, and educational performance as a means 
of preventing involvement in crime.  
Consequently, the economic and social issues, and values and logics 
occurring on the estate and visible in the project and its approach to rectify 
them, were part of the context that shaped rioters’ dispositions, or specifically, 
shaped the choice to attack the police plausible or desirable. Although I could 
not participate in their world, observation allowed me to some extent to 
imagine or place myself within research subjects’ logics and modes of 
																																																								4	On a number of occasions early on I explicitly asked and in principle an interview was 
agreed too, however, this was always at ‘another time’.	
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perceptions, through observed interactions that were facilitated by the 
information gathered from youth workers (Gobo, 2008; Pink, 2010).  
Importantly, what provides further credence to the research developed 
through the project is that, more than just working with young people and 
issues of crime and criminalisation (Jane, one of the founders, sometimes 
worked as an advisor to prisons on gangs) all of the workers have lived in 
Hackney for most or all of their lives, and many had attended the project 
before volunteering as adults. Thus these individuals were local ‘experts’ and 
could provide a practical understanding of the social context and how it 
shaped individuals’ choices and values, based on the issues of young people 
they had dealt with as well as through their own experiences at an earlier age.  
The participant observation and interviews/chats complemented each other in 
that I could observe how the context of social and economic exclusion 
interacted or shaped concrete situations, and develop an understanding of the 
relation between the ‘macrostructural’ and affective dispositions (Wacquant, 
2010: 9-10), as the perceptions, drives, and values they applied to some 
situations. In this line, another aspect enabled particularly by the youth project 
was that it allowed me to see what problems it sought to deal with and how. In 
other words, rather than simply seeing the structural ‘problems’, the project 
gave insight into how this translated into a lack for the young people and how 
such issues might be rectified.  
For instance, much of the project’s success in getting individuals to engage in 
education or employment seemed to come from the trust and emotionally 
rewarding relationships built between the young people and workers. The 
sense of belonging produced and the self-esteem some clearly felt after 
achieving in, for instance, educational tests/scores, revealed not only that this 
is something they often lacked either at home or school and was sought out at 
the project, but that it relates to their engagement, or lack thereof, in 
legitimated social practices (formalised education, employment), both in that 
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‘success’ encouraged further engagement and to some extent seemed to 
inhibit the move towards ‘the streets’ and crime.5  
Through the youth project I learned or gained a number of valuable insights, 
perhaps the most important came in relation to the social context and 
dispositions of young people coming from backgrounds of social and 
economic exclusion. Firstly, my impression was that there existed a common 
mistrust or resentment of the legitimate or dominant order, of which I was 
seen to represent (through my appearance of a white, middle-class 
researcher from a university). This mistrust was a general factor, rather than 
specifically related to the police, likely shaped through the long running history 
of experiences of the black community at the hands of often racists state 
institutions.  
In turn, I began to understand the causes of this through the project, some of 
the people I interviewed outside of the project, and through reading published 
accounts through the media from people in these areas. However, what also 
made sense of what I was seeing was the parallels with my own experiences 
with education and employment. Despite my appearance or ‘researcher 
identity’, I grew up in a single parent family, in a working class town in the 
Midlands. While in some ways my experiences were very different than 
growing up on a deprived estate in London, in other ways there was 
significant overlap. 
My experiences of high school as boring, irrelevant, and even to some extent 
shameful due to my low grades, paralleled what I was seeing at the project. 
Relatedly, the resistance, or ‘bad behaviour’, some were displaying at school 
similarly seemed to be emerging from a refusal of education, both due to the 
lack of rewards and stimulation, but also by refusing to engage failure was 																																																								
5 It should be noted that the project clearly did not, nor could not succeed all of the time. In 
part this relates to the fact that the problems they are dealing with in young people relate to 
their ‘lifeworlds’ (Atkinson, 2010) – the views, logics, and values based on the broader social 
context they exist in, thus the project can only provide a space that offers a partial 
replacement. These factors mean there will always be the chance that some will not 
‘succeed’. As I will discuss later, I interviewed one volunteer – Mark – who spoke as if his 
criminal engagements were behind him, yet after my research had finished I discovered by 
chance in the media that he had been arrested for carrying a large amount of cocaine, and 
sadly, days later was killed in a drug related argument. 
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you choice, not your stupidity. In other words, I was able to empathise with the 
young, and to use this to better understand what the project sought to do and 
the difficulties faced by these young people. 
Indeed, like many in areas such as Hackney, I left school with no 
qualifications to speak of and ended up in a Work Experience Centre through 
the unemployment office. For a few years, I hung around with a group for 
whom petty crime and violence were not things to avoid but things to brag 
about, and where the police were similarly not respected (although I 
personally engaged relatively little in these activities, and had few interactions 
with the police).  
Furthermore, while I spent little time unemployed during this period, I had 
jumped between low paid, low status jobs until at aged 26 I decided to try 
university. Indeed, what prompted me to try university was in part, the 
frustration at a stream of dead end jobs that either ended in my quitting or 
being fired. Another factor was that my elder sister had gone to university so 
as a mature student, having left home at 16 and become a traveller; thus her 
perspective was more open and less constrained by working class ‘common 
sense’.  
This was in contrast to my circle, in which university was generally not 
considered worthwhile or achievable.6 Thus her actions opened university up 
as a ‘plausible’ opportunity for me. Indeed, even with this advantage and the 
feeling that I was intelligent enough to attend university, the whole world was 
particularly intimidating at the beginning, particularly meeting middle-class 
young people who clearly had a better education than I. My initial response to 
the feeling of low self-worth was to resist through performing my more 
masculine working class identity. 
Consequently, I could understand how aspects of the social order would be 
implicitly or pre-reflexively closed off. Moreover, I understood, in part, why 
representatives of the legitimated social order, such as myself, might be 																																																								
6 The response of people to discovering I was going to university was often negative in 
someway. For instance, my employer at the time questioned whether I was capable, while the 
response of some peers was ‘why?’ However, there were others, and family that supported 
me. 
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understood as threatening. The response of closing down and refusing to 
engage, could be interpreted as hostility, particularly if stereotypes of these 
young people are accepted, however, my experiences revealed that what 
actually drives this form of resistance is power and the potential to shame.  
Thus, in part due to my own experiences, what became apparent to me was 
that while the police may have been a focal point for some rioters, the 
resentment or mistrust seemed to stem in part, from a broader set of 
encounters with state or civil society organisations. As with experiences of 
high school and initially at university, the disadvantage and stereotypes 
produce a sense of rejection, mistreatment, and low self-worth.  
Rather than engage, the drive is to resist and to reject those who make you 
feel angry. Indeed, as mentioned, the police were similarly disliked in my 
circles, and some I knew identified and boasted about their criminal activities. 
Indeed, I find it hard to imagine that, had the 2011 riots happened around my 
friends and myself at aged 18, we would not have similarly engaged and 
enjoyed it. Consequently, the research evolved to examine how individuals 
were being alienated through practises of education, employment, and 
contact with the police and justice system, and how these fed into, or 
intersected with each other.  
With regards to the interviews, in total for my research, I spoke in depth to 12 
individuals, conducting 7 semi-structured interviews (4 at the youth project), 
and a further one that was cut short due to external circumstances (also at the 
youth project). The interviews at the project were conducted with Maria (mixed 
ethnicity, late teens, had attended, now employed at the project), Mark (black, 
early 20s, had attended before volunteering), Lim (black, early 20s, had 
attended, now volunteered), and Polly (mixed ethnicity, 30s, daughter of 
founder Jane, manager). The interview that was cut short was with Carla 
(black 50s, one of the founders). Similarly, I held conversations with a number 
of workers, questioning them on what they did at the project, its value, and 
issues and what they thought, most substantially Polly and Lim (above), Jane 
(black, 50s, one of the founders), and Ray (black, male 50s, volunteered at 
the project).  
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All of the interviews aimed at an unstructured format, however, I did have a 
list of questions to facilitate should this approach not work, and would 
principally describe them as semi-structured, given the general resistance to 
discussions on the riots (the exception being Polly, who largely drove the 
interview). All took a conversational style using principally open-ended 
questions, with the aim of enabling the interviewee to drive the production of 
information (what they saw as relevant, felt most strongly about, and to use 
their own terms and meanings rather than my own) as much as possible 
without losing direction (Conti & O’Neill, 2007; Gillingham; 2005). The 
interview lengths varied from between 30 minutes to an hour and a half, 
depending on the willingness of the subject; two of the interviews were 
recorded with audio, while for the others I took notes either due the 
context/environment being unsuitable (e.g. background noise) or because, 
particularly once I perceived the mistrust of me, I felt recording may have had 
a negative impact on the flow of the interview and the information produced.  
2.5.3. Other Sources of Research 
Due to stop and search being highlighted in the data, and in particular the 
strong sense of anger at the police amongst rioters, I sought out individuals 
who worked in, or would have knowledge of, this subject and the impact on 
young people. I also sought out stakeholders or workers in the local 
communities – both for their local expertise, and initially for the potential to 
connect me with rioters – and individuals, with experiences of structural 
factors that were highlighted by data on the 2011 riots (e.g. education, 
unemployment, involvement with crime) with the aim of understanding their 
experiences and how these shaped them.  
The main source I gained access to in this light was the civilian stop and 
search monitoring group for the borough of Haringey.7 The group works with 
police and the public to try and understand the problems and improve how 
stop and search is carried out. One of the principle methods was a ‘know your 
rights’ campaign as a means to defusing hostility between young people and 
police either through a lack of knowledge or misinformation. I spoke to Ben 																																																								
7 I also tried to contact a similar group in south London but received no response. 
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(black, 50s), who ran the monitoring group in 2014, and I had planned to 
interview him. Instead, he invited me along to a nation wide amateur boxing 
event at which they were running a stall. The context made interviewing him 
and those present impossible, as we were located in a large hall sometimes 
with boxing matches occurring, and crowds of people wondering about. 
Nevertheless, I spent a day and half with the Ben and some other individuals 
(most significantly Aisha – a volunteer, black, female, late 40s) involved and 
managed to speak to them informally, in which we talked about issues around 
stop and search and police-public relations in Haringey, mistrust in the police 
and justice system, and the impact and consequences on those subject to 
stop and search. Ben spoke to me about some of his personal experiences, 
some related to earlier involvement in crime, but principally of being stop and 
searched which he described as having happened ‘hundreds’ of times.  
During the boxing event Ben also conducted a survey of 43 young people 
regarding whether they had been stop and searched (28 had), their 
experiences and feelings, and how they felt about the police, some of which I 
observed through Ben’s recordings and also the preliminary results of the 
survey. His experiences and knowledge were particularly useful because not 
only has he experienced stop and search personally and been involved in 
crime at an earlier age, he has also spoken to many people of all ages, 
ethnicities and genders in his role in liaising with police and running the 
monitoring group.8 
With regards to local experts I also interviewed Steve twice, a black man in 
his 50s and a central figure in the community of the Broad Water Farm estate, 
where Mark Duggan had lived and Steve had grown up. While I contacted 
Steve regarding his work and knowledge of the community over many 
decades and with young people from the estate, he also had worked with 																																																								
8 Ben also told me to talk to Mike, a police officer, stating ‘he’s one of the good ones’, 
(apparently implying that the majority were not). Mike was a police constable involved in 
organising the boxing event. While we spoke briefly about stop and search, he did not have 
much time to spare, and offered to meet up again. However, he did not respond to any further 
attempts at communication. 
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police to improve community relations, thus not only did he provide a local 
‘expert’ perspective on the impact of forms of exclusion on young people, he 
was also informed on the issues around stop and search. Although it was 
clear he was not willing to too give up much of his time, he did agree to speak 
to me and I conducted an interview in his shared office. 
Two other interviews I conducted gained through personal connections, were 
with Ned, a white male in his mid-20s, and Nick a black male in his 40s, both 
from different areas of south London which saw rioting. The initial aim of these 
was to gain an insight into experiences of education in impoverished areas 
that experienced rioting, and develop the understanding I was generating from 
the youth project. This later became a partial focus in part due to the 
necessity of including other foci that I felt were important to understanding the 
context. Nevertheless, both offered insights into the attitudes and experiences 
growing up in such areas and conditions, and both were perhaps the most 
forthcoming due to the personal connection between us.  
The insight gained from Nick was principally in his experiences of home life 
and education and how this disadvantaged him in society at large. Nick’s 
relevance to the project was principally in regards to his family’s class position 
and ‘culture’ of education and context of poverty, and how this disadvantaged 
and diminished the value of education for him and his siblings, some of which 
ended up with drug addictions and involved in crime. In turn, as a black man, 
we also spoke about his perception of police.  
Ned, who I had become acquainted with outside of the research, agreed to be 
interviewed on his experiences of secondary school, which he had mentioned 
to me before.9  The interview was particularly relevant, albeit not for the 
reasons I had expected. Ned comes from a middle-class background but 																																																								9	Perhaps because of our personal connection and openness with me, Ned gave a far more 
nuanced, but similar, account than I had achieved in other interviews broaching the same 
topic. Through his descriptions and reminiscing of his school experiences and descriptions of 
the social ‘code’ and worldviews, he revealed a context in which problems with the police and 
rejection of law emerge, and how breaking the law became part of his everyday existence 
and social structure. Apart from reinforcing the relevance of exclusion through education, his 
account fed into the developing theorisation that many young people experiencing social and 
economic exclusion were shifting away from the values and norms of legitimated society, and 
developing forms of capital that opposed the law and valorised conflict with the police. 
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attended a poorly performing school, where many of the students lived on 
poor estates. My aim had been to speak to him about his relative lack of 
success in the education system and the problems of the school, however, 
what emerged developed and complimented what I had learnt from the youth 
project. The school, rather than enabling and encouraging students to 
participate in legitimate society, appears to have contributed to the 
development of a ‘criminal’ set of values and practises which encouraged and 
saw opposition to the police as a means of gaining status. I also made a 
freedom of information request for Ofsted reports on the school in order to 
corroborate and back up his account of the situation and context at the 
school. 
In order to add greater depth to understanding and due to the 
reconceptualization of riot analyses, I also examine the 1980s riots through 
secondary data and research. I also consider rioting and the social context or 
structural conditions in the 1980s, not least because many areas of the 2011 
riots, including the two focal points of my research (Haringey and Hackney), 
also saw rioting in this period. Sahlins (1994) argues for the value of historical 
ethnographies; these can synthesise field experiences with the history of the 
community, revealing continuity, change, and the relation between worldviews 
or logics of meaning, and macrostructural factors.  
 
4.5. Conclusion 
The focus on the police as a target of violence in 2011 emerged from the 
multiple methods of gathering data, 10  which developed in tandem and 
complimented each other, strengthening emerging themes or foci for 
investigation. In turn, these also began to reveal the problem with the concept 
of the riot and trying to explain what occurred without embedding action in the 
social order. Each of these methodological approaches function together 
through a theoretical perspective in which the situational dynamics and 																																																								
10 Statistics and research on the riots, video footage of the same, interviews and participant 
observation, as well as my understanding of the perception of police developed through living 
in north London. 
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choices (captured by video footage and data) becomes manifest through 
structural forces (captured by the data and ethnographic research). 
The methodology and framing seeks to deploy the situations of the riots to 
generate a contextualised picture of the social/structural processes and 
practises related to the symbolic and normative views of and around police 
and law outside of the events of 2011. In part, this approach evolved from the 
necessity and difficulties created by the lack of access to rioters, but also 
because the broader social context began to emerge as a causally relevant to 
attacking the police. I have sought to show that by utilising the data and 
available research on the 2011 and 1980s riots, in conjunction with an 
analysis of aspects of the rioting as it occurred through video footage, we can 
understand the situation of the riots as resistance emerging from and to the 
social order.  
A final note is that what I argue must be taken with the awareness that this 
cannot explain the ‘the riots’ or ‘the rioters’. Firstly, the thesis focuses on one 
particular act, attacking the police; secondly, there may be other structural 
factors involved not highlighted by the data on 2011, or excluded due to 
scope, and that the aspects that are considered may interact with these other 
processes and impact differentially on those involved. Thirdly, no project can 
account for the individual specificity of each rioter and how this shapes 
personal experiences and shapes choice. Consequently, the thesis and 
methodological approach should be acknowledged as developing a fuller and 
more nuanced context with which to understand the aspect of attacking the 
police, and how such an act could become plausible and desirable given the 
‘opportunity’.  
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3. Riots or Rioting? 
 
Riots, along with other forms of social unrest, are dramatic, traumatic, and 
often surprising occurrences, occurring with relative frequency throughout 
human history. Consequently, rioting has been subject to much discussion 
and analysis throughout the years. Generally speaking, however, until the 
latter half of the last century explanations of them have tended to come from, 
and reflect the position of the dominant powers of whichever society they took 
place in (Bagguley and Hussain. 2008). In other words, riots were explained 
principally through the ‘pathologies’ of the poor or the ‘mob’ mentality (e.g. Le 
Bon, 1996). The shift has come as academic analyses have become 
increasingly more complex and distanced from the subjective positions of 
power holders. 
This is not to say that these explanations have disappeared however, rather, 
now these explanations or acts of labelling tend to come from mainstream 
media and politicians. Nevertheless, issues remain within academic theories 
of riots. To generalise, these issues either conceptualise riots as a single 
event or the crowd as a single actor, or fall back to a form of socio-economic 
determinism (Newburn et al(a)., 2016: 2).  
The aim in this chapter is to discuss riot theories, and their usefulness and 
problems with regards to approaching analysis of such events, and in turn to 
locate the approach taken here within the literature. The discussion of 
theories of riot and crowd violence will then move, taking the same general 
themes, into the events and accounts of rioting in 2011. In particular, I will aim 
to show how conceptualising events as a singular ‘riot’ is problematic; and 
that we also need to go deeper than many approaches attempt, to look at the 
generation of dispositions, or preferences, values, and logics, in order to 
understand how the choice to attack the police was made.  
3.1 Theorising a Riot 
One of fundamental problems with analysing the series of events that 
constitute a riot, is that of ‘the crowd’. Bagguley and Hussain (2008: 12) 
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distinguish between objectification, as a process through which groups can 
construct, and treat as real, imaginary identities and boundaries; and 
reification where a group is thought to, and treated as having characteristics 
which do not belong to it. Groups may talk as if there is a consensus, and that 
all ‘members’ belong, but the reality that exists, and that should be the focus 
of analysis, is the processes through which individuals come to engage in 
collective action. To do otherwise, and treat the objectification as truth, is to 
reify the crowd, and naturalise the apparent coherence of identity and 
narrative (ibid.). In terms of analysis, the effect is to produce a singular 
narrative of what happened and why, when the events, actions and individuals 
being described are much less clear or coherent.  
Further problems arise with the search for simple or singular explanations. 
According to Horowitz (2002) analysts theorising violence have 
problematically tended to explain the event by employing categorisations that 
focus on the manner in which disorder is manifested. In the case of collective 
violence, doing so can assume a homogeneous event and, in the case of the 
2011 riots, would miss the behaviours which cut across these boundaries.  
When we look beyond singular definitions we tend to find the actions involved 
in the rioting tends to be different, involving differing motivations amongst 
participants, and varied or random target-selection including violence directed 
against groups, institutions, property, or a mixture of these. Consequently, 
when looking at the literature on rioting, we also tend to end up with very 
different explanatory theories of analysis allowing for multiple, and sometimes 
contrary, interpretations of the same events.  
3.1.1 The Simple Riot 
One novel approach to analysing violence of all types, rather than riots or 
crowd violence alone, comes from Randal Collins (2008). Collins proposes 
that we can understand the emergence and form of violence through the 
situational dynamics alone, arguing that violence pushes against our natural 
tendency to find solidarity and belonging. For violence to occur then, 
something must overcome this threshold inhibiting violence, and this is found 
in the situational dynamics. Collins proposes a number of situational pathways 
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that ultimately enable one side to become emotionally dominant, and the 
other submissive, thus, in an asymmetric sense, achieving a form of solidarity 
and enabling violence to occur. 
They method of analysis utilises video footage, amongst other forms of data, 
to reconstruct the situational dynamics through the actions taken, and 
emotions and expressions displayed, with the aim of identifying and mapping 
out the dynamics of the situation. However, despite this useful methodology, 
the theoretical issues and framing is problematic. Collins argues that humans 
are hard-wired to avoid violence, and thus in all but a few cases (e.g. 
professional killers) the individual’s background, and relations with the target 
are dismissed as irrelevant, or at best, setting up the situation.  
Apart from the failure to consider large amounts of research into violence that 
reveals the importance of individual experiences (e.g. Gilligan 2003; 
Palishkar, 2005), or the consideration of emotions as something that 
references past experiences, and prompt future actions (e.g. Damasio & 
Damasio, 2006; Honneth, 1995; Merleau-Ponty, 2005; Scheff, 2000), is that 
ultimately Collins (2008: 136) falls back on the same linear, causal logic that 
Cameron employs. He argues, for instance, that because all people in poverty 
do not commit violence, then it cannot be a cause of violence. Of course, what 
matter is not ‘poverty’, but how poverty translates and interacts with other 
factors to become an experience. 
Hobsbawm and Rude’s (1970) approach might be thought of as the opposite 
to the depoliticising narratives of politicians in 2011. The authors frame riots 
as political action seeking redress and change, a mode of voting by violence, 
so to speak. While of course, some examples of collective violence may 
adhere to this theory, such as the UK miners’ strikes in the 1980s, or their 
analysis of rural discontent in the 1830s, it does not consider that many riots 
never articulate political goals or complaints (Waddington, 2003).  
Arguably, all riots are political in the sense that they stem from socio-political 
conditions (Reicher & Stott, 2011; Younge, 2011), but this does not 
necessitate that they are political action or seek forms of redress. Putting 
political action where it is not, cannot be conducive to effective and 
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informative analysis because it subsumes relevant causal factors in explaining 
behaviour. This is because in its connection to action, ‘political’ is not an 
explanatory concept, but perhaps implicitly justifies it. Thus, rather than being 
able to counter naïve discourses of ‘criminality’ or ‘the mob’, it operates on the 
same terms by seeking to legitimise riots through the type of action, rather 
than trying to understand the causes of action.  
The unifying concern I have with the above approaches is that each to some 
extent effectively diminishes the role and relevance of the experiences and 
subjectivities of individuals as socially embedded actors, or fits them into a 
pre-defined explanatory framework. However, similar problems emerge when 
the analyst takes the crowd, or collective behaviour, as the principle focus. 
3.1.2 Riots and the Crowd 
If one were to employ Durkheimian (1995) theory the analyst would seek to 
understand how the presence of a crowd created an increasing sense of 
mutually reinforcing effervescence. These explanations are relevant to 
explaining the momentary emergence of violence, but it is dangerous to 
consider the emotion generated by the experience of belonging and acting as 
part of a group as causal in a primary sense. This is because such a position 
cannot explain why in other group contexts riots have not occurred, and it can 
only partially explain the attraction of those not initially involved and spatially 
separated, to join the crowd and commit violence.  
Turner and Killian (1987) recognised that a crowd was not homogeneous, but 
that it may contain some degree of coordinated action. Similarly, Reicher’s 
(2001; 1996) theoretical perspective can be positioned as dealing with inter-
group conflict and social or crowd identity. However, despite criticising the 
reification and patholigisation of crowds by other theorists, these flaws to a 
lesser extent remain.  
For Reicher and Turner and Killian (1987), an individual’s identity becomes 
subsumed or shifts to the social one through a process of identification, or 
realisation of a common position, during the event, which then becomes the 
measure of behaviour (Bagguley and Hussain. 2008: 34-5). This more 
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nuanced approach allows a social identity to be understood as emerging from 
historical forms of identity that individuals share, rather than simply the crowd 
as generating group sense and action through effervescence.  
Nevertheless, while such an analysis may hit on relevant points and to some 
extent includes pre-existing norms, the overemphasis on ‘social’ identity and 
its emergence still limits the consideration of the influence of everyday norms 
and values, and in turn offers little theoretical route to understand how these 
were shaped and were involved in riotous action.  
A feeling of groupness may emerge and be important in bringing together 
different people and enabling the riot, but this does not necessitate that a 
group, and common norms and values exist. Focusing on the crowd as an 
actor not only homogenises participants, the construction of norms through 
the everyday is neglected.  
3.1.3. Moving Beyond a Riot? 
David Waddington’s ‘flash point’ model (2003) is arguably more 
comprehensive in its movement beyond the immediate violence of the riots 
and simplistic views of the crowd. For Waddington a six-level approach (2003: 
14-20) better grasps the complexity of, and interrelation between, causal 
factors of large-scale violent acts. To perform this, not only should the analyst 
seek to understand the context of the riot, but also subjectivities informed by 
external social, economic and political forces. 
Waddington’s ‘structural or macro-sociological’ level focuses on material and 
social inequalities in the larger society; thus inequalities in power and their 
affect on the subjects of study, such as the opportunities available to them for 
earning money. His ‘political or ideological’ level takes into account the 
manner in which a culturally or politically disaffected group is treated by the 
state institutions. This level could examine how the media and commentators 
represent the group, their aims, or aspirations, or how they are policed. The 
‘cultural’ level refers to the inter-subjective set of ideas and norms by which 
the group governs themselves in specific situations.  
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As Keith (1993: 81) points out, however, there lies a danger in locating 
diverse forms of collective violence under one explanatory framework 
because it risks de-emphasising the importance of, or simplifying individual 
motivations in relation to their social context. King (1995: 638-9) similarly 
criticises Waddington for separating the three levels of structural, 
political/ideological, and cultural, when in practise it is difficult to see where 
these levels end and separate. For instance, the objective inequalities of the 
structural level rely on the cultural understanding the group has of itself.  
The problem for Bagguley and Hussain (2008: 30) is that Waddington aims to 
create a theoretical framework to explain group violence through 
generalisations, and thus again assumes a homogeneous crowd. Moreover, 
they argue Waddington’s approach risks conflating what may be very different 
actions and individuals, such as football hooliganism, picket line action, and 
urban riots (ibid.). We should further note that the conflation here is not simply 
between different types of crowd action, but different types of action within 
‘the crowd’. A single explanatory framework for collective violence runs the 
risk of subsuming relevant details in the attempt produce a singular theory 
and account of events. 
Perhaps the problem is in trying to isolate the different levels without a theory 
of how these intersect in individual experience to generate subjectivity, as the 
messy reality will always involve a complex interaction. Thus while 
Waddington perhaps provides a comprehensive approach to analysing ‘riots’, 
his structuring of analysis assumes that we know that there is a ‘group’, a 
consensus of ideas, actions, and history as well as, for the project here, 
placing too much emphasis on the immediate circumstances that triggered the 
riot. 
Similarly, focusing on ‘ethnic’ riots, Horowitz represents a sociological and 
psychological perspective on rioting. His aim is to provide a systematically 
theorized approach to ethnic riots, discussing the factors involved in shaping 
group violence such as the social boundaries and identities which delimit the 
behaviour of rioting for a particular group. For instance, Horowitz notes how in 
every ethnic riot there is target selection. To explain these selections Horowitz 
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examines ‘target choice’ (2002: 5): A choice is perceived as ‘natural’ to the 
attackers, meaning there is reason to attack one group. The nature of the 
choice is suggestive of the reasons for violence, for instance, pre-existing 
racial prejudices: “The ethnic riot thus provides clues, not only to the character 
of violence, but to the substance of group relations.” (Horowitz. 2002: 8).  
Problematically riots may not hold easily definable groups. Horowitz’ mode of 
analysis focuses primarily on the acts of violence occurring between two or 
more pre-existing groups; and although he does not reify group identity, the 
nature of his focus means he does not articulate how to explore in depth, 
conditions, relations, and perspectives which shape subjectivity outside of 
groups or riots.  
 3.1.4. Resistance and the Social Order 
Another approach incorporating crowd behaviour, relative deprivation, group 
immersion and frustration-aggression theories is that of Smelser’s (1962) 
Theory of Collective Behaviour. Smelser argues that riots are the result of 
‘social strain’ felt by disaffected groups, causing disruption and deviant 
behaviour within an integrated and self-balancing order that is society. Moving 
past the problems focusing on the immediate and situational factors of 
collective action, Smelser’s structural-functionalist approach usefully argues 
for the examination of norms and values of individual participants allowing for 
a fuller understanding of how the intersection of conditions and dispositions to 
act enabled the collective violence to occur.  
However, while this approach certainly moves beyond single-cause 
explanations and appears looks deeper at the subjectivities of the rioters, it 
ultimately fails because it adheres to certain assumptions. One, for instance, 
is that riots are irrational and deviant action within a society conceived as a 
single entity and encompassing all people within its defined boundaries. The 
problematic assumption of an enclosed social order may have meant theorists 
have rejected Smelser’s idea in favour of the more isolated view of riots. 
However, the problem with Smelser’s (1962) conceptualisation was not that 
he sought to understand instances of violence within or in relation to the social 
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order. Instead, it was that he first assumed this social order was enclosed and 
self-balancing, and secondly, he viewed that order from his position of power, 
leading to the notion that riots were aberrations and outbursts. What is 
excluded by these assumptions is that the power relations of the social order 
might be the cause, and the rioting the response to this. Indeed, the very idea 
of a riot suggests not an aberration, but a revelation that the social order is 
failing to self-balance. Moreover, taken from the position of power, Smelser 
also neglects that riot participants might feel his social order as alien and 
repressive.  
Indeed, Engels’ (2005) notion of rebellion highlights an aspect that Smelser 
neglects. For Engels, resistance relates to the form of consciousness in 
whose rebelling; the working class were not part of the social order as 
Smelser would have it, but exploited by it. Engels highlights the differences in 
rebellion by arguing that those engaged in crime were resisting society, but 
lacked the collective consciousness or identity of the working class, enabling 
them to unite. Rather than irrational action in a unified society, rioting is 
shaped by the identities of those resisting and the socio-economic relations 
that underpin them. 
Ferrell (2001), while not explicitly discussing riots, examines forms of anarchic 
resistance, from the Wobblies to graffiti, as responses to the regulation of 
social and public life, inhibiting the creative potential of individuals. Ferrell’s 
analysis points us to two important considerations in rioting; on the one hand, 
how forms of power, or government regulation, are shaping the experience of 
individuals and prompting resistance. On the other, Ferrell importantly notes 
acts of destruction are in themselves creative, and respond to the repression 
and inhibition of creativity. Thus, unlike theories of riots, Ferrell points us to 
how acts of resistance can only be understood as an aspect of relations that 
exceed the moment of violence, and how the violence itself is not mindless 
destruction but an attempt at reorganisation of the social life. 
Merton (1938) and later Cloward and Ohlin, (1969) also considered strain in 
society, albeit not related specifically to riots. These ‘anomie’ theories argued 
that rather than part of the social order, criminal or delinquent subcultures in 
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which the norms of the social order are rejected, develop in response to strain 
within the order. This strain is created by discrepancies between aspirations 
and the means to achieve these, and thus tends to emerge in lower class, 
urban areas. While there is merit to this approach, it makes misleading 
assumptions, in particular that . 
Agnew (2012) criticises these anomie approaches for assuming the lower 
classes have middle class aspirations. Agnew argues that it is not a mismatch 
between aspirations and possibilities that generates delinquent behaviour, but 
the inability to avoid ‘painful or aversive conditions’ (ibid: 33-6). Thus, relevant 
factors are parental rejection or neglect, negative relations with teachers, 
discrimination and victimisation. Agnew thus takes an important step to 
connecting social structure with forms of resistance to it by moving beyond 
blunt assumptions of and about social class, to understand how types of 
repeated and patterned experiences generate anger. 
3.1.5. Cultural Criminology, Historical Sociology, and Riots 
The approaches of anomie or the similar cultural criminology approaches, 
tend not to focus on rioting, although they can be utilised. Lea and Young 
(1982) are worth mentioning for their analysis of riots in 1981. The authors’ 
develop the position that poverty, political and cultural marginalisation, and 
economic and social exclusion led to cultures of despair, alienation, anger, 
and increasing crime in black communities.  
This facilitated the stigmatisation of these communities as ‘criminal’ and 
dangerous, resulting in oppressive and discriminatory over-policing, and a 
collapse of consensus policing. The authors argue this lead to a vicious cycle 
as one reinforced the other, before erupting in to rioting through particular 
events, such as the oppressive and discriminatory stop and search operation, 
‘Swamp 81’ (ibid, 18-9). 
However, while Agnew (2012) takes a significant step forward by identifying 
the production of anger, the theoretical development is lacking. Similarly, Lea 
and Young also do not adequately bridge the gap between structure and 
agency. Ray (2014) however, usefully incorporates the notion of shame, and 
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through this anger at a sense of mistreatment. In turn, Ray argues shame and 
anger need to be turned into action; thus he draws on the notion 
performativity. Here violence becomes a way of performing shame and anger 
generated through norms and power relations within society. 
Keith’s (1993) historical sociology looking at the riots in the 1980s argues for a 
focus on the trigger incident as symbolically important in the pre-existing 
relations between communities and police, and the spaces in which these 
occur. Keith also describes rioting as moments of ‘spontaneous rationality’ 
(1993:185), or a sudden escalation of relations and practices that exist 
outside of the events. Thus while Keith considers evidence pertaining to the 
riots of the 1980s, he does this in order to identify and further research causal 
relations, practices, and values located in the prior experiences of rioters.  
Keith performs one of the most insightful ethnographies with regards to the 
1980s riots, and his argument for the emergence of behaviours out of the 
social context is convincing. However, while Keith’s approach significantly 
informs the one taken here, his focus is principally on relations between the 
police and the black communities from which the riots emerged. 
Problematically, Keith dismisses the value of cultural criminology approaches, 
arguing that these approaches homogenise and stigmatise black 
communities, and thus neglects the role of relations between the excluded 
and the social order.  
In a similar vein, Bagguley and Hussain (2008: 28) criticise Lea and Young for 
pathologising certain localities and their inhabitants by focusing on ‘street-
culture’ and ‘criminality’. However, while it Lea and Young may homogenise 
rioters, Bagguley and Hussain reject their argument altogether based, in part, 
on the normative term of ‘criminality’.  
As we have seen with Agnew (2012) and Ferrell (2001), transgressive 
behaviours are responses to the practice of power, and thus a failure in 
society itself. Rioting is a transgressive forms of behaviour, thus the aim 
becomes to understand how behaviours emerge that require or valorise the 
transgression of another set of rules enforced by those in power, or indeed, 
prompt the use of violence towards those representatives of power. 
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Rather than criminalising, or expressing a ‘breakdown’ of culture, we seek to 
understand the generation of resistance, connected and responding to larger 
political and economic relations. In this sense, I would argue that Lea and 
Young (1982) are pointing to how the social order is producing its own failure 
to maintain itself, particularly through policing and political, social, and 
economic marginalisation. In other words, they are not ‘blaming’ or ‘othering’ 
young black men, but politicising conceptualisations of ‘criminality’ that seek 
to frame individuals as being morally pathological. 
Nevertheless, the criticisms also have some relevance in that there is the 
tendency to generalise across communities and assume criminal resistance is 
what underpins the rioting While I believe the basic focus on cultural 
responses to forms of exclusion is worthwhile, there appears little effort to 
understand how this differentially impacts and shapes those marginalised, 
and the subsequent translation into different choices and actions. With 
regards to understanding unrest, this results in the simplification of explaining 
‘the riots’ through ‘criminality’, albeit removed of its stigmatising and moral 
condemnation.  
Despite what I would see as the partially flawed criticism of Lea and Young, 
Bagguley and Hussain (2008) do, along with Keith, provide one of the most 
nuanced approach to explaining riots. Examining the Bradford riots in 2001, 
they argue against creating a general theory or model of crowd behaviour to 
avoid reification or participants and events, simplification, and 
decontextualizing motivations. Instead the authors argue for placing violent 
disorder in its social and historical context, before moving on to examine the 
rioting in complex ways, creating questions from the empirical data available. 
To do this they argue for examining riots in the context of what preceded and 
proceeded events (ibid: 177). They argue that riots are contested events, and 
consequently exploring them only in terms of what participants state 
happened is problematic as it relies on subjective assertions and 
interpretations of events, particularly so when one tries to impose a single 
coherent narrative on events. 
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While I think that Bagguley and Hussain provide a viable, and certainly more 
effective approach than most discussed above, arguably neither Keith (1993), 
or Bagguley and Hussain (2008) attempt to go deep enough and to explore 
the production of everyday subjectivity outside of the rioting to be analysed, 
and thus cannot provide detailed accounts of the translation of social context 
or structure into action.  
While these approaches explore the choices made by riot participants, they 
do not explicitly investigate how the broader practices and experiences of 
participants have shaped the construction of agency as cultural criminology 
does. This is particularly noticeable when Bagguley and Hussain (ibid: 176) 
locate explanation for some actions in ‘short term opportunities’, but do not 
theorise what constituted that possibility as a relevant or desirable 
‘opportunity’.  
Perhaps this is the reason Bagguley and Hussain assume ‘criminalisation’, 
rather than explanation, when considering Lea and Young’s argument; 
because they partially fail to recognise the historical framing of the choice in 
socio-culturally generated values and logics. Indeed, only Ray (2014), 
adequately grasps the connection between structure and agency through his 
incorporation of shame, anger, and the logic of expression, enabling the 
translation of structure into agency and the avoidance of the pitfalls of ‘the 
riot’. 
3.2. The 2011 Riots 
Now that we have begun to locate our approach to resistance rather than 
riots, we can begin to look how the actions of 2011 have been understood. 
The point here is to explore how the riots have been explained both in the 
media, political, and academic commentary and analysis. In arguing for what 
has been lacking in these explanations, I will also seek to justify and further 
develop my particular approach. 
3.2.1. The Social Media Riot? 
Regarding the events of 2011, much was made of social media, in particular, 
Blackberry messenger, as an important factor in explaining the riots (e.g. 
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MailOnline, 2011; The Economist, 2011). While such sources can shed light 
on events (i.e. video footage posted online which will be utilised here), 
arguably, social media’s involvement represents nothing fundamentally new to 
riots, nor causally relevant.  
For instance, the similarities between the 1980s and 2011 riots are striking, 
the only difference is the speed of transmission facilitated by technology. As 
Waddington explains, three months after the 1981 riots in Brixton, “the 
Toxteth (Liverpool) riot of 3–6 July broke out. One day later, Manchester’s 
Moss Side erupted and there were disturbances in Handsworth, Birmingham 
and dozens of other British towns and cities” (2003: 80). The cause of these 
outbreaks was related to the common underlying conditions, discontent, and 
the dispositions these produced; whereas the ability to communicate (i.e. 
newspaper and news coverage) only allowed these common feelings to be 
perceived, activating already learnt dispositions, and perhaps encouraged 
violent action by making it seem possible.  
Regarding social media then, the relevant difference between rioting in 1957, 
the 1980s, and 2011 was not in its causal role, but only in the speed and 
scale of transmission. Communication is not only always present in rioting or 
any collective action (albeit in different forms), it is a necessary function as a 
means of it spreading. Yet it is not related to the causes, or the factors that 
allow rioting to occur other than in an immediate, enabling sense.  
3.2.2. Apolitical Riots and Criminality 
The events of early August 2011 took much of the UK by surprise. What 
seemed to cause the alarm was the apparent arbitrary nature of the violence 
and ‘greedy’ looting performed by so many (e.g. Cameron, 2011; Clarke, 
2011; Gabbat, 2011; Hastings, 2011). The media and politicians threw about 
terms such as ‘thugs’, ‘feral’, and ‘underclass’. While further explanations 
were proffered, for instance, the rioters were largely members of violent 
‘gangs’ (Samuel, 2011) this was soon challenged by statistical information on 
arrestees revealing a relatively small involvement of gang members (THO, 
2011: 18). 
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Similar accounts from academics have also emerged. Carroll (2012) provides 
a marginally more complex version of the above thesis, arguing that the riots 
are the result of a ‘spoilt brat mentality’. Apart from the clearly derogatory 
tone, lack of any substantial evidence, and the homogenising generalisation, 
arguing that the welfare state is the single or primary cause of the behaviours 
seen, is problematic to say the least. To highlight the issue with this 
perspective we might simply ask, what about those rioters who were 
employed or in education?  
To assume that one factor defines a culture, or that there is one culture, 
excludes the myriad of issues faced by areas of poverty and how these affect 
those subject to them. The general implication of these positions is that the 
only possible cause for this ‘underclass’ and the greed and aggressiveness 
‘displayed’ are bad parenting, liberalism and its lack of discipline and 
responsibility, and soft punitive responses to crime in general (Allen & Taylor, 
2012). Of course, it might be asked, ‘if the parents are to blame, then who is 
to blame for them?’ and ad infinitum. Or similarly, if it was simple ‘criminality’, 
then should we not look at the societal relations that produced so much of it?  
The coverage largely sought to tell a particular narrative of ‘moral collapse’ of 
parts of society, leading some to argue for punitive solutions as a preventative 
measure for this moral failure (e.g. Shipman & Walker, 2011). Rather than 
proffering any realistic solutions based on the conditions and context that 
people might face, this position assumes punishment alone will alter 
behaviour because the problem is one of individual morality.  
The reasons for this are up for debate. Tyler (2013) argues that the 
demonization of the rioters was employed to further a neoliberal economic 
agenda; Pearson (2012) situates the moral panic over the 2011 riots within a 
context of historical amnesia and cultural pessimism over youth behaviour. 
While for Wacquant (2010: 46) such discourses aim to depoliticise events by 
shifting attention away from the historical and cultural experiences of 
ghettoization, to the ‘pathologies’ of the participants.  
Regardless of the motive, what is excluded is the possibility that there is any 
dysfunction within the claimed social order or status quo, or that the rioters 
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held to different value-systems, and that these might have resulted from the 
manner in which the ‘social order’ – taken simply as the norms of behaviour, 
modes of practise, doxic ideas of success, and values – is constituted.  
Indeed, it is worth briefly deconstructing the concept of criminality here. 
Adapting Marx’s (1990) economic argument, that any social order must be 
able to reproduce the conditions of production, enables us to understand the 
role of the discourse of ‘criminality’. This term, as with any form of moral 
condemnation, functions as a normative mechanism of the task of social 
reproduction, a category of practise that aims to condemn and in doing so 
produce shame in those who think to transgress the social order’s rules.  
However, if it employed as it was in 2011, ‘criminality’ likely only serves to 
reinforce the differences and problems without understanding why the events 
took place. If we empty the concept of its normative content – that is the 
subjective position of those empowered and benefiting from the rules, positing 
that the breaking of their rules as ‘bad’ – what we are left with is simply a 
willingness to transgress certain rules. For analytical purposes then, the term 
‘criminality’ is useless as it cannot explain why people are willing to break the 
law. What is required is a mode of analysing those relations which position the 
dominant social order’s rules as illegitimate or normatively powerless; in other 
words the relations and practises that produce value systems and doxic ideas 
which oppose and enable the transgression of the social order.  
3.2.3. The Political Riot? 
Similar to Hobsbawm and Rude’s (1970) position, some argued the riots were 
an unarticulated revolution, an emotional outpouring of discontent (e.g. 
Penny, 2011; or see Ryan, 2011 for discussion). This argument posits that the 
rioters wanted change but did not have the knowledge and understanding to 
articulate their complaints and organise political action. Given the spark for 
the riots occurred during a protest march over the shooting of, what was 
popularly interpreted as, a ‘black’ man by police, this argument seems to have 
some credibility. 
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Indeed, many rioters, when asked, stated they were discontent and angry with 
the police, fed up with the lack of opportunities, and sourced the recent cuts 
as relevant to discontent (Guardian & LSE, 2011). Furthermore, Reading the 
Riots provided data showing that the majority of participants were from 
impoverished areas (Datablog, 2011). However, to employ this data to argue 
for a single meaning of the riots, or as a direct explanation, homogenises and 
over simplifies events.  
Yet, even if we ignore the problems with homogenisation, the actions of 
rioters do not easily fit into ‘political action’. To make this point we should 
simply note that the attacks on the police appeared to have no larger aim. 
Moreover, the riots did not always hold to the pattern of violence against 
police, as across the country 51% of crimes recorded were against 
commercial premises (THO, 2011: 4).  
Problematically, the political action perspectives seem to argue on the basis 
of what observers would have liked 2011 to be, and ignore the significant 
amount of people acquiring goods, the targeting of local shops and, albeit a 
small amount, members of the public. Moreover, as we have noted, this 
position engages in a game of legitimation with ‘criminality’, and does not 
seek to analyse.  
In contrast to those that sought to either politicise or depoliticise, there were 
voices providing a more nuanced perspective. Journalist Gary Younge (2011) 
argued the riots were Political, but not because there was a coherent political 
goal, rather simply that: “When a group of people join forces to flout both law 
and social convention, they are acting politically”. Reicher & Stott put this 
another way: “riots are political in the sense that they both reflect and 
reorganize power relations between groups in the societies in which they 
materialize.” (2011: 45%).  
Rather than utilising the political-criminal dichotomy, the argument here is 
predicated on the view that regardless of whether riot participants had political 
points or desired change, they stem from socio-political conditions and it is 
these that require investigation. So while we must consider the political 
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elements, we should not make the mistake of those who assume that political 
change was a desired, albeit unarticulated, goal.  
3.2.4. The Consumer Riot? 
Moving towards a more academic front, some early responses positioned the 
riots as consumerist outbursts (e.g. Moxon, 2011; Sumner, 2012; Zizek 2011). 
Zygmut Bauman (2011) argued that rioters were consumerism’s ‘have-nots’, 
inculcated into the desires for the latest goods and brands, believing that 
through these objects they can achieve dignity and meaning. However, this 
possibility of generating life-meaning is denied to them through economic 
exclusion. Consequently, they took the opportunity to rectify their exclusion 
when the police were perceived as having lost their ability to control.  
Moxon (2011) argues for avoiding assumptions about who the rioters are and 
why they acted, by examining the acts of commonly witnessed moments of 
the riots. While in principle Moxon’s break down of the riots into themes – the 
initial moment of the riot in response to the trigger, the acquisitive moment, 
and nihilistic moment of destruction – are a step forward in dealing with the 
complexity of the events of 2011, they do have problems.  
Indeed, if we are to avoid assumptions then beginning with ‘nihilistic’ seems 
contradictory to say the least. Furthermore, within this category there is no 
distinction between violence against police or state representatives and that 
directed at private actors. Violence against police appears located, for Moxon, 
in the initial moment, or the shift from protest to riot, however, this makes 
assumptions of its own because violence against the police continued far 
beyond the start of the rioting in Tottenham, and thus contradicts his 
assertions of a largely consumer riot. Perhaps then it is better then to look at 
violence against police as an act in its own right. 
A better developed and evidence based argument for a consumerist riot 
comes from Treadwell, Briggs, Winlow and Hall (2013). Operating during the 
riots in London and Birmingham the authors managed to speak to over 30 
male rioters of varying ages, as well as managing to generate follow up 
interviews and spend time with rioters post event (ibid: 3-4). The authors 
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forward that for the rioters they spoke too, revenge against the police was a 
secondary reason, if not an excuse, for the primary motivation of self-gain.  
Rather than enact political goals, or express political discontent, the 
temporary absence of order created by the rioting was utilised to collect 
consumer goods. But the point Treadwell et al. make is not that the consumer 
motive was simply the primary one, rather that the symbolic consumer 
ideology provided the totalising frame for action (ibid). At the same time, 
economically excluded from the practices of the social order, crime becomes 
a mode of achieving this self-improvement, and from the very beginning, the 
framework of choice inhibits the possibility of political action or complaint. 
While their argument is compelling and has explanatory significance, it may 
not be representative, especially given the origins of the riots and the attacks 
on police that followed. Furthermore, what Treadwell et al. (2013) do not 
account for are the structural and social conditions outside of consumerism on 
their research subjects’ perspectives, and how exclusion and alienation may 
result in the police constituting what Wacquant calls “the last ‘buffer’ between 
them and a society that rejects them, and which they therefore view as ‘the 
enemy’” (2010: 33). Consequently, what is ignored is how other relations or 
conditions may have influenced rioters’ actions to the point where attacking 
the police and breaking the law was deemed acceptable, or even offered 
another means of social improvement.  
Larry Ray (2014) provides the most developed take on the consumer riot 
perspective, largely avoiding the flaws discussed above. By focusing down on 
shame produced through social and economic exclusion in a consumer 
society, Ray argues that the looting was a performative moment. While 
consumers took goods as a form of consumer practice, the utilisation of 
shame and anger enables Ray to avoid the constraining embrace of a 
‘consumer riot’, and argue that rioters were performing confrontations with 
authorities that rejected and shamed them. Thus, while Ray’s focus is on 
looting, he provides a nuanced take that avoids dismissing aspects of the 
rioting that do not fit simply within the framework of material gain.  
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3.2.5. Attacking Authority: Overcoming Assumptions of Consumption 
Sociological critiques of consumerist explanations can also be enlightening 
here, not least because they complicate single or homogenising explanations. 
Platts-Fowler (2013) employs statistical data to challenge the consumerist riot 
theory, arguing that while some may have got involved for material gain, a 
significant number of other factors and evidence needs to be considered. In 
seeking to understand the social unrest, we need to consider how cuts to 
welfare, youth initiative funding, economic conditions and large amounts of 
unemployment, likely to have driven involvement, and also that the nature of 
the policing during and at the beginning of the riots likely became symbolically 
important in relation to previous experiences of policing.  
Furthermore, Platts-Fowler notes how ‘looting’ is a pejorative terms which 
conflates numerous different types of activities, which include material gain, 
and, as Ray (2014) also argues, expressions of power over authorities. 
Similarly, McDonald (2012: 20) argues that we see different aspects amongst 
the looting in 2011, from instigators who are prepared to smash windows, to 
those that follow, and also styles of acquiring goods, while Harding (2012) 
argues that some of the acquisitive acts in 2011 were symbolic, aimed 
particularly at gaining reputation on the street. Thus while looting and 
consumerism are clearly relevant, we should not use this to label the riots as 
simply ‘consumerist’. 
Reading the Riots (2011) provided the greatest breadth in analysis of the 
events of 2011. Conducted as a joint study between LSE and the Guardian 
newspaper, the study sought to generate an expansive account of what 
occurred during the riots, and at a speed that would ‘maximize’ the effect of 
the research on public and political debate (ibid: 2). Speaking to 270 rioters, 
combining qualitative interviews with statistical accounts, the study argued for 
both the influence of consumer ideology, discontent and anger at police and 
government, and simple opportunism, thus providing evidence that questions 
explanations of the riots through a consumer/political dichotomy.  
However, the manner of qualitative investigation arguably did not move 
beyond reporting what the rioters stated, and thus may be vulnerable to 
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Zizek’s (2011) earlier criticism where rioters justify their actions, post-hoc. The 
study also, therefore, failed to really draw conclusions, beyond such factors as 
mistreatment by police and economic exclusion, as to the production of 
motivations to riot and the relation of these to larger systemic relations.  
Having said this, Newburn, Deacon, Diski, Cooper, Grant, & Burch (2016 (a) 
& (b)) worked on the projects and through the same data, perform an 
enlightening and more theoretically grounded analysis of rioters motivations in 
academic articles. In particular they note the clear and sometimes visceral 
sense of anger directed at the police, feelings of liberation and expressions of 
empowerment in getting revenge on the police and, a broader sense of 
alienation from society. 
In addition, this evidence is largely corroborated by two other major reports on 
the 2011 riots - by the National Centre for Social Research The August Riots 
in England Understanding the Involvement of Young People (Morrell, Scott, 
McNiesh, and Webster, 2011) and 5 Days in August An Interim Report on the 
2011 English Riots, by the government commissioned Riots Communities and 
Victims Panel (RCVP, 2011) – which both argued, to differing extents, for 
connections to anger with the police, consumerism, and alienation.  
Reicher and Stott (2011) performed a broader, but more nuanced situational 
analysis than Collins (2008) theory forwards. The authors brought together a 
large amount of online footage (CCTV, public recordings) of the 2011 riots, 
locating them temporally and spatially where possible. Along with other forms 
of secondary evidence, this enabled them to not only see patterns in 
chronology, but also how certain types of action developed and varied across 
areas.  
Reicher and Stott (2011: 70-72%) acknowledge that their analysis should not 
be understood as explaining the riots as a whole, but rather as examining, in 
the main, whether the discourse of criminality and opportunistic looting has 
accuracy. In contrast, they forward the rioting occurred against a background 
of recession, lack of opportunities, and discrimination. This would lead to 
increasing resentment and anger in poorer areas when coupled with 
aggressive policing.  
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In stressing that the riots were not about ‘criminality’, Reicher and Stott argue 
that factors such as police relations and lack of economic opportunities foster 
‘grievances’ that motivate the different forms of action (ibid: 74%). While I 
largely agree with this statement, it is limited in its nuance because it leans 
towards a direct form of complaint or contest, and does not consider what 
effect these relations have over time at a pre-reflexive level. Consequently, 
not only is the connection between the structure of social space and action 
assumed, ‘criminality’ is largely dismissed or put aside without a deeper 
exploration of whether, and to what extent a rejection of law was involved. 
What the following chapter seeks to do, is to develop beyond concepts of ‘the 
riot’, and to understand how the organisation of power in the social order is 
productive of agency and action. However, rioting groups together not any 
form of behaviour, but a transgressive or non-conformist act. Thus what is 
required of our theoretical approach is to explain how the social order is 
generating resistance to itself. 
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4. A Theory of Resistance 
 
4.1. Introduction  
Sociological approaches of riots have tended to offer theories that explain 
riots as a single phenomenon and often somewhat detached from the society 
in which it occurs. While these theories offer some useful aspects and 
observances, what often occurs is a reification of ‘riots’ as a thing in 
themselves, or rioters are conceptualised as a specific group defined by their 
involvement, and with a tendency to focus on how the particular spatial setting 
or temporal organisation facilitated or triggered the rioting.  
The problem with reifying riots and rioters is that it will risk confusion between 
what may be very different individuals and actions. We cannot assume that 
the attacks on the police that we seek to explore are driven by the same 
motivations as looting. Furthermore, while a focus on the immediate 
conditions may be important in explaining how the rioting emerged at that 
point or investigating how to improve responses to rioting (e.g. in policing 
tactics), they cannot explain how the choice to riot came about and made 
those particular conditions something worthy of examination. By focusing on 
the event itself, the context that makes riots meaningful and made rioting 
possible are to some extent neglected. 
Instead of attempting to explain or produce a theory of ‘riots’, these temporally 
contiguous and socially related actions should be framed as both a warning of 
problems within, and an opportunity for insight into, society. The reason for 
this is, as Marx (1996) once argued, if a society fails to reproduce the basic 
economic conditions for production, it will break down. Indeed, Merton (1938) 
made a similar point when he argued that strain within a social group will 
inhibit conformity to culturally defined goals and social norms of behaviour, 
and prompt transgressive behaviours.  
Riots are made up of transgressive acts, and thus a symptom of a social 
group’s failure to reproduce itself. This is particularly the case with regards to 
the attacks on the police, as it is these who are supposed to maintain that 
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social order. Thus what we should seek to examine is not the narrative tool – 
the reified, singular ‘riots’ – but particular types of ‘action’ as embedded in, 
and emerging from a social and historical context that we seek to understand. 
Rather than a theory of riots, we need to begin with a theory of action. Taking 
this tack, we can use the riots to better understand a particular historical point 
in society, and in doing so better understand the attacks on the police by 
situating them in the context from which they emerge.  
 4.1.1 Structure of the Chapter 
To set out the theory of action and approach we begin with the discourse or 
logic of neo-liberalism; that is the politicians’ and media’s attempt to ‘explain’ 
the rioters’ actions by neglecting the impact social structure may have and 
pathologising rioters through moral condemnation. This is then contrasted 
with the general left leaning explanations, which as Newburn et al. (2016) 
point out, may account for structure but fail to avoid issues of determinism, 
implanting structure directly into agency, and assuming that injustice equals 
political action. We then critique Keith’s (1993) conventional understanding of 
riots, noting, that while it moves avoids relying on either ‘free will’ or 
determinism, it leads him to exclude the broader social relations. 
This discussion provides a useful means of approaching the issue of structure 
and agency, and summarily demonstrates the necessity of understanding riot 
actions as emerging from their social context. Bourdieu (1985; 2003) provides 
this connection through his notion of ‘habitus’, providing us with the broad 
theoretical framework of how social structure inheres and is reproduced 
through everyday interactions. However, Bourdieu does not fully or clearly 
elaborate how social strife and contest occurs at an emotional level, leading to 
a relatively rigid social structure. This, in turn, limits the understanding of the 
development of new social structure and values and norms through a certain 
inflexibility in his conception of dispositions.  
In other words, Bourdieu gets us so far, but to understand resistance rather 
than conformity, we need to go deeper. This theory of resistance will be 
developed through a consideration of emotion, particularly shame and self-
esteem, as a mechanism through which social structure has relevance or 
	 74	
influence. In particular, Honneth’s (1995) notion of respect/disrespect provides 
the core understanding of how social resistance or struggle is produced. 
Following this I will consider the specific structural role and position of the 
police in the production of disrespect, and the manner in which this can 
connect or shape affective dispositions towards them.  
The final aspect that requires theorising is how this understanding of 
structure’s impact on dispositions translates into agency. Butler’s (2011) 
notion of performativity compliments the expressive understanding of action 
and will be incorporated into the broader theory. Performativity particularly 
lends itself to making sense of the riot actions we observe through video 
footage discussed in the methodology. We begin then, through a discussion 
of two polar, implicit theoretical positions on the 2011 riots, the free agent on 
the one hand, and structural determinism on the other. 
 
4.2 Structure versus Agency 
As discussed in the introduction, there have been two broad ways in which 
the 2011 riots were constructed as an event. On the one hand there was the 
dominant mainstream response typified by the David Cameron’s ‘criminality’ 
while on the other, more left wing perspective, was the framing of the riots as 
political, rebellion, albeit unarticulated. Dealing with the mainstream narrative 
first, we can note that Cameron (2011a; 2011b), among others, argued that 
rioters were selfish, immoral thugs. At the time, Cameron was the Prime 
Minister of a neo liberal government that justified its political reforms and 
greater shift to free market capitalism on the logic of the free, possessive 
individual (Hall, 2011). In this logic the freedom of the individual is constricted 
only through interference by other actors, and agency is viewed as 
unencumbered by ‘fantastical societal forces’ (Atkinson et al., 2012: 8). 
In other words, neoliberalism relies only on a concept of negative freedom: if a 
choice is ‘free’ it is uninfluenced by any external factors and thus, no 
examination is required because it is the individual that is the cause of the act. 
As Wacquant (2010) argues, those who utilise this logic to condemn groups of 
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individuals as ‘criminals’ or ‘underclass’, reveal more about themselves and 
their position of dominance than their subject matter. While it must be the 
individual that makes a choice, we should not assume choice is a simple 
exercise of a utopian ‘free will’. Instead, we must seek to understand how that 
choice to attack the police was made, and this requires understanding 
‘choice’, not as ‘free’, but as shaped by experience and social structure.  
Yet here care must be taken too; the less popular left wing interpretation of 
2011 was that the riots constituted a political rebellion (e.g. Penny, 2011). As 
Newburn at al. (2016) point out, these explanations assume riot actions are 
simply expressions of rioters’ sense of injustice at the system they are 
exploited by. What makes structural analyses determinist is the 
conceptualisation of the actor, which supposes stability and uniformity in 
action deriving from common forms of structure – from this perspective 
injustice equals political action. Taking from Merton, Marsh (2010) argues that 
a theory of action needs to account for the instability of action, and this can be 
achieved through understanding the subtle and nuanced ways in which a 
multitude of structural factors intersect in the individual through experience. 
Consequently, through their assumptions both perspectives leave a 
theoretical and explanatory ‘gap’ connecting structure and action. On the one 
hand the neoliberals have an assumed actor free from any external influence, 
thus the rioters are simply immoral; while on the other, the actor becomes 
only a vessel, a direct translator of the structure, and the rioters are simply 
political and just. Consequently, neither perspective can hope to adequately 
understand or resolve the issues driving the rioting, either because (for 
neoliberals) there is no explanation beyond the thuggery of the individual, or 
because the left cannot conceive of how exclusion might impact on agency 
other than to make it political. 
4.2.1 The Broader Social Context 
A more nuanced perspective that partially accounts for the gap between 
structure and action is that of Michael Keith’s (1993) analysis of the riots in the 
1980s. Utilising data on the rioting to direct enquiry, Keith mapped out the 
relations between black communities in London and the police in detail, noting 
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how these antagonistic, often hostile and violent interactions shaped the way 
many black people saw and felt about the police. This, he argues leads to a 
sense of injustice, a view of police and policing as illegitimate, and a strong 
resentment and drive to contest ‘policing’.  
However, while I value Keith’s analysis, his focus on relations between the 
black communities and the police alone means he neglects the larger social 
context of the riots which shaped those communities and the interactions with 
police. Keith (1993: 16-7) heavily criticises ‘left realist’ or anomie approaches 
to the 1981 riots in which a criminal culture is seen to develop through social 
and economic exclusion amongst black communities. He argues that there is 
no evidence for a substantially greater amount of ‘black’ criminal acts, and 
that the approach produces a ‘stereotypical’ young, black criminal.  
Problematically, Keith makes certain misleading assumptions. Firstly, 
because the focus was on black people/communities in light of the largely 
black rioters in the 1980s, this implies for Keith, that the argument of such 
approaches is that black people should commit more crime generally. 
However, the anomie or strain (e.g. Merton, 1938; Cloward & Ohlin, 1969) 
approach makes no distinction between ethnicity, other than ‘race’ as one 
mechanism of exclusion, only that if certain groups are alienated there will be 
a tendency to reject the dominant social norms of behaviour, often law.  
Furthermore, Keith assumes anomie theory seeks to explain complete 
individuals, thus arriving at a generalisation of an entire group. This may or 
may not be the case, but I would argue that what should be explored is simply 
the negative influences over the normative aspect of law and the dominant 
society’s values. One example is that of Stuart Hall and colleagues (1980: 
347) who demonstrate that, in socially and economically excluded black 
communities in the 1960s and 70s, there was a variety of dispositions towards 
the law; from those who found value through the transgression of it, to those 
who did not but empathised with others who broke it. The point they make 
was that certain structural relations were diminishing the value of law and the 
sense of belonging to society, which did not lead to a single type of actor or 
action, but there was commonality or similarity in the types of response of the 
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black community. 
Keith’s (1993) criticism means he neglects the impact of the broader social 
context, and makes the mistake of trying to understand what shaped the 
attacks on the police through interactions between the police and the black 
community alone. Due to their position in the social order, the police have a 
complex and non-linear relation to society. The police’s actions can influence 
the way people view society, and society can shape the way people view the 
police (Bradford, 2015; Loader, 2006; Wacquant, 2010). In other words, we 
must also consider how those individuals involved in attacks on the police are 
treated by other institutions linked to society, and how this shapes their 
disposition towards the police and law as part of the state apparatus or larger 
society.  
What Keith lacks is a theory of action, particularly emphasising the manner in 
which social structure interacts with affective mechanisms. Through this we 
can develop a framework to understand how larger and seemingly distinct 
social processes becomes implicated in nuanced ways in dispositions to 
attack the police, but do not determine behaviour. Thus, rather than begin with 
an approach to police-community relations and resistance, we begin with a 
theory of action before focusing down to examine how the police are tied into 
the broader social structure and implicated in the attacks upon them.  
In turn, this will enable us to historicise the construction of rioters’ choices to 
attack the police as “a social rationality that takes due stock of past 
experiences” (Wacquant, 2010: 50). In other words, what we require is a 
theory of action that accounts for the influence of structure or system, but 
rather than removing choice, understands how such factors are a part of 
choice and make choice possible. We begin then with Bourdieu, who provides 
the broad theoretical framework that counters simplistic neoliberal notions of 
the ‘free individual’ but also avoids determinism through his concept of 
‘habitus’.  
4.3. Capital as Social Structure 
Before we begin with trying to connect structure to agency, we should define 
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the terms. Agency simply means that capacity to choose and act, structure is 
more complex. Social structure can be seen as the patterned, or regular 
social arrangements, be it formalised institutions, social norms, or common 
modes of cognition and affect. Importantly, we should be careful not to reify 
structure as a thing in itself; Collins (2005: 5-6) argues that when we talk of 
the macro or largest level of social structure, we are simply abstracting and 
generalising what occurs at the micro level – the specific interactions.  
This is ultimately similar to Foucault’s conceptualisation of power: it is not 
something that exists in or above an individual, but occurs ‘only in action’ and 
influences another’s behaviour (2004: 15). In other words, structure refers to 
patterned and repeating relationships of force, exercised on individuals by 
individuals through interactions, which influences or limits their action, and 
which we, the analysts, generalise from. 
Pierre Bourdieu enables us to theorise and incorporate how these forms of 
interaction creates the basis of agency, by constructing values, modes of 
perception, and forms of behaviour. In particular here, will help us begin to 
theorise how a violent opposition to the police might emerge through 
acceptable or valued forms of behaviour towards them. Bourdieu’s concern is 
to highlight the manner in which the ‘structure of social space’ or ‘field’ (as a 
particular formation of structure) is constituted by the accepted forms of 
‘capitals’ and how these are reproduced through, in, and by the individual and 
their habitus – or sets of dispositions (Bourdieu, 2003: 19; 1985).  
Capital simply means something that an individual has and can invest for the 
sake of reward and to generate further capital. While economic capital 
(monetary or material wealth) is the commonly known form, Bourdieu 
distinguishes between types of capital (1986b). For Bourdieu there are two 
further principle types of capital: ‘cultural’ and ‘social’.  
Each of these refers to less physically tangible means of ‘production’; social 
capital is less relevant to the thesis but refers to the connections an individual 
or group may have and be able to draw upon in the pursuit of her goals (i.e. 
forming networks of contacts who can do favours, create opportunities, and so 
forth) (Bourdieu, 1986b: 248). Cultural capital refers to objects and practises 
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that are socially valued by particular groupings or classes of individuals, and 
thus an individual’s investment in accumulating cultural capital (i.e. gaining 
educational qualifications and knowledge) provides social rewards, such as 
status. It is this form that relates most closely to the issue of choice. 
One of Bourdieu’s (1986a) famous examples is how being part of particular 
social class shapes what actions/objects you see as valuable and therefore to 
be displayed or enacted. For instance, an object (a fine wine) can display 
status and position within the group, but so can a practise utilising this object 
(display of knowledge or appreciation of fine wine). An actor who invests in 
learning or appropriating knowledge of the object and how to display it is 
rewarded when they do so by the social esteem or respect of her peers. As 
this suggests, capitals function symbolically because it is what the practise or 
object means to those observing that defines whether the individual will gain 
in social standing.  
It is the distribution and types of capital that define the ‘immanent structure’ of 
the social worlds we inhabit (Bourdieu, 1986b: 242). Another way of talking 
about the ‘immanent structure’ is through the concept of ‘social space’, or a 
‘field’ as a specific and delimited occurrence of this. A field can be understood 
as analogous to a geographical space, but rather than physical distance 
between objects as the manner of differentiation, it is the social features – the 
forms and distribution of capitals – of each individual’s position which mark 
out the difference or characterise the positions and thus the structure of a field 
(Bourdieu, 2000: 134; 2003: 6). 
 4.3.1. The Field and Habitus 
The concept of field provides a way of examining structure, but as part of 
agency and action. The concept posits a relational social world through 
conceptualising a series of objective, interconnected positions occupied by 
individuals (Bourdieu, 1985: 16-18; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 2005: 97). These 
positions are determined by the amount and type of capital each individual 
has in relation to others and the valued forms of capital in that specific field. In 
other words, the amount and forms of capital an individual has within that 
specific social field or structure determines, in the first instance, what those in 
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each type of position are capable of doing and the rewards, or lack thereof, 
that can be gained through certain practises or displays. Just as economic 
capital is valued through its function within a market, so cultural capital is 
valued through educational, political, and social systems (Bourdieu, 1986b: 
242).  
A field therefore, firstly determines a class of individuals, not in a Marxist 
sense of a unified class or the alternative false consciousness, but as a 
grouping of individuals who occupy and have roughly similar positions and 
opportunities. This could be the more conventional understanding, such as 
the working classes defined by their relative lack of economic capital and their 
practice of particular forms of cultural (e.g. doing ‘hard labour’) capital, or 
ethnic minorities for similar reasons.  
Why it does not presuppose class unity, or ‘group’, in the Marxist sense, or 
remove individual differentiation, is because any social space provides an 
epistemological foundation for how we understand and act within that world, 
much as with structuralism. Yet it differs from structuralism in that it cannot be 
considered separately from the concept of ‘habitus’ (Bourdieu, 1985; 2000; 
2001), which sits in a non-linear relation of production to a field, removing any 
notion of determinism. Unlike structuralism, social structure for Bourdieu is 
only ‘objective’ because it presents itself to those within it as such; it is the 
‘nature’ of reality and beyond an individual’s control, so to speak.  
By shaping the opportunities and rewards available to them, social structure 
enables certain types of habitus or class based tastes and values to be 
formed through action. In its function as a structuring force (through the 
valued forms and distribution of capitals) over what can be performed and 
achieved, and what will be valued, a field constitutes the base framing of an 
individual’s experience of what is practical or achievable, and what is socially 
valued (Bourdieu, 2001: 104). Through experiences within a field we gain an 
informational, practical, and value base to thought and action found in 
common ‘schemes of perceptions, appreciation and action’ (Bourdieu, 200: 
138). In other words, a field ‘disposes’ individuals in similar positions to certain 
forms of viewing and valuing the world, other actors, and their behaviours, 
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and subsequently shapes their understanding of how they should and want to 
act in the world.  
Dispositions that emerge as practices or tastes can, in turn, be mapped onto 
social space – i.e. football and the working class, or golf and corporate class – 
which simultaneously function symbolically, signifying one’s position in that 
social space (Atkinson, 2010: 55-6). The implication here is that it is not 
simply the possession or lack of signifying objects and ‘embodied’ dominant 
forms of capital that determines and distinguishes ‘classes’ and forms 
modalities of inclusion and exclusion. Instead, it is how this lack is interpreted 
and enacted by individuals in relation to objects, displays, or markers of that 
position. 
Each aspect of capital, habitus, and field is defined by, and exists in relation to 
the other. Just as capitals form the field that we will be confronted by, so our 
experience of the field will shape our habitus or understanding of which 
capitals are valuable, and how to utilise the forms accessible to us. In turn, 
through shaping our habitus we (re)produce those forms of capital and who 
can be included and excluded. The theory that Bourdieu forwards, moving 
past the subjective/objective or agency/structure divide, is that one’s habitus 
is the subjective appropriation of elements of the objective social structure; 
that is to say, the structure inheres in choice, or becomes part of, the 
individual through sets of ‘dispositions’ or predilections for certain behaviours 
and objects learnt through the rewards we receive, and in turn is reshaped by 
their actions.  
4.4. Developing Bourdieu 
Yet, there are three issues to be dealt with before continuing on to how 
Bourdieu helps us with the riots: firstly, and most simply, the argument here is 
interested in actions towards the police, a particular actor, rather than the 
logics of a whole habitus and field. One means of resolving this is to focus 
down on the relevant disposition towards the object of police and its 
production in a field. Nevertheless, this does requires looking beyond the 
interactions with the police, but only to understand how this interacts with the 
symbolic meaning of the object of ‘the police’. Of the two further theoretical 
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issues, the first revolves around whether Bourdieu’s theory explains the 
motivation to act or is deterministic, and the second relates to a limit in his 
theoretical conception of ‘field’. 
 4.4.1. Determinism or Predisposing Rioters? 
The issue here regards a partially flawed critique of ‘habitus’ as deterministic, 
which is worth dealing with here because it elaborates the level at which the 
habitus-field-capital nexus functions, and its validity as an approach to 
understanding the conditions of choice to attack the police. Sayer (1999: 407; 
412; 416) criticises Bourdieu for his lack of acknowledgment, or subsumption 
of intentionality, reason and reflexivity through the concepts of ‘instrumental’ 
or ‘strategic’ action and ‘distinction’. Similarly, King (2000) argues that habitus 
overemphasises ‘objective’ forces and their impact on agency, leading to a 
deterministic view of agents.  
These arguments, while arguably valid to some of Bourdieu’s explanations 
which might give too much focus to the structure, firstly miss the point that if 
we are to explain common behaviours or actions we must, to some extent, 
generalise beyond the behavioural specificity of each individual, and search 
for the context behind common forms of behaviour.  
Secondly, Sayer and King both ignore his use of the term ‘pre-reflexive’ (2000: 
99), which positions structural influences happening prior to and enabling, not 
excluding or preventing, conscious reflection or choice (Bourdieu, 1985: 13). 
In other words, these critiques miss the point that habitus is not determined 
behaviour or ‘rule’ following, but rather describes how the “oppositions 
inscribed in the social structure of the fields serve as the support for cognitive 
structures […] which make it possible to produce ethical, aesthetic or 
cognitive judgments.” (Bourdieu. 2001: 105). Or simply put, without mapping 
out the entire experiences and social structures an individual participates in, 
the exploration of dispositions can explain why an individual might choose and 
value one thing rather than another.  
In describing habitus, what Bourdieu calls a ‘feel for the game’ or similarly 
‘illusio’ refers to the implicit understanding and valuation, or a form of agency, 
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that does not require conscious calculation – although it may be utilised – in 
order to act because of “a fundamental belief in the interest of the game and 
the value of the stakes” (Bourdieu, 2000: 11; 1985: 14; 1990: 12). In other 
words, we may question our values, logics and beliefs, but often we act, even 
consciously, without examining this base. 
Importantly, the ‘feel for the game’ should not be understood as a means-end 
calculation, but rather as an expressive act achieved through the moment. 
Drawing on Dewey, Honneth (1995: 136) argues that emotions are not simply 
expressive of some inner state prior to actions, but occur through and are 
dependent on action and the learnt expectations one has regarding the 
outcome. Consequently, it is not that an individual engages in the practise of 
fine wine because they consciously evaluate the social rewards (although it 
may often seem, or even be, the case), but because their observation or 
experience of the rewards have shaped their interests; the experience 
habituates or disposes them, and the practise becomes valued in and of itself 
and forms a preference in choice. Similarly, it is not whether rioters did or did 
not consciously choose to attack police that we are interested, but rather how 
they became disposed to do so.  
 4.4.2. Rejecting Capitals: Race and Class 
King and Sawyer’s critiques of Bourdieu, while flawed, are understandable 
particularly in light of the next issue that requires discussion – the notion of a 
field. While I will not utilise ‘field’ in the analysis, it is worth discussing to 
develop beyond the limits of Bourdieu’s theory. Perhaps the largest problem 
with this concept is its rigidity. Bourdieu tends to talk of specific fields as 
defined by sets of power relations, such as academia, and thus specific 
practises, values, and goals (2000: 143). While it was argued that Bourdieu 
avoids determinism, his theory does tend towards a certain ‘singleness’ of an 
actor – that is, if you are within a field your habitus is shaped specifically 
towards that field. This is problematic theoretically, but also for the thesis 
here, as it fails to explain how someone located in social space, but lacking 
capital might develop dispositions outside of, or even that oppose those forms 
of capital.  
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Lahire (2011:15-7) criticises Bourdieu for building the concept of habitus on 
an analysis of a ‘weakly differentiated’ society, and not accounting for the 
contradiction this may bring when the subject exists within a society with 
‘highly differentiated’ groups. In other words, there is a certain limitation in the 
fluidity of the subject in which their position in relation to the forms of capital 
might create ‘mutations’, so to speak, and begin to change the social structure 
itself. Through Bourdieu’s rather static or enclosed notion of the field he de-
emphasises (rather than excludes) the possibility of cultural and value-based 
shifts through the ambiguous or amorphous position a group might have. 
What Bourdieu’s concept of field lacks therefore, is found in Bell Hooks’ 
theorization that the margins of societies are not simply sites of deprivation, 
but a site of possibility and a social ‘space of resistance’ (1990: 341).  
In other words, individuals who are excluded through their lack of valued 
forms of capital and defined by the dominant society in this way, do not 
necessarily accept this identification of them and may resist these forms of 
exclusion. Neither is this to say that divergence constitutes a complete 
disconnect from the larger set of capitals; for instance, the working class 
remained to some extent within society through practises of employment and 
the market (Hoggart, 1992). What Bourdieu misses then with his rigid concept 
of social space, is how resistance can be generated rather than conformity. 
For instance, issues of both ‘race’ and ‘class’ can be connected to the 2011 
riots, and conceptualising them through capital and distinction is a useful way 
of understanding how such categories function and to what ends. Both race 
and class can be conceived of as forms of capital, with skin colour, accent, 
style of dress and so forth, operating as the objectified and symbolic forms of 
that capital, and thus a means of distinction. Those with the markers of the 
white, middle or upper class are included, and become able to exclude those 
without. Thus a Bourdieusian ‘class’ is created in that a group, however it is 
defined and distinguished, is located in social space in such a way as to 
present those individuals with roughly similar opportunities, or lack thereof. 
A working class accent might be interpreted as a sign of stupidity by those 
whose accent is associated with intelligence, or as Wacquant notes how black 
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males have become synonymous with crime and violence: “so that, unless 
they display the trappings of middle-class culture, they are de-facto barred 
from bordering white areas” (2010: 57). In other words, we have markers and 
logics of distinction. What these are is objectively arbitrary; they emerge in 
relation to the current social hierarchy and serve to maintain it through acts of 
distinction, and justify it through logics of superiority/inferiority. 
An act of racial or class-based discrimination is an act of distinction that marks 
out individuals for differential social respect and status and thus treatment 
with regards to the practice and distribution of economic and material 
resources. In other words, ‘race’ and ‘class’ are cognitive and emotional 
categories through which the dominant group justifies the relative positions in 
the social hierarchy, and enacts economic and social exclusion (Bulmer & 
Solomos, 1999; Hall et al., 1980; Lee, 2017; Tyler, 2013).  
Subsequently, the creation of Bourdieusian ‘classes’ also denotes that race 
and class imply a related lived experience – as those being differentiated from 
the ‘norm’ – along with the production of dispositions (Bulmer & Solomos, 
1999). Yet, to assume that the dispositions of ethnic minorities or lower 
classes simply accept and go along with these forms of structural exclusion 
would to be problematic to say the least. Of course, Bourdieu does not make 
such an assumption, but his theory cannot adequately explain the resistances 
that dominated groups have repeatedly shown to their exclusion. 
It is perhaps because Bourdieu does not develop or explore the emotional 
content implied in concepts like ‘disposition’ or a ‘feel for the game’, that he 
does not appear to fully recognise this issue. To elaborate this idea in relation 
to the riots as resistance we can turn to emotion and look beyond Bourdieu. 
While emotion is certainly present in Bourdieu’s work, he fails to adequately 
theorise the relation between these and social space, in particular the notions 
of (dis)respect, the self-esteem-shame nexus, and why classes of individuals 
might reject some dominant forms of capital and create their own. These 
emotions seem particularly relevant to the notions of distinction and cultural 
and symbolic capital, as it is these that enable social rewards or status, and 
habituate us to value certain forms of capital.  
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 4.4.3 Shame and Self-Esteem 
From a sociological perspective, Scheff (2000) defines shame as a set of self-
oriented emotions (principally embarrassment & humiliation, but incorporating 
fear and anger) created through viewing ourselves from another’s eyes. 
Shame is produced through a discrepancy between an ideal self (imagined) 
and the experienced self (how one is treated), but importantly, that this 
discrepancy represents a threat to the ‘social bond’ (Scheff; 2000: 96-7; also 
see Turner, 2007). Palshikar (2005: 5430) extends this definition further, 
arguing that shame occurs when a social order’s norm about the self is 
violated or reversed - for instance, losing one’s ‘manliness’ by being 
‘feminised’, leading to a situation in which one is judged as not up to the 
standard.  
More than just a stimuli-response mechanism, individuals become sensitive to 
potential situations that might lead to such judgement, and learn to anticipate 
these situations and adapt their behaviour. To call this conscious or 
calculative would be misleading, instead shame is ‘subtle and pervasive’ in 
that it is not necessarily understood as a mechanism in a system of social 
sanctions, but rather over time becomes ‘unspeakable’ and implicitly 
‘compels’ or habituates action (Scheff; 1988: 396; 2000: 90). Thus to some 
extent, shame functions at the dispositional or pre-reflexive level and operates 
in response to acts of distinction. 
As this also implies, and it is important to note here, shame sits in a relation to 
self-esteem both of which are implicitly tied with cultural capital, providing “a 
nexus between the ideals of a society and their reproduction in the individual 
through his aspiration to personify them” (Pitts-River, 1965: 23; Bourdieu, 
1965: 211; Scheff; 1988: 396). We are driven to rectify the situation of shame 
and achieve self-esteem, not simply because we want to remove/avoid the 
negative feeling, but because we want to a positive sense of self through the 
approval of the group (Honneth, 1995: 131).  
However, while shame functions to maintain the social order as an affective 
mechanism of sanctions, as with ‘criminality’, it is also possible that it will have 
“corrosive effects for the underlying normative order” (Palshikar, 2005: 5431). 
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The reasons for this is because shame is, in part, an aversive emotion – that 
is we will try to rectify the situation so as to not experience shame again, 
either by changing our behaviour to conform or secondly, as Bradford (2015: 
106) argues, rejecting the social order’s ability to judge them, and finding 
other routes or processes to negate shame and produce self-esteem. In other 
words, it is self-esteem that generates Merton’s (1938) conformity to norms 
and aspirations, and it is shame that holds the potential to create their 
rejection. 
4.4.4. Structure, Affect, Resistance 
The removal or degradation of one’s status or honour is a particularly social 
act. To reduce status, or perform ‘evaluative degradation of certain patterns of 
self-realization’, is to inhibit the possibility of those individuals finding positive 
self-significance within that community and its social practises (Honneth, 
1995: 134). It is this affective reaction to disrespect, and the struggle for self-
esteem against shame, that is the motivational basis of all human social 
struggle, conflict, and resistance (Honneth, 1995: 164).  
Honneth’s conceptualisation of the social acts behind these affective states as 
‘respect’ and ‘disrespect’, sits neatly with Bourdieu’s understanding of capital 
and distinction, and can function as perhaps the primary affective mechanism 
through which social structure comes to inhere in habitus. As Honneth points 
out a ‘successful relation-to-self’ requires the ‘intersubjective recognition of 
one’s abilities and accomplishments’ (1995:136). If an individual is unable to 
access the practices and capitals that enable such recognition, a feeling of 
inadequacy may result. Here self-esteem and shame are linked explicitly to 
recognition. That is to say, it is the esteem gained from successful exercises 
of cultural capital, or the disrespect for a lack, exclusion, or failure, that 
habituates us to desire or find value in the practise.  
As with Bourdieu’s discussion of capitals, who is distinguished and how, are 
obviously not objective features but particular formations of prejudice shaped 
by the historically specific social hierarchy, that made these visual cues and 
categories socially pertinent (Hall et al., 1980). If enough individuals find value 
in these categories their acts will create the micro-foundations of one aspect 
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of the abstraction we call ‘social structure’; individuals who have the relevant 
visual markers are singled out for dis/respect and economic in/exclusion, 
which presents itself to those experiencing these rewards or punishments as 
an ‘objective’ feature of the social world.  
Those individuals, in turn, will experience this either as social recognition and 
self-esteem, or alternatively a sense of inadequacy or disrespect (Hall et al., 
1980; Honneth, 1995; Tyler, 2013). Through repeated and patterned 
interactions such as these, an individual experiences recognition or disrespect 
which shapes how they see their position in the social group, or indeed, 
whether they see themselves as part of the group at all, and prompt some 
form of action aimed at rectification. 
4.4.5. Self-Esteem through Practice and Empowerment 
However, ‘dis/respect’ should not be understood only as symbolic acts of 
distinction, but also in terms of embodied capital, or what the exclusion 
implies in terms of the individual’s capacity for action. In other words, it is not 
only about telling individuals they are not good enough, but intertwined with 
this, it is about preventing individuals from participating in practices, or 
capitals, that enable self-worth to be built. Honneth (ibid: 132-3) highlights this 
element of disrespect in which the individual is denied autonomy over their 
body, either physically or socially, and consequently loses confidence in the 
self to be capable of effective action.  
This might be considered an existential form of self-esteem; Heine, Proulx, 
and Vohs (2006) argue that meaning exists in the relations between objects, 
such as hammer and nail. Practice and efficiency with these relations leads to 
“[f]eelings of subjective certainty with regards to these meaning frameworks 
[which] provides people with confidence regarding how they should behave” 
(Heine et al., 2006: 96).  
Hannah Arendt (1970) made a similar, albeit more socio-politically oriented, 
point with her concept of ‘power’, which is not that of ‘command-obedience’ 
but what she saw as an innate part of humans as political beings: “Power 
corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in concert. Power is 
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never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in 
existence only so long as the group keeps together” (1970: 44). 
In other words, power for Arendt is the capacity of humans to act, through 
organising and co-operating, to shape the social world; it is not a means but 
an expressive end, perhaps similar to concepts of positive political freedom. 
Power’s importance, for Arendt, is in its capacity to fulfil humanity’s ‘faculty of 
action’, that which makes us ‘political beings’: “it enables him to get together 
with his peers, to act in concert, and to reach out for goals and enterprises 
that would never enter his mind” (Arendt, 1970: 82). Perhaps more 
importantly, it enables individuals to organise to overcome unfavourable 
conditions, such as disrespect and exclusion. To be part of ‘power’ then, is to 
be politically and socially potent – to believe in your capacity to affect change. 
While Arendt does not explore the foundations of ‘power’ in emotions, her 
conceptualisation fits with that discussed above; Arendt’s concept of ‘power’ 
refers to participation in politicised and organised action, and is based on an 
inherent capacity and drive in humanity; the drive pushes us to achieve a 
sense of control over the social world and to feel recognised by others. To be 
disempowered in Arendt’s terms is, in affective terms, to feel impotent and 
thus constitutes as existential form of disrespect, and to be vulnerable to 
disrespect.  
It is through these affective mechanisms that structural forms of exclusion 
shape experience. Through the affective mechanism of shame and self-
esteem we have now connected structure through disrespect and 
disempowerment to dispositions. The negative experience of shame creates a 
drive to achieve a state of self-esteem, and it is through action that this 
affective disposition is expressed and potentially resolved. This is not to say 
an individual ‘must’ react, or in particular ways, to resolve their negative state, 
because we are capable or acting against or overruling our feelings. The point 
is simply that it creates a disposition in which certain actions become 
preferential or desirable. However, to explain resistance we must go further 
than noting the relation between affect and structure, and also consider the 
cognitive correlates if we are to develop this theory fully.  
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4.5 Structure, Affect, and Resistance 
Merton (1938) argues there are a number of potential reactions to the ‘strain’ 
of social and economic exclusion, ranging from outright rebellion to apathy 
and retreat. As noted, Merton did not adequately theorise the generation of 
resistance (Agnew, 2012). Although not developed by her, Butler’s (2004; 
2011) notion of ‘performativity’ enables us to understand the role structure has 
in conjunction with the expression of affect.  
Action is not simply means-end oriented, but enables the achievement of a 
valued self. Identity is made possible through social structure or power 
relations, but is not determined by them; rather the actor plays out these 
relations through the body reproducing norms of behaviour, or resisting 
through acts that challenge and refuse power relations: “I feel good breaking 
the law. Laws are made to control people” (Graffiti artist Omar, quoted in 
Ferrell, 2001: 182). 
Similarly, Honneth (1995: 163) and Ferrell (2001) point out that the 
experience of disrespect does not necessarily shape the nature of the 
resistance, which could be, for instance, an anarchist union movement, 
graffiti, or a riot which may have no particular goal at all. These responses are 
expressive in that they use oppressive power relations to articulate a 
response, although not necessarily an end goal or political claim. The point 
Honneth (1995) makes is whether it is politicised and organised resistance or 
not depends on certain cognitive conditions. The subjects need to ‘recognise’ 
they are a group facing this type of experience, and to be able to reflexively 
frame the recognition of disrespect as an injustice through an intersubjective 
framework of interpretation.  
In other words, to act on an ‘injustice’ requires a disposition that enables the 
experience to make sense as an injustice. In turn, their actions in response to 
this rely on the perception of certain types of action as plausible and 
worthwhile. If Politicised or political action is the outcome then the subjects 
have organised, shifting from powerless, impotent, and discriminated, to 
empowered: a group acting in concert to improve their situation (Arendt, 
1970).  
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We can return to the issues of both ‘race’ and ‘class’ to see the intertwined 
nature of the disrespect and resistance. As noted, to be marked out for 
inclusion or exclusion by ‘race’ or ‘class’, whether one realises it or not, is to 
shape one’s lived experience and thus dispositions. Those of the dominant 
group valorise what they have (or what they believe they have), and tie their 
self-worth into these markers of capital, for instance, associations between 
white skin and civilisation in the British Empire, in contrast to and over what 
they believe others lack: “the Negro race can only be humanised and civilised 
by Europeans” (quoted in Cole, 2016: 29). Those lacking the markers of 
capital are excluded, rendering them powerless and disrespected through the 
interactions that condemn and refuse them access to social or material 
resources. 
It is these power relations that enable the oppressed to formulate resistance. 
If a grouping of individuals realise their common form of exclusion, they can 
resist this form of capital/distinction and overturn their shame through the very 
same category that enables their exclusion. Indeed, these categories, such as 
specific articulations of race or class based identities, are fundamental to 
countering forms of the exclusions they are shaped by (Bulmer & Solomos, 
1999: 5). In Butlerian (2011) terms, the recognition of the form of exclusion 
enables the performance of resistance to and through those power relations. 
Without categories of ‘black’ there could be no ‘black power’ or ‘black is 
beautiful’ as means to resist the disrespect and disempowerment. 
4.5.1 Excluding Politics in Practice 
Exclusion and shame necessitates an adaptive behaviour, in such cases 
where it produces resistance however, it does not necessitate politicised 
action. Indeed, to understand this we should first note that ‘political action’ is a 
normative concept rather than purely a descriptive one. As a description 
‘political’ only refers to action aimed at change within and to a particular social 
order, but it implies a certain moral justification or subjective value in the type 
of action (Akram, 2014). In other words, ‘political’ implicitly contrasts with 
‘criminality’; if resistance no longer aims at the legitimated social order, it can 
be vilified and condemned, and no longer requires explanation.  
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To utilise ‘political action’ in its normative sense neglects Deranty and 
Renault’s (2009) argument that increasing social and economic exclusion 
creates the possibility that society’s political space becomes increasingly 
irrelevant to those excluded. In other words, the forms of performance not 
seek to perform and re-articulate power within the legitimated structure, 
because this is not understood as an effective means to express and 
overcome discontent. Indeed, as this relation escalates, so does the potential 
that the whole public and political sphere becomes irrelevant or oppressive to 
those excluded.  
We can elaborate the relevance of this point by noting that to be excluded 
implies symbolic disrespect by labelling individuals, as with Cameron’s 
‘criminality’, the implicit connections between ‘black’ and danger and 
criminality (Hall et al., 1980; Wacquant, 2010) or indeed the problematic 
concept of ‘underclass’ (Tyler, 2013). Such stereotypes also imply derogatory 
treatment, such as the aggressive policing of blacks, or teachers responding 
to working class children as stupid. In these cases, those disrespected are 
made to feel inferior, and thus either not part of, or not an equal in the group.  
This does not necessitate depoliticised action, but that the ‘power’, in 
Arendtian (1970) terms, that resides here is sending the message to certain 
individuals that they are not included. Consequently, the processes of  ‘power’ 
in the social order are at best ineffective or irrelevant to them, and at worst 
oppressive. Problematically, if an act of resistance is not ‘political action’, then 
it risks being labelled ‘criminality’. But as we have seen, because an action 
does not seek to perform through or within the dominant power structure, is 
because this power has excluded them, rendering participation ineffective. 
Indeed, if an excluded group is resisting through attempts that seek to 
rearrange that power structure to achieve respect, such protest or acts of civil 
disobedience, then this is foundationally identical to action that aims within the 
power structure. The same could be said for rebellion, the difference not being 
the cause but being the use violence. In other words, to perform political 
action, removing the normative connotations of the term, is simply refers to 
those less excluded.  
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However, as we have seen it is also possible that the repeated experience of 
disrespect and inability to engage also holds the possibility to make action 
aimed at any change within the society pre-reflexively irrelevant. An absence 
of engagement, ineffectiveness, or indeed, the experience of shame through 
engagement in the political processes or forms capitals, will shape the 
disposition to not engage. For those that are told they do not belong, or are 
not equal, who see no way to express and overcome their discontent, the 
increasing risk is that their actions will no longer speak to that power but 
simply against it.  
4.5.2. Neoliberalism and Individualism 
To further understand why non-political action is produced we must also look 
at how these structural exclusions are experienced and interpreted. On the 
one hand, as discussed earlier, the repeated experience of shame and the 
irrelevance of the political sphere to the excluded may produce apathy, or 
indeed, anger and a rejection of the social group and its values (Gilligan, 
2003; Palshikar, 2005; Merton, 1938). Another factor that may inhibit the 
political action and organisation of resistance, is individualisation. 
Individualism, as noted earlier is a logic inherent in neoliberalism, however, 
these terms are not without problems. Without developing a full critique of 
these concepts, we can note that because the ideology of neoliberalism relies 
on a model of the individual as self-interested, utility maximisers, and it is 
often assumed that people actually become and behave as such (Barnett, 
2010). Indeed, neoliberal critiques tends to assume a distinct line between 
two sets of values, those of public, communal, and perhaps altruistic, and 
those private, egoistic, and individualistic.  
Of course, neoliberalism and individualism did not suddenly emerge in the 
1980s, nor are values so clear cut and simple; ego and self-interest have 
always shaped concerns. Rather than creating a distinct set of values, 
individualism should be conceived of as a sort of cultural weighting that 
promotes some, and diminishes other forms of understanding. In terms of 
impact on disposition, it promotes an increased emphasis on the self as the 
source and reason for behaviour and achievement to the neglect of structure. 
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With this, individualism conceals certain power relations, and thus limits the 
possibility of performing with or against them.  
Neoliberalism can be considered a set of economic and social practices that 
promote at the pre-reflexive level, an individualistic mode of perception and 
logic. This ‘shapes dispositions because, rather than simply egoistic concerns, 
by diminishing structural understanding it tends to increase shame – as blame 
or inadequacy of the self – whilst also inhibiting the value or visibility of 
resolution through change to the social structure. 
However, the depoliticising impact of individualism is also broader than this. 
Anomie theory proposes that individuals become alienated from the normative 
social order when in a supposedly meritocratic and free society framed by an 
individualistic outlook. People come up against the contradiction of structural 
exclusions along the lines of class, race and gender (Rock, 2007: 9-10). The 
problem is that the diminishment of the awareness of social structure 
necessarily diminishes the ‘consciousness of social justice’ (Honneth, 2007: 
89; Bauman, 2000: 35). It conceleas the categories that resistance occurs 
through. 
As we have mentioned, this is important for the overcoming of racism or 
classism through the affective and cognitive realisation of a common injustice, 
and the formation of a collective identity to counter the disrespect such 
experiences imply. Collective resistance in this regard is not simply a 
pragmatic tool with which to reach a goal, but is in itself an act of empowering 
or overcoming shame and inadequacy through constructing a new relation-to-
self as part of a social group (Arendt, 1970; Honneth, 1995: 164). Through 
this group, individuals can unite and perform acts of resistance together that 
seek to re-articulate norms (Butler, 2011) 
4.5.3 Shame, Impotence, and Violence 
The point in noting the lack of political action is not for its own sake, but rather 
to note that such action is that of individuals who are pre-reflexively 
disempowered within democratic society. To be depoliticised is to be made 
impotent with regards to social order to the point that any consideration of 
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action aimed at the political sphere occurs as negative affect: apathy or 
aversive responses. The impact of depoliticisation is more that just 
disengagement, but may have a toxic impact on the social order and even 
lead to violence as a cathartic action.  
On the one hand, the disjuncture between the capitals encouraged and 
rewarded by society, and the shame – rather than a politicised and righteous 
anger – felt for failure to live up to these ideals, can ultimately lead to 
psychological and cultural rejection of the doxic ideas and goals of society. 
This context further holds the potential to produce alternative values and 
practices – or capitals – which generate social recognition and esteem outside 
of, or even through transgression of the dominant norms and values which 
shame them (Bourgios, 2003; Cloward & Ohlin, 1969; Hall et al., 1980; Rock, 
2007: 9-10; Skegg, 2010). 
While on the other, and tied in with this process of alienation, is violence as a 
destruction of, or seizing of power. In contrast to her notion of empowerment 
as a means and end in itself, Arendt (1970) argues violence stems from and 
responds to the frustration of power, and can be used to destroy a repressive 
power. Arendt’s point is also that in such cases violence becomes the means 
of overcoming impotence, an intense response to the frustration of individuals’ 
inherent need to be empowered: “riots in the ghettos and rebellions on the 
campuses make ‘people feel they are acting together in a way that they rarely 
can’” (1970: 83). Or in Butlerian (2011) terms, violence, through performing 
the destruction of power for those who have been excluded from it, structures 
and enables the effective release of pent up emotion. 
To be driven to perform violence then, is to channel emotions that prompt 
expression and resolution but have no other means, no power, by which to 
overcome or rectify the causes of shame and discontent. Indeed, that violence 
is connected to shame should not be surprising. For Scheff (2006) violence is 
always a consequence of unacknowledged rage and shame. Any form of 
disrespect will produce shame, although it can be reconstructed as an 
‘injustice’. However, if disempowering and disrespectful relations continue 
without resolution, and become cognitively repressed and framed as a flaw of 
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the self, it tends to produce anger and rage as a drive to overcome the issue. 
As Gilligan (2003) notes, feelings of impotence or inadequacy may be 
exercised, and perhaps even be experienced as pleasurable, through 
performing violence – an act which firmly establishes the superiority of one 
(the self) over another. Importantly, as we will see, this does not have to 
target those responsible. 
If the available cognitive structures cannot position the experience of 
disrespect as an injustice, shame as a failure of the self will be the response. 
If this continues, it represents a potent and dangerous situation that might 
very well result in violence. Nevertheless, even at this point it would seem that 
violence can be avoided if those experiencing shame have institutionalised or 
organised means by which they can act to overcome shame. This may be 
through ‘political action’ or indeed, through other forms of collective resistance 
which constructs a new and positive relation to self through mutual recognition 
of injustice (Honneth, 1995). However, if these possibilities are lacking then 
the opportunities to negate this dissonance is closed off from agency. With the 
institutional routes are closed off, or collective resistance is not possible, then 
the subject is made to feel impotent and shame and anger may produce rage, 
prompting violent action as a means of establishing superiority.  
4.6. The Police, Legitimacy, and Resistance 
What we have then, is a theory of how patterned actions of individuals form 
what we term social structure, which is referred to as such because of the way 
it structures experience and action. What is required before we attempt to 
utilise this theoretical position to analyse acts of rioting, is to contextualise this 
in relation to the police, the object of violence, and to show how they are both 
part of, and shaped by the broader structural relations of neoliberalism. The 
police in this light, should be understood in Butler’s (2011) terms, as a 
particular organisation and concentration of power relations that not only 
structure experience, but function as a structure by action can be performed 
and emotion can be expressed. 
4.6.1. The Symbolic Power of the Police 
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It is important to note that the police are representatives of the state and 
social order (Bradford, 2015: 106; Loader, 2006; 1997). This is to say that the 
actions of other state or societal institutions may impact on how the police are 
perceived. To be labelled and disrespected by a government may mean that 
the hostility this potentially produces become associated with the police. In 
turn, as Keith (1993) notes, the police are not distinct form society and its 
prejudices and stereotypes, but a part of it. Thus the moralising and 
pathologising discourses of criminality and underclass will likely shape the 
behaviour of the police towards those who hold such markers, as is this 
‘group’ who are ‘dangerous’ and to be policed. The police then, form a 
particularly tangible means by which the empowered exclude and 
disempower.  
The police, however, are not just any institution but one that holds a particular 
position in society, and with it unique powers. The police, as part of the state, 
occupy a particular location in the societal or ‘bureaucratic’ field, “laying claim 
to authoritative nomination and classification” of who is good or bad, in or out 
(Wacquant, 2004: 8). Ultimately, this positions the police in certain relations of 
power over others, and provides them with a particular form of cultural capital, 
or legitimacy, enabling them to shape the field and construct symbolic 
meanings about those within it.  
Utilising Bourdieu’s concept of habitus but emphasising its emotional content, 
Loader (1997; 2006) argues the police’s legitimacy functions as a symbolic 
power to compel certain behaviours and operates via a set of ‘dispositions’: 
“inculcated through instruction, habit and routine, as power misrecognized as 
such, even exercised by those who are subject to it” (Loader, 1997: 3). This 
commitment to obey or trust is principally affective or pre-reflexive; trust 
cannot be based on rationality alone as by definition to ‘trust’ is to act without 
enough knowledge to know the outcome (Barbalet, 2001).  
In turn, this trust in the police allows them to say something, to symbolically 
represent people and their status and position, through their actions 
(Bradford, 2015: 105-6 & 111). It is because of the police’s position in relation 
to feelings of security that the police have the power (although not 
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uncontested) to judge and define for the dominant society what is 
“normality/deviance, inclusion/exclusion, us/them” (Loader, 2006: 210; also 
see Bradford, 2015: 111). For instance, when making an arrest, observers 
who trust in the police may see the arrestee as a potential threat to their 
security or simply as ‘criminal’, and the individual being arrested may 
recognise this judgement of them and feel ‘disrespected’ and ashamed.  
Here then is the first important implication of the police’s symbolic capital: the 
police hold the ability to label and ‘disrespect’ people and to produce ‘affective 
sensations’ (shame or feelings of inadequacy) that make it possible for an 
individual to realise that recognition is being withheld from them (Honneth, 
1995: 136; Bradford, 2015: 107). In other words, through society’s imagined 
judgement, the police hold the symbolic power to criminalise, or promote 
shame, and to contribute to the exclusion of individuals from legitimated 
capitals through which a positive sense of self can be produced. This may 
produce shame and perhaps anger, but it also produces the possibility that, 
over time, some may come to reject the police and society’s ability to judge 
them as a means of avoiding these negative emotions.  
To put it simply, if trust, obedience, and legitimacy can be generated, so can 
mistrust, disobedience, and opposition. The point Bradford (2015: 107) makes 
is that if an individual perceives they have been targeted based on who they 
are, or treated substantially differently because of who they are, they will 
question the neutrality of the police, whether they are accorded the rights of 
group membership, and whether the police are actually there to protect them. 
Fair treatment by the police is connected to trust and legitimacy, and 
consequently, compliance with the law, while unfair treatment can result in 
cynicism towards the law, a lack of cooperation with police, and even 
resentment through the police’s actions being understood as an injustice 
(Bradford, 2015: 109).  
As Honneth (1995: 163) argues, such resistance will take different forms (e.g. 
political, symbolic, violent) depending on how this experience take form 
through power relations, and what forms of action they find plausible or 
acceptable. Consequently it may take the form of a normative rejection of that 
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society, its rules and representatives, and even a violent opposition to those 
that are seen to deny recognition as a means to negate or overcome feelings 
of shame and inadequacy (Gilligan, 2003: 1150; Palshikar, 2005: 5431; 
Scheff, 2006).  
Indeed, through these interactions a form of social identity may emerge which 
takes as its uniting premise opposition to the police. Stott and Reicher (1998b) 
detail the way in which hostile interactions between England fans and Italian 
police resulted in a symbolic understanding of the police as illegitimate and a 
threat. Consequently, England fans who had not previously intended violence, 
began to unite in opposition to the police as an unjustified aggressor. Yet this 
is not the end of the implications, because there also exists the possibility to 
shape dispositions towards the police through constructing them as a violent 
threat and oppressor. 
4.6.2. The Police and the Monopoly of Force 
In addition to the normative role of the police, the state’s monopoly on force, 
in part enacted through the police, creates the position in which they “stand 
simultaneously as a guarantor of, and threat to, citizen security”, and which 
one occurs may depend on who it is that is being policed (Loader, 2006: 208; 
Phillips & Bowling, 2007: 440). In other words, the police’s position and 
organisational structure provides them with a form of social capital through 
which they can bring to bear superior force, for instance through powers of 
arrest or stop and search.  
Firstly, this creates the possibility to deny individuals the autonomy of their 
body potentially producing shame and a loss of trust in oneself to be capable 
of action (Honneth, 1995: 132-3). In turn, this produces an affective drive 
through anger, to re-establish a positive sense-of-self. Furthermore, if a 
rejection of the legitimacy of norms or law exists amongst a body or class of 
people, this shifts the understanding of the police from a legitimate actor that 
provides protection, to an oppressive force which functions as a threat to 
security. Once this occurs policing may be perceived as hostile action, as the 
issue becomes one of policing without consent: “Any police action, sensitive 
or senseless, [becomes] likely to be opposed” (Keith, 1993: 125; also see 
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Bradford, 2015: 109).  
Taking this argument further, rather than protectors the police may come to 
occupy a position that is understood more like an occupational power, 
enforcing rules that are not believed in over a subjected population (Bradford, 
2015: 111-2; Hall et al., 1980: 329-30). Once these oppressive power 
relations are in operation and generating shame and anger, the possibility to 
perform their reversal and generate self-worth exists. When considered in this 
light, the police’s powers of arrest or stop and search can play an important 
role in shaping them as a valid target of violence.  
Here specifically we see the possibility that the police, as a symbolic meaning 
and an object of action, become something that might be worth attacking. By 
performing violence against the police, the possibility exists to overturn 
everyday oppressive power relations and exercise the sense of impotence 
and inadequacy generated through these power relations. The proof, 
however, is in the pudding. Next, we need an approach that can incorporate 
this nuanced understanding, into an analysis of riot actions. 
4.7. Conclusion 
The two positions of the neoliberal politicians and left wing commentators 
could be seen as the two extremes in the game of legitimation: the simplistic, 
free individual on one side, and the structurally determined individual on the 
other. Of course, the majority of explanations do not fall into these traps but 
there is a tendency to emphasise one or the other, and this is arguably due a 
lack of theorisation of the mechanisms that connect structure and agency. 
A further problem was the notion of the ‘riots’, as seen in Keith’s (1993) 
analysis. The danger in this concept is that it deemphasises the emergence of 
rioting from the everyday society. Theories of riots, through the focus on the 
‘event’ neglect relevant relations that the theory of affective resistance 
reveals. This was, in part, because explanations and theories leave a ‘gap’ 
between agency and structure. The point was made that rather than a ‘riot’ we 
should look at the events as social actions much like any other, the only core 
difference being that these actions did not reproduce the social order and 
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norms, but transgressed them.  
In order to bridge this gap we began with Bourdieu who enabled us to think 
about the relation between structure and agency. The position was developed 
through Bourdieu’s notion of ‘capital’, that the structure, or ‘objective field’, is 
constituted by the actions of those who accept and participate in forms of 
capital. Thus structure presents itself to the individual as a force through the 
interactions they have with others, for instance, the repeated and patterned 
experience of discrimination. Bourdieu thus provides the core idea as to how 
structure comes to be, and in turn shapes agency and action at the pre-
reflexive level, or what Chambers & Carver (2008: 45) called agency’s 
‘necessary scene’. 
Despite these useful theorisations, it was noted that Bourdieu’s work held a 
certain rigidity that edged close to determinism, and which left little room for 
resistance to dominant forms of capital. By focusing on affect we could 
remove the rigidity of Bourdieu’s theorisation. In particular, the nexus of self-
esteem and shame was argued as the mechanism by which society’s values 
and ideals could take hold, or be rejected in agency. In other words, this 
provides the key to the generation of resistance.  
Honneth’s (1996) theorisation of ‘disrespect’ was particularly useful here, as it 
not only framed the modalities through which a society might directly and 
indirectly produce shame in individuals (e.g. labelling and forms of exclusion), 
Honneth forwarded that shame was the affective drive behind social 
resistance. In other words, the aversive response, the desire to re-establish a 
positive sense of self, prompts resistance to the acts of disrespect.  
This form of shame relates to a feeling of inadequacy, however, shame can 
also connect with disempowerment. Here, to lose the confidence that one can 
act effectively in world can produce a particular potent form of shame. This 
may happen physically, such as acts of violence against the self which 
perform the victims inadequacy. In turn, Butler’s (2011) notion of 
‘performativity’ developed the understanding of action as the performance 
with and through power relations; resistance utilises the very power relations 
that generate disrespect, to express emotion and perform identity. 
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Finally, we looked at neoliberalism and its underpinning logic of individualism 
and the impact of these upon the form that resistance takes. The logic of 
individualism removes structure from consideration. However, this is also an 
operational logic in society, which, rather than simply making people selfish as 
is sometimes assumed, encourages shame as structural causes of social 
failures are not acknowledged, making it more likely to be internalised as a 
flaw of the individual.  
In turn, mechanisms that can overcome the sense of shame are also 
diminished or removed as the dominant modes of perception and cognition 
neglect causes outside of the individual. The possibility of performing 
resistance to disrespect is diminished as the individual is disempowered 
ontologically. Without understanding of the power relations that cause 
disrespect, how can one seek to re-articulate them? Thus, race or class are 
not only the modalities through which structural exclusion manifests, but the 
forms of identity that reference structural inequality and can be utilised to 
diminish feelings of shame, to organise action, and to resist modalities of 
disrespect. 
Without such types of categories shame is lodged deeper, internalised as the 
self is felt as inadequate or inferior. In turn, political modes of resistance are 
lost as it is the self that requires changing, not society. The problem here, it 
was argued, is that violence often becomes a means to express and 
overcome feelings of shame particularly when related to disempowerment. A 
violent act firmly establishes the superiority of the victor, and the impotence of 
the victim. 
With the theory of action and resistance set out, the next task was to specify 
and connect this to the police as an actor in a particular social position 
connected to the state. Thus shame and anger generated by other 
representatives of the state may spill over into relations with the police, and 
visa versa. Moreover, the police’s position in society enables them to label 
and condemn members of society as in or out, citizen or criminal. This role 
enables them to reproduce society’s stereotypes and to disrespect individuals, 
producing shame. The police’s monopoly of force provided by the state 
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structure, also enables the police to physically remove agency from 
individuals through their powers of arrest or stop and search. Thus, the police 
have the potential to operate as a potent means of disrespect, particularly to 
excluded groups. Indeed, such may be their impact that they generate 
processes of positive identification through performances that overturn these 
relations. 
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5. Anti-Police Violence: 1970 to 2011 
 
5.1. Introduction 
When large amounts of people engage in violence directed at society’s 
proclaimed peacekeepers, it is a sign that something is wrong within the 
social order. Indeed, if large amounts of people engage in any form of 
behaviour whereby the rules that define that social order are transgressed, 
this is a sign that the order is failing to reproduce its conditions of existence. In 
other words, the violence is the moment where the skin of that social order 
ruptures, and the pressure building is released. In this light, it becomes 
important not to explain the rioting per se, but rather to understand the rioting 
as part of a social process. What the forms of action within a riot offer are a 
means to investigate this underlying problem. Moreover, where we see similar 
types of action occurring within riots elsewhere, these can function as 
informative and offer a comparative aspect. 
With this in mind, this chapter begins to explore violence against the police 
during rioting, emerging in the 1970s, escalating dramatically in the 1980s 
and, although reducing in the intervening periods, occurring again in 2011. 
The 1980s was a period marked by social and economic turmoil in Britain, 
and not least by the regular outbreak of violent clashes between the police 
and the public. However, in popular narrative the 1980s have been framed as 
‘race riots’, while as we have seen 2011 was framed as driven by ‘criminality’. 
Consequently, these two symptoms are positioned as distinct and unrelated 
events. Indeed, in an act that neatly distanced the rioters in 2011 from the 
clearer cause of injustice, such as in the 1980s, Cameron (2011) stated: 
“These riots were not about race”.  
However, it is important to understand that the events of 2011 are not distinct 
from the riots of the 1980s. The difference in how they are framed should not 
be taken as defining. While the narrative of ‘race riots’ won out in the 1980s, 
the very same discourse of ‘criminality’ was used as politicians and media 
attempted to delegitimise rioters complaints. This is not to say the riots are 
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identical or the same phenomenon, but rather, that if we go underneath the 
narratives of ‘race riots’ and ‘criminality’ and avoid singular notions of ‘the riot’, 
what we find is these acts of violence against the police, separated by three 
decades, are connected to the same, but shifting, historical processes of 
disrespect and disempowerment.  
We begin with a descriptive accounts of the rioting. The aim here is simply to 
provide the reader with an overview and to draw out some parallels and 
differences, setting up the analytical discussion. This begins with an 
examination of the events that triggered the rioting, as these tend to constitute 
symbolic instances of the underlying discontent, and thus, point towards the 
failure of the social order. The parallels in the role and the understanding of 
the police are discussed, before the chapter then seeks to complicate the 
narratives and understandings of the rioting in the 1980s and 2011, noting 
how neither fits easily into the categories of ‘race riot’ and ‘criminality’ 
imposed.  
We will also examine similarities and differences between participants. The 
key purpose here is to complicate the understandings of the involvement of 
‘race’. The problem is that in 2011 race was successfully dismissed as 
causally irrelevant in contrast to the 1980s. Yet the data does not support this. 
What is required is a more nuanced understanding incorporating structural 
and identity based notions of race, and avoids reifying racism as a thing in 
itself, rather than as a modality of social and economic exclusion.  
5.2. The Emergence of Anti-Police Rioting: 1970 to 1985 
Prior to the 1970s, rioting tended to take the form of inter-ethnic, or racially 
motivated clashes between civilian groups.11 Waddington (1992: 74) notes 
that after this point instances of collective violence take the form of clashes 
between black youth and the police. This posits a shift or change in the 
context that shapes the manner in which disorder emerges, and who 																																																								11	For instance, the Notting Hill riots of 1958 constituted racist attacks on the Caribbean 
population, which emerged from the context of the socially and economically excluded white 
population competing for limited resources in employment, housing etc. with a relatively 
recent influx of Caribbean immigrants forced to live in the same impoverished areas. Racist 
perceptions and logics located blame for the white populations suffering on the ‘underserving’ 
immigrants (Pilkington, 1988). 	
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constitute the actors.  
However, this perhaps overstates the change as in 1981 the Southall riots 
were started by racist skinheads who attacked Asian residents, which then 
escalated into violence between Asian youth, skinheads, and police (Ball, 
2012: 29; Keith, 1993: 61-2; Lea & Young, 1982: 17-8). Nevertheless, there 
was a paradigmatic shift in which the police went from intervening in racially 
motivated inter-ethnic clashes, to becoming the primary targets of collective 
acts of violence.  
Although violent confrontations were relatively commonplace between police 
and black youth, perhaps the most notable early occurrences were in the 
1976 and 1977 Notting Hill Carnivals. While initially set up to promote 
understanding between Caribbean immigrants and the white population, by 
the 1970s the carnival had become symbolic of ‘blue verses black’ 
confrontation (Keith, 1993: 124). During the clashes with police the crowd 
chanted anti-apartheid slogans connected to black resistance against the 
white establishment in South Africa (Gilroy, 2013: 552; Keith, 1993: 124; 
Waddington, 1992: 74).  
Yet relatively speaking, these events failed to garner much attention. It would 
be the 1980s that would explosively bring these types of events to public 
attention, and would see the frequent emergence of clashes between 
predominantly black youth and police all across the country. However, despite 
the media furore, while some clashes were labelled as riots, other, generally 
smaller scale encounters were often neglected (Ball, 2012; Keith, 1993; 
Waddington, 1992).  
The first of these riots erupted in Bristol in 1980 on the 2nd of April in St. 
Paul’s, an inner city area with a significant ethnic minority population, and took 
the form of clashes between youth, largely black, and police and some looting 
and/or vandalism of shops. Initial clashes occurred after a police raid on a 
cafe resulting in officers being attacked with stones, police cars vandalised, 
one set on fire, and a police van overturned (Ball, 2012: 290-7). Although 
numbers of participants are not clear, the initial confrontation would swell the 
crowd, with estimates given of ‘thousands’ (ibid). The police would ultimately 
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be forced to withdraw from St. Paul’s, which would then see selective 
vandalism and looting and four buildings would be set on fire. These were the 
bank, post office, unemployment office, and a rent office, popularly viewed as 
external or oppressive of the community (Reicher & Stott, 2011; Ball, 2012: 
396-7).  
The violence would be popularly understood as the ‘St. Paul’s Riots’, 
however, this neglected the fact that violent clashes with police also emerged 
in other areas of the city, not least the largely white estates of Southmead on 
the 3rd and 4th, and in Knowle West on the 4th and 5th of April, which were 
dismissed as ‘copy cat riots’ (Ball, 2012: 26-7). While the clashes in Bristol, or 
St. Paul’s at least, seem to have garnered more attention than those at the 
Notting Hill Carnival, immediate interpretations by police and media dismissed 
the disorder in Bristol as a ‘one-off’ (Ball, 2012: 30). However, this was not to 
be; in the following year riots erupted in Brixton, south London, another area 
with a significant ethnic minority population.  
The initial clash in Brixton came when police apprehended a young, black 
male who was running through the streets (Waddington, 1992: 81-3). The 
young man had been stabbed, which led to a crowd gathering who interpreted 
the situation as another incident of police brutality. Despite this developing 
into a clash between police and around 100 members of the public, the 
disorder did not continue beyond this immediate situation; however, a 
decision was made by the police to continue to implement a planned stop and 
search operation ‘Swamp 81’. The next day another stop and search again 
drew crowd, which would escalate into three days of violence, resulting in 415 
police officers injured, 122 police vehicles, and 145 buildings damaged (Ball, 
2012: 27-8).  
Keith (1993: 101) notes the differences between the different days of rioting in 
Brixton 1981. The first day of rioting consisted exclusively of conflict between 
a black group and the police; on the second day the disturbance went on for 
longer, was more varied in the types of participant, and included arson and 
looting; the third day there was again both looting and attacks on police but 
less extensive due to the large police presence. Indeed, similar to St Paul’s, 
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rioting often targeted businesses that were perceived to be hostile or to exploit 
black people (Waddington, 1992: 87). 
Brixton would also see rioting again in 1981 on the 10th and 15th of July which 
occurred after the emergence of other riots around London. While again, 
these saw violence targeting police, Keith (1993: 152) argues the difference 
between the April and July riots is that the earlier involved, in the main, locally 
based individuals. In July the conflict between the police and public seems to 
have involved a broader section of the black community than in April. 
Moreover, large numbers of people appear to have arrived from outside the 
area to have joined the rioting and, in particular, looting. 
Brixton was obviously not the only place to experience rioting in 1981, with 
rioting occurring in 16 of London’s boroughs, largely involving attacks on the 
police or their property, but also accounts of looting and vandalism (Keith, 
1993; Waddington, 1992). Not least among the areas which saw rioting were 
the boroughs of Hackney and Haringey, which were both were in the top nine 
boroughs for arrests (Keith, 1993: 55-6). While both these riots were 
underreported and lack data, Keith manages to draw a picture of events in 
Hackney, while one journalist Harrison (1992) was also present for some of 
the rioting. 
Events in Hackney were preceded by increased tension after earlier riots in 
Southall, West London, and only a 2-3 miles away in Haringey, Wood Green 
and Finsbury Park, where large groups of young men smashed up ‘stalls’ and 
‘mugged’ people (Harrison, 1992: 347). The 8th and 9th of July saw isolated 
incidents where two police cars were stoned, before on the 10th, the principle 
day of the rioting in Hackney, a jewellery store was broken into (Harrison, 
1992; Keith, 1993: 150). However trouble did not spread beyond these 
isolated incidents until the police closed down a café, which Keith describes 
as a ‘social focus’ of the surrounding black community (ibid).  
The gathering crowds displayed resentment of the police’s action, and around 
a couple of hours after the café had been closed a petrol bomb was thrown at 
police and an Argos showroom, and running battles ensued between the 
police and crowds of principally young black men (Harrison, 1992; Keith, 
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1993: 151-2). Police charged but were initially pushed back, before managing 
to take control of the area of Sandringham Road and disperse rioters. 
However, after initial clashes with police, the disorder would spread and 
Harrison witnessed looting by both white and black young men.  
Neither was rioting confined to London, with other cities in 1981 seeing 
collective violence including Liverpool, Manchester, Birmingham, 
Wolverhampton, Derby, Leicester, Nottingham, and Leeds (Bagguley & 
Hussein, 2008; Ball, 2012: 30; Lea & Young, 1982; Reicher & Stott, 2011; 
Waddington, 1992: 80). Although much of what went on is not recorded, Ball 
notes that Toxteth in Liverpool began with an arrest of black man, leading to a 
street confrontation with police, before escalating into four days of rioting, 
resulting in, among other things, 355 injured police and 244 arrests (Ball, 
2012: 28-9). As the violence in Toxteth subsided, Moss side in Manchester 
saw rioting, most notably with an attack by over one thousand individuals on a 
local police station (ibid: 30).  
While riots and clashes would continue to occur throughout the decade, 
another notable year for anti-police riots was 1985. Clashes between police 
and generally young, black men would again break out in Handsworth, 
Birmingham and Brixton and Tottenham in London (Davis, 1989; Fazakarley, 
2010; Waddington, 1992). Tottenham’s riots notably broke out on Broadwater 
Farm estate on the 6th of October, Mark Duggan’s estate. The Broadwater 
Farm riots began after building tensions, but in particular, the death of a black 
woman in a police raid on her home and a protest march the same day to the 
local police station (Davis, 1989; Waddington, 1992: 91-2).  
Despite some scuffles, serious violence would not break out until later that 
evening when police attempted to enter the estate in force. The actions would 
result in violence between the police and largely black, young men who had 
gathered on the estate, but the crowd would swell with others from outside 
coming to the estate to join the fight (Davis, 1989; Parry et al., 1985; 
Waddington, 1992). In the ensuing battle, rioters attacked and pushed police 
back and out of the estate, killing one officer, Keith Blakelock, who fell to the 
floor in the police’s retreat and was struck repeatedly with bladed instruments. 
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Alongside the death of PC Blakelock, in one night, fifty officers were injured, 
and two police were treated for gun shot wounds (Parry et al., 1985).  
The 1980s (and to a lesser degree the 1990s) would continue to see similar 
forms of disorder, often in the same areas, and often involving confrontations 
between police and young black people. However, the scale would not reach 
that of 1981 or 1985 again until a series of riots in northern English towns in 
the early 2000s. However, rather than violence directed explicitly at police 
however, these appeared similar to the violence seen in Notting Hill in 1958 
(Pilkington, 1988), and in Southall in 1981 (Ball, 2012: 29), taking on the form 
of racially based clashes instigated by racist far-right groups, with the ensuing 
violence occurring between Asian youths, white racists, and the police who 
were seen by both sides as partisan (Bagguley & Hussain, 2008). However, in 
2011 the police would again become a focus of violence across the country. 
5.2.1 2011 Riots: Looting and Police 
The scale of rioting in 2011 would take mainstream society by surprise, and 
unlike the 1980s was framed as about the looting rather than the attacks on 
the police. However, while as has been argued, while looting does appear to 
have formed the dominant type of act, to assume it was all about 
consumerism is problematic.  
In total, the rioting lasted five days, spread at an unprecedented speed, 
involved an estimated 13-15,000 rioters, resulted in over 4,000 arrests (RCVP, 
2011: 11), and while initial estimates put the cost to the country at £200 million 
(Reuters, 2011), this soon appeared conservative, with the Metropolitan 
Police estimating that in London alone the riots resulted in £300 million in 
damages (Dodd, 2011).  
As noted the rioting had begun on the 6th of August after a protest march from 
Broadwater Farm to a police station in Tottenham, north London. Violent 
clashes on Tottenham High Road would continue throughout the evening, 
emerging in different areas of Tottenham’s borough, Haringey, with two 
shopping areas being looted, and violence re-emerging on the 7th in the area 
on (Morrell et al., 2011THO, 2011). The realisation that the police were 
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struggling to control events appears to have allowed the rioting to spread as 
people took to the streets and organised gatherings on social media.  
The 7th also saw rioting emerge in Enfield, six miles north of Tottenham. It 
began with small skirmishes around 7pm, before escalating, although mainly 
took the form of looting (Guardian & LSE, 2011: 16-7). Rioting also emerged 
in Brixton, south London, during a music festival. Initially it took the form of 
clashes with police before shops were broken into which continued for several 
hours. Elsewhere some minor skirmishes broke out in Oxford Circus, Hackney 
and Waltham Forest.  
The 8th was perhaps the most intense of the five days of rioting; sustained 
violent clashes with police and wide-scale looting would occur all over 
London, with Reading the Riots (ibid) reporting 22 out of the 32 boroughs 
experiencing some form of rioting. The Metropolitan Police reported rioters 
attacking police with machetes and petrol bombs (MPS, 2012: 43 & 76). The 
rioting began at 5pm in Hackney, preceded by a stop and search operation 
and resulting in violent clashes with police and some apparent looting.12  
Rioting also emerged for the first time outside of London, mainly in the 
Midlands, but also Liverpool, Bristol and other towns in England. The 9th of 
August saw more rioting outside of London, in Manchester, Bristol, Liverpool, 
Birmingham, Leeds and others. The framing would again focus on the looting, 
noting the prevalence of disorder occurring in central shopping areas. 
However, this would underplay the fact that looting was often preceded by 
violent conflict with the police (Morrell et al., 2011: 4). Ultimately, rioting 
beyond London revealed similar scenes of clashes with police, looting and 
vandalism, before the police largely regained control on the 10th.  
 
5.3. The Iconic Events: A History of ‘Duggans’ 
So were the riots of the 1980s and 2011 unrelated and completely different 																																																								
12 Although shops were broken in to, it is unclear to what extent this occurred for the purposes 
of looting, or to what extent it related to gaining missiles to attack the police. As we will see in 
the video footage, Chapter 9, early incidents of breaking into shops appear to have been 
utilized to gain missiles (video 2). 
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events? Was one about racism and the other about consumerism or 
criminality? Perhaps the best place to begin to answer these questions is to 
examine how the rioting begins. Reicher and Stott argue for a useful way of 
conceptualising events that ‘trigger’ rioting: that in the emergence of rioting, a 
common feeling – sometimes focused on a particular actor or institution – 
enables individuals to unite, which is often brought to the fore through an 
‘iconic’ event (2011: 28%; RCVP, 2011: 42).  
They use the term ‘iconic’ because rather than simply ‘triggering’ the rioting, 
these types of event are symbolic and connect that moment to a common 
underlying discontent. The event spreads its tendrils outwards, connecting to 
memories of both personal experiences and historical accounts of disrespect 
and unexpressed anger, which enable individuals to identify with each other 
through a common discontent.  
The context from which the rioting emerged in 2011 - a protest against the 
police’s behaviour in causing and responding to the death of a black man13 - 
is informative not just in reference to the immediate moment, but because it 
reveals a connection to a history of mistreatment and deaths of black people 
during interactions with the police, and that have been largely ignored, or 
situated as largely only relevant to disorder in Tottenham (e.g. RCVP, 2011).  
It was this broader historical context of mistrust and expectations of abuse 
form the police that shaped the immediate interpretation of events by people 
from Tottenham as police lying over for what some were seeing as an 
‘execution’ (IPCC, 2011; Israel, 2011). Contradicting what could be seen as 
the RCVP’s (2011) comforting claim for the dominant political order and 
police, this interpretation also existed beyond Tottenham (Guardian & LSE, 
2011; Morrell et al., 2011), and moreover, did not appear to alter with time.  
Maria - a young mixed race woman from Hackney I interviewed in 2015 - 
explicitly connected the shooting of Duggan, mistreatment by police, and the 
riots: “So I think that whole thing was retaliation to police over like what they 																																																								
13 Duggan was actually a mixed race man with a white mother and black father, but it was 
popularly interpreted, both in the media and locally, as the death of a ‘black’ man, 
symbolically locating the events within a context of black deaths and mistreatment at the 
hands of the police. 
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do over years, especially that they killed Mark Duggan and he didn’t have a 
weapon, that the case innit?” The common opinion amongst those I spoke to 
– that the police were in the wrong and had tried to hide their actions, in 
Maria’s case by planting/lying about a gun – reveals the broader context with 
which actions of the police have come to means something particular to black 
communities. This perception was grounded partly in the views that the police 
had done this before ‘over years’, were often discriminatory, and this time was 
no different. 
The incident surrounding Mark Duggan’s death was often seen as symbolic of 
rioters’ own experiences, and connected with a narrative of police illegitimacy 
and brutality (Guardian & LSE, 2011: 18; Morrell et al., 2011: 5). Indeed, as 
the video footage will reveal, violence emerged on the 8th of August in 
Hackney in response to a police operation beginning with stop and searches, 
before attempting to forcefully close down the main high street in the area.  
A brief look back at the 1980s reveals that similarities between the type of 
anti-police action that “encapsulate[d] all that leads people to become 
disaffected, [and] angry” (Reicher & Stott, 2011: 38%). In other words, the 
events that precipitated riots were interpreted as extreme actions, but 
representative of, and located within a broader context of discrimination and 
mistreatment by the police.  
In 1981, riots in Moss Side (Manchester), Toxteth (Liverpool) and Handsworth 
(Birmingham) were all preceded by stop and search operations targeting the 
local population, generally young black men (Waddington, 2003: 90). In 1985 
Toxteth would see rioting again after a protest over the arrest of four black 
men, and Handsworth after a dispute over a parking ticket between police and 
a black man (Ball, 2012; Fazakarley, 2010; Waddington, 1992).  
Brixton’s first riots in April 1981 began after a police officer stopped a young 
black man who had been stabbed and was running through the streets, the 
interpretation of the on-looking public was that the police were trying to kill him 
(Waddington, 1992: 81-3). The following day disorder erupted again following 
‘Swamp 81’, a stop and search campaign that predominantly targeted black 
individuals (Delsol & Shiner, 2006: 245; Keith, 1993: 152; Phillips & Bowling, 
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2007: 435; Waddington, 2003: 81-3). Stop and search, at the time colloquially 
known as ‘sus’ laws,14 had for a long time been used to harass minorities, 
particularly, although not exclusively, young black men (Ball, 2012; Bradford, 
2015; Delsol & Shiner, 2006; Keith, 1993; Lea & Young, 1982; Waddington, 
1992). 
Amongst the communities that saw rioting in the 1980s, a relatively frequent 
response to police operations and in particular stop and search, was crowds 
of people gathering, questioning, and resisting the police’s actions (Keith, 
1993; Waddington, 1992). Ultimately, such actions suggest that the police are 
neither trusted nor viewed as legitimate, and thus are challenged often 
resulting in violence. Brixton’s second riots in July 1981 came after an 
aggressive raid on a number of houses by police in an area known as a 
‘frontline’ between police and the black community; the raids would cause 
damage, finding nothing, and were seen as ‘revenge’ by police for the earlier 
riots (Ball, 2012: 170-1; Keith, 1993: 131). 
Bristol’s rioting in the previous year began in the context of a police raid on a 
cafe in St. Paul’s, another ‘frontline’, with the aim of finding alcohol and 
cannabis on the premises (Ball, 2012: 285-8; Reicher & Stott, 2011). The cafe 
had a history of police raids and in 1979 had lost its liquor licence, which was 
popularly viewed as an act of police racism. Ball (ibid) notes that the police 
came in force for what was a small cafe, acted aggressively to customers who 
had done nothing wrong, and arrested the owner and one man found with 
alcohol. Ultimately perceiving the incident as a police ‘robbery’ and another 
injustice, the crowd intervened (ibid).  
The rioting in Hackney in 1981 was preceded by a number of incidents of 
minor disorder, indicating raised tensions; however, again the iconic event 
would also be a police raid on a café, which Keith describes as a ‘social focus’ 
of the surrounding black community (ibid: 151-2). This was another area that 
had been a focus of confrontation between the police and the black 
community, and once again, this event was perceived as another example of 																																																								
14 ‘Sus’ refers to suspicion, as the power allowed the police to stop, search, and even arrest 
based on their suspicions. 
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the police injustice. However, in light of the regular emergence of rioting, often 
left underreported, what is also worth noting is that, as Keith (1993: 70) 
argues, the riots of 1980s were neither novel nor fundamentally different to 
the ‘everyday’ experiences on streets of London.  
Rather what some of these occurrences did represent was both a quantitative 
and qualitative increase in the scale and seriousness of violence and 
vandalism. During his research Keith found that it was not uncommon for 
police to be confronted by hostile crowds, largely black, sometimes being 
attacked and losing the arrested parties to the crowd, (ibid: 145). These would 
often result in clashes but escalation was facilitated by a moment that 
appeared symbolically important, and enabled a group of people to gather 
and unite. 
Waddington (1992: 80) notes that many instances of disorder involving 
violence against the police were under-reported, particularly between 1982-4. 
Similarly, Ball (2012) notes that throughout July 1981 there were around 200 
instances of disorder across the country, only a few of these would become 
large enough to be labelled ‘riots’. In other words, despite the apparent 
sudden appearance of large-scale disorder, ‘riots’ were not aberrations or 
truly unexpected to anyone paying attention to what was occurring in the 
everyday.  
Indeed, it is not surprising then that the death of black individual resulting from 
interactions with police often formed the ‘iconic event’. Such an event would 
clearly constitute the most extreme outcome of interactions between black 
individuals and the police, and would also function as the most extreme 
instance of disrespect – that black people’s lives are without value. Thus, 
Brixton was to see rioting again in 1985 after the shooting and paralysation of 
a black woman, Cherry Groce, during a police raid on her home in search of 
her son (BBC, 2014; ICI, 1989: 222), and again in 1995 after the death of 
black man in police custody (NYT, 1995).  
The Brixton riots in 1985 were followed closely by disorder at Broadwater 
Farm in Haringey. One week prior to the violence at Broadwater Farm police 
had positioned themselves at the main entrance to the estate and conducted 
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a stop and search operation on people entering. This seemingly served to 
raise tensions and antagonise local residents, with complaints relating to the 
arbitrary nature and abusive treatment by police (Davis, 1989). However, the 
iconic event was again the death of a black person, Cynthia Jarrett, when 
police raided her house (BBC, 2014; Moxon, 2011; Waddington, 2003: 91-2).  
The raid had come after police had arrested her son for assaulting a police 
officer after a stop for an out-of-date tax disk. Not only were the charges of 
assault not believed, but it was widely believed that police had illegally 
entered his mother’s flat, using his keys and without a warrant, and pushed 
her to the floor. The police claimed Cynthia Jarrett died of heart failure, 
nevertheless, it was another death of a black person at the hands of the police 
and would prompt a hostile response by the community (Reicher & Stott, 
2011: 38%; Waddington, 2003: 91-2).  
 5.3.1. Beyond the Iconic Event 
As we have seen, Duggan’s death was framed by politicians and one major 
report (RCVP, 2011) as largely irrelevant to the rioting outside of Tottenham, 
and thus utilised to argue that the police’s behaviour was not causally 
involved – instead it was about looting and greed. Other than the rather 
obvious political motive of diminishing the state and police’s role, this narrative 
is made possible by the amount of looting and by the admittance of some 
rioters that they did not care or know about Duggan (e.g. Slovo, 2012: 29; 
Treadwell et al., 2013: 5).  
However, to make such an argument not only homogenises all rioters, it 
neglects evidence to the contrary; for instance, while some rioters appear not 
to have cared or thought about Duggan, this was not the same for all rioters. 
Duggan was often referenced around London and to a lesser extent outside 
London; moreover, discontent with police behaviour appears to have 
remained a relative constant (Guardian & LSE, 2011: 18; Morrell et al., 2011: 
5 & 27). As Morrell et al. (2011: 5) point out, although Duggan is mentioned 
less outside of London, police behaviour remained a relative constant 
reference point. 
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Such events and the response to them highlight the interpretive framework 
through which the police are viewed. This interpretive framework tells us 
about how the perception of the police has been shaped at the pre-reflexive 
and affective level. In turn, this connects to the experiences of the individuals 
and the context that made these events meaningful. In other words, we see 
that black communities particularly, but not alone, perceive any police actions, 
legitimate or not, with suspicion and often respond as if that action was an 
aggressive or hostile act.  
Maria, like any of us, cannot know if police actually planted the gun, but she 
believed they did. The community of Tottenham, or beyond cannot know if the 
police murdered Mark Duggan, but many appear to have believed they did. 
The death of Cynthia Jarrett perhaps could have been pure coincidence, but 
residents of Broadwater Farm did not believe it so. Indeed, perhaps most 
telling is the young black man who had been stabbed in Brixton, 1981. Upon 
realising the man had been stabbed the police had tried to get him to a 
hospital; however, not trusting the police, the wounded man had tried to get 
away and the gathering onlookers made the assumption that the police were 
trying to kill him (Waddington, 1992: 81-3). In both the 1980s and 2011 then, 
the object of the police was prompting hostile affective responses prior to, and 
shaping, reflection or interpretation.  
 
5.4. The ‘Nature’ of the Riots: 1980 to 2011 
 5.4.1. Looting and Criminality? 
While the 1980s were framed as about ‘race’ and thus ‘political’, 2011 would 
become the ‘consumer riot’ of greedy criminals (Cameron, 2011; Clarke, 2011; 
RCVP, 2011). Rather than fundamentally different however, these were 
simply different outcomes of the contest between those voicing discontent and 
those seeking to maintain the status quo. Indeed, despite the lack of 
comprehensive coverage, there is evidence indicating that a not insignificant 
amount of looting occurred in the 1980s riots (Fazakarley, 2010; Keith, 1993; 
Waddington, 1992). This is not to argue against the important role of racism in 
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the 1980s, but rather to point to the complexity of riots that is concealed by 
the narrative clarity and political contest that occurs after the events.  
The 1980s saw similar attempts to frame events as about criminal behaviour, 
with politicians and media repeatedly seeking to frame rioting throughout as 
about black communities’ ‘criminality’, ‘greed’, and even their biological 
inferiority and cultural incompatibility (Ball, 2012: 32-3; Fazakarley, 2010; 
Jackson, 2003: 146; Nassy Brown, 2005: 63; Scraton, 1982: 34). Indeed, 
despite what would now be considered the blatant institutional racism of 
police and the state in the 1980s, Thatcher, in strikingly similar terms to 
Cameron’s response to 30 years later, stated the disorder was simply a ‘spree 
of naked greed’ and ‘criminal violence’ (quoted in Jackson, 2003: 146).15  
Despite these discursive attempts, it appears that this narrative did not stick in 
the long term. This is likely due to the iconic events that provoked riots, the 
continuous involvement of black individuals, an increasing rejection of racism, 
attacks on the police appearing to form the vast majority of riot actions as 
opposed to looting, and accounts from rioters, witnesses, reports, and 
academic research all implicating issues of police discrimination, racism, and 
deprivation (e.g. Ball, 2012; Davis, 1989; ICI, 1989; Harrison, 1999; Keith, 
1993; Lea & Young, 1982; Reicher & Stott, 2011; Scarman, 1982; Thomas, 
2012; Waddington, 1992).  
Despite the similarity in terms of iconic event in 2011, the response was again 
that the riots were about looting, greed, and criminality (Cameron, 2011; 
Clarke, 2011; RCVP, 2011), and this time it stuck. In comparison with the 
1980s, this claim was at least better supported by data demonstrating the 
greater amount of looting that occurred in 2011, with 51% of recorded crimes 
being recorded against commercial premises in the 2011 riots (THO, 
2011:13). Firstly, however, we must be careful not to assume that looting is 
simply about the acquisition of goods, but is also a social act with meaning 
(Platts-Fowler, 2013). For Ray (2014) looting in 2011 functioned as a form of 
symbolic resistance, a display that rejects the law and authority that excludes 																																																								15	Thatcher’s Home Secretary would also state the rioting in Handsworth in 1985 were 
instances of ‘criminality’ (Fazakarley, 2010). 
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them. 
Moreover, similar to Bristol in 1980, Reicher and Stott (2011: 64%) note that in 
Ealing, West London, in 2011, shops, boutiques, and cars considered external 
or oppressive of the local community were smashed but not looted. Indeed, 
while looting appears to have been the dominant type of act in 2011, it should 
be noted that the police’s categorisation of recorded crimes which is used to 
quantify the amount of looting, also includes ‘damage to premises’ (THO, 
2011: 13). That damage was done to commercial premises does not actually 
necessitate ‘looting’, but might also indicate forms of vandalism and thus 
potentially relate to anger at, or alienation from dominant society. The point 
here is firstly that once we begin to look beneath the surface, the picture is 
much more complicated than the initial narratives we are offered.  
5.4.2 Anti-Police Riots?  
The riots of the 1980s have been popularly framed as anti-police violence 
carried out by black communities while the smaller amounts of looting that 
occurred were pushed to the background; 2011, however, has reversed this 
neglect, and it is the attacks on police that have been pushed to the back of 
the picture.16 As with the looting, the minor role of attacks on police appears to 
be supported by official statistics for 2011, which posit that the targeting of 
police or their property constituted just 6% of recorded crime during the riots 
(THO, 2011: 4). However, this figure is arguably even more problematic than 
that which is used to imply looting. How attacks on the police or property were 
recorded, and what exactly constituted this category of act, is problematically 
not detailed.  
For instance, is it the case that crowds hurling missiles are recorded as a 
single crime, multiple crimes, or at all? Were the police recording each 
incident of an individual throwing a missile at them? Or each time an 
individual attacked them but was not arrested? Moreover, were attacks on 																																																								16	Generally, those who took this position only accepted the role of anger against the in 
Tottenham (Cameron, 2011; RCVP, 2011). This argument seems to imply in Tottenham was 
‘justified’ by Duggan’s death - for to say otherwise might be too politically damaging - whereas 
elsewhere there can be no possible reason for attacking the police other than immorality of 
rioters.	
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police stations or vehicles by large groups recorded as a single crime? Or 
what about attacks on police vehicles by crowds as they were driving? It 
would seem unlikely that the police, under attack and under resourced, could 
accurately quantify or record these as crimes.  
Furthermore, the only partially useful figure with regards to prosecutions17 in 
2011, which might be more informative regarding the number of participants, 
is that of ‘violent disorder’ (an act involving 3 or more individuals), which 
applied to 18% of all those sentenced (MoJ(a), 2012: 6). While it may indicate 
a greater involvement of violence, unfortunately this is not broken down by 
target thus we do not know to what extent this occurred against the police, 
and who or how many were involved.18 Consequently, the official statistics 
provides us with very little useful information about violence against police, 
where it happened, or who committed such acts. 
However, if we take other forms of data the attacks on the police in 2011 
seem to take a more prominent role. Of the three major reports, two identified 
police-relations as important and relevant beyond Tottenham (Guardian & 
LSE, 2011; Morrell et al., 2011: 4-5). Specifically, Reading the Riots reports 
that 85% of their 270 interviewees rated the police as an ‘important’ or ‘very 
important’ factor in why the riots occurred, identifying feelings of injustice and 
discrimination (Guardian & LSE, 2011: 18).  
Newburn et al(a). (2016: 7) who worked on the Reading the Riots study state 
the ‘overwhelming’ finding in 2011 was a sense of anger towards the police. 
The report also found that many people around the country referring to the 
police as the ‘biggest gang’, emphasising that many thought the police to be a 
‘law unto themselves’ (ibid). By comparing their results to the British Crime 
Survey the study found that nationally 56% of respondents stated that the 
police were doing a good job compared to 7% of rioters interviewed (Guardian 
& LSE, 2011: 20). In particular, ‘stop and search’ was particularly emphasised 
by many as a source of discontent (ibid: 19-20).  																																																								
17 No figures regarding arrests for ‘attacks on the police’ were available. 18	I made an FOI request to the Ministry of Justice regarding this breakdown, but was refused 
on the grounds that it would exceed the apportioned cost due to gathering and collating 
information from different organisations/forces.	
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Moreover, a brief examination of anecdotal evidence also indicates a similar 
picture: the Metropolitan Police reported wide-scale violence and the use of 
weapons and petrol bombs against them, along with 217 injuries to officers 
(MPS, 2012; RCVP, 2011: 26).19 Indeed, as in the 1980s, 2011 saw multiple 
instances of rioters specifically targeting police stations and property (e.g. 
Carter(a); 2011; Carter(c), 2011; Prasad(c), 2011), and descriptive accounts 
from police concur, with one inspector stating: “I’ve not seen violence on that 
scale, or that much hatred for the uniform.” (Slovo, 2012: 24).20  
Utilising a situational analysis of video footage in 2011, seeking to identify 
locations and the different types of actions in riot footage, Reicher and Stott 
(2011: 64-5%) argue that the extent of clashes with the police varied by area, 
but was present in many. This violence, they argue, was about displaying 
power as an end in itself, indicated by signs of pleasure amongst the rioters 
(ibid: 58%). Other rioters corroborate this sentiment. In a news-television 
interview (on YouTube) during the riots, one young, male rioter from 
Manchester (covering his face) stated: 
[I’m here] to piss the police off, you get me […] The police nicking 
[arresting] for stupid things mate, and this is our payback cos they 
can’t do nothing to us today. (Manchester riot, 2011, 0.57).  
Similarly: 
They [the police] mostly aggravate teenagers these days, and 
they'll stop you for no reason, and they'll rough you up [laughs], just 
rough you up for no particular reason. People were screaming out: 
'This is for Mark [Duggan].' (male, Tottenham, Carter(f), 2011) 
These remarks parallel complaints made throughout the 1980s (Delsol & 
Shiner, 2006; Harrison, 1992; Keith, 1993; Waddington, 1992). Indeed, 
Sheldon Thomas, a black man who rioted in Brixton 1981 and now works to 																																																								
19 While this figure is much smaller than the injuries to the police in the 1980s, with Brixton’s 
first riot in 1981 alone nearly doubling this figure (Ball, 2012: 27-8), this is not necessarily 
meaningful due to 30 years of improvement in police tactics and equipment, meaning the 
likelihood of injury is reduced. 20	For similar accounts from officers noting the hostility and violence they faced see MPS, 
2012.	
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get young men out of gangs and crime, described his experience: “When the 
first of our bricks hit the meat wagon (the police van), that was it […] This was 
going to be our night, this was payback for years of systematic bullying and 
exploitation” (black male, Thomas, 2012: 120). These rioters clearly express 
anger in relation to the police and their treatment of them, and, in part, their 
purpose seems to have been to get ‘payback’. Indeed, in both periods it is the 
opposition to the police that enabled rioters to come together: “You can have 
an anti-police riot without systematic looting, but you can’t have systematic 
looting without an anti-police riot.” (Reicher and Stott. 2011: 73%) 
5.4.3.The Meaning of the Police: Babylon and Gangs 
We can begin to better understand this opposition to the police, and provide 
further evidence for the central role of police, by examining each period’s 
common and derogatory terms for the police. In the 1980s the police were 
often referred to as ‘Babylon’ in black communities (e.g. Harrison, 1992: 359; 
Thomas, 2012). The term derived from Rastafarianism, a political/religious 
movement that saw repatriation to Ethiopia as the solution to Western 
discrimination and the powerlessness visited upon black communities (Gates 
Jr, 1976: 310).  
The meaning comes from the Old Testament and connects to a powerful, 
oppressive force (the state or city of Babylon) and references injustice or 
enslavement visited upon a people, against which they should struggle. While 
the term Babylon is still employed today, or has re-emerged in London slang, 
this was not the term commonly employed in 2011 and appears to be 
disconnected from its politico-religious origins. However, the term that was 
commonly employed – the ‘biggest gang’ (Clifton(b), 2011; Guardian & LSE, 
2011: 18; RCVP, 2011: 67) – has a similar meaning.  
Newburn et al. describe the emotional and cognitive underpinnings of the 
‘biggest gang’ as being “profoundly distrustful of the police, often viewed the 
police service monolithically as a single, hostile force” (Newburn et al.(b), 
2016: 15). One rioter stated that a gang meant those who ‘intimidated’ the 
public, and according to him the police were the ‘worst gang’ (Guardian & 
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LSE, 2011: 18).  
The similarity is straightforward: both the ‘biggest gang’ and ‘Babylon’ position 
the police as a dominant, oppressive force, and it is this position and the 
treatment this implies that constituted a focal point of struggle and for the 
release of their anger. However, the difference is also telling; while Babylon 
connects both to the experiences an ideology of resistance emerging from 
black communities, the biggest gang retains the emphasis on domination but 
lacks any reference to the experiences of an ‘us’ and instead references a 
criminal structure – the police are simply the most powerful and resented. 
5.4.2. Social Identity and the Common Enemy 
As these terms begin to suggest, the police were not simply a target but 
actually played a central role in producing the rioting through a common 
opposition: “the genesis of conflict derives from the relationship between the 
identities (and the associated understandings) of different groups” (Stott & 
Reicher, 1998a: 512). In both the 1980s and 2011 the broader disorder was 
made possible through groups of people joining together to challenge the 
police through the intersubjective view of police as illegitimate and a source of 
disrespect.  
In the 1980s riots this unification was often possible due to the sense of black 
identity and the connections between this and feelings of injustice at racist 
treatment by the police. As we have seen, these conditions resulted in the 
relatively regular occurrences of crowds of largely black people gathering to 
protest or resist police stop and searches and arrests (Ball, 2012: 266; 
Harrison, 1999; Keith, 1993; Waddington, 1992).  
Harrison recalls of his time in Hackney in 1981 that there was a lot of talk 
amongst young men of the “matter of group honour: the police, as a clan, had 
humiliated young blacks, as a clan, and clan revenge had to be exacted” 
(1992: 352; also see Ball, 2012; Keith, 1993). Similarly, Thomas (2012: 120) 
describes how when the riots first began his ‘posse’ united with another, 
violent Brixton gang, and under the direction of their leader, attacked the 
police. Their experience as black people at the hands of the police overcame 
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their own rivalries.  
In other words, it was not simply a race-based identity that enabled individuals 
to unite, but rather anger at the police both contributed to the formation of 
notions of ‘black’ identity, and functioned to produce resistance to the police 
and state. Indeed, as we began to see with the iconic events, there was a 
common disposition towards the police. This disposition was one of mistrust 
and resentment, and appeared to unify rioters in opposition to the police.  
The importance of connecting the police (and state) to the formation of identity 
and resistance, is that we can note that, to some extent, this process was also 
producing social identities across ethnicities in Bristol, Liverpool, Manchester, 
and London (Ball, 2012; Bloom, 2012: 108; Harrison, 1992; Keith, 1993). Ball 
(2012) in particular notes that in Bristol many white young men were 
experiencing similar hostile treatment by police, and empathising with black 
people, often their friends, albeit over their qualitatively worse treatment by 
the police.  
In 2011 we see the police play a similar role in uniting rioters. Again, we can 
note that the ‘opportunity’ was not mindless, but rather as the 2011 the Home 
Affairs Committee stated: “The single most important reason why the disorder 
spread was the perception, relayed by television as well as new social media, 
that in some areas the police had lost control of the streets” (HAC, 2011: 36). 
Once it was perceived that the police had lost their power, people gathered to 
‘test reactions’ and the first riot successes encouraged others to do the same 
(RCVP, 2011: 12).  
This does not necessarily indicate that the police were universally disliked or 
that every rioter was motivated to ‘test’ the police, as rioters may have used 
the situation for looting. Nevertheless, it does suggest that for many rioters the 
police had de facto authority, but lacked legitimacy or de jure authority. In 
other words, there was no disposition to obey, rather it was only the threat of 
force preventing the riots from spreading. 
Thus, for some rioters the perception that the police lost control may have 
simply enabled them to get caught up in excitement of the moment, or even to 
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go explicitly go looting; yet there were those who utilised this situation as an 
opportunity to attack the police. In Croydon, south London, the police received 
information that calls were being circulated on social media to join up to ‘fuck 
the feds’ (MPS, 2012: 73-4). In Hackney, as we will see from footage in 
chapter 9, it was the presence of the police on the main high street that 
caused people to gather and eventually violently oppose the police (Video 1). 
Reading the Riots reported that often “A sense of a common enemy, a 
common cause, brought members of gangs from different territories” 
(Guardian & LSE, 2011: 22). Others specifically reported different or rival 
‘estates’ working together, and even overcoming ethnic rivalries, to fight the 
police (Clifton(a); 2011; Prasad(a) 2011).  
In other words, what began in Tottenham through clashes with the police 
facilitated a sense of unity in other locales around the common opposition to 
police, strong enough to overcome other enmities. However, unlike the 1980s 
where small scale incidents of disorder were, with relative frequency, breaking 
out between largely black people and the police, in 2011 it seems the police 
had to be perceived to lose control before violence could emerge. Moreover, 
this time we see a social identity form across a much greater mix of 
ethnicities, with race-based identities appearing not to play a central role 
(Guardian & LSE, 2011; Morrell et al., 2011). 
What this brief examination suggests is, in the 1980s, the existence of a group 
or sense of an ‘us’ that exists prior to interactions with the police, but also in 
connection with an opposition to the police. Thus, rather than only the most 
extreme acts, any police action in relation to the black community brought with 
it the potential for violent resistance. In 2011, however, it was the police’s loss 
of power and the demonstration of this in the riot itself, that united and 
empowered individuals to act “together in a way that they rarely can’” (Arendt, 
1970: 83). In other words, in 2011 the riots appear to have functioned as a 
proto-Political moment, creating a social identity through the realisation of 
common enemy and purpose, and the plausibility of attacking the police: "You 
saw enemies become friends just for one day," (Newburn, et al., 2011).  
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5.5. Demographics of the Riots 
To explore this difference we need greater depth regarding who was involved. 
Thus far, we have demonstrated that the police not only formed a focus of 
violence in both periods of rioting, but that it was the common anger at police 
that, in part, enabled the unification of individuals and acts of collective 
violence. However, in noting the centrality of identity, hostile dispositions 
towards police, and factors such as race, we should also examine who was 
involved and what such demographic factors might mean. 
5.5.1. Age and Gender 
While the complexities of the topic at hand will mean that gender will not form 
a theorised aspect of the discussion,21 it is worth noting that one principle 
aspect that appears to match between the two periods is that of the 
disproportionate involvement of young males. In 2011 the statistical data, 
reveals the significant over-representation of males in the offence of disorder 
(violent disorder, public order and breach of the peace) with 803 men to 50 
women arrested across the country (THO, 2011: 18).22  While this is not 
broken down by attacks on police or property, video evidence (see list in 
bibliography) of attacks on the police reveal in all cases an over-
representation of males.  
Similarly, in 2011 the MoJ (a, 2012: 3) report that those aged 10-17 and 18-
20, constituted 27% and 26% of those brought before the courts respectively, 
and only 6% aged over 40. In London, those in the age categories 10-17 and 
18-24 made up 23% and 48% of arrests respectively (The Guardian(a), 2011: 
Annex table A6, A7, A8, & A10). 
																																																								
21 During my research evidence did suggest conceptions of masculinity, and notions of 
dominance and violence, that were interacting with experiences of exclusion, hostile policing, 
and shame. However, the evidence was suggestive rather than conclusive, and given the 
complexity of the topic it was decided this would not form an aspect of the discussion. In turn, 
it would also be worth exploring further the role of gender stereotypes, such as the 
expectations of violence from men as opposed to the ‘carer’ stereotype of women, in shaping 
stereotypes of the ‘criminal’. 
22 Males were over-represented in all forms of crime in the 2011 riots; however, relatively 
speaking this over-representation was greater in terms of the offence of disorder (for which 
24% of all males were arrested as opposed to 12% of females arrested), rather than for 
looting, (75% of females arrested were for acquisitive crimes, as opposed to 57% of males). 
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Gender and age and its involvement in the 1980s is generally under 
discussed or not referenced, and I was unable to find statistical data on 
gender in arrests/involvement in the 1980s. Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence 
does support a similar predominance of young males; for instance, Keith 
(1993) notes that while there is no neat definition of ‘the rioter’, violence 
clashes tend to occur between young black men and the police. Harrison’s 
(1992) witness account similarly reveals mainly young men rioting in Hackney 
in 1981. Waddington (1992: 81-3) further notes that it was largely young, 
black men who gathered and were shouting at police prior to the rioting in 
Brixton. Finally, Ball (2012) also points out that the crowd that formed in 
response to the raid on the café in St. Paul’s was predominantly male.  
Furthermore, we can also note that in 2011 complaints about police 
harassment and expressions of anger regarding the police, tend to indicate 
that it is young men, mostly black, who are being targeted by the police 
(Guardian & LSE, 2011: 4-5; MoJa, 2012: 3; The Guardian DataBlog, 2011: 
Annex table A9; THO, 2011). Analysis of antagonistic relations with police, 
harassment of members of the black community, and excessive stop and 
searches, all reveal that it is young men who have generally been principle 
target of police (Ball, 2012; Clancy, Hough, Aust, and Kershaw 2001; Delsol & 
Shiner, 2006; Hall et al., 1980; Harrison, 1992; ICI, 1989: 226; Keith, 1993; 
Waddington, 1992). To put it simply there is a correlation: it appears that 
young men are often the most targeted group for over-policing, and it also is 
young men who have disproportionately attacked the police. 
5.5.2. Race in the 1980s 
In the 1980s, the nature of the ‘iconic events’ that precipitated the above 
attacks on police, the disproportionate involvement of black men in the riots, 
and indeed, the over-policing and young black men, are more than suggestive 
as the causal involvement of racism. Yet despite this, the notion that race and 
racism were causally implicated was not immediately accepted. Indeed, while 
the dominant perception of the events of the 1980s appears to have, over 
time, become understood as a series of ‘race riots’, originally this was not so 
clear cut (for a fuller discussion of competing discourses see Ball, 2012).  
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For instance, competing efforts to frame the 1980s riots can be found in the 
response of the dominant group: Thatcher’s government propagated both 
explanations of ‘criminality’ (Jackson, 2003: 146), and paradoxically, explicitly 
racist arguments focusing on the problematic culture of immigrant groups, a 
perspective taken even further by the likes of Enoch Powell (Ball, 2012: 33-4). 
However, despite these attempts to depoliticise the rioting, the perspective 
that they were about racism has, in the long term, largely won out. 
While the statistical data available is partial, the evidence over the 
involvement of racism is clear. The violence in Notting Hill in the 1970s was 
accompanied by chants of ‘Soweto’, connecting the problems of apartheid 
South Africa to the racial discrimination of London (Gilroy, 2013: 552). Indeed, 
Thomas makes this same comparison: “We ran out into Brixton High Street, 
and what we saw reminded us of TV footage of Soweto in 1976, where there 
were thousands of black people on one side of the road and the police on the 
other” (2012: 120). 
From what we can know of events in London, attacks on the police appear to 
have been carried out in the main, by young black men; specifically, Keith 
notes that in Brixton first riots, 80% of those arrested for attacking the police 
were black (Keith, 1993: 104). Moreover, St. Paul’s in Bristol, Brixton, 
Haringey (Tottenham/Broadwater Farm), Hackney (Dalston and Stoke 
Newington) in London, Handsworth in Birmingham, Toxteth in Liverpool, and 
Moss Side in Manchester all had higher than average ethnic minority 
populations and were the focus of racial tensions prior to the rioting (Ball, 
2012; Davis, 1989; Keith, 1993; Scraton, 1982; Waddington, 1992). However, 
while there are clear parallels in the attacks on the police between the two 
periods, when we examine the data for the involvement of race in 2011 we 
again see the indications of the involvement of race, but its extent and impact 
is much less clear. 
5.5.3 Race in 2011 
The state produced data discussed here comes from The Home Office (THO, 
2011) and the Ministry of Justice (MoJ(a), 2012). These reports compile data 
on those arrested, prosecuted, and crimes recorded. While state recorded 
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data allows a more comprehensive examination of the numbers and 
demographics involved, we should briefly note that these are not 
representative. The main issue, which is that police made the majority of 
arrests through identifying known subjects on CCTV footage (HAC, 2011: 8-
9), leading to a bias in the arrest process (for a fuller discussion see Ball and 
Drury 2012). Moreover, as noted, there is no demographic breakdown of the 
attacks on the police, meaning we cannot know what types of people were 
typically involved in this type of act. Nevertheless, it does provide the best 
available opportunity to develop an idea of those involved, and this can be 
supported by qualitative data and accounts. 
The data available on the 3,051 brought before the courts reveal that 41% 
self-identified as white, 38% as black, 12% as of mixed origin, and 7% as 
Asian, (MoJ(a), 2012: 4). However, nationally these figures cannot tell us 
much as the ethnic make-up of areas where disturbances occurred results in 
large differences in the ethnic make-up of rioters. The number of individuals 
brought before the courts in London by June 2012 was 2194 (MoJ(a), 2012: 
13); of these 627 (33%) identified themselves as ‘white’, 855 (46%) classified 
themselves as ‘black’, and 222 (10%) as of mixed backgrounds.23 ⁠  
Unlike the 1980s therefore, we seem to see a much greater involvement of 
white individuals. Yet despite this shift, if we consider this in relation to the 
ethnic make-up of London, it does suggest that the structural experiences of 
racism that come with being a black person influenced involvement. London in 
2011 had a population of just over 8 million, of these ‘white’ constituted around 
4.8 million, ‘black’ just over 1 million, and ‘mixed’ ethnicity just over 400,000 
(Nomis, 2011). Looking at these figures we can note that despite being over 4 
times less numerous than the white population, as well as making up roughly 
1/8th of London’s population, black people constituted nearly one half of all 
participants brought before the courts in London, while those of mixed 
ethnicity constituted less than 1/16th of the overall population, but formed 
1/10th of all participants. 																																																								23	Similar figures are also provided by The Home Office (THO, 2011) and Reading the Riots 
(Guardian & LSE, 2011: 13; The Guardian, 2011: Annex table A9). 
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Indeed, almost all of the boroughs that saw rioting in London have significant 
ethnic minority, and in particular black, populations (The Guardian DataBlog, 
2011: Table 1.14 courts). Furthermore, as of the 12th October 2011, every 
borough in London had seen more black people brought before the court than 
any other group, while in each case white people formed the second largest 
group (The Guardian DataBlog, 2011: Table 1.12 courts). Of course, I have 
noted the potential bias in the process of making arrests may have led to an 
over-representation of young black men in the data. However, if this is the 
case it also serves to reinforce the notion that structural racism is a relevant 
factor. 
Findings from qualitative research back up such a perspective. All three major 
reports note the prevalence of complaints against the police across ethnicity, 
but specifically from black individuals against the police, particularly noting the 
use of stop and search against black males, (Guardian & LSE, 2011: 4-5 & 
18-20; Morrell et al., 2011: 5-7 & 13; RCVP, 2011: 71). In conjunction with the 
statistics, this seems to paint a clear picture. Yet there is a problem which 
relates to the fact that none of the three major reports distinguish between 
‘race’ as a structural factor of exclusion, and ‘race’ as a lived category in self-
worth and identity formation.  
Indeed, Reading the Riots found that unlike the 1980s, 2011 was generally 
not conceived of as a ‘race riot’; instead, the study found what tended to 
group participants together was rioters were ‘generally poorer’ (Guardian & 
LSE, 2011: 4-5). Yet, despite this finding, the study fails to examine the 
complex role race seems to have played. The question of ‘race’ in 2011 is 
generally left under-explained and ‘racism’ only appears to be understood as 
an issue in relation to policing. The question is not asked, if race only relates 
to the police (or indeed, only in Tottenham as RCVP weakly argue), why do 
we see amongst rioters both a disproportionate involvement of black youth 
and a significant over representation of markers of poverty and exclusion. 
5.6. Complicating Race 
Despite de-politicising discursive attempts to the contrary, there is no doubt 
that in both periods, race and racism were involved. Indeed, if it were the case 
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that the 2011 riots were ‘not about race’ (Cameron, 2011b), the involvement 
of black rioters in London should represent something closer to 13%, in line 
with the ethnic make up of the city. Instead, in terms of involvement ‘black’ 
constitutes the largest ethnic grouping in London, and second largest in 
England. Nevertheless, I want to point out that the narrative of ‘race’ and ‘race 
riots’ have problematically inhibited understanding of the broader social 
processes, and arguably enabled the likes of Cameron to dismiss ‘race’ as a 
relevant factor in 2011.  
Simply put the involvement of race and racism has been oversimplified in the 
1980s, and underplayed in 2011. The point is not to downplay racism’s role, 
but rather to help us understand the changing levels of involvement by 
ethnicity, and the changes in forms of resistance between these two periods. 
Neither 2011 nor the 1980s were ‘race riots’, but riots about disempowerment 
and disrespect manifesting in historically specific ways relating to the 
modalities of exclusion/distinction. 
5.6.1 Same Place, Different Time? 
One interesting piece of evidence that not only reveals the 
interconnectedness of the 1980s and 2011, but also helps us complicate the 
explanations of the periods of rioting, is that many of the areas that saw rioting 
in 2011 were the same places that had seen rioting in the 1980s. Salford in 
Manchester, St. Paul’s in Bristol, Toxteth in Liverpool, Handsworth in 
Birmingham, Chapel Town in Leeds, and in London, Brixton, Hackney, 
Haringey, Walthamstow, Acton, and Peckham to name a few, all saw rioting in 
both periods.  
Indeed, this comparison reveals part of the problem with analysing a ‘riot’ as a 
temporally closed off process, and how the narrative construction hides the 
interconnectedness of these events. As with 2011, in the 1980s these ‘riots’ 
often occurred in response to earlier events in different locales, often involved 
attacks on the police, and often by black and marginalised youths in the inner 
cities of England (Ball, 2012; Keith, 1993; Waddington, 1992).  
Indeed, if we stop trying to analyse the narrative construction of temporally 
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and spatially delimited ‘riot’, we will begin to note that the 1980s and 2011 
rioting, while separated by up to three decades, are both historically specific 
symptoms of the same on going processes. Taking this logic, it is not that the 
1980s were about race and 2011 was not; the issue is why, if we see the data 
indicating the involvement of race and racism in both periods, did the 1980s 
produce race-based resistance, yet in many of the same areas and estates, 
2011 did not? 
5.6.2 Social and Economic Exclusion: 1980s 
The re-occurrence of rioting in the same areas in 2011 is not a coincidence, 
but a common response to the on-going social and economic exclusion. 
Indeed, looking underneath ‘race’ reveals this is what structurally grouped 
both black and white rioters. This is particularly visible in both the ethnically 
mixed St. Paul’s and largely white Southmead, in Bristol.  
Whilst having a different ethnic make up, both had higher than average 
numbers of semi or unskilled labour, although St. Paul’s had less skilled 
workers (Ball, 2012: 219). In terms of long-term unemployment Southmead 
was slightly higher than average, whereas St. Paul’s was 3 times that of 
Bristol, arguably due to the combined impact of recession and racial 
discrimination; however, perhaps more importantly, both areas had huge rates 
of youth unemployment (under 25) with some locales or wards in these areas 
reporting over 80% (Ball, 2012: 224-5).  
Similarly, the area of Hackney (Dalston/Stoke Newington) that saw rioting also 
had a large ethnic minority population, but again only 27 per cent of families in 
1981 had a ‘head’ from a Commonwealth country (Harrison, 1992: 371-2). 
Again, the issues faced by this community related to poverty, deprivation and 
disrespect, with Hackney ranked as the poorest borough in London in the 
1980s (Keith, 1993: 35) after a massive declining in manufacturing jobs in the 
1970s (Harrison, 1992: 50-1).  
In Liverpool Wally Brown, a black man and member of the Liverpool 8 
defence committee set up to mediate between the community of Toxteth and 
government/police after the riots, stated: “The Thatcher government did very 
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little in actually putting in real jobs, improving the housing, improving the 
quality of life for black people in Toxteth (Playing the Race Card, 1999). 
Similarly, Scraton analysing the situation at the time argues that no realistic 
attempt has been made to alleviate the poverty and unemployment “which 
has trapped the black community” (1982: 25). White communities, albeit to 
lesser extents, also shared these sorts of conditions and experiences, 
resulting in the possibility of identifying with the black community through 
similar experiences: “Blacks and Whites joined in common cause against the 
police” (Nassy Brown, 2005: 65; also see Tyler, 2013). 
 5.6.3. Social and Economic Exclusion: 2011 
Turning to 2011 then, we can again note that it is not simply the same areas 
that are seeing rioting, but the same economic and social conditions. The 
Home Office reported that of the areas that were affected by disorder in 2011, 
42% were in the top quartile for the most deprived areas (THO, 2011: 9), while 
55% of the areas that experienced rioting were ranked in the worst 10% of 
areas in terms of long term unemployment (RCVP, 2011: 55).  
Utilising both their data and that from the Ministry of Justice, Reading the 
Riots argues that around 59% of arrestees came from the most deprived 20% 
of areas in the UK, while only 3% came from the richest areas (Guardian & 
LSE, 2011: 14).24 Nationally, as of February 2012, 46% (151) of those aged 
10-17 brought before the courts lived in the ’10% lowest income areas’ (NYA, 
2012: 3); while of the 192 10-17 year olds brought before the courts in 
London, 82 (43%) were in the lowest income decile, a further 41 (21%) and 33 
(17%) in the second and third lowest decile respectively (The Guardian, 2011: 
Table 4.10b). 
As of 28/09/11, 1,344 individuals had been found guilty for disorder related 
crimes before the courts, 78% of these were confirmed as registered on the 
Department of Work and Pensions database (Gavin, 2014: vi). While in later 
figures regarding the total amount of those brought before the courts, 40% of 
adults were claiming a DWP benefit and 35% were claiming out of work 																																																								
24 RCVP (2011: 11) similarly calculates that 70% of rioters prosecuted came from the top 30% 
of most deprived postcodes. 
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benefits, compared to the national average of the population of 15% and 12% 
respectively (The Guardian, 2011: table 4.1 & 4.6). While for London, 40% of 
those arrested were unemployed (THO, 2011: 18). In other words, a greater 
amount of involvement appears to correlate with greater levels of poverty and 
deprivation. Thus, as with the 1980s rioters are grouped together by indicators 
of exclusion or the fact that rioters were ‘generally poorer’ (Guardian & LSE, 
2011: 4-5). 
The more comprehensive, although still flawed, data available for the 2011 
riots has not only allowed better insight into the conditions of rioters, it has 
also enabled better understanding of the forms of exclusion. For instance, it 
was not just employment and poverty that grouped many rioters in 2011, but 
also education. Thus, while the link could be made that riot hit areas and 
black communities in the 1980s were more likely to be underperforming in 
education (Harrison, 1992), Reading the Riots found specifically that rioters in 
2011 were more likely to be educated to a lower standard than the general 
population (Guardian & LSE, 2011: 14).  
Gavin notes that compared to the average population, 10-17 year olds 
brought before the courts were not only more likely to have been excluded 
from their schools, these individuals consistently performed worse over a 
series of educational measures (Gavin, 2014: vi; NYA, 2012: 3-4). While 
RCVP reports that 66% of the same group have special educational needs (3 
times higher than the population), 36% had been excluded from school at 
least once, and for those who had taken GCSEs only one in 10 achieved 5 A-
C grades compared to the population average of one in two (RCVP, 2011: 30).  
The point is simply this: as practices and capitals can be mapped onto the 
social space through the position of class, such as football and the working 
class (Atkinson, 2010: 55-6), so to can riotous behaviours be mapped to the 
most excluded and disrespected of a society. What we will see in any riot that 
aims at the police or state is a greater involvement of those most 
disempowered and disrespected. We see a greater involvement from the 
black dominated groups because of their position in the social hierarchy below 
the excluded white working class, constituting a ’super-exploited’ and 
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disrespected section of the dominated stratum (Hall et al., 1980: 389-90).  
5.6.4. ‘Race’ or Disrespect? 
To note the similar conditions of rioters, black and white, in the 1980s is not to 
say that structural stereotypes of ‘black’ did not result in being excluded to a 
greater extent from social and economic resources. Moreover, nor should this 
be taken to mean that ‘racism’ does not imply a different lived experience. The 
point is simply that what makes race and class important is not the logics that 
underpin them, but the manner and extent to which these are utilised to 
reproduce the social hierarchy, and necessarily to exclude and thus 
disrespect individuals. 
The value in making this point becomes clearer when we try to explain the 
rather messier 2011 riots, which as we have seen also indicates the role of 
structural racism, but alongside an increasing involvement of white individuals 
and a reduced identification of ‘race’ as an issue. We cannot simply argue that 
2011 were ‘race riots’, but we also cannot simply dismiss the involvement of 
race – what is required is a more nuanced way of picking out the involvement 
of race. As has been argued race is a logic of exclusion/distinction connected 
to the social hierarchy that groups individuals together, and a related form of 
identity (Bulmer & Solomos, 1999; Lee, 2017). Consequently, logics of 
exclusion shift in order to maintain the social hierarchy and relations of 
privilege and disadvantage. As these shift, so Bourdieusian class changes 
and along with it the experiences and forms of identification of those grouped 
and excluded.  
Indeed, while the 1980s was clearly about race, the lines were not as evident 
as one might expect. In St. Paul’s, Bristol the anger at the police produced a 
form of solidarity amongst the community that cut across ethnicity (Ball, 2012: 
442). Reicher and Stott (2011: 41%) similarly argue the Bristol riots were 
related to a ‘local identity’ or community and a shared feeling of being 
exploited by police and the state.  
Why there was solidarity across ethnicity relates to the fact that the popular 
view of St. Paul’s as a ‘black area’ was mistaken; in 1981 it was a poor, inner 
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city area with a mixed-ethnic population, with only around one third of 
households being of Caribbean, African, or Pakistani descent (Ball, 2012: 
217). In addition to the complexity of St. Paul’s, Knowle West and Southmead, 
which also saw rioting were a predominantly, although not exclusively, white 
estates. Yet despite two days of rioting and the police reporting that in 
Southmead “gangs of youths numbering some two hundred smashed several 
large shop windows and stoned police officers” (ibid: 26-7), this part of the 
rioting has been largely ignored and media coverage focused almost 
exclusively on the ‘black’ riots of St Paul’s. 
Of course, London specifically did involve a significant amount of black-police 
confrontations, but importantly, not all these riots were the same and nor did 
the data produce an ‘average rioter’ neatly defined as ‘black youth’ (Keith, 
1993: 97). Bloom argues that Brixton and the riots in the 1980s were depicted 
as about immigration through the focus on black youth, “but the kids on the 
street were black and white” (2012: 108). Indeed, while obviously a large 
proportion, that 80% of those arrested for attacking police were black 
nevertheless indicates a significant involvement of non-blacks in the violence 
(Keith, 1993: 104).  
Harrison provides anecdotal support in Hackney, where he interviewed people 
around the community, and found that it was common amongst the white 
youth to express hate for the police: “this sus law that the coloureds say 
they’re always getting picked up on, that’s been going on for years” (white, 
female, Hackney, in Harrison, 1992: 348). While this suggests an ethnic 
division and a dismissal of ‘coloured’ complaints, it nevertheless points to 
hostile relations with police, moreover, not all white, excluded individuals felt 
the same.  
Harrison (1992: 351) spoke to a group of about 50 young men, mostly black 
but with some white, who complained of unemployment, racism, but the main 
source of discontent was with police. Ball (2012: 76) argues that mass 
unemployment during the 1980s and the ‘post-school dole queues’, was a 
unifying force amongst inner city black and white youth. Harrison also 
witnessed rioting in Hackney and notes a white man confronting police, a 
	 137	
group of around “five or ten youth, black and white” looting a clothes shop, 
while other white men watched and warned them when police were 
approaching (1992: 349). 
Issues of racism were also clearly important in the Toxteth riots in Liverpool, 
with reports from many organisations of daily harassment and abuse of black 
people by police throughout the 1970s (Scraton, 1982: 25). As Tyler (2013) 
notes, despite the similarity to London’s anti-police riots, these riots took place 
amongst predominantly white communities and took a similar form of clashes 
with the police. This might underplay the level of black involvement, but 
nonetheless, a black participant in the Toxteth riots was interviewed on 
television and described what he witnessed:  
Hundreds of White people started converging into the community at 
about five, six in the evening […] They come to join up with the 
Black youth […] they suffer the same sort of brutality but the only 
[difference] is they don’t get called niggers. (quoted in Nassy 
Brown, 2005: 65). 
The point to make is not that racism was not central, but that ‘race riots’ tends 
to imply an issue about black and white; whereas, for the rioters what we 
appear to see is an issue about black and the (white) state/police. Moreover, 
because the contention is about the state or police, this is an issue sometimes 
that enables black and white rioters to overcome racialised divisions against a 
common enemy.  
As the last quote suggests, both blacks and whites were being excluded and 
disrespected, but for black people this was happening on a greater scale, to a 
greater extent, and involved greater stigmatisation. The point here is that to 
focus only on the racialised aspects of the riots, or to assume the riots are 
about ‘race’ alone de-emphasises what makes the category relevant and 
enables the lesser exploited white group to empathise and identify with black 
rioters – disrespect and disempowerment (Hall, 1980: 338).  
Taking this more nuanced look at the 1980s riots enabled us to better 
understand the apparent paradox of race in 2011. What 2011 represents is 
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the conclusion of the process emerging in the 1980s – the constitution of a 
super-exploited group across racial lines, and thus potentially the beginnings 
of a shift in forms of identification. Thus, we do not see a complete change 
from the 1980s, but rather a significant increase of the involvement of white 
rioters in 2011. Furthermore, as with the 1980s rioters hail from, often the 
same, socially and economically excluded areas that have been subject to 
over-policing. Thus we see an increase in white individuals complaining about 
police, but the complaints remain similar: “I can't relate to being a black killed, 
because I'm a white man still alive, but I could relate to injustice within the 
police force” (male, 33, Liverpool, Prasad(e), 2011).  
 
5.7. Discussion 
What appears clearly important in both periods of rioting are relations with 
police. Despite being three decades apart, violence directed against the group 
formed a significant focus of resistance, and clearly related to negative 
experiences at the hands of police. Indeed, it seemed to be the opposition to 
police that enabled the moment of unification, or social identities, in both the 
1980s and 2011. However, to focus solely on the police in both periods is to 
ignore the larger context that data and research on the riots reveal and which 
make the police a target of violence. 
What the analysis of the riots and factors emerging from data suggests is that, 
in the 1980s it is social and economic exclusion that is key to the rioting, and 
race functioned as the dominant modality of exclusion. In 2011 it appears 
again the social and economic exclusion is driving the rioting, but the 
dominant modality is not clearly about race. Thus, while race is involved in 
both periods of rioting the difference between the 1980s and 2011 riots is that, 
in the latter, there is both a greater mix of ethnicity and the lack of clear 
identification of and through race.   
Framing this shift through the Bourdieusian notion of ‘class’ enables us to 
understand that ‘race’ is a means of making distinctions between people that 
utilises certain markers; thus ‘race’ can change and still be relevant. The shift 
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we see implies that many of the rioters in 2011 constitute a ‘super-exploited 
group’ previously occupied largely by black individuals (Hall et al., 1980). 
However, in 2011 the facts of increased ethnic heterogeneity, suggests the 
markers of the super-exploited group, or the means by which they are 
distinguished have shifted. If this is the case, then we should be able to note a 
parallel shift in terms of society’s stereotypes away from ‘racism’ as a means 
of distinction, and ‘race’ based identities, but simultaneously maintaining a 
new modality of exclusion. However, before we move onto this, to connect 
behaviour into the social order requires that we take a deeper look at the 
forms of resistance occurring. 
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6. ‘Fucking up the Feds’:  
The Politics of Criminality 
 
1. Politicality, Pure and Simple? 
In 1965 the Watts riots in the US began with an iconic event involving a stop 
by police on a black person, before erupting into clashes between the black 
excluded communities and police. As one journalist put it: 
There must have been a feeling of release, as they could now give 
vent to the anger which they had suppressed for so long. Mingled 
in with the other emotions must have been the feeling of power: did 
they not put the police, who until then were inviolable, on the 
defensive? (Greaves, quoted in Waddington, 1992: 87)  
Amongst the usual, uncritical or politically motivated condemnations that 
seem to follow every act of disorder, this statement stands apart. What is 
perhaps so insightful about this quote is not only how it frames action as an 
affective and expressive response, but that by doing this it moves past the 
limiting understanding of politics and criminality that are generally employed 
by outsiders to judge rioters’ actions.  
Here we see the moral dichotomy of ‘politics’ and ‘criminality’ overcome. We 
see violence without political purpose, but couched in an understanding of 
disempowerment. We see how the violence may have lacked forethought, but 
is nevertheless understood through anger and repression. The statement, 
without condemning, understands how collective acts of violence and law 
breaking may liberate without being ‘political’. Simply put, this journalist 
recognised that one does not have to be ‘politicised’ for violence to be 
Political. 
The important point to make here is that ‘political action’, stripped of its 
normative connotations, simply means that which works at the maintenance 
or organisation of the social life within the norms of the legitimised political 
sphere, or as Gamson puts it: action based on ‘a belief that influence is 
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possible and necessary’ (1968: 48). If you vote, write to an MP, sign a petition, 
or even engages in protest, you aim at producing some state of affairs with 
regards to the organisation of the social world, and you do so through 
legitimised and institutionalised practices.  
On the other hand, ‘Politics’ is what underpins and makes possible ‘political 
action’ but is not confined to it. For Jenny Edkins, (1999) ‘the Political’25 is 
what forms the moment of potential choice between different forms of social 
organization, but does not necessitate action through institutionalized and 
legitimised spheres. Thus certain relations of power are Political, while to be 
Politicised implies an understanding of the how the relations of power impact 
upon social organisation. Importantly then, Political action does not require 
the legitimised sphere to act through and indeed, may even oppose it.  
This is an important distinction to make when trying to understand the forms 
of resistance we see during rioting; the narrow conception of ‘politics’, when 
functioning as a normative label, it neglects to account for the role of power in 
legitimising and shaping action. Because of this neglect, any actions that seek 
change outside of the accepted sphere risks being categorised and 
delegitimised as ‘criminal’. However, when ‘criminal’ behaviour is stripped of 
these normative connotations and power it is simply any action for any 
reason, which rejects and transgresses the normative rules of the legitimised 
social order.  
Thus, ‘criminality’, when referring to collective acts of resistance or violence is 
action that opposes or seeks to re-organise power relations, but rejects the 
institutional means and norms of the dominant order. In this light the Watts 
riots, whether they fit with ‘criminal’ or not, were Political: a contest over, or 
resistance to, the exercise of ‘power’ of the dominant and legitimised social 
order.  
Prior to any political action or even any Political understanding, all resistance 
is prompted by acts of disrespect by those empowered (Honneth, 1995). All 
riotous actions are Political in that they are expressive of shame and anger, 																																																								
25 Edkins does not use the capitalized ‘Politics’; this is done here to better distinguish between 
the common, normative usage and the expansive concepts utilized here. 
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generated through the dominant social order. Thus, it is in the emotions of 
rioters in response to relations of power that we find the ‘Politics’ of the riots. 
Consequently, to better comprehend the meaning of action in the rioting in 
2011 and the 1980s, we need to understand the attacks on the police as an 
expressive struggle that sought to overcome, in that moment, power relations 
that work against a positive sense of self.  
However, we also need to understand the role of power or the social structure 
in shaping the form resistance takes. Firstly, we must be careful not to ignore 
that the spontaneous nature of rioting makes political organisation difficult 
(Millington, 2016: 713); thus an apparent absence of clear goals may not 
necessitate a lack of Political understanding or identities. Furthermore, why 
‘political action’ is understood by rioters as an irrelevant or implausible choice 
but violent retaliation against the police is not, cannot be explained by morality 
– an effect of power – but by the experiences of those rioters. If any actions 
are not ‘political’ in the smaller sense, this should not delegitimise resistance 
but provide us a starker warning of society’s failure to reproduce itself – that 
these individuals have been shaped in such a way that they are disposed to 
not seek change within or through the political system, but to transgress its 
rules. 
We begin with the 1980s, exploring the context of black communities which 
will enable us to make sense of the forms of resistance that emerge during 
the riots. These are principally Politicised rebellion, and individualistic 
resistance or ‘criminality’. Both these behaviours stem from the same affective 
response to long term social and economic exclusion, and both can be 
understood as a form of resistance to the stigmatisation and low self-esteem 
that comes with acceptance of one’s position in the social hierarchy. 
This exploration not only enables us to comprehend the commonalities and 
differences between these behaviours, it also connects us with the 2011 riots 
and enables us to complicate the assumption of the ‘criminality, pure and 
simple’. Using rioters’ discourses we can see how ‘criminality’ is actually a 
form of individualised resistance, in contrast to collective and Political forms, 
to the disrespect and low self-worth experienced, and indeed, how violence 
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functions as a form of politics to those excluded. 
The final section then seeks to explore this shift to more individualised forms 
of resistance that begins to be visible in the 1980s riots. The discussion 
evaluates the role of consumerism, the lack of effective political 
representation, and lack of Politicised discourse, in producing more 
individualised forms of resistance that more easily can be labelled ‘criminality’. 
 
6.2. The Politics of the 1980s 
To understand how the 1980s saw wide spread rioting we need to shift focus 
to understand how the widespread forms of exclusion, principally through the 
modality of race, shaped the lived experience of people who held the 
appropriate markers of distinction. While it was argued in the previous chapter 
that race is a logic of exclusion, here the historically produced meaning of 
‘race’ becomes important to understand in that it shapes the forms of 
disrespect and exclusion experienced, and in turn the resistance amongst the 
excluded populace. 
Caribbean immigrants arriving in Britain in the late 1940s quickly faced 
widespread and severe racist discrimination. Situated in the context of an 
extreme housing shortage post World War 2, black immigrants were largely 
forced to find accommodation in the bomb damaged and overcrowded inner 
city, working class areas of London, where ‘rent sharks’ who could exploit the 
trapped market were only too keen to offer disgusting housing at high prices 
(Green, 1979; Penketh, 2000: 16; Pilkington 1988: 52-4).  
Discrimination was not simply limited to housing but occurred in all spheres of 
life including employment and education, and helped by newspapers regularly 
running articles stoking white fears about black immigrants (Gates Jr, 1976; 
Jackson, 2003: 138-42; Penketh, 2000; Pilkington, 1988: 87-90). Indeed, 
alongside generally lower pay and fewer opportunities, later economic 
downturns in the context of widespread and accepted racial discrimination 
meant it was black people who lost their jobs first (Hall et al., 1980; Pilkington, 
1988: 87-90). 
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Simply put, the black population of Britain was not only faced long term and 
entrenched exclusion from the practises of economic capital, but also from 
obtaining and engaging the dominant white forms of cultural capital (e.g. 
educational qualifications). Biological and colonial racist stereotypes that had 
originally emerged to justify enslavement and colonialism had cast black 
people as supposedly less intelligent, uneducated, savages and so forth 
(Jackson, 2003: 135-8; Penketh, 2000: 13; Pilkington, 1988: 88-90). This 
shaped early forms of exclusion in Britain, however, this stereotype began to 
shift in order to maintain the privilege of the white working class with whom 
Caribbean immigrants now competed for employment and housing. New 
meanings were added to the stereotype, with black people becoming framed 
as dirty and unkempt, more prone to accidents, or requiring more supervision 
than white workers, and ‘lazy, unresponsive to discipline and truculent’ (Cole, 
2016: 36; also see Penketh, 2000: 17; Pilkington, 1988: 88-90).  
While of course, there was some change in material conditions in the 
following decades, particularly with regards to the housing problem, ultimately 
it would be small and the conditions of high unemployment, few opportunities 
for respectable or economically rewarding employment, and poor housing 
would continue (Hall et al., 1980: 329-30). In turn, the later restructuring of the 
economy in the 1980s to a neoliberal market would result in the suffering of 
some groups more than others, particularly blacks, women, and poorer 
communities (Atkinson, Roberts & Savage. 2012: 7-8; Keith, 1993: 235). The 
result of long term exclusion based on logics of race was black people largely 
living in urban ‘ghettos’, and a position, in class terms, at the bottom of the 
social hierarchy. 
Lea & Young, (1982: 14-5) argue that the generation of young black people 
excluded from employment is not simply an issue of deprivation, but ‘a crisis 
for the political process’. The problem is, they point out, that engagement in 
politics had been based on access to the processes of labour and capital, 
thus those excluded lack the institutional and social means by which to 
express discontent and create change. The political process increasingly 
becomes irrelevant and pre-reflexively excluded as a choice or means by 
which to express and overcome discontent.  
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Politically impotent and beset by systemic and strong discrimination marking 
them out as ‘different’ or ‘inferior’, black communities in the 1950-60s were 
showing signs of rejecting legitimated society and its rules, and the 
emergence of oppositional values, behaviours and movements as a means to 
cope with their situation: “As a collective solution, the option of assimilation 
has not only been officially closed by white society, but blacks have actively 
closed the door on it themselves, from the inside” (Hall et al., 1980: 355). The 
result was generations of black people that were born in Britain who were 
rejecting the social order:  
Even though I was born here I don’t belong here and I don’t call 
myself an Englishman. I don’t call myself nothing to do with the 
English race (young, black, male, in Hall et al., 1980: 354).  
Political and social resistance built from the harsh reality many faced took the 
form of, among other things, the ‘Black Power’ movement ideologically 
connected to the Black Panthers and Malcolm X in the USA who explicitly 
rejected white society. Rastafarianism also emerged as the ‘religion of the 
oppressed’ connecting black youth back to their Caribbean ‘roots’ and calling 
for a repatriation of black people to Ethiopia (ibid: 357; Gates Jr, 1976: 310).  
These movements not only presented Political forms of opposition to racist 
exclusion, they functioned culturally and symbolically through language and 
music. Emerging as forms of resistance to the disrespect and stigmatisation of 
white society, such movements re-articulated notions of ‘blackness’ that could 
produce self-esteem: “In part because of its sense of isolation and 
powerlessness, Black London defines itself through its own instruments.” 
(Gates Jr, 1976: 308). These tools enabled a positive form of identity that 
distinguishes black people from white society and its stereotypes. 
However, as black communities sought to empower themselves through a 
rejection of white society, it’s values and schemes of judgement, so white 
society increasingly began to frame blacks as a violent and criminal threat to 
the social-fabric (Cole, 2016: 39; Hall et al., 1980). The response of white 
society was to increase stigmatisation through greater emphasis on the threat 
of immigration, moral panics over forms of supposedly ‘black crimes’ such as 
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muggings, and increasing calls to aggressively police black communities 
(Cole, 2016; Davis, 1989; Gunning, 2010; Hall et al., 1980; Lea & Young, 
1982; Penketh, 2000). However, as noted power relations are not only 
implicated in stereotyping and disrespect, but shape the possibilities and 
plausibility of resistance. 
One consequence of this cyclical long-term exclusion by, and rejection of 
white, British society was an increasingly ambiguous relation to crime. With 
prospects of unemployment or low-paid and low-status work, “[y]outh’s battle 
to be free from ‘shit work’ was buoyed up by an ill-defined but nonetheless 
alternative conception of social life, affirmed in the unruly, dissident 
(sub)culture” (Gilroy, 2013: 552; also see Harrison, 1992: 292, Hall et al., 
1980). In other words, excluded from legitimated capitals, young blacks were 
investing their own social systems as a means of resisting the stigma and low 
self-esteem white society imposed upon them. The notion of a ‘hustler’ was 
defined as a positive and semi-political way of being (Hall et al., 1980). Rather 
than ‘professional’ crime, ‘hustling’ utilised illegal and informal markets to earn 
economically in whatever means available, outside of the legitimated markets 
and capitals from which they were excluded (e.g. selling drugs or stolen 
goods).  
Hustling functioned as ‘survival strategies’ in relation to economic hardship, 
from a generation rejecting what they saw as demeaning, oppressive, and 
socially unrewarding roles that their parents had accepted (Hall et al., 1980: 
355; Thomas, 2012: 115). By rejecting both the positions and standards of 
white society, and by displaying disrespect for that society and its norms, self-
worth and positive identities were being re-articulated. Those who had 
measures of success in this line of work gained status and cultural capital, 
indicated by the term applied to such hustlers: ‘cool cats’ (Hall et al., 1980: 
352).  
However, while driven at the pre-reflexive level by the same experiences of 
disrespect, criminal behaviours and identities were ‘semi-Political’, an 
expression of anger that lacked or perhaps rejected the structural 
understanding that came with Political identities. Engels defines this as an 
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individualised form of ‘primitive rebellion’: “The criminal could protest against 
the existing order of society only singly, as one individual” (2005: 478). In 
other words, criminal behaviour for Engels was struggle without ‘class 
consciousness’. If we remove Engels’ concept from the constraints of the 
Marxist reification of class, criminality in this light is the expressive rejection of 
society’s normative and physical regulation. What makes it individualised 
resistance is that it lacks the cognitive underpinnings needed to develop a 
collective identity through common experiences and aims, that might produce 
Politicised struggle (Honneth, 1995).  
These forms of struggle are underpinned, in the first instance, by the 
motivation to re-establish a positive sense of self. Unlike political action, the 
belief that the legitimised or institutional means can produce change and self-
worth is pre-reflexively absent. While unlike movements connected to ‘black 
power’, the re-articulation of identity remains implicit. What distinguishes 
‘hustling’ or ‘criminality’ from Political identities, is the difference in the 
capacity to generate a collective belonging and action, be it ‘working class’ or 
‘black’: 
Few young blacks consciously choose crime as a form of political 
revenge against white society. But consciousness and motives do 
not work in that way. […] driven into one of the few remaining 
strategies for survival open to them, they develop a collective 
definition of their situation; and, in doing so, they draw on the 
available reservoir of charged feelings and emotions about racism 
and its system (Hall et al., 1980: 359). 
In other words, Hall et al. are talking about a pre-reflexive and affectively 
driven opposition that takes shape through the subjective experiences and 
available and understood forms of action to those caught in such a situation. 
For some, performing Politicised ‘black’ identities did not function to generate 
adequate resistance, to express the anger or overcome the shame. Instead 
the practice of hustling ‘made sense’, or perhaps seemed to more effectively 
enable the expression of the build up of negative affect through action. As 
more young black men accepted and performed these non-Political logics and 
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identities so too did white society accept the evidence of ‘black criminality’. 
This reinforced the sense of threat to white privilege and connected with fears 
over immigration, increasing the strength of prejudice and escalating 
aggressive policing and other forms of exclusion (Cole, 2016; Hall et al., 1980; 
Penketh, 2000). As the recession of the late 1970s hit, and Margaret 
Thatcher’s neoliberal government stepped up the reorganisation of the 
economy and society, so the forms of exclusion and disrespect grew. The 
1980s erupted into violence. 
 6.2.1 The Politics of the Rioting 
The manifold ways in which black individuals were excluded from, and 
disrespected by, society clearly led to a pervasive, widespread anger and 
sense of injustice. It was these emotions and the understanding of the 
structural injustice that gave the 1980s their Political character. It was the 
exclusion and exploitation leading to deprivation and crime that Politicised 
Steve during this period and led him to seek change through legitimised 
engagements: ‘I was amazed that people could continue to live like this’. 
Although his mistrust of police was still present when I spoke to him, Steve’s 
Politicised viewpoint even persuaded him that he had to put aside his anger 
and work with the police to improve relations. This, he felt, could limit the 
impact of over-policing on engagement with crime.  
Similarly, for Nick as a young boy watching the rioting on TV, it was clear that 
black people were ‘second class citizens’ in a white society, and that the riots 
‘were about us’. Indeed, when I spoke to Aisha (black, female, late 40s) she 
connected the experience of black people to the slave trade and colonialism: 
‘we’ve had it for centuries’. These perspectives and emotions were visible in 
the riots as well. 
As noted, the first outbreaks that began to catch the attention of the broader 
society were those in the Notting Hill Carnival in 1976 and 1977. If a 
statement of ‘political’ intent or orientation was needed, the chanting of 
‘Soweto’, connecting the violence in London to political and anti-apartheid 
violence breaking out across South Africa, should have done it. Speaking on 
his experiences in the 1980s, Sheldon Thomas (2012: 120), would also 
	 149	
equate his involvement in the 1981 Brixton riots with that of Soweto, and the 
rage he experienced as a young black man.  
The connection for Thomas was in his experiences as a black child and young 
man in a white, racist state, and the common sense of disrespect and anger 
this produced. Thomas at one point describes his reaction to watching Roots, 
a documentary film series on American Slavery broadcast in the late 1970s – 
it was the first time he heard of the African slave trade: “The next day at 
school, it was obvious everyone had seen ‘Roots’ […] It was at this point I 
stepped up to lead the revolt in school, because I felt so violated, so hurt, so 
in pain, so angry” (2012: 116). Thomas was not the only rioter who watched 
the documentary: “we’re fighting for our forefathers […] We’ve been watching 
Roots. They used us here for twenty years, now they got no use for us, they 
want us out.” (secretary, 17, rioting in Hackney 1981, in Harrison, 1992: 352).  
What is also revealing of the Politicised nature of the 1980s riots were the 
presence of organised groups, often mobilised around the issues of racism 
and policing, and engaging in discursive acts to frame the riots or raise 
awareness of issues. For instance, during the 1980s in Hackney a number of 
black focus groups organised the Police Out of Schools campaign in an 
attempt to limit what was seen as the toxic impact of interactions between 
police and young black people (ICI, 1989: 226).  
In response to the rioting in 1981, the Brixton Rastafarian Collective stated: 
“the police were no longer protecting the people […] They were in fact a force 
of occupation within the Brixton area” (quoted in Keith, 1993: 31); similarly, 
The Black Liberation Front26 stated: “we consider the uprisings of the summer 
1981 as well as those since the 1970s as legitimate self-defence actions” 
(ibid: 92). Indeed, this was not limited to black mobilisation, with one resident 
revealing the Political context amongst the multi-ethnic riot in Liverpool: 
“People say 'Toxteth riots' or 'Liverpool 8 uprising' depending on their politics” 
																																																								
26 The BLF was a pan-African, radical socialist organization founded in London 1971, and 
among other aims, sought to develop black Political identities and forms of resistance to racist 
exclusions. 
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(Ball, 2012: 28).27 However, it is worth noting that what the above discussion 
reveals is not the ‘politics’ of the 1980s riots – these groups were not utilising 
the legitimated routes of action – but the ‘Politics’: this was about rebellion.  
 6.2.2 Anti-politics in the 1980s Riots 
To frame the 1980s riots as ‘political’ in the smaller sense is problematic in 
part because this supposes a ‘descriptive unity’ and essentialist identity 
attributed to a fictional actor ‘the crowd’ (Keith, 1993: 53). But more 
importantly, framing these riots within the political/criminal papers over or 
misses important processes occurring. The Black Liberation Front reveals this 
contradiction by its very naming, and not least in its view of the police as a 
form of ‘occupation’. Similarly, the Brixton Rastafarian Collective saw the riots 
as ‘legitimate self-defence’, while for many the Toxteth was an ‘uprising’, not a 
riot. 
These all contain Politics in the larger sense of the term because they 
respond to and rely on an understanding of power relation and the exclusion 
and mistreatment of themselves as a group. But they also speak to alienation 
from the political process – change to some extent is not envisaged within the 
social order but by breaking away from it or through violent opposition. Due to 
the disempowerment and disrespect experienced by the black community in 
white Britain, political action was increasingly being excluded at the pre-
reflexive level – ‘democracy’ was not working and was not an option.  
This is of course, not to deny that members of the black communities were not 
engaged in political action, but rather that increasing numbers of black 
individuals, and some white, had given up on the legitimated system: “we 
were not going to allow a system to repress us” (Thomas, 2012: 115). Thus, 
as noted previously, Rastafarianism saw the solution as repatriation of the 
black members of British society to Ethiopia, and violent opposition to police 
and the state that sanctioned them was considered ‘legitimate’ (Gates Jr, 
1976: 310; Keith, 1993: 92). In other words, these movements and 
organisations spoke of rebellion or revolt: Political action that explicitly aims at 																																																								27	Liverpool 8 refers to the postal code of the area, Toxteth was the term popularly used by 
media.	
	 151	
the overthrow or removal of relations of domination.  
Thus, framed around and in response to the issue of race and racism, and 
through notions of black identity, resistance and rebellion was formulated. 
Harrison’s accounts of the riots in Hackney revealed the distinction between 
the police as a ‘clan’ in opposition to ‘clans’ of black individuals, and heard a 
young boy advocating using ‘guerrilla tactics’ (Harrison, 1992: 352). Similarly, 
Keith talks of certain streets in Hackney, Brixton, and Notting Hill, all of which 
saw rioting in the 1980s, as ‘front lines’ and were often the sites of police 
conflict with young, black men from the area (1993: 20-2). For those involved 
in criminal activity and the more politicised elements of the black community in 
Brixton, Railton Road was commonly understood as the ‘front line of defence 
against the police’ and as a source of black solidarity (ibid: 27).  
At the ‘front line’ in Hackney, an investigation into the death of a black man at 
the local police station, found it was ultimately ‘isolated from the community’ 
by decades of mistreatment and violence towards black individuals, resulting 
in its perception as more like an enemy outpost, a place to be avoided (ICI, 
1989: 240). However, as Keith’s study of ‘front lines’ suggests, opposition to 
the police and state is not always articulated in Political terms.  
Again, this was a form of resistance was seen in white working class 
individuals as well. Ball notes in areas such as St. Paul’s in Bristol there was a 
multi-ethnic form of resistance happening, often emerging through 
‘subcultures’ connected to Caribbean culture, such as Rastas, skinheads, and 
punks, but also through mass unemployment and the common experience of 
the ‘post-school dole queue’ (ibid: 76 & 261-5). These youth movements, 
rather than specifically black youth, were regularly having negative 
experiences with police, and in turn, rejecting their authority. Thus, faced by 
similar conditions and treatment by the police, sections of the super-exploited 
white working class were also viewing the police as an enemy or occupying 
force:  
It’s insulting that [the police] are being paid, that these people 
we’ve got nothing in common with, that have got nothing to do with 
Southmead. […] They was coming in seeing that we was behaving. 
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[…] So ‘occupying’? Kind of, yeah. But not ‘occupying’ […] Kind of 
warders in a jail (white rioter quoted in Ball, 2012: 268-9).  
  
6.2.3 ‘Criminality’ in the 1980s Riots 
What the 1980s riots make clear is that there were groups of individuals being 
disrespected to the extent that it produced violent resistance. For many, this 
took the form of revolt or rebellion, however, as we have seen crime was also 
produced as a form of resistance to disrespect and exclusion. As with the 
more Politicised forms of rebellion, this both brought and emerged from a 
specific relation with the police. Davis (1989) and Lea and Young (1982) both 
argue that violence against the police in the 1980s was driven by the 
interconnected processes of exclusion, stereotyping of black youth as 
criminal, and a drive to aggressively over-police. Davis (1989) notes the 
manner in which over-policing symbolically reinforces motivations to over-
police by criminalising black youth. For Lea and Young (1982) these 
antagonistic relations contribute to criminal behaviours, drove much of the 
rioting, and in turn reinforce motivations to over-police. 
However, criminal forms of resistance were occurring across ethnicity, but the 
greater amount of black people rioting appears to correlate to the greater 
extent to which, as a group, they were stigmatised and excluded. One rioter in 
the predominantly white area, Knowle West, Bristol saw the St. Paul’s riots as 
a mark of respect and reveals that opposition to authority was something to 
valorise: “you’d gone from thinking we were the hardest area in Bristol and 
they’d kind of jumped ahead of us […] it was kind of a respect thing I suppose 
‘cos they’d had a pop at the cops…’” (quoted in Ball, 2012: 370). Similarly, the 
issue of excluded and stigmatised youth in Liverpool during the 1970s and 
80s was also generating crime and conflicts with police: “One gang we know 
has given the police an ultimatum to lay off within two weeks or they fight 
back. It could lead to civil war in the city” (Margaret Simey in 1971, Labour 
councillor for Liverpool, quoted in Scraton, 1982: 24).  
In Hackney, Harrison (1992: 356) found that both black and white youth ‘hate 
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the police’, that the recent economic conditions had led to increases in crime, 
and that it was these excluded and angry youth that were rioting. Ball (2012: 
432) found that in the areas that saw rioting – two predominantly white 
estates/areas and the ethnically mixed St. Paul’s – the impact of the long term 
exclusion exacerbated by the economic crisis of the late 1970s had led to 
informal survival strategies, resulting in increased negative contact with, and 
resentment of the police  
Indeed, despite Thomas’ (2012) explicit awareness of racism and motivation 
through a sense of injustice, his resistance or struggle was not ‘political’ and 
moreover, seemed to blur the lines between rebellion and ‘criminal’. For 
instance, while he saw the riots as an ‘uprising’, at the same time he speaks 
of forming gangs to defend themselves from police (2012: 113). However, 
these gangs were not just about conflict with the police, but created rivalries 
between gangs in Brixton which would be overcome during the riots as they 
faced off against their bigger, common enemy.  
Consequently, 1981 was in some respects a battle and in some respects, 
‘revenge’. Supporting this blurred context, it was not the black political figures 
that Thomas valorised, rather he recalls looking up to the Yardies’ – gangsters 
from Jamaica “with an ‘I don’t-give-a damn’ attitude” towards the white crime 
families – because “it was again showing the establishment […] we were 
running things” (Thomas, 2012: 118). In other words, the relations of power 
oriented around race and racism were impacting on Thomas differently. 
6.2.4 Criminality: Rebellion without a Cause? 
Indeed, it is perhaps in Thomas (2012) that we see the role of power in 
producing and shaping different forms of resistance. Through his personal 
experiences of racism and learning of slavery Thomas felt shamed, treated 
and valued as unequal, and thus angry. Thomas clearly does not see the 
white political system as relevant, but rather as a means of black oppression. 
That he has been disempowered means there is no resolution to his anger 
through the legitimated system, and like the Black Liberation Front or the 
Brixton Rastafarian Collective, ‘political’ action is excluded and the legitimated 
political system is opposed. However, while both rebellion and criminality 
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function as an anti-politics, they are also clearly different.  
The issue of racism and Thomas’ identification as ‘black’ functioned as the 
source of his resistance and struggle, as with these more Politicised groups. 
Yet at the same time he seemed to lack direction and organisation, and 
partook in individualised resistance. Politicised black identities seem to have 
enabled others to unite and/or organise, such as in the Black Liberation Front, 
and empower themselves to counter the stigma of white society. However, for 
Thomas it was a mix of his anger relating to personal and historical 
experiences of racism and the gang structure that better enabled him to 
express and perform the emotions he felt.  
The forms of rebellion then, appear to be an explicitly articulated rejection of 
the political sphere and rules of that social order. These movements utilise 
Politicised modes of identification that symbolically reorient the very means by 
which they are excluded and grouped - ‘black’. Thus, drawing on what could 
be positioned as ‘theirs’ and positive in contrast to white society, through 
language/dialect, music and religion, sections of black community performed 
their positive and different identities and rejection of the white legitimated 
social order and norms (Gates Jr, 1976: 308).  
Part of this re-orientation occurs through alternative conceptions of the social 
order in which the relations of power that locate them as a super-exploited 
group are removed. By doing so, these groups resisted the disrespect visited 
upon them, and provided alternative means to generate self-worth. As the 
white ‘working class’ had done previously with notions of hard labour and 
organisations such as unions (Hoggart, 1992; Lea & Young, 1982; Solomos & 
Back, 1994), so movements emerge around black identities that resist the 
stigmatisation of the dominant order.  
However, as with the early working class movements, the disenfranchised 
position of the black communities meant their movements often saw no 
alternative than reject or even to violently oppose the dominant order (Lea & 
Young, 1982: 14). While the white working class movement had hard won 
gains, such as unions, which empowered them as a group to participate in the 
organisation of the social order, this possibility was fast being retracted by the 
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emergence of neoliberal, or laissez-faire economics. White working class 
communities were beginning to have the carpet pulled from under them, while 
for black communities, the carpet was taken away before they had put a foot 
on it. Thus, in developing forms of resistance, black movements articulated 
themselves against an order that offered them nothing but exclusion and 
stigma. 
‘Criminality’, or individualised resistance then, is also produced by a situation 
of disempowerment and disrespect, and similar to rebellion, constitutes a 
rejection of the legitimated society and its norms and values (Agnew, 2012; 
Cloward & Ohlin, 1969; Merton, 1938). Indeed, extreme forms of exclusion in 
the white working classes had also generated different forms of ‘criminality’ 
which found means and processes of positive identification that operated 
outside the law. Speaking of the white working class Teddy Boy movement 
that emerged in the 1950s, George Melly stated:  
The fights and cinema riots, the gang bangs and haphazard 
vandalism were produced by a claustrophobic situation. They were 
the result of a society which still held that the middle classes were 
entitled … to impose moral standards on a class whose way of life 
was totally outside its experience. (quoted in, Brake, 2003: 74)  
However, without a Politicised form of identification there can be no 
constructive articulation of an alternative and no symbolic re-appropriation of 
the modality by which you are grouped and excluded. The processes of 
identification as ‘Teddy Boy’ enabled an overcoming of the disrespect and 
stigma imposed by middle-class society through a rejection of behaviours and 
rules, and thus removed the possibility of shame and feelings of low self-
worth. However, it also suggests the failure of the ‘working class’ identity to 
adequately incorporate white youth’s struggle. Without a Political bridge to 
frame the individual’s discontent and stigmatisation through a collective or 
structural understanding of the problem, no alternative can be articulated, and 
the shame and anger felt can only be expressed through an individualised 
form of action that displays a rejection or disrespect of those rules and 
authorities.  
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The performative transgression of the rules and the opposition to police 
becomes a positive factor in the construction of identities and opens up a 
plausible form action, as was the case in Paris’ 2005 riots in the banlieue: 
“Violence and public unrest are their only possible and effective means of 
struggle” (Lapeyronnie, 2009: 38). Criminality, or individualised resistance, is 
an affective and rational response to disrespect and disempowerment where 
there is a lack of a cognitive means – or ‘semantic bridge’ (Honneth, 1995) – 
to connect and develop Politicised understanding and action. In other words, 
Sheldon Thomas’ form of resistance in Brixton 1981 was not simply due to his 
and black people’s exclusion from the politics of British society, but an 
increasing inadequacy of Politicised identities to enable the expression of 
‘rage’ that he felt.  
It was the combination of the experience of disrespect and disempowerment 
as a black man in a white society, that produced “such rage and bitterness” 
(Thomas, 2012: 120). By resisting – rioting, forming gangs – Thomas appears 
to have sought empowerment in the only way he could see was available to 
him, or perhaps the only way that justified and adequately performed his 
anger and rage. Thus the expressive and performative acts of violence sought 
to overcome the disrespect and shame in a more individualistic sense, rather 
than seeking ‘justice’ or change: “Many of us now wanted nothing more than 
to take revenge” (Thomas, 2012: 115). 
Ultimately, the 1980s revealed the beginnings of a shift away from political 
and Politically articulated behaviour, the start of the loss of ‘bridges’ that 
enabled collective resistance. Indeed, for some of those in the community this 
was visible prior to the rioting and the consequences were expected:  
unless the black community as an oppressed minority discovers its 
strength as a movement which can exert political pressure […] Our 
future here is bleak. It’s hard to predict violence […] but the 
situation is deteriorating very badly. There’s a lot of tension, just 
below the surface. (Social Worker, black, Brixton, quoted in Gates 
Jr, 1976: 315).  
In other words, the conditions for black people growing up in Britain in the 
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1970s and 1980s was one in which plausible solutions to the 
disempowerment and disrespect experienced were increasingly failing to be 
articulated through a plausible, Politicised identity. The impact of this was to 
fail to offer young people a cognitive means to express or overcome the 
affective impact of the same disempowerment and disrespect being visited 
upon them. 
Unlike prior generations which tended to feel a sense of duty to British society, 
young blacks were increasingly rejecting British society altogether (Hall et al., 
1980). Consequently, more explicitly ‘criminal’ behaviours and identities were 
emerging throughout the 1970s and 1980s in black communities, due to 
“positive search for identity and survival in the harsh conditions of the inner 
city” (Lea & Young, 1982: 8). Rather than Politicised anger, in Hackney, the 
long term impact of disrespect and disempowerment was increasingly 
generating, even amongst school age children, ‘alternative system of values, 
rewards, and punishments working in diametric opposition to the school’s 
formal values” (Harrison, 1992: 292). 
Thus, alongside the Political aspects and identities that were involved in the 
rioting, we also saw individualised resistance. Importantly, this is not 
conceived as immoral ‘criminality’, but rather an individualised form of anti-
politics. A situation in which the political world is not only pre-reflexively 
rejected as a plausible medium for change, but where individualisation has 
impacted upon the capacity of Politicised identities to adequately enable 
expressive action which overcomes the sense of anger young people were 
feeling. Next we seek to connect the apparently ‘apolitical’ resistance in 2011 
to that of the 1980s. We begin by looking at the forms of resistance and the 
relation to Political understandings, and then seek to highlight some 
processes which an explain this shift. 
 
6.3. The Politics of Criminality in 2011 
In the 1980s riots the legitimated political sphere was increasingly becoming 
irrelevant to the ‘struggle’ of young, principally black, and excluded 
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individuals. The relations of exclusion, disempowerment, and sense of 
disrespect this generated, not only produced anger but inhibited the 
expressive overcoming of the sense of disrespect through the legitimated 
political sphere. These exclusionary power relations were made manifest 
through different forms of anti-politics, firstly, in the Politicised rebellion which 
resisted and opposed the legitimated order. But these also manifested in what 
Engels (2005: 478) saw as individualised protest, or struggle without class 
consciousness - crime.  
The 1980s were a period of great change and the shifts we see in Thomas 
were just the beginning. Indeed, Lea and Young’s (1982) point in 1982, that 
the black working class had been excluded from representation and action in 
the processes of labour and capital, would foreshadow the expansion of this 
super-exploited group. The ideological restructuring of the market and 
destruction of labour power by Thatcher’s government, which has just begun, 
would increasingly push the white working class into a position similar to that 
which black communities had been facing for years (Atkinson, Roberts & 
Savage. 2012; Clement, 2012; Reay, 2006).  
By 2011 those resisting police and society through individualised means 
constitute a more ethnically diverse group. More important is that, in contrast 
to the 1980s, the notion that the riots were understood as about ‘race’ or 
‘class’ was largely absent. While class and race were mentioned by rioters, 
these did not seem to function as a Political form of identity or enable the 
unification of rioters. As we saw it was the common opposition to the police 
that appeared create the realisation of a common purpose and unite rioters. 
Indeed, in 2011 rather than identities oriented to notions of race or class, 
some individuals were identifying as ‘criminal’:  
I’m not law abiding like … [I’m here] to piss the police off, you get 
me (young male, Manchester riot, 2011, 0.57) 
I am here ‘cos I’m a criminal man, fucking, that is what I do (male, 
Treadwell et al. 2013: 10) 
You think there's no job out there for me, so you think fuck it, going 
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to go out on the road and steal and sell drugs, do whatever to get 
your money. (Rioter described himself as a ‘natural criminal’, young 
male, Birmingham, Carter(g), 2011)28 
As we can see, this form of identification certainly has similarities to the notion 
of the ‘Hustler’, connecting to survival strategies and to positive forms of 
identification: ‘natural criminal’. Moreover, while any identification as ‘criminal’ 
at minimum implies a rejection of the authority of the police, for the first rioter 
his purpose in rioting is explicitly to ‘piss the police off’. Indeed, alongside the 
evidence of widespread exclusion amongst rioters, there is quantitative 
support for the widespread involvement of individuals who rejected the social 
orders normative regulation of behaviour and authority of the police.  
The Home Office reported that the areas that were affected by disorder were 
typically those with generally higher crime rates (61% in top quartile) (THO, 
2011: 9). Connecting this to issues of exclusion, the Riots, Communities, and 
Victims Panel reported a correlation between areas with greater level of 
deprivation and higher numbers of crimes during the riots, and moreover, that 
71% of rioting occurred in areas that were ranked lowest for social cohesion 
(RCVP, 2011: 61-2). In addition, nationally, 71% of the adult male population 
brought for prosecution had prior criminal records, compared to 28% of the 
adult male population in general.29 Importantly, Reading the Riots’ data, based 
on a smaller sample but mostly including individuals not arrested, generally 
agrees with the court data, albeit slightly lower at 68% (Guardian & LSE, 
2011: 14).  
Looking at a different demographic, 45% of males prosecuted aged between 
10-17 also had prior conviction comparing to just 2% of the general population 
(Gavin, 2014: v). In turn, 41% of all age groups brought before the courts had 
5 or more previous criminal offences (MoJ(a), 2012: 16), while Casciani 
(2011) calculated that the average for those with prior convictions was 15, 																																																								
28 The identification of ethnicity in these sources is sporadic and generally left unstated. 
However, we can note that the previous chapter revealed the greater mix of ethnicities 
involved in the riots, with ‘black’ making up the second highest number of arrests (although in 
proportion to population this grouping is ranked highest) in contrast to the 1981 riot in Brixton 
of which around 80% of total arrests for attacks on the police were black individuals. 
29 I could not locate figures for London on prosecutions. 
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however, these are not necessarily for serious crimes. Importantly, we should 
not argue that these individuals constitute a professional criminal class as per 
Cameron (2011); as Casciani points out the majority of convictions relate to 
theft or breaching orders,30 whereas only just over 14% of convictions relate 
to more serious crimes of violence, robbery, or burglary. In other words, what 
these figures indicate is what Morrell et al. (2011: 7) found during their 
research, that of a ‘low-level criminality’, demonstrating an increased 
willingness to transgress the law. 
The point here is that we see the involvement of significant amounts of young 
men who appear to be rejecting society’s standards and values or are at least 
coming into increased contact with the law. Of course, blunt numerical data 
cannot reveal anything in itself, which is why it could be used to support 
Cameron’s claim of ‘criminality, pure and simple’. However, Cameron ignored 
the data we saw in the last chapter revealing social and economic exclusion, 
disengagement from the system, a lower sense of belonging, and a lack of 
aspirations within legitimate society. Taking these into account, the implication 
is that disempowerment and disrespect are causally involved in creating 
opposition to the values, rules, and representatives of dominant or legitimated 
society.31 
Thus, rather than indicating the simple and uniform notion of ‘mindless 
criminals’ or ‘consumer’ rioters, this data reveals the lack of alternative 
identification processes by which individuals can generate self-esteem and a 
drive to resist the disempowerment and disrespect experienced through 
exclusion. However, perhaps the difference with regards to the ‘hustler’ is that 
identification as ‘criminal’, while also about resistance, seems to lack the 
Hustler’s position as semi-Political (Hall et al., 1980: 357). Paralleling the 
distinction between ‘Babylon’ and the ‘biggest gang’, the ‘criminal’ identity 
lacks the reflective consideration of action enabled by notions of black identity 
and understandings of racism. Thus, rather than ‘immorality’ or a complete 																																																								
30 For example, failing to comply with Anti-Social Behaviour Orders. 
31 For similar findings and arguments see Bourgios, 2003; Cloward & Ohlin, 1969; Fenwick & 
Hayward, 2000; Hallsworth, 2013; Hayward, 2004; Sutherland & Cressey, 1960; Wacquant, 
2009. 
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absence of Politics, what we commonly and clearly see amongst rioters is 
individualised forms of resistance: to be a criminal, to attack the police. 
Supporting this more complex notion of individualised resistance, Morrell et al. 
(2011: 7-8 & 34) found that a number of factors shaped involvement, not least 
notions that certain ‘criminal behaviours’ were ‘less wrong’, experiences of 
poverty, ‘little sense of ownership or stake in society’, and ‘cynicism/anger 
towards politicians [and] authority’. On the other hand, factors that inhibited 
involvement were being stakeholders in the community, having aspirations 
and prospects, and alternative forms of identity such as religious belonging 
(ibid). Indeed, Clive Bloom (2012: 106) argues that both religion and Political 
Islam have proved remarkably effective in countering crime in impoverished 
and excluded communities, by providing a sense of belonging, self-worth, and 
thus shifting behaviour away from illegal and violent practices. 
6.3.1 Expressive Politics 
If we examine the discourses of rioters, the presence of this Political context, 
albeit not an identity, is visible in the expressive or affective drive nature of the 
struggle and to differing extents in rioters’ perspectives:  
Literally amazing, like. When people are actually going at the 
[police] vans themselves [… There's] a general feeling of being let 
down by the government. […] they don't like or trust the way the 
government works (young male, Liverpool, Carter(a), 2011) 
There was people there to get on a rob [loot], there for the 
spectacle, there to have a go at police. And then people there for 
all of the above. We hate the police, hate the government, got no 
opportunities ...” (male 22, unemployed, Manchester, Clifton(c) 
2011) 
Both rioters explicitly reference political factors and connect government with 
police and their discontent. In turn, there is a sense of an excluded ‘us’ or ‘we’ 
in these discourses and there are signs of an anti-politics - change is not 
sought because the government and police are not ‘trusted’. However, in 
contrast to Thomas, the anti-politics and the ‘us’ lacks a unifying identity – this 
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is not about black people, this is not about racism.  
While race based identities in the 1980s may have enabled to come together 
in opposition to the police, as we saw previously, in 2011 it appears it was 
only the common anger and dislike of police that enabled a social identity to 
emerge seemingly in the moment. The sudden realisation of strength and 
common enemy suggests that for some at least, the ‘us’ was a realisation 
produced by the riots, rather than something existing prior to them.  
Thus, in the above quotes we see an individualistic perspective in operation, 
but not completely so. This individualistic perspective is much clearer in other 
rioters: 
it's fucking my area … these fucking shops, like, I've given them a 
hundred CVs … not one job … That's why I left my house […] 
yeah, maybe I have got a bit of hate in my heart … against the 
authority (22 male, unemployed, London, Prasad(g) 2011) 
What is notable is that this rioter again has an element of the Political in his 
discourse. However, unlike the quotes above the discontent appears much 
more personal as the rioter expresses anger at not being given a job, and his 
dislike of the ‘authority’ and police. Indeed, this rioter goes onto discuss being 
made to feel ‘worthless’. Thus the Political relations and discontent felt seem 
to be understood in a more individualistic sense than the first set of quotes. 
Moreover, there is also no articulation that either emphasises change, or 
indeed, an understanding of the systemic origin of their discontent. Instead, 
this rioter has learnt to ‘hate’ authority.  
However, perhaps the clearest indicator of individualised anti-political 
resistance visible in many of the rioters discourses, is that action is not 
collectively framed but about the self. Rather than an idea of the ‘legitimate 
self-defence’ of a community or group, overwhelmingly attacking the police in 
2011 was about a release of emotion, as with Thomas (2012) in the 1980s, 
‘revenge’ as ‘therapy’. It is in their dispositions that the Political is found, seen 
through the expressive nature of their descriptions which reveal the 
connection between the violence and disempowerment and disrespect: it was 
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‘literally amazing’ to attack the police. 
 6.3.2 Anti-Police Violence as politics in 2011 
In the 1980s anti-police violence was both Political and anti-political. Similar 
can be said of the 2011 riots, which largely occurred in areas with high crime 
and poverty rates and a context of over-policing. However, with the loss of 
Politicised identities, as we began to see in Thomas in the 1980s, so 
diminishes the capacity to bridge “the impersonal aspirations of a social 
movement [with] their participants’ private experiences of injury” and enable a 
collective identity (Honneth, 1995: 163). 
Without this collective identity to organise around and through, not only will 
the necessary Political movements required to generate change not 
materialise – or at least lack support – individuals from excluded communities 
will be unable to overcome the disrespect and shame experienced through 
collective organisation and empowerment. Collective resistance in this regard 
is not simply a pragmatic tool with which to reach a goal. It is an expressive 
and performative action which can overcome feelings of shame through social 
support, belonging, and empowerment (Arendt, 1970; Butler, 2004, Honneth, 
1995: 164).  
But with politics and Political identities pre-reflexively excluded, ‘criminal’ 
behaviour and violence becomes the expressive means by which to exercise 
and overcome the sense of shame and anger. Consequently, those who 
attack the police in 2011 reveal an anti-politics in their rejection of the norms 
and rules of behaviour. The Political is present through the relations of power 
that both shaped their dispositions to resist, and function as the performative 
means of resistance. Despite the lack of ‘empowerment’ as a collective, 
individualised expressive acts of violence overturn power relations and 
function as “a cleansing act […] that cures the oppressed of their ingrained 
feelings of inferiority” (Palshikar, 2005: 5431): 
Fuck up feds' … It felt like it was on a leash for years and it felt like 
we've come off the leash (male, student, 20, London, Prasad(a), 
2011) 
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like someone was holding onto your shoulders in like a hug for a 
long time and then they just let go, like, no drugs could make you 
feel like this […] you felt invincible in a way (rioter in 2011, 18, 
male, London, Newburn et al.(a), 2016: 5). 
we violate [them] like they violate us, this was our way of getting 
revenge ... For once we had the police and government scared, for 
once they felt like we felt. (Prasad(c), 2011). 
The euphoric expressions and the sense of release, mixed with anger, 
indicates they were overcoming prior relations in which their expectations for 
a positive sense of self were not being met (Honneth, 1995:136). The sense 
of shame was finally overcome through a performative conflict in which 
‘violating’ the police displayed and demonstrated the police’s vulnerability in 
contrast to the rioters ‘invincibility’. By becoming superior, rioters overcame 
prior experiences of shame and enabled the released pent up anger: ‘we’ve 
come off the leash’.  
Moreover, while the manner in which they expressed their discontent is 
individualised – emphasis is placed on their personal experience rather than a 
collective injustice – at the same time this is also appears to constitute an 
emerging Political moment. These rioters felt empowered through becoming a 
collective and acting in concert to change, if only for a moment, those power 
relations that cause discontent:  
I could feel like, that the air was, it wasn't how it normally was, it 
was like an unspoken kind of feeling just floating around. It actually 
made me feel really strong. It made me feel really powerful. 
(Carter(d), 2011). 
It seems the sense of power produced through a realisation of common 
opposition and success in overturning resented relations of power, at least 
contributed to a sense of a collective ‘we’ that we see in discourses. Prior 
conflict lines, be it ethnicity or estate, were overcome through the emotional 
release and overcoming of relations that had disempowered them. Indeed, the 
experience of unification and Politicisation can be a powerful one. The quote 
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below comes from a protester in the USA, but parallels and perhaps expands 
on many of the rioters’ statements: 
by yourself, singly, you’re powerless. You’re subject to violence, 
you’re subject to death, you’re subject to a lot of aggressions and 
harassment … And that’s what makes it so powerful, that you feel 
that you’re reclaiming the space, that by yourself is not yours. 
(Women’s Critical Mass activist, quote in Ferrell, 2001: 91). 
In other words the moment of the riots where rioters overcame the police 
achieved a primordial version of Arendt’s ‘power’. The individualised 
resistance that formed part of the everyday could never quite ameliorate the 
sense of stigma and inferiority or reverse the relations of power. However, 
together, through their mutual enemy, rioters realised their common cause 
and power. This sudden reversal and empowerment of rioters achieved their 
expectations of a positive self through punishing the police, and pleasure was 
experienced: 
I was happy. I was overjoyed. Because it just felt so good … I was 
just like, 'Yes, you gonna get taught a fucking lesson now.' (male, 
student, 20, London, Prasad(a), 2011) 
We smashed the police station at the bottom of Park Road and for 
me that was, I'll never forget that, never forget that. (male, 30s, 
unemployed, Carter; 2011, I knew…’) 
In other words, the violent acts were individualised in that they expressed and 
sought to overcome the causes of personal discontent, but they were also 
Political in that they were produced by, but more importantly sought to 
“reorganize power relations between groups in the societies in which they 
materialize.” (Reicher & Stott, 2011: 45%). Because these relations were 
Political, those excluded had a common enemy and a common purpose. The 
rioting, for a moment, created the bridge between the individualised 
discontent, and a rudimentary realisation of the common cause. Having 
mapped out this individualised form of resistance, we need to explore how this 
type of resistance, rather than a Politicised form, could be produced. 
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6.4. Attacking the Police: from 1980 to 2011 
6.4.1. Consumerism 
As noted, what is perhaps the most obvious indicator of difference between 
the 1980s and 2011 riots was the substantial increase in looting. This has led 
to the argument that 2011, unlike the 1980s, was a consumer riot and in turn 
can be utilised to explain the individualistic or ‘apolitical’ actions of rioters 
(Bauman, 2011; Moxon, 2011; Zizek, 2011). The most developed and 
evidenced version of this argument with regards to the 2011 riots came from 
Treadwell et al. (2013). The argument makes a two-fold contribution to 
explaining the riots: firstly, that consumerism promotes an individualistic 
worldview in which the self becomes the focus of improvement or overcoming 
discontent, rather than politics. Secondly, that economic exclusion in a 
consumer society constitutes a form of social exclusion and disrespect. 
This argument posits that consumerism constitutes one of the dominant and 
most widespread practices of achieving a positive relation to the self 
(Bauman, 2011 & 2000: 76; Hayward & Young, 2007: 112; Treadwell et al., 
2013). By associating forms of social status with a product, the practice of 
consumerism creates the logic whereby material gain and display achieves 
the ‘idealised self’ and produces self-esteem (Bauman, 2000; Dittmar & Drury, 
2000: 113; Wernick, 1983 & 1991: 23 & 61; Williamson, 1983: 19).  However, 
as Hayward (2004) argues, the paradox of modern capitalist societies is that 
amongst the economically excluded it generates strong ‘feelings of alienation’, 
through over-exposing them to mainstream consumer culture. 
The issue is not only economic, but symbolic. The exclusion from economic 
capital prevents or limits access to the signs of worth that run through 
consumerism. Supporting this notion, during my research in impoverished 
areas in north London, many identified the importance of looking good, having 
the right brands, or material gain. While Lim, Mark, and Steve all mentioned 
the importance of appearance for young people, Ned described how the 
clothes and brands you wore at school would impact upon social status. For 
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Maria: “like everyone has to dress nice and stuff”.  
The habituation into doxic notions of success and status, combined with 
exclusion through the inability to effectively practise and obtain markers of 
economic capital, produces a form of ‘ontological insecurity’ (Hayward & 
Young, 2007:112; also see Honneth, 1995: 137). This was highlighted by 
Polly who described how most young people she knew spent their money on 
clothes, trainers, and gave a particularly telling example of a few young men 
she knew who had ‘flashy cars’ but could barely afford the petrol to run them.  
They had the cars because it was important to their status and image in the 
local area. In part, Polly thought this was to do with the recent gentrification in 
the area and the increased visibility of wealth, thus as Bauman (2000) argues, 
comparison with the self is no longer defined by which class you belong to, 
but is applied to those most ‘successful’ in society. However, supporting 
Treadwell et al.’s (2103) argument, Polly was talking about the pressures of 
young people to engage in crime. 
Each of the examples Polly gave were objects that, alongside the pragmatic 
purpose, may also function as a display and thus say something about the 
person’s status. Indeed, revealing the move away from ‘working class’ as a 
Political and positive identity, one rioter revealed the shift in the process of 
maintaining self worth:  
we’re in a working class area so if you turn around in your I dunno 
hundred pound trainers an’ say ‘Oh look at these what I got 
yesterday’ people gonna think ‘Ra this guy’s top guy in the school 
cos he got the best trainers’. So that can in a way put you in a 
different – different calibre or class whatever in your school area. 
(Slovo, 2012: 53). 
What is particularly noticeable about the importance placed on material goods 
in relation to social recognition today is that any evaluation - positive or 
negative - is attributed to the individual: ‘this guy’s top guy’. Poverty has 
shifted from something excluded groups had to deal with, to symbolising the 
‘inferiority’ of the individual. Through the individualising pressures of material 
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gain and display to achieve status and respect, we can see how such factors 
become pre-reflexively important and ‘working class’ loses the capacity to 
resist low self-worth.  The expectations are no longer to ‘labour’ and cope with 
difficulty (Hoggart, 1992), but to display the right brands.  
Polly contrasted this need to display with her experiences of being young in 
1980s Hackney. For Polly it was okay to ask for help from neighbours, 
describing a community network of ‘aunties’ or friends of her mother who she 
could go to if there was a lack of food at home. These seem to have 
functioned as a local community with a set of norms and expectations that 
acknowledged their class and race based conditions as an injustice, providing 
emotional and practical support to each other, and enabling Polly not to feel 
disrespected by experiences of poverty. Today, she noted, it is not okay to 
ask for help from neighbours as this demonstrates inferiority.  
Indeed, the scale of looting as well as the targeting of designer brands 
suggests this is an important factor (MoJ(a), 2012: 6; THO, 2011; Guardian & 
LSE, 2011; Morrell et al., 2011; RCVP, 2011: 46). According to Reading the 
Riots a number of retailers were mentioned again and again by interviewees, 
such as Foot Locker (which sells trainers), PC World, mobile phone outlets, 
and not least JD Sports, which lost £700,000 of stock (Roberts, 2011: 26%).32 
Talking to young people from the communities, RCVP (2011: 104) noted that 
brands that were mentioned and viewed as important not status tended to be 
‘luxury’ or ‘designer’, such as Louis Vuitton, Nike, Apple, and Diesel. 
Indeed, many rioters in 2011, to some extent, appear to have rejected the 
legitimated forms of cultural capital and economic practise (e.g. education, 
employment), but not economic capital per se as a function of generating self-
worth. Perhaps because, as Hayward (2004) argues above, of the pervasive 
and encompassing message of consumerism. This is particularly visible 
through Treadwell et al.’s interviewees who mention exclusion from legitimate 
means of economic gain alongside the importance of material gain and 
display:  																																																								
32 I could only locate this in E-format without page numbers, thus provide the % as a general 
location of the source. 
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I am 23, never had no job, been in care, in Brinsford, Glenn Parva. 
I got fuck all to lose man, fucking Babylon [police] can’t do shit 
anyway, fuck them. We run this town now, not them pricks man, I 
am gonna take as much as I can get. I want to get watches man, I 
want me a fucking Rolex. (Treadwell et al. 2013: 11) 
The only people round me with cars and money, they’re dealers. 
Look at the cars on their drives, man, and it fucking shows crime 
pays, man. Now I am gonna have me some of this. (Treadwell et 
al. 2013: 10-11) 
This drive to obtain and display material goods contrasts with law for those 
economically excluded, which functions as an inhibition to material gain 
outside of legitimated routes. Consequently, law contrasts with the understood 
modalities to develop and maintain a positive sense of self, and may become 
normatively devalued and potentially resented. Indeed, there is support for 
this perspective from other sources, such as the rioter who revealed that law 
had no normative power when he referred to looting as ‘just business’, or 
another rioter asked on a television interview if he felt guilty: “No cos I’m 
watching my plasma that I just got (laughter). Feels like Christmas came 
early.” (London Riots, 2011, 3.43).  
There is much to take from Treadwell et al., (2013) and as we have seen, 
there is evidence that supports the importance and role of consumerism; not 
least the way in which consumerism has shaped the affective and pre-
reflexive concerns and understandings of the excluded (and included). Again, 
this was supported in my findings. However, to argue that consumerism is the 
defining feature of the 2011 riots is a simplification which ignores similarities 
with the 1980s, homogenises rioters, and draws too strong a conclusion with 
the notion of consumer riots.  
Indeed, the notion that looting was simply about self-gain lacks nuance. For 
some it certainly seems to be the case that looting was the primary or only 
motive, but this does not exclude that, as Harding (2012) argues, some acts 
of looting in 2011 functioned symbolically at gaining reputation on ‘the streets’; 
or as Platts-Fowler (2013) notes, that looting may often operate as an 
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expression of power over resented authorities. By breaking the ‘authority’s’ 
rules in front of them, one challenges their resented position of power.  
As we saw in the previous section, there were a number of rioters who spoke 
of both looting and attacking the police, and indeed, expressed a sense of 
release with regards to their actions in general. Even in their own quote 
above, Treadwell et al. neglect the fact that one ‘looter’ explicitly expresses a 
discontent or anger with the police and satisfaction at overturning power-
relations with them, achieved by looting: “Fucking Babylon […] fuck them. We 
run this town now, not them pricks man” (Treadwell et al. 2013: 11).  
6.4.2 Anti-politics in 2011? 
What appears to provide support for the consumer riot claim is the shift from 
the more Politicised actions in the 1980s, to apparent lack of both Political 
organisations and discourses in 2011. Indeed, we can note that in 2011 there 
were no organisations speaking out like that of the Black Liberation Front;33 
and no politico-religious, or equivalent cultural, movements to that of 
Rastafarianism which explicitly speak to the Political context of excluded 
groups.  
However, while this may in part, be attributable to consumerism’s 
diminishment of political forms of identification, to assume this is the only 
influence or indeed that the causal relation is linear, would be too simple. 
Indeed, this alone could not adequately explain both the anti-politics and the 
move towards criminal forms of resistance we saw in the 1980s riots, prior to 
the emergence of a strong consumer culture. Problematically, the over-
emphasis on consumerism ignores the pre-reflexive rejection of politics that 
occurs through exclusion and alienation itself, and the complex ways in which 
this might occur.  
Social exclusion tends to devalue accepted forms of engagement with society, 
such as politics, as the experience of disempowerment renders them 																																																								
33 There were of course, some people who spoke of the problems faced by young people in 
excluded communities, such as black journalist and activist, Darcus Howe, Sheldon Thomas 
(2012), and Stafford Scott (2011), community activist in Broadwater Farm. However, in 
general there appeared to a be a qualitative and quantitative difference in the level of political 
articulation and organisation. 
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increasingly irrelevant to the social questions of the excluded (Deranty & 
Renault, 2009: 43, Hall et al., 1980). Thus as we saw in the 1980s, excluded 
classes often do not present their complaints to the political system, and 
discontent is expressed through practices and actions external and often in 
opposition to the legitimated social order.  
Why the capacity of notions of black identity were ceasing to function to 
overcome the sense of disempowerment cannot be answered easily. Born in 
Britain to Jamaican parents, Nick felt there was a disconnect between the two 
generations. Nick and others also thought that first generation immigrants 
showed a deference or loyalty to the British state, an acceptance of their 
exploitation that did not speak to the later generations’ experiences (Hall et 
al., 1980; Pilkington, 1988; Thomas, 2012). One youth worker in 1970s 
Brixton though the lack of black people in positions of power meant that “our 
children assume we are of little or no account and refuse to accept our 
discipline” (Gates Jr, 1976: 308). 
However, there was also a certain lack in the capacity of political movements 
to speak to the young (Gates Jr, 1976: 315; Lea & Young, 1982; Penketh, 
2000). From Nick’s description it seemed like the means to resist the 
disrespect felt through racism were present in the community, but the means 
to empower young people were not. On the one hand, he recalls more explicit 
talk of experiences of racism than today, which he felt helped unite the 
Caribbean community: ‘people were tighter’. But on the other hand, what Nick 
felt was not transmitted was the ‘sense of being in a struggle together’, of 
passing on the torch.  
Nick, in part, felt this was to do with ‘ownership’, in which the elder generation 
thought they had done the hard work, while his and younger generations ‘had 
it easy’. Whatever the mix of relations, for the young black people growing up 
in the 1970s and 1980s, the older black generations were increasingly being 
understood in a negative light and therefore to some extent unable to shape 
the struggle: “we were not going to be like our parents, we were not going to 
allow a system to repress us” (Thomas, 2012: 115).  
Indeed, Nick’s perspective rung true with what I had seen in my research. 
	 172	
While the youth project and Steve all provided services that were fundamental 
if we want prevent alienation, crime, and rioting, there was a lack of Political 
dialogue. I saw no education regarding structural disadvantage or history of 
struggles being passed on to young people; there was no talk of racism and 
the disadvantages they might face.  
This was supported by a distinction I noted during my research between the 
generations. While all of the elder generation (above 30 years) I spoke to 
explicitly identified and expected racial stereotyping by the police, and more 
often than not acknowledged the social and economic context behind 
involvement with crime, the younger generations tended to frame the 
discontent in more personal or individual terms, or mistreatment by the police 
as an issue of the particular police involved. Indeed, this individualised 
understanding seen in many rioter discourses, appears relatively common. 
The British Youth Council’s (2011) online survey finding that over half of the 
young people who responded identified the 2011 rioters’ ‘lack of respecting 
right and wrong’ and ‘lack of respect’ as significant causes of the riots.  
This is not to argue for a clear line between the two generations, as modes of 
perception do not work in such clear ways – certainly Lim and Maria both had 
some understanding of the larger issues (particularly given their position in 
dealing with the problems of other young people). Nevertheless, there was a 
difference, and one which can be seen when we compare the two most 
extreme examples of each position: Aisha, a black woman in her late 40s who 
I met at the civilian stop and search monitoring group; and Mark, a black man 
in his early twenties, who volunteered and had previously attended the youth 
project in Hackney. 
The informal interview/conversation with Aisha barely required me to ask any 
questions, other than an initial mention of my research on the police and the 
riots, before she set out how she saw the problems. Her perspective was well 
formulated, confident of the justness of her position, and one which framed 
black people as being systematically exploited and excluded, both by white 
society and their representatives, the police, and as noted she even 
connected this back to colonialism and slavery.  
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On the other hand Mark felt differently; his errors in his life (getting into trouble 
with the police, and on one occasion being taken to court, although he did not 
state the nature of the charge), were down to him and being ‘young and 
stupid’. His response with regards to the motivations of rioters, although short, 
was to claim that the rioters were like him, irresponsible and out for 
themselves. In turn, when I asked what he thought about police racism, he 
simply responded: ‘If a policeman is an arsehole or a racist, then he’s going to 
be one when he does his job’. 
In other words, Mark was using the ‘bad apple’ argument, and despite 
acknowledging some racism occurred in policing, he did not perceive racism 
as a political problem or as pertaining to the riots. Mark did not account for 
structural conditions and how this might have shaped his, rioters, or even the 
police’s behaviour, but rather blamed ‘bad’ policemen, the rioters, and even 
himself. Of course, how this impacted on Mark’s sense of self was not clear 
given his limited willingness to engage with me. However, we can note that of 
all those I interviewed, he was the most mistrustful towards my researcher 
identity, suggesting a stronger sense of rejection of legitimated society.  
Indeed, when looking for organisations and charities that work with young 
people around the issues of exclusion and poverty in such areas, I began to 
note that these all tend to be framed through the individual and coping with 
the symptoms of exclusion. For instance, the organisations 100 Black 
Men/Women in London, appears to provide an invaluable service in inspiring 
confidence, aspirations, and self-esteem in young black people.34 However, 
this occurs through notions such as developing ‘leadership’ and ‘presentation 
and communication’, each of which seeks to empower the individual to 
overcome problems, not to motivate young people to deal with the wider 
structural issues that produce a lack of confidence. Thus, this may help for the 
specific child but not for future generations. This is not a criticism of the 
organisations per se, but perhaps of an individualised society that increasingly 
neglects the political sphere as a means of change. 																																																								34	See website: http://100bml.org/about-us/, Or for similar organisations see 
http://www.childhoodtrust.org.uk/; http://www.ukyouth.org/; http://www.xlp.org.uk/; 
http://www.tomorrows-people.co.uk/about-us/what-we-do/	
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 6.4.3 Political Representation 
Of note in this regard is the shift from legitimised political representatives of 
excluded black or local communities leading up to the 1980s, to politicians 
who seem distinct from the communities they represent by 2011. Take for 
instance, a Councillor and later MP for Haringey, Bernie Grant, a black man 
who was seen as a hard left politician. In response to the Broadwater Farm 
riots in 1985 he stated: “What the police got was a bloody good hiding”.35 
Simply put, as part of the community he understood the violence was a 
response to the relation between police, society, and the black community in 
Tottenham. On the other hand the MP for Haringey in 2011, David Lammy, a 
locally born black man, seemed to tow the mainstream line, stating: “The vast 
majority of people in Tottenham reject what has happened here last night”, he 
went on to state the events had been carried out by ‘mindless, mindless 
people’ and unlike the riots of 1985 it was not about the police, ‘this was an 
attack on Tottenham’.36 
In other words, although Lammy would acknowledge some of the underlying 
problems, he largely took the position of mainstream politicians and morally 
condemned the rioters.37 This condemnation is more than just problematic in 
itself, but indicative of a separation between the legitimised political 
representation of these areas, and excluded sections of the community. 
Unlike Bernie Grant who functioned as a spokesperson for black people in 
Haringey and thus provided a connection and means by which discontent 
could be articulated through the political system, Lammy blamed, 
demonstrating the lack of means by which the excluded are represented. 
This again, returns us to the importance of considering what underpins 
modalities of exclusion such as racism - the maintenance of relations of 
privilege and disadvantage. Indeed, rather than seeking to overcome the 
issues highlighted by anti-racist movements, it is arguable that those 
benefiting from their position in the social hierarchy sought to incorporate and 																																																								
35 For instance, see http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/706403.stm or 
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2000/apr/10/guardianobituaries.obituaries 
36 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DVEQFsjY7pY 
37 Lammy also homogenised and simplified what ‘respectable’ members of the Tottenham 
thought, portraying a unified and straightforward understanding of local opinions. 
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silence the voices that opposed it.38 Indeed, it may be the case that what we 
see in 2011 is the culmination of the process that Sheldon Thomas (2012) 39 
identified in his youth, where black leaders and spokespersons in the 1970s 
were increasingly taking governmental or official positions and losing touch 
with those they sought to speak for. Agreeing with Thomas, Lea and Young 
argue the introduction of ‘ethnic politics’ by the dominant white society in the 
1960s and 1970s, diminished the capacity to form political resistance, as 
“[a]rticulate members of the black community were channelled off into the 
political vacuum of Community Relations Councils” (Lea & Young, 1982: 17).40  
For angry and disrespected young people the political sphere, and indeed, to 
some extent even Political movements, could no longer adequately offer a 
mechanism through which to express the anger: “our community leaders […] 
had no idea about our anger, hate, and worst of all the violence that was to 
come” (Thomas, 2012: 114). By 2011 this process, shaped by the increasing 
dominance of consumer society and norms, appears to have come to fruition 
and not only political action, but Political understanding, has become 
increasingly irrelevant: I don’t talk politics with them […] Young men like me 
think politics is a middle-class hobby (young person, rioter, Manchester, 
Morrell et al. 2011: 42).    
6.5. Conclusion 
What we have seen throughout this exploration of the forms of resistance 
seen during rioting in the 1980s and 2011, is that there has been an 																																																								
38 It should be acknowledged that the protection of privilege is far more complex than I can 
give space to here, and in no way is the argument being made that the dominant group 
simply form a conscious and intentional group cynically oppressing the lower echelons of 
society. Rather, this point should be considered inline with the broader argument being made 
throughout this thesis, that of the pre-reflexive nature of prejudice in maintinaing privilege 
through shaping interpretation of events and stereotypes of individuals with certain markers. 
For instance, see Neal’s (2003:71) comparison between the Scarman and later MacPherson 
Reports, and how the change in ‘regimes of truth’ regarding race, first inhibited and later 
enabled the acceptance of institutional racism as a feature of the police. 
39 Supporting the notion that positive role models who articulate Political means of resistance 
can help, Bernie Grant would actually take Sheldon Thomas (2012) under his wing and help 
him out of the gang lifestyle. Today, Thomas works to help young people in similar situations 
to those he experienced, escape violence and gangs. 40	, Bernie Grantseems to have been an exception even in the 1980s and not only is still 
spoken of positively in Tottenham today, but was renowned for his radical politics and it 
seems was also considered a problem for the establishment and even an embarrassment to 
the Labour Party.	
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increasing shift away from legitimated society. The social order is failing to 
maintain itself because the affective responses to exclusion and 
stigmatisation have no means to be expressed other than in violent opposition 
to the system. This was already apparent in the 1980s when resistance was 
articulated as rebellion and anti-politics. However, perhaps even more 
dangerous for the social order was that which has been labelled ‘criminality’, 
but can be understood as a form of resistance without the bridge that enables 
the Political understanding and collective organisation seen in the rebellious 
movements. 
Without this form of Political understanding and identity to resist and 
overcome disrespect and disempowerment, all that is left is an individualised 
rejection of the normative rules. Expressive and performative displays of 
disrespect to the authorities provide esteem through the transgression of law, 
and reject the capacity of society to judge and disrespect. It was this form of 
resistance that was prevalent in the 2011 riots. Here the sense of disrespect 
and disempowerment was the same as the 1980s, but the violence was 
increasingly individualised, a personal expression of anger and rage which 
could not adequately be dealt with in the day to day.  
The rioters of 2011 largely seem to have lacked the issues of racism or class 
to unite around and form identities that could resist the stigma and low-self 
worth the felt from exclusion. Without these, violence as a momentary 
overturning of power relations, was all that was left to them. Yet in the riots, 
the common and potent anger against the police – the most visible, tangible, 
and importantly, present oppressor – enabled rioters to achieve a moment of 
empowerment, where together they could make the police feel as the rioters 
do in the day-to-day. 
In trying to understand this shift we noted the importance of consumerism and 
the lack of realistic political representation or Political identities had shaped an 
individualistic approach to the world. These factors inhibited the expression of 
discontent through logics and identities that framed their condition structurally, 
and through modalities that could re-articulate their sense of self through a 
new and Politicised group. However, to focus down on particular relations and 
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seek to explain the attacks on the police through these alone, neglects how 
logics such as individualism or lack of Politicised representatives and 
movements interact with exclusion in education and employment. Neither 
individualism nor the shift in political representation simply occurred out of the 
blue, but emerge from larger social processes.  
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7. Neoliberalism: The Expansion of Disrespect 
7.1. Introduction:  
The similarities between the attacks on the police in the 1980s and 2011 riots 
were clear. Both were justified as a response to long term aggressive and 
disrespectful over-policing. Both appear to have been committed principally by 
young men, and in both decades these young men appear to have 
disproportionately come from backgrounds of poverty, unemployment, failure 
in education, and were more likely to have felt disconnected or alienated from 
society.  
The 1980s revealed that the contexts of exclusion and over-policing were 
intertwined. Through society’s operant stereotypes of the lower ranked, the 
police reproduced society’s social hierarchy or relations of privilege and 
disadvantage by criminalising and over-policing principally black, but also 
white, communities. Consequently, if the analysis of the 1980s taught us 
anything it is that to gain an understanding of how those who are supposed to 
keep the peace once again became the focus for violence in 2011, we cannot 
confine ourselves to relations between the rioters and police but must 
understand what underpins and shapes this conflict. 
While the last chapter examined the forms of resistance in rioting, connecting 
this to the larger social context, this chapter develops the account of the role 
of the social order in generating individualised resistance. Firstly, this chapter 
explores the broader social, political, and economic processes which have 
both shaped, and been shaped by, individualistic logics with the impact of 
increasing the type of resistance we saw in 2011. Secondly, to connect the 
gap between structure and agency, the chapter will explore how the 
exclusions in education and employment, identified amongst rioters, 
translates into shame and disrespect, and how this also contributes towards 
individualised forms of resistance.  
As we will see, the emerging dominance of neoliberalism and its emphasis on 
individualism and meritocracy has resulted in an increasing shift away from 
forms of prejudice/stereotypes that explicitly reference social structure (class 
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and race) in their justification of (dis)advantage. On the one hand, neoliberal 
educational and economic policies created a more ethnically heterogeneous 
super-exploited group, such as we saw in the data on 2011. On the other, the 
individualistic and meritocratic logic of (neo)liberalism rendered ‘race’ and 
‘class’ based forms of exclusion morally problematic, or unable to perform the 
function of justifying the privilege of the dominant groups.  
Thus, racist expressions and stereotypes were repressed, as black individuals 
apparently ceased to be the dominant targets of exclusion. However, the 
social and economic inequality that this stereotype had justified remained – 
black people did not and were not allowed en mass move up the social 
hierarchy. Thus, the argument will be made that the drive or need to justify 
relations of privilege and disadvantage, that is prejudice, was re-formed into 
the ethnically inclusive, moralising, and ‘morally acceptable’ category of the 
‘underclass’ (Tyler, 2013). 
Yet, as Bulmer & Solomos (1999: 5) argue, identification in terms of ‘race’ is 
necessary to resist ‘racism’. Individualism did not simply shape the way 
individuals thought about their exclusion, it shaped the very visibility of that 
exclusion. Without explicit forms of structural distinction, rather than moral 
forms, it becomes harder to create a bridge between the personal 
experiences of shame and anger, and that of people ‘like you’. In other words, 
individualism has impacted in multiple ways; on the logic of exclusion, on the 
visibility of those forms of exclusion, and as we saw in the last chapter, on 
how shame and disrespect is processed. 
 
7.2. From Class to Underclass  
7.2.1 Economy 
Prior to the 1970s white working class children had relatively stable, albeit 
class and gender based, expectations (Clement, 2012; Reay, 2006). Working 
class boys would expect to leave school for factory apprenticeships, or 
perhaps join the police or military, while for girls the options were generally 
restricted to nurses, shop assistants, or house wife. Despite clear 
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discrimination and an educational system that reproduced disadvantage, the 
white working classes’ path into and through society offered stability and 
some measure of economic security. 
The late 1970s and 1980s saw the restructuring of the market in the name of 
‘competitiveness’ and ‘efficiency’, resulting in deindustrialisation and loss of 
manual labour jobs, the privatisation of public services, the weakening of 
trade unions, the removal of apprenticeships, and loss of the possibility of a 
‘job for life’ (Atkinson, Roberts & Savage. 2012: 7-8; Clement, 2012).  
On one side of this ideological shift, neoliberal policies beginning with 
Thatcher focused on the notion of ‘choice’, and claimed to free individuals 
from the restraints of state legislation by turning services and welfare into 
quasi-consumer markets (McMahon, 2007). This was claimed to create 
efficiency through competition, and unburden the taxpayer from the inefficient 
bureaucracy of the state and the freeloaders in the benefit system. 
Supposedly ending the questionable ‘something for nothing culture’, the 
guarantees of the welfare state, such as social housing or unemployment 
benefits, began disappearing, leaving those the most disadvantaged 
increasingly vulnerable to market forces (Atkinson, 2012; Atkinson, Roberts & 
Savage, 2012).  
The other side of neoliberalism’s laissez-faire argument called for de-
regulation of the market itself in order to enable the full benefits of competition 
to create economic growth. The reality, however, was not de-regulation but 
rather disguised state intervention, or regulation on the side of capital in order 
to remove restrictions to wealth accumulation by business (Lipman, 2012: 
244). This meant the removal of protections on waged labour, an acceptance 
of a certain amount of unemployment in order to make a readily available and 
cheap labour force, limitations on striking, and reduction in certain taxes whilst 
increasing others, such as VAT (Value Added Tax), which disproportionately 
impacts on those with the lowest incomes (Atkinson, Roberts & Savage, 2012; 
Avis, 2014).  
One impact of this process was to disempower the white working class by 
removing their traditional access point and bargaining route from the 
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processes of political engagement; labour power increasingly ceased to have 
a say in the organisation of social life. As Lea and Young (1982) pointed out in 
1982, for black communities this was a ‘crisis for the political process’. 
Harrison notes in Hackney that the increasing economic weakness of workers 
in manufacturing, translated into political weakness: “The more they needed a 
pay rise, the less they could afford to take industrial action” (1992: 55). IN 
other words, black communities were increasingly being joined by members of 
white working class, in being disempowered and unable to seek change 
through the legitimated political system. 
The other related implication was to push the white working class into even 
closer proximity to black communities in terms of economic status and 
stability. Beginning in the 1970s but accelerating in the 1980s, neoliberalism 
would breakdown the white working class structure with secure employment 
opportunities and economic stability, in order to produce ‘flexible labour’. 
While this may benefit business, as Avis (2014: 67) points out, this is because 
risk is shifted from the business and the economy to the individual worker. 
The result was increased insecurity for the worker, a reduction in power or 
bargaining capacity, and thus increasing exploitation in a situation where any 
safety offered by the state is being increasingly withdrawn.  
The impact of such policies and attempts to globalise the British economy 
meant recession and increasing poverty in the most disadvantaged areas, 
specifically those that relied on manual labour. Success for business in the 
neoliberal economy meant shedding labour costs by reduction in jobs, wages, 
and even moving production to countries with cheaper labour sources. The 
idea of ‘flexible labour’ does not mean the individual simply becomes flexible, 
but rather the labour pool becomes flexible. Thus, working class areas suffer 
when businesses migrate but the labour force is unable to adapt.  
Harrison (1992: 50) notes that Hackney in the 1970s saw a 40% drop in 
manufacturing jobs between 1973 and 1981, the principle sector providing 
employment for residents. This process would reshape the city through the 
distribution of wealth, and creating ‘new urban geographies of exclusion and 
marginalization’ (Lipman, 2012: 249). As Atkinson (2012) found during his 
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ethnographic research into economic insecurity, the impact of neoliberal 
policies and cuts has been an increase in negative affect amongst those 
‘closest to necessity’; coping strategies were buying cheaper foods thus 
decreasing nourishment, giving up cars, selling possessions, and working 
longer hours: “words like ‘anxious’, ‘stressed’, ‘worried’, ‘unhappy’, or ‘feeling 
a failure’ speckled the participants’ accounts” (Atkinson. 2012: 26).  
Ultimately, the impact upon the lower end of the social hierarchy was material 
and existential insecurity and disempowerment. The gains won by the white 
working class movement were being withdrawn, and with this the class 
distinction between white and the under-privileged, black working class. Thus, 
as the last chapter demonstrated, in the 1970s and 1980s the black 
communities, excluded on class and race based lines, suffered most; yet, 
increasing numbers of the white working class were pushed into similar levels 
of poverty and insecurity. 
 7.2.2 Education 
Despite the rhetoric of ‘fairness and responsibility’ and giving ‘talent and 
ambition’ the opportunity to develop and achieve regardless of a person’s 
background, upon entering government in 2010 the Conservative and Liberal 
Democrat coalition introduced a period of austerity which targeted the worst 
off in UK society, both economically and educationally (Atkinson, Roberts & 
Savage. 2012: 5). Perhaps the most famous cut in the context of the 2011 
riots was that of Educational Maintenance Allowance or EMA, which provided 
a small contribution to poorer students in non-compulsory education. Yet this 
was simply one amongst many; the recession that hit in 2007 and the 
subsequent austerity programme saw cuts in welfare, education, and youth 
resources across the board.  
As is the case with cuts to public services in an unequal society, the need for 
services is not uniformly distributed, and it is those already economically and 
socially excluded who suffer the most (Atkinson. 2012: 14). Reay (2012: 34-5) 
argues the recent austerity program has disproportionately impacted on 
poorer students and institutions, with those on free school meals having 
support cut by £370 per year, while schools in deprived areas have had to cut 
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services such as careers advice and extra support for low performing children, 
and youth services decimated, with Haringey seeing 8 out of 13 youth centres 
closing and a 75% cut in youth funding (Cooper, 2012).  
While certainly implicated in the 2011 riots however, these are only the most 
recent round of reduction in services. Moreover, while they may have had an 
immediate impact on young people, these cuts did not have the time to shape 
alienated dispositions through long term experiences of disrespect. Again, the 
exclusion and disrespect faced by young people today can be better 
understood if we return to the 1970s and 1980s. 
Arguably the British educational system has always functioned as mechanism 
to reproduce the social hierarchy. The basic logic of providing certificates to 
students, ultimately functions to create distinctions between members of a 
social order. In effect, the system creates a privileged minority with the cultural 
capital to gain prestigious positions and higher incomes in contrast to the rest. 
As Harrison (1992: 291; also see Reay, 2006) notes, the education system 
has always been based on class-based forms of knowledge and practice: 
“instead of compensating for disadvantage, British education reinforces it and 
perpetuates it” (Harrison, 1992: 278).  
Simply put the education system was designed to reward what the middle and 
upper classes had, and exclude those that lacked it. Working class parents 
who have not succeeded in education, who hold little practical experience of 
subjects and skills, or place little value in educational success, at best cannot 
adequately prepare their children, and at worst reproduce their own lack of 
value in the system (Atkinson, 2010; Reay. 2012: 43). Moreover, the 
education system failed to account for the geographical accumulation of 
deprivation and educational disadvantage. Thus, in areas with high ethnic 
minorities and concentrated deprivation, like Hackney, Harrison found that 
schools struggled under the weight of the difficult tasks they faced: “the 
average level of ability and behaviour is so poor that every school […] is a 
dump school compared with a suburban comprehensive” (ibid). 
For the white working class, the stability and wide availability of manual labour 
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employment routes meant this was less of a problem pre-1970s. The same 
could not be said for Caribbean immigrants who have been excluded from 
accessing educational and economic capital from the very beginning. Thus 
the black working class formed the super-exploited group (Hall et al., 1980); 
the bottom class, rejected and offered nothing by society. However, once 
neoliberal regulation and recession began to change things, education 
became far more important in terms of gaining employment. Thus the 
inequalities that underpin the system, but had only been fully felt by the black 
population, began to impact the white working classes 
Due to the individualistic ideology of ‘choice’, deindustrialisation, and the 
requirements of ‘flexible’ labour, educational qualifications increased in 
importance with regards to gaining employment. Under the ideological 
purview of neoliberalism, the education system would facilitate a meritocratic 
society allowing the most talented to rise to the top in a system where all 
could compete against all. Amongst other reforms, the National Curriculum 
was introduced in 1988 along with competition between schools and students, 
whereby standardised testing functioned as economic measures of 
performance that could be rewarded through funding (Beckmann & Cooper, 
2005; Clement, 2012). Schools could now be measured against each other, 
rewarding institutions for doing well and encouraging lower performers to 
improve. 
While these policies began with Thatcher, the flaw was perhaps most visible 
in the late 1990s when Tony Blair’s New Labour continued and increased the 
Conservative focus. New Labour took the competitive logic even further and 
compounded the hidden structural disadvantage by ‘naming and shaming’ 
failing schools and emphasising ‘standards of literacy’ (Sammons, 2008: 654-
655). Problematically, the emphasis on ‘standards’ – a blunt, decontextualised 
measure of performance – ignored a plethora of structural disadvantages that 
might have contributed to lower performance. 
Neoliberal educational policy has also ignored the impact of poverty. In the UK 
social inequalities have a markedly high impact on student performance 
(Atkinson, 2010; Beckmann & Cooper, 2005; Clement, 2012; Reay, 2006 & 
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2012). Indeed, using a longitudinal study and regression analysis of children 
born in 1970, Bynner and Parsons (2002: 298-300) show that those 
unemployed and with little educational qualifications are more likely to have 
had a low birth weight (suggesting lower standard of nutrition and poverty), 
grown up in inner city housing estates, been on free school meals, and come 
from families on benefits.  
But the disadvantage faced by poor and working class children is not just from 
their background, however, but also compounded by the schools they attend. 
In the competitive system, failure in the educational race does not mean help 
for those lagging behind, but penalisation. Rather than overcoming 
disadvantage, the pseudo-meritocratic system rewards schools for excluding 
students who are failing or disruptive by better positioning them in the league 
tables. Not only does this mean that, as the external pressures on schools 
have increased, so has the number of children excluded (Beckmann & 
Cooper, 2005: 479); but also this has functioned to further stratify the school 
system. 
Good publicity in league tables attracts the better prepared, or privileged 
students; lower positions in the league tables mean parents with the cultural 
and economic capital to send their children elsewhere, do so. Consequently, 
failing schools in areas of poverty can only attract those most unprepared for 
the education system, resulting in a cyclical relation of deterioration (Atkinson, 
2010; Lipman, 2010: 245-6; Reay, 2012; Sammons, 2008: 655). The 
competition between schools in the attempt to attract students and 
maintaining funding has explicitly shifted to a system that creates winners and 
losers. The losers are ‘dump’ or ‘sink schools’ where the most disruptive, 
disadvantaged, and the worst performing children end up (Harrison, 1992; 
Sammons, 2008: 654).  
In other words, neoliberal policies have not done anything to solve the 
reproduction of inequality and exclusion that the education system has 
produced. Instead neoliberalism has exacerbated these inequalities by hiding 
the impact of deprivation and the social hierarchy on performance. The result 
has been, as Reay (2006: 295) puts it, to shift the white working class from 
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‘educational outsiders’ to ‘outsiders within’: everyone competes and is 
measured against each other, but not everyone starts from the same position. 
Disadvantaged young people would now have to enter an increasingly 
insecure and competitive market place, which allocates rewards to individuals 
based on their achievements in a system operates on an implicit class 
system. Of course, this system to some extent already existed for the super-
exploited black communities up until the 1980s. What neoliberal educational 
policies have ultimately achieved is to expand disadvantage and the super-
exploited group.  
 
7.3. From ‘Black’ to ‘Underclass’ 
In 2011 we saw, in contrast to the 1980s, a more ethnically mixed group 
individuals attacking the police produced by the expansion of the super-
exploited group. However, we also saw less identification around notions of 
race or class, and an increase in individualised resistance. This did not 
emerge out of nowhere but reflects changes in power in the social order. 
Thus, we need to understand the way in which notions of race changed with 
these material changes.  
Race and class are two forms of distinction by which the social hierarchy, or 
privilege and disadvantage, was maintained; the stereotypes that functioned 
as forms of distinction served as justifications for these relations of 
privilege/disadvantage, delegitimising representatives and behaviours of the 
excluded (Lee, 2017; Skeggs, 2004). The result of neoliberal policies has 
been to increase poverty and insecurity amongst the most vulnerable, whilst 
simultaneously removing the economic and social stability of the white 
working class. While explicit racial prejudice meant that previously black 
groups constituted as the bottom group, the destruction of the class structure 
shifted more white people into similar conditions. At the same time ideological 
changes were occurring through the increasing emphasis on individual choice 
and meritocracy, tied up in the justification of laissez-faire capitalism.  
Beginning in the 1960s, liberal ‘meritocratic’ society was increasingly 
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positioning racial and to some extent, class-based hierarchies as moral 
wrongs under the logic of equality of opportunity for all (Clement, 2012; 
McKoy, 2001). However, racial prejudice does not simply disappear because 
the category of ‘race’ is no longer normatively accepted (Bulmer & Solomos, 
1999: 5). What is important was not why one’s group was superior to another, 
but simply that they were. As James Baldwin put it so potently in the Civil 
Rights era, the ‘race problem’ in America was not black people, but white 
America’s social and psychological need to invent ‘the nigger’ (Baldwin, 1998: 
718). In other words, with the increasing multi-ethnic super-exploited group, 
and the meritocratic myth, the neoliberal social order required a more suitable 
form of stereotype to justify relations of privilege. 
 7.3.1. Shifting Logics of Exclusion 
As we have seen, the last four decades have expanded the exclusions and 
inequality that were produced by ‘race’ and ‘class’ as categories of distinction. 
Simply put, the moral rejection of the categories of ‘race’ and ‘class’ has not 
been accompanied by the dissolution of the social hierarchy and inequality 
that was justified by them. Thus while the particular categories may slide into 
the background, this simply implies that the form of making distinctions 
between groups has shifted. This new form of distinction requires a stereotype 
that does not contradict the liberal morality of equality and ideals of a 
meritocratic society.  
Indeed, we began to see such a change in the last chapter, which 
demonstrated how racial stereotypes of black people had shifted to fit the 
changing context, starting from the colonialist logic of biological inferiority 
before moving to ‘black criminality’. This shift in stereotype did not simply 
result from changes in understanding of ‘race’, but also from the material 
context; shifting from enslavement and colonisation outside of British society, 
to exclusion and stigmatisation within British society. As we have seen, this 
shift produced rejections of, and forms of resistance to, white British society, 
such as the Black Panthers, or the acceptance and valorisation of semi-
criminal roles like the ‘hustler’.  
The very consequences of widespread stigmatisation and exclusion began to 
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be utilised as evidence for the justifiability of that exclusion, as the black 
population was morally demonised through associations with poverty, problem 
estates, and unemployment (Penketh, 2000: 20). Black resistances, alongside 
media portrayals and panics about ‘black crime’, produced fear amongst the 
dominant groups of a loss of their privileged position and sense of identity, 
which had been pre-reflexively constructed through “the superiority of white 
culture” (Penketh, 2000: 10; Hall et al., 1980). Indeed, Thatcher herself 
expressed this exact sentiment, implicitly framed through racial prejudice, but 
underpinned by a need to protect white privilege:  
The British character has done so much for democracy, for law and 
done so much throughout the world that if there is any fear that it 
might be swamped people are going to react and be rather hostile 
(Thatcher, quoted in Cole, 2016: 39).  
Resistance to a white dominated social hierarchy and its stigmatisation of 
black communities resulted in a change in stereotype; from one where blacks 
were simply inferior and thus justifiably lower down the pecking order, to one 
in which blacks were increasingly criminalised and viewed as “on the wrong 
side of the moral divide, part of the alien evil that threatens the security of the 
white world” (Gunning, 2010: 37). Rather than simply justifying the position of 
blacks in society through biological inferiority, which was increasingly being 
rejected as a logic with any scientific or evidential base, the different 
behaviour of the excluded became to be framed as a moral and physical 
threat that needed to be ‘policed’ (Lea & Young, 1982: 10-11). The flaw was 
not in their biology but their morality.  
However, with the increasing shift to a (neo)liberal, meritocratic outlook and 
the notion of equality of opportunity, and the increasingly ethnically mixed 
super-exploited group, discrimination through concepts such as race and 
class were considered morally wrong. Liberal policies which sought to tackle 
racism, however, were doomed to failure for the very same neglect of 
structure we saw above. These policies did so by focusing in all the wrong 
places, and arguably ended up simply repressing explicit racism without 
tackling the structural source of the prejudices.  
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For instance, the introduction of ‘ethnic politics’ gave no actual power away, 
but put up a façade of change (Lea & Young, 1982). ‘Racial Awareness 
Training’ in state institutions in the 1960s and 1970s assumed racism could 
be solved by making individuals ‘aware’ of their prejudice (Penketh, 2000: 25-
6); similarly, liberal notions of multiculturalism (e.g. Kymlicka, 1995) frame the 
problem as one of culture clashes that can be overcome by dialogue. 
Problematically, such approaches ignored the role of structural (dis)advantage 
in prejudice (Cole, 2016: 38; Penketh, 2000: 25; Skeggs, 2010). Thus, rather 
than resolve the inequality that fed racism and classism, the particular 
modalities were supressed. 
Once race and class could no longer be utilised to justify the sense of 
superiority and position of the dominant in the social hierarchy, the affective, 
or pre-reflexive prejudice required a new cognitive form of distinction that 
would side-step any moral dissonance with the liberal worldview. In other 
words, liberalism required a stereotype that concealed its very basis and role 
in the hierarchy. The ‘underclass’ does such a job by shifting emphasis away 
from something beyond the control of the individual (biology or socio-
economic position) to something morally wrong with the individual 
(criminality).  
The individualistic logic that argues those who achieved their wealth did so 
simply by hard work, simultaneously conceals the impact of structure on 
social position and inequality, which becomes a matter of poor individual 
choices or laziness. The ‘underclass’ enables distinctions to be made 
between those ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’, the ‘hard workers’ from the 
‘parasites’, but it does by drawing on implicit stereotypes of black people and 
‘white trash’ (Tyler, 2013: 186 & 188-9). 
The point to make is that ‘underclass’ does not constitute a disjuncture or 
separation from what went before, but rather should be understood as a 
cognitive (re)construction of the stereotypes of ‘black’ and ‘class’. The new 
stereotype draws on previous reservoirs of prejudice, and brings together the 
markers previously associated with these categories. So now a black man, if 
he dresses in a way that does not transgress middle class norms he may, 
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more often, avoid being judged as dangerous. However, if he combines the 
correct markers – speaking the London patois, dressing in a hoody, and so 
forth – he will likely be judged and treated as criminal. The same will apply to 
a white man, with the obvious exception of skin colour. Thus the shift from 
‘black’ and ‘class’ to ‘underclass’ enabled certain affective prejudices to be 
maintained; avoided moral contradictions now associated with ‘race’ and 
‘class’; adapted to the shifting economic and social circumstances that were 
producing a more ethnically mixed dominated group; and thus protected the 
social hierarchy and privilege that accompanies this.  
7.3.1. Enacting the ‘Underclass’ 
Of course, to say that the ‘underclass’ is utilised as an explicit mode of 
distinction would be to defeat what it achieves – the concealment of 
discrimination. Rather, ‘underclass’ to some extent refers to the moral 
condemnation of anyone who fits the profile. Indeed, New Labour’s ‘NEETs’ 
(18-24 year olds who are ‘Not in Employment, Education, or Training’) is one 
example of how such prejudice is implemented. ‘NEET’ constitutes a 
quantitatively measured and thus morally ‘neutral’, but functionally similar 
concept to the ‘underclass’.  
As Clement (2012) points out, those grouped this way are actually a 
consequence of the above changes to industry and education, the failure to 
account for the impact of disadvantage, and the stigmatisation for failing. 
Yates et al. (2011) highlights the variety of backgrounds that are 
unproblematically grouped together, making single resolutions unlikely to 
succeed. Yet the purpose of these terms, as McMahon (2007) argues, is not 
to resolve but to reconstruct or ‘rediscover’ so called ‘social problems’ in order 
to attribute easy ‘solutions’. While NEETs are seemingly identified by their 
structural position, it is actually the behaviour of NEETs (economically 
unproductive, anti-social, etc.) that is the main concern. 
Indeed, even where New Labour explicitly identified structural disadvantage 
with regards to ‘NEETs’, ‘solutions’ focused not on changing the structure that 
disadvantaged them, but as with earlier liberal anti-racist initiatives, by 
focusing on the individual; or in other words, not on the what causes ‘low 
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ambition’, but on the ‘low ambition’ itself (Avis, 2014: 64). Indicative of this 
patholigisation was New Labour’s policy of offering counselling and training 
programs (Bynner and Parsons, 2002) in an effort to turn them from work shy 
and unproductive, into economically active members of society. Of course, 
once this fails to achieve results, it ultimately provides proof of the hidden 
stereotype, because, ‘Why if we have done so much for the socially excluded 
are they still behaving so badly?’ (McMahon, 2007: 28).  
As has been pointed out previously, neoliberalism did not create the exclusion 
and stigmatisation of those positioned at the bottom of the social hierarchy. 
Rather, what I have begun to explain above is what we saw in the difference 
and emerging process between the 1980s and 2011: a more ethnically mixed 
group to some extent rejecting the norms, values, and authority of society. 
Part of this came through concealing economic and social disadvantage, 
resulting in members of the white working class being pushed into the position 
of super-exploited previously reserved principally for the black population. 
However, neoliberalism also shifted the modalities by which individuals are 
distinguished and excluded, leaving the exclusion intact but removing the 
explicit means by which it occurs. This also has an impact on the lived 
experience of exclusion. 
 
7.4. Lived Experience  
As with ‘black’ and ‘criminality’ in the 1970s and 80s, ‘underclass’ is not simply 
a stereotype plucked out of the air; it is a simplification and misdiagnosis of 
behaviour, and a generalisation that groups socio-economically positioned 
individuals. Moreover, it does not simply symbolically frame an individual, but 
shapes the treatment of them by society. Thus in seeking to expose the 
anatomy of the ‘underclass’, and how this mechanism is implicated in attacks 
on the police, we must look at how individuals experience exclusion and 
stigmatisation and how this generates the resistance we saw in 2011. 
Utilising a longitudinal study, Yates (2011: 16) points out that among young 
men with low socio-economic status, those with ‘misalignment and uncertainty 
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in aspirations’, were significantly more likely to finish school without 
qualifications and end up unemployed. Low performance and experience of 
education alongside experiences of unemployment has been shown to 
connect to involvement in crime and disengagement from the legitimated 
system (Atkinson, M. 2012; Bynner and Parsons, 2002; Carrabine et al., 
2014: 377; Skeggs, 2010; Tyler, 2013). Indeed, Agnew (2012: 33-4) notes that 
crime in the US, rather than correlating with social class, has been found to be 
highest amongst those who have low educational and occupational 
expectations, and have been subject to “harsh, demeaning and unfair 
treatment by parents and teachers as well as those who find school ‘boring’” 
(ibid: 34). In other words, those who are taught not to expect to do well tend to 
be those resisting norms of the social order. 
While this was also the case in the 1980s, and thus led to increases in crime, 
we cannot ignore the increases in individualised resistance in 2011. Prior to 
the educational reforms discussed above, the system explicitly operated on 
and excluded individuals on class and race lines. Thus while it stigmatised 
white and, even more so, black working classes, the recognised existence of 
these groups enabled forms of resistance whereby young people could 
appropriate certain positive identities. These enabled young people to some 
extent, to negate the stigma and disrespect through belonging to alternative 
forms and standards of valuation tied to identities of ‘black’ or ‘working class’ 
(Hall et al., 1980; Harrison, 1992; Hoggart, 1992; Willis, 1979).  
The impact of neoliberal changes to education and the economy has been to 
expand these exclusions and forms of disrespect. In part, this has occurred 
through the concealment of structural disadvantage, which both exacerbated 
and expanded economic and social disadvantage. In education specifically, 
the competitive system also began to increasingly attribute ‘failure’ to the 
student alone.  
Without the cognitive means to frame the shame experienced as an injustice, 
or understand oneself as part of a group that rejects legitimated society’s 
‘education’, and to create processes of identification that can produce a 
positive sense of self, shame will be increasingly experienced and 
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internalised. Excluded from or disadvantaged in the legitimated forms of 
education, individuals will have no way to overcome this shame and re-
establish a positive sense of self. Thus, they will increasingly reject the 
dominant norms, values, and authorities; instead they will valorise what they 
attributes they have, and even those practices which enable them to express 
their anger at authorities (Atkinson, 2010; Reay, 2012).  
7.4.1. Education and Disrespect 
Agnew’s (2012) findings that delinquency correlates with low aspirations and 
experience of disrespect picks up on both interconnected aspects that shapes 
the rejection of legitimated society and different forms resistance to it – shame 
and identification. The aim of the youth project in Hackney is to give 
disadvantaged young people the help and assistance that most others in 
society take for granted. By doing this they seek to counter the disrespect and 
disempowerment imposed on young people through exclusion and 
stereotyping. 
One of the principle means they seek to achieve this is through facilitating 
success in education and, in turn, gaining meaningful employment: “the major 
goal is to help kids from the ‘hood’ in terms … try to adapt to society, modern 
society and help them develop erm, qualifications or if they’re interested in 
certain activities, dance, knife awareness, fashion, etc” (Lim). The reason for 
this is that many of the young people come from the sorts of economic 
pressures and family circumstances we have described above, and lack the 
skills and ‘confidence to succeed’ (Mark).  
Many children at the youth project came from single parent families who could 
not provide the time and/or a pragmatic understanding of educational skills 
and practices necessary to succeed in the system. While at the most extreme, 
other young people came from contexts where drug addiction or violence was 
common, resulting in situations of neglect in which educational performance 
understandably suffered. Adolescence is a key time in the formation of 
identity, and through peer relationships an individual can experience “group 
belonging, acceptance, solidarity and social affirmation” (Robertson, 2002: 
73). Thus these conditions alone can be particularly alienating for children, 
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producing experiences of rejection, insecurity, and humiliation resulting in a 
particularly low sense of self-worth (Gilligan, 2003; Ray, 2016: 349; Reay, 
2006).  
However, these conditions also mean that many of the children lacked the 
implicit and basic understanding of how to engage with the legitimated 
system. This did not simply extend to educational subjects but to the very 
basic knowledge required to interact with the social system. For instance, the 
project often dealt with young people who did not understand how to open a 
bank account, or more worrying, why they might need one. Thus, to attempt to 
engage with the legitimated social order is, from a very early point, something 
not understood and intimidating. 
Not having the necessary cultural capital also does not simply mean that they 
are less skilled or knowledgeable in the valued and required forms of practice; 
the notion of capital implicitly references both the idea of social reward or 
respect. This is fundamentally important to understanding the generation of 
self-esteem and dispositions to engage with what may otherwise be an alien 
and intimidating system. In other words, the key issue that related to the 
(anti)educational and societal dispositions of young people that the project 
sought to overcome was low self-esteem.  
For instance, all the young people seemed relaxed and outspoken within the 
project, yet this was in stark contrast with their interaction with me (or rather 
my researcher identity). Particularly towards the beginning the young people 
often closed down, stopped smiling, and even refused engagement. My 
position was as an outsider and threat to their self-worth; it is not hard to 
imagine that many might respond in a similar, albeit more familiar, manner to 
teachers and other authorities/representatives in society.  
Indeed, this was a problem the youth project often had to deal with as 
education was often seen as something unpleasant and not worthwhile.41 The 
education system is implicated in processes that produce low-self esteem 
rather than enabling positive forms of identification, thus the youth project 																																																								41	For similar finding see Atkinson, 2010; Harrison, 1992; & Reay, 2006	
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often worked with young people who are disengaging and rejecting the values 
of the system. These problems tend to begin at home. As with Harrison’s 
findings in the 1980s, the home life was significantly impacting upon children’s 
engagement with education: “Many teachers notice how children are more 
disturbed on Monday mornings, after weekends of domestic conflict” 
(Harrison, 1992: 288).  
It is important to note that this is not purely a consequence of neoliberalism 
itself. Harrison details how home life and lack the knowledge, educational 
drives, and good practice of the middle-classes in 1970s and 1980s Hackney 
meant not only that many young people were semi-literate, but that the 
amount of social issues faced meant “the inner-city school cannot afford to 
regard itself as a purely educational institutions” (Harrison, 1992: 283). 
Indeed, this seemed like a description of the project, but that alongside taking 
on functions of the family, it was also taking on functions of the school. As we 
have seen above, the social and economic changes brought about my 
neoliberalism has expanded and exacerbated shame and disadvantage. 
When I asked Lim how home life and lack of confidence impacted on young 
people at the project, he relayed one particularly potent example. Lim 
described one young woman who came from a single parent, low-income 
family that had not given her the practical knowledge or values to engage with 
education. To add to this, Lim stated she was often the primary care giver for 
her young brother while her mother was at work.  
Her school performance was particularly low and had been marked out as a 
disruptive and poor student, and on a number of occasions had been 
excluded “she gets into fights in school, she’s always having tantrums”. As 
such she had developed or been assigned a behavioural disorder that Lim 
could not specify: “she’s been given a title, let’s just say”. At the time she 
began attending the project, the young woman had become hostile to 
authority (parent and teachers), had low attendance at school, and outside of 
school was beginning to engage in drugs and get involved with other forms of 
crime. 
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The account given by Lim suggests a mix of all the issues discussed 
previously, and their impact upon a sense of self-worth; the context of poverty 
and a difficult home life, a lack of cultural capital, fed over into stigmatisation 
at school both as an object of condemnation and through a failure to generate 
mastery experiences. This led to a rejection of the value of education and its 
authority over her, and produced behavioural issues with anger or violence. 
While the account lacks first hand detail, we can explore how such issues 
shape experience and disposition through other informants. 
7.4.2 Family and Cultural Capital 
One particularly illuminating example of the issues relating to family and 
education came from outside the project and reveals the continuity between 
the 1980s and contemporary experiences of exclusion in an individual’s life. 
Nick (black, male mid-40s) comes from a large, poor family in Peckham, south 
London - which experienced rioting in 2011. Nick is clearly an intelligent man 
and during the two interviews took quite an analytical approach to his own life 
and family; however, he has largely failed in an education system that 
measures the forms of practice he has never acquired. When I asked him 
about his school he described it as ‘pretty ordinary’, however, of his family 
none have succeeded academically, and some of his brothers ending up 
involved in drugs and crime.  
While the school seems to have been neither high nor low in its performance, 
it was Nick’s family and the world of a poor black community that he identified 
as the problem. To some extent he resented his family’s approach to 
education and academic performance. He told me how throughout his life he 
has felt the pressure from his family to not display intelligence; questioning 
family viewpoints brought criticism of Nick for acting superior.  
Nick’s description of his home life seemed to fit what Atkinson found in 
working class communities: “Alienated by a system that esteems what they 
had little of […] many thus developed […] oppositional attitudes” (2010: 89). 
Thus, rather than encourage Nick’s engagement, he noted that practically 
engagement with education was inhibited. In particular, the home lacked any 
books or anything he might find intellectually stimulating, but perhaps most 
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telling is how he recalled that at an early age often not being able to do his 
homework due to lack of materials, and regularly searching the house for 
pencils and any sort of paper to work on. Harrison describes similar 
conditions:  
the typical Hackney […] semi-skilled or unskilled worker’s home, 
offers few toys and books; fewer outings and holidays; shortage of 
personal space for play or study; and shortage of attention from 
parents (Harrison, 1992: 278). 
For Nick’s family, engagement with formal education was largely seen as 
something you had to do, but doing well was not seen as an achievement, 
and indeed could be understood as a negative. He told me that even today, 
despite some members of his family occasionally saying they are ‘proud of his 
intelligence’, he consistently feels the pressure to not display it. In other 
words, Nick was struggling with the contradiction between what seemed to be 
his desire to learn, and the family/cultural norms which devalued and 
disadvantaged him in relation to middle-class forms of education. 
This seems to have affected Nick, because he also admitted being insecure 
and struggled with who he was and how he saw himself. However, this was 
also related to his experiences in education, both at school where he failed to 
achieve good grades, and later where he also tried to attend university as a 
mature student. At university he stated he struggled to fit in with academic 
practise, received low marks, and dropped out in the second year.  
Despite his family context, Nick had the basic drive to engage with education, 
but it seems he lacked the embodied cultural capital, or practical know-how, 
which would have enabled him to reproduce the required middle-class forms 
of educational displays measured by standardised tests or essay writing. 
Instead, he experienced disrespect through failure. Thus structural 
disadvantage is not only given institutional and concrete form through the 
assessment process, it also implies the child will more likely experience 
damage to self-worth through failure they can do little about. 
Nick’s family background does not contain any of the more serious issues of 
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violence, drugs or neglect that some young people faced at the project. 
Nevertheless, the stigma attached to his intelligence in his community 
alongside his failed attempts to engage with education meant Nick could not 
develop a sense of self-worth and positive identity through the legitimated 
system. Instead of being rewarded, Nick lost confidence in his capacity to act, 
to be good at something, and to achieve or become what is socially valued by 
the larger or local society (Honneth, 1995; Robertson, 2002).  
 7.4.3. Exclusion in Education 
What matters of course, not simply the student’s context but the school and 
how the behaviour of the institution and its representatives impacts on young 
people. Simply put, without belief, encouragement, and support students will 
not be able to gain mastery experiences, or generate self-worth through 
legitimated forms of practice. In turn, that they ‘fail’ and understand their self 
and their abilities in this light, means they will also fail to build a sense of self-
esteem through, and value in, the socially valued categories and practices of 
the dominant order (Reay, 2012).  
As Harrison’s research demonstrated, the issue of underfunded schools 
contributing to students’ rejection of the system is certainly not new to 
neoliberalism. However, the individualised logic and competitive structuring of 
relations has meant an increased inability for children to resist this stigma 
through alternative structural identities. In an ethnographic study in London, 
Lucey and Reay found that many of their 450 disadvantaged children were 
feeling ‘pathologised’, underperforming, and rejecting education:  
the lack of access to representations through which positive 
identifications can develop, generated negatively framed and 
defensive identities among the working-class students [and] which 
were expressed through shame, disavowal and dis-identification 
(quoted in Reay, 2012: 39) 
This may occur through children being labelled as ‘problems’ rather than 
given greater attention and support. Or it may occur through an under-
resourced and under-performing school, or what has been termed ‘sink’ 
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schools (Beckmann & Cooper, 2005: 479; Reay, 2012: 39 & 34-5 & 2006: 
294-303).  
Despite having some of the wealthiest wards in London, Haringey has 
consistently been ranked amongst the worst boroughs in terms of indices of 
deprivation, structural disadvantage, and crime (London’s Poverty Profile(b), 
2015; North & Donnelly, 2014: 4; UKCrimeStats(f)). This has unsurprisingly 
impacted upon educational performance. In 2010, Haringey’s secondary 
educational performance was below the national average, with some schools 
having less than 15% of their students achieving 5 or more GCSEs at A to C 
level (North & Donnelly, 2014: 6).  
While for 2009-10 at primary school level, Haringey was the fourth worst 
performing borough with just under 30% of children age 11 failing to achieve 
basic standards in Maths and English at key stage 2 tests (Hackney was 
ranked the worst borough) (MacInnes et al., 2011: 78). Steve argued that the 
problem related to stigma and stereotypes around schools and the area, 
leading parents who can afford it to take their children elsewhere along with 
an evacuation of teachers: “good teachers don’t go to ‘bad areas’”.  
Take for instance, Downhills Primary School in Tottenham.42 One teacher at 
this school spoke of their campaign against the government forcing it to 
become an academy due of its low performance. While the teacher admitted 
their results were not up to the standards of other schools, she argued this 
was impossible given the conditions and limited resources they had, and in 
protest against the unfair context had boycotted key stage 2 tests in 2010.  
Corroborating much of what the teacher argued, a 2011 Ofsted report 
(Kessell, 2011) stated that poverty was high amongst pupils, and the school 
received significant numbers of children who spoke English as a second 
language, with over 40 different languages spoken at the school. The school 
was located in an area with high levels of poverty and crime, and had many 																																																								42	I attended a talk in 2013 where one of the teachers from Downhills spoke about the 
pressure the Conservative/Liberal government was putting on schools to become academies 
or ‘free schools’ entitled: How Can We Stop the Tories Wrecking Education? Alan Gibbons, 
Jess Edwards & Downhills School campaigner 
https://marxismfestival.org.uk/downloads/marxism-2013-timetable.pdf	
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disruptive students with social problems stemming from home life. The report 
stated that quality of teaching was ‘variable’, resulting in inconsistency in the 
learning progress, although on the other hand, the same report found the 
views of parents to be overwhelmingly positive. This seemed to support the 
teacher’s claim that they were underperforming in the standardised testing, 
but were having a positive impact with children and in the community, given 
the conditions they faced. 
Regardless of the reality of teaching provision, given the structural conditions 
faced it would seem the school should be expected to perform below the 
national average. Yet, rather than increased funding to cope with the 
additional pressures faced over other schools, the competitive system meant 
they were being penalised and pressurised. The result was less help for 
already disadvantaged children, putting teachers under greater stress, 
diminishing the quality of care and education, and an increased likelihood that 
these children would be unable to succeed in the dominant order. Indeed, a 
year later another Ofsted report43 found that conditions at the school had 
deteriorated and it was forced to close, reopening as an academy.  
Without amelioration through support, the impact of these sorts of conditions 
on young people can be particularly negative, leading to a rejection and 
disengagement with the system. As Harrison (1992: 287-9) notes in the 
1980s, two ‘dump’ schools in Hackney had children with issues such as 
illiteracy and partial literacy, anger and violent behaviour, truancy sometimes 
reaching 50 per cent, substance abuse, and vandalism. The impact of the 
exclusion and stigmatisation of children in the context of social and economic 
deprivation meant a rejection of the education system and its authorities: 
“world of street life invades the schools.” (Harrison, 1992: 289). 
Today, the problem is compounded by the competitive system which creates a 
circular relation: the low self-worth amongst students leads to behavioural 
forms of resistance, which in turn leads to them being stereotyped, then 
further stigmatised along with the school which drops in the tables, funding, 																																																								43	See petition ‘Closure of Downhills Primary School, Tottenham’ 
https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2012-03-
22/debates/12032276000017/ClosureOfDownhillsPrimarySchoolTottenham	
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and leading parents who have the capital, to go elsewhere. Ned (white, late 
20s) attended St John Rigby’s (south London) - what could also be described 
as a ‘sink school’, albeit due to a particular context.  
When Ned began attending the school he described it as having a 
‘reasonable’ reputation, however, the head teacher had been funnelling a 
large amount of school funds into her own account, leaving the school in debt. 
While the school did receive some aid, this was not enough to get it out of 
debt and was left to attempt to rectify it’s own situation in a competitive market 
place.44 The result was falling pupil numbers, lack of materials, increasing 
debt, deterioration of standards, and teachers leaving and being replaced by 
constant series of substitutes (Buckley, 2001).  
Indeed, Ned’s parents who had the capital to relocate him, wanted to put Ned 
into a better school once the deterioration of St John Rigby began, but Ned, 
already part of that world and trying to belong, wanted to and fought to stay. 
The situation got so bad that after Ned left the school attempted to rebrand 
itself to improve its reputation, but a few years later was closed down due to 
the level of debt and continuing drop in student numbers. An Ofsted report 
was produced during Ned’s time in 2001, a year after the former head was 
dismissed and criminally charged for theft of school funds.  
While it notes that improvements had been made, the report states that “all 
aspects of the college had been badly neglected, many of the teaching and 
non-teaching staff and the pupils and parents became severely demoralised 
and almost one third of the teachers left or resigned” (Buckley, 2001: part A).45 
The report goes on to note that the school has issues with behaviour and 
attendance of ‘a significant minority’, ‘rowdy behaviour’, ‘vandalism’ and 
GCSE results below the national average. In turn, parents reported concerns 
with ‘poor behaviour and bullying’, a ‘continual turnover of teachers’ (ibid), and 
approval ratings had dropped significantly (ibid: part C).  
The school drew children mainly from the boroughs of Bromley and Croydon 																																																								44	e.g. See Hill, J. ‘Head Teacher’s Legacy Jeopardising School’, in News Shopper 
http://www.newsshopper.co.uk/news/661292.headteachers_legacy_jeopardising_school/	45	The report does not contain page numbers therefore I source by sections.	
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(Buckley, 2001), both of which saw rioting in 2011. Although the school had 
children from a mix of socio-economic backgrounds, Ned stated there were 
many from poor estates, particularly one ‘white working class estate’ in 
Bromley, and another estate in Croydon where many of the black children 
came from. Ned described both areas as being ‘rough’, and the children 
would hang around in groups, in part, defined by which estate they came 
from. While initially this was not a serious issue, the deterioration of the school 
saw an increase in criminal behaviours and vandalism.  
Ned described the young men from these estates forming gangs, getting 
involved in fights, and engaging in crime. The main group of black children 
from Croydon formed a gang called ‘TMS’ (The Money Stealers), which would 
get into fights, carry out muggings, sell stolen goods and similar, while the 
white estate Ned described as ‘like Shameless’ a TV show which depicts a 
poor, criminal, ‘underclass’ in Manchester.  
Indeed, the prejudice or lack of care of teachers was made visible through 
their treatment of students who, black and white, appear to have become 
viewed as ‘underclass’, or amoral and criminal. Ned stated that very few 
teachers ever got the respect of the children and thought that they viewed the 
students as ‘not worth it’. He described how some teachers would attempt to 
assert control over students by embarrassing them, calling them out in class 
and making them look stupid. Others teachers might simply ignore students, 
most did not know the students’ names, and Ned even described one 
substitute who started a fight with a student when his authority was 
challenged.  
Unsurprisingly, Ned felt that neither his peers nor himself would ever ‘be a 
high achiever’ and described his time at St John Rigby as ‘barely an 
education’. Indeed, the increase in disrespect experienced by the students 
seems to have gone hand-in-hand with an increasing disrespect of the school, 
with Ned stating that it was common to misbehave, insult teachers, and even 
tag (graffiti) class room walls when teachers left the room. Ultimately, Ned 
found that the way to develop self-esteem and a positive identity was not 
through academic performance, but through joining those who were 
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displaying a lack of concern for rules and the school, and a proficiency with 
violence or minor forms of crime.  
The problems Harrison found in the 1980s are exacerbated by competitive 
educational policies that result in situations where young people from 
disadvantaged backgrounds, who require extra support, encouragement, and 
aid, are penalised. As with Ned’s experience this translates into neglect and 
disrespect, and facilitates a downward spiral, whereby students lose respect 
for the school and teachers, and the teachers stigmatise and disrespect 
students.  
Problematically, individualistic and moralised logics fail to understand what 
shapes young peoples’ behaviour, and only reinforce stereotypes of ‘stupid’, 
‘lazy’, or ‘trouble’, and create a cycle of exclusion. Similarly, without Politicised 
and structural understanding and identities, young people will struggle to 
resist the sense of shame and low self-worth, leading to a rejection of 
dominant values, authority, and an undirected anger (Ray, 2014: 121). 
Through her wide experience both working in and researching on, youth work 
Robertson (2002: 74) argues the function of a youth worker or teacher is not 
just to teach, but both to support and believe in the young person. Supporting 
this, improvement in Haringey’s educational record in 2014 was attributed in 
part to the increased emphasis of “instilling self-confidence and belief in their 
pupils” (North & Donnelly, 2014: 7). The report interviewed teachers who, 
agreeing with what respondents had said to me, argued that demonstrating 
belief in pupils meant the students believed in themselves. Negative 
messages from the teachers or parents, shaped through assumptions and 
stereotypes of students, schools, or even area, often reinforce the perception 
that you are stupid, you cannot achieve, or as Ned thought, ‘not worth it’.46  
Shame is an aversive emotion; it disposes us to avoid similar experiences 
(Scheff, 1988 & 2000). Thus shame in education means engagement risks 
becoming a negative factor; while for those excluded and disadvantaged, 
particularly in a competitive system, failure and thus shame is always on the 																																																								
46 Also see Atkinson, 2010; Reay, 2006 & 2012; Robertson, 2002 
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table. For those like Ned or many at the youth project, the rejection of school 
authority and legitimated practice constitutes a dispositional shift that 
prevents/limits future experiences of shame by negating both the standards 
by which they are judged, and the capacity of authority to judge them. Of 
course, this process of exclusion does not end with education, but spills over 
into employment. 
 7.4.4 Employment 
When we examine the transition from education to work for those structurally 
disadvantaged, what we generally see is severe disadvantage in education 
and employment alongside stigmatisation within these systems and by society 
in general. The changes in education coupled with increasingly scarce and 
unrewarding employment opportunities and decreasing protection through 
welfare, has created a system that increasingly offers nothing but economic 
lack and insecurity, socially unvalued roles, and low self-esteem (Atkinson, 
Roberts & Savage, 2012; Avis, 2014; Clement, 2012).  
In turn, perhaps the largest misrecognition in successive neoliberal 
governments’ attempts to ‘solve’ these problems is the assumption that 
waged labour is ‘pivotal to the assimilation of young people into society’ (Avis, 
2014: 69). Such a logic supposes that improvements in educational 
achievements or training will enable young people to gain work, and thus 
prevent their disengagement from the system.  
The paradox, of course, is that what constitutes ‘waged labour’ and the 
poverty and lack of dignity this implies, is part of the problem created through 
neoliberal policies. Indeed, this is one of the differences between the 1980s 
and 2011; in the former, for the white working class at least, failure in 
education did not doom an individual to low-paid work or unemployment, and 
the shame that tends to accompany these.  
Harrison (1992) found that it was common for young men in Hackney to 
leaving school early to start full-time work. Willis’ (1979) seminal study 
demonstrated how young working class men were resisting the stigma 
imposed by education and society, by finding self-worth through the creation 
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of identities around notions of ‘labour’. As Hoggart (1992: 48-54) put it, 
working class identities and practices functioned both to defend from and to 
demonstrate disrespect of those with power over the working classes, such as 
police, teachers, and managers. 
Stigma was experienced in education and in relation to the authorities of 
society, but the shame and low-self worth could be resisted through the 
possibility of relatively economically rewarding employment, the attribution of 
social value to manual labour, and thus engaging in an alternative process of 
positive identification within the legitimated social order. However, Harrison 
also notes that times were changing and the previously readily available and 
rewarding jobs in Hackney were beginning to dry up. 
As we saw, neoliberal policies removed this possibility. McKenzie (2012: 137) 
found in an area of Nottingham that also saw riots in 2011, that the only 
options open to many are ‘low-skilled’, ‘low-paid’ work, and these may not 
provide the ‘valued identity’ needed to make them feel part of the dominant 
society. As with education, the youth project sought to develop the 
employment possibilities and dispositions in their young people; again due 
their backgrounds and home life, many came to them already rejecting the 
dominant forms of capital and with little awareness of the opportunities and 
practical skills required to operate in the conventional employment market.  
Beyond education, the project sought to open up opportunities from very basic 
help such as with CVs and bank accounts, to making connections with 
organisations that offer grants to young entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, no 
matter the success they may have with an individual in terms of getting them 
to engage and to achieve educationally, their capacity to shape their 
possibilities beyond education is limited. For the majority of young 
disadvantaged people from Hackney or Haringey the economic rewards of 
employment are limited at best. 
In gentrifying Hackney, as of 2014-15 the average rent was equivalent to 76% 
of the poorest quartile’s income; 38% of private renters were claiming housing 
benefit; and 42% of all young people come from families where tax credits are 
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needed to top up income (London’s Poverty Profile(b), 2015).47 While for 
2009-11, 16% of all residents were classified as low-paid (below the living 
wage) and just under 17% of working-age individuals were claiming out-of-
work benefits (ibid).  
Similarly in Haringey in 2014-15, which also has an extreme wealth divide, 
35% young people are from families claiming tax credits and 52% of private 
renters were claiming housing benefits (London’s Poverty Profile(c), 2015). 
While in 2009-11 over 15% of the working-age population were claiming out-
of-work benefits, and just over one quarter of residents were classified as in 
low-paid work (ibid). If the objective situation regarding return (qualifications, 
paid work, can achieve expectations) for investment (attending school, 
interviews, working) in legitimated forms of cultural capital, is so weak, then 
we should expect to see dispositions that do not prompt engagement.  
Indeed, questioning the notion that better training and waged work are the 
solution to the NEET ‘problem’, between 2010 and 2014 in Haringey 
educational performances increased, yet at the same time inequality and 
disadvantage have increased (North & Donnelly, 2014: 7), and while it may be 
the case that unemployment has dropped in both Hackney and Haringey 
since 2010/11, low paid work has increased by a greater proportion in both 
cases (London’s Poverty Profile(b) & (c), 2015). For those socially and 
economically excluded, this data suggests a significant and increasing tension 
between the earning potential available to people and the costs of living in 
these boroughs. However, as we will see, to talk of employment in economic 
terms will miss not only the impact of exclusion but also the forms of exclusion 
that push people away from legitimated forms of practice. 
Nick is one whose failure to achieve in the education system has left him 
marginalised and apathetic about engaging with the legitimated system. As a 
consequence, he does not feel motivated to gain employment at the level that 
is available to him (low-paid, insecure labour). However, to understand Nick 
and indeed, the affective impact of these experiences better, we must also 																																																								
47 Figures for these measures were not available for years closer to 2011 in either Hackney or 
Haringey. 
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account for social forms of exclusion and stigmatisation. Nick’s exclusion does 
not simply occur through an objective lack of qualifications, but also through 
an alienating process and judgement which operates on markers of the 
‘underclass’: “when you walk into a shop, a job interview, an area, it’s how you 
are made to feel”.  
Nick was talking about the perception of, and response to him as a black, 
unemployed man without qualifications. The stigma and shame Nick 
experiences when trying to engage through job interviews and even the 
unemployment office, the sense of being judged as lesser, can only diminish 
his desire to do so. Thus, when Nick reflects on his position he states he 
‘should’ find employment, but simultaneously he feels apathetic and 
unmotivated and thus pre-reflexively resists such action.  
Consequently, for a number of years after education Nick was ‘in and out’ of 
employment in low paid and low status roles (for instance, stage 
hand/labouring in theatre companies, video shop assistant). Ultimately, in 
many of Nick’s positions he worked long hours without much economic 
benefit, simultaneously, also experiencing a low sense of self-worth. For 
instance, he originally thought working for theatre’s might, in contrast to other 
positions he had worked, both be interesting and provide a career; yet the 
reality of the role was a little more than a ‘dog’s body’, and Nick saw little 
chance for progression. In later life Nick gave up and had been unemployed 
for a number of years.48 
Merton (1938: 678) might define Nick’s response as ‘defeatism’ or ‘retreatism’, 
where the individual has continually failed to attain society’s goals by 
institutional means, but cannot partake in illegitimate means due to normative 																																																								
48 However, in a second interview I did with Nick in 2017 he revealed he has since tried to re-
enter employment. Nevertheless, his experience is arguably reinforcing the disposition to 
reject and give up. He has begun gaining some experience and developing his CV by 
volunteering for a legal charity. Nick was already feeling bored and frustrated by the basic 
administrative role, and expressed despondency about the realities of improving his position 
given his age (mid-40s) and lack of qualifications, or how, if he continues to work, he could 
ever become economically comfortable.  	
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or practical concerns with breaking the law, thus seeks escape. However, this 
is perhaps not quite nuanced enough, as Nick despite to some extent fitting 
this category, Nick does not completely reject the legitimised goals or means 
completely. Perhaps this is due to Nick also has a Political/structural 
understanding of himself as a black man unfairly disadvantaged.  
However, as we have seen, despite Nick’s awareness of racism, he was not 
involved in any form of political struggle or group and thought this was lacking 
amongst black communities. To some extent this awareness allows Nick to 
resist the stigma of himself as an object of disrespect; yet at the same time he 
cannot overcome the disrespect felt through exclusion from practices. For 
Nick, there is no possibility of empowerment through struggle, or self-worth 
through mastery experiences and identification, and thus, no possibility of 
change or improvement.  
Indeed, rioters depict similar experiences and dispositions to Nick: “When you 
go down the Jobcentre, they give you this look … It’s this sick look.” (rioter in 
Ray, 2014: 129). However, as we might expect, one difference from Nick is 
that generally amongst the rioters there is a tendency to reject the norms and 
values along with the institutionalised practices of society: “I want good gear, 
but I don’t want some shit job, I don’t want some fucking training course. I 
don’t wanna work for some prick. I want to get up when I want, have a smoke, 
have a few tots [drinks] and do fuck all” (Treadwell et al. 2013: 13).  
 7.4.5 ‘White Man’s Money’ 
While Nick still saw legitimate work as the only acceptable, albeit implausible, 
alternative to unemployment, Ned described a rejection of ‘work’ more akin to 
that of some of the rioters. Ned used two interesting terms when talking about 
how he and his school peers saw their future: ‘legit (legitimate) work’ and 
‘white man’s money’, both being to some extent interchangeable and having 
the same basic meaning as ‘shit work’ (Gilroy, 2013). When I asked him to 
explain the terms, he stated that ‘white man’s money’ did not refer to any work 
within the system, but to the low status employment that was seen as 
available to them.  
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The example I was given of ‘white man’s money’ was of working at WHSmiths 
(e.g. a cashier), which was understood as the realistic opportunities for Ned 
and his peers in the dominant social order. The lack of value and possibility 
for positive identification through the ‘legit’ route, meant it was to some extent 
pre-reflexively excluded from consideration. Indeed, like those of the working 
class, their “movement into work was guided by the pre-reflexive 
expectations, orientations and valuations of the habitus” (Atkinson, 2010: 92). 
However, whereas for Atkinson’s interviewees their dispositions and 
expectations as working class directed them within the legitimated 
employment system, for Ned’s peer group work was expected to come 
through illegal routes.  
Corroborating this construction of expectations and orientations, Ned stated 
that those that took this route, or tried to succeed in the ‘legit’ world were 
disparaged as ‘neeks’, a blending of nerd and geek. In other words ‘white 
man’s money’ provided little in terms of economic gain and self-worth, and 
thus the practise had become shameful and normatively rejected. The 
connection to ‘white’ money implied an exploitative practice – getting paid by 
the ‘white man’, or legitimated society, for work that had little economic reward 
and gave no status.  
Indeed, this is not an uncommon finding in excluded communities where to 
take on ‘shit work’ “may diminish local respect and status carries far too much 
risk, and too much loss” (Mckenzie. 2013: 4.7; also see Hall et al., 1980; 
Bourgios, 2003; Wacquant, 2010). While it cannot be stated with accuracy - 
as Ned did not know the origin of the term - the aspect of ‘white’, and its 
connection to ‘legitimacy’ seems to imply the historical experience of non-
white or black people being discriminated against by a predominately white 
social order. However, paralleling the shift from ‘black’ to ‘underclass’ in 
stereotypes and exclusion, for Ned the term functioned beyond the 
boundaries of racial experience and was used by himself and other white 
people facing similar experiences of exclusion and rejecting the legitimated 
system. Thus, it appears that neither structural identities of black or working 
class were functioning amongst Ned’s group. 
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In turn, rather than simply the desire for consumeristic objects generating self-
worth, for Ned this rejection of work was tied into the valorisation of criminal 
means which enabled positive forms of identification. This often connected to 
the capacity to obtain the necessary economic wealth, such as petty theft and 
selling pirated goods on the black market, yet Ned also took part in graffiti. As 
with the working class identity and ‘labour’, each of these functioned as forms 
of capital and processes of identification through which he could develop self-
esteem through peer approval in accepted forms of behaviour, and relatedly, 
resist the disrespect he received from authorities through the transgression of 
their rules.  
The practice of graffiti was particularly important in terms of status and 
identity. If you did not have a ‘graf’49 it was considered ‘weird’: ‘almost like not 
having a Christian name’. Ned spoke specifically of how he once put a large 
‘dub’50 on a wall outside the school so the teachers and students would all 
see it as they entered significantly increased his status. In other words, graffiti 
could be seen as about disrespecting the authorities, and thus both refusing 
the disrespect they experienced, and constructing a sense of self-
worth/identity through the approval of peers.  
Indeed, the relation to disrespect is supported by the fact that graffiti 
increased in the school as the conditions deteriorated. Furthermore, the 
school eventually responded by getting a local respected graffiti group, FDP 
(Fuck Da Police) to paint the property. After this students policed themselves 
preventing the work being painted over. This is notable in part because the 
group, which Ned described as like ‘celebrities’, defined themselves nominally 
through opposition to police and authority. Indeed, although Ned had relatively 
few negative engagements with the police, he noted that being arrested 
constituted a ‘badge of honour’, and reminisced about the respect he gained 
after one occasion were he was taken out of school by a number of armed 
police who had mistakenly been informed he was carrying a gun. 51 
Importantly, this parallels Thomas (2012) in the 1980s, where it was not the 																																																								
49 A ‘graf’ or ‘tag’ refers to the nickname of the artist, and functions as a type of signature 
painted on the walls.  
50 A ‘dub’ is a 3D version of the artist’s graf.	51	He had been seen with a realistic pellet gun prior to school. 
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‘political’ opposition that he valorised and shaped his process of identification 
and resistance, but the criminal – the ‘Yardies’.  
Furthermore, Ned’s relation to graffiti is also revealing because it was about 
power. Once FDP had painted the school it ‘belonged’ to Ned and his peers, 
as opposed to before this where the school alienated and disrespected them 
and they marked it. Indeed, when asked why he engaged, Ned stated that 
tagging a building or location was ‘like you owned it, it was yours’. Graffiti, in 
other words, was a ‘performance’ (Butler, 2004; 2011). It demonstrated his 
rejection of legitimated power and its inability to control him. It made Ned ‘feel 
powerful’, functioning as a form by which disrespect was resisted in the 
everyday context of disempowerment. The point is that all Ned’s peers were 
not simply criminal, nor were they ‘immoral’. Rather, these activities form 
modalities of resistance, a means to overcome the disrespect experienced. 
 
7.5. Conclusion 
In exploring the social processes that shaped the attacks on police we have 
set our sights on the broader social structure. The purpose has been to 
provide a more nuanced understanding of the forms of resistance we saw in 
2011 and the 1980s riots, and to counter neoliberal, moralising and 
individualising discourse, propounded by the likes of Cameron. Importantly, 
these discourses are not external responses to the context of the riots. The 
act of de-Politicising and pathologising the rioters, was just another symbolic 
construction, or act of power, that occurs through education and employment, 
and sought to maintain the social hierarchy. 
The stigmatisation of lower ranked groups is of course, not new. As we have 
seen, black communities in Britain have been excluded and stigmatised since 
their arrival. What changed was the quantitative expansion of the super-
exploited group through re-structuring the market and education and, in effect, 
concealing relations of privilege and disadvantage. The emerging logic of a 
meritocratic, capitalist society – alongside scientific dismissals of ‘race’ as a 
concept – produced a moral logic that rejected the categorisation and 
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judgement of individuals by factors beyond their control. Ideologically, ‘race’ 
and ‘class’, and their ‘isms’ were no longer acceptable. 
Neoliberalism then, constitutes a particular re-organisation and re-framing of 
the relations of privilege and disadvantage. Previously it was black people 
who had constituted the ‘underclass’, those who had been socially and 
economically excluded, stigmatised and criminalised. By 2011 this super-
exploited group had expanded to include members of the white working 
classes. While the stigma had always existed, the removal of the logics of 
race and class, along with the white working class’ social, economic, and 
political structure, diminished the possibility of resistance.  
In the 1980s we saw that black resistance was already emerging from a 
disempowered context, and thus producing anti-politics through Political 
resistance and individualised resistance. However, for the white working 
classes, the loss of manufacturing, unions, and the notion of ‘labour’ meant 
that this group could no longer achieve economic stability. Neither could it 
resist the stigmatisation of the dominant groups within legitimated society 
through the political process or through the working class identity. Thus, many 
were forced to into the social position previously reserved largely for black 
communities: excluded, stigmatised, and disempowered. 
The neoliberal re-structuring of the market and education system has 
diminished the capacity of Political identities and forms of resistance. Thus it 
is increasingly difficult for the shame and low-self worth to be overcome 
through legitimised means, or even through Political identities and 
movements. Instead, individualised forms of resistance emerge which 
disrespect legitimated authority and its representatives, and offer the excluded 
positive forms of identification. 
Thus rather than simple criminality, or even simply the consumer ideology, the 
point is that society is excluding young people through stigmatising them and 
preventing their engagement in processes of positive identification through 
legitimated practice. In a broad sense, this firstly occurs through the 
production of mistrust and anger, which will influence of the sorts of 
relationships that will be constructed with authorities or representatives of the 
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legitimated system; and secondly, that by inhibiting the resistance and 
overcoming of the affective impact of disrespect and disempowerment, 
violence becomes increasingly likely to be justified. However, these also feed 
directly and specifically into relations with police, which provides the final key 
in understanding why we see symptoms of the social order’s breakdown. 
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8. Keeping the Order:  
Policing the Underclass 
 
8.1. Introduction: Why Stop and Search? 
In the last chapter we saw how social and economic conditions created 
through neoliberal policies had created a context in which groups of people 
were categorised as the ‘underclass’ or ‘NEETs’, facilitating their exclusion 
through policy and the experience of shame and disrespect at the hands of 
the social order’s representatives.  
The point in discussing the broader context was, of course, to argue that we 
cannot understand the context of over-policing without understanding both the 
stereotypes generated by society, and the exclusion and disrespect enacted 
through these self-same stereotypes. In this chapter we seek to examine how, 
and to what effect, neoliberalism and the underclass stereotype impacts on 
policing. In particular, we will examine how the intersection of policing with 
resentment and exclusion, could shape the choice to attack police in 2011 as 
subjectively rational, or reasonable and desirable. 
The motive for a detailed focus on stop and search is, in part, simply because 
all the major reports on the 2011 riots to note, to differing extents the 
relevance of stop and search. Alongside this we also find a sense of anger at 
police, a perception of them as a gang and an oppressive factor in public 
space, and reports of abuse and mistreatment. Furthermore, we also examine 
whether ‘underclass’ has replaced ‘black’ as the dominant stereotype in 
policing, and stop and search – due to its contentious nature – is one of the 
most researched aspects of policing.  
Indeed, research and data on stop and search also supports such a focus, 
suggesting that stop and search is having a particularly significant and 
negative impact on individuals’ perception of the police. Firstly, due to its 
fundamental role in police-public interaction, stop and search is indicative of, 
and impacts upon, the broader state of relations between the police and 
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communities: in 2004 the Chairperson of the Metropolitan Police Authority’s 
Scrutiny Panel described it as the ‘litmus test’ of police-community relations 
(Delsol & Shiner, 2006: 251). 
In 2011/12 there were just over 1.1 million stop and searches countrywide, 
resulting in around 100,000 arrests (a consistent rate of 9% since 2009) 
(MoJ(b), 2013: 37-9). The reality is that 9 times of out 10 the individual 
stopped was not involved in any criminal activity. While this may not 
necessarily represent a failure of stop and search in its own terms, as 
eliminating suspicion and thus preventing unnecessary arrests is a valid goal 
(Delsol & Shiner, 2006: 243; HMIC, 2013: 4), unless such searches are 
managed particularly carefully, what this represents is a clear potential for 
what was identified in data on the riots: the feeling of harassment and being 
unjustly targeted.  
Indeed, since the 1980s data has demonstrated the net impact of police 
initiated interactions with citizens in public spaces has been a reduction in the 
trust and perceived legitimacy of the police (Bradford, 2015: 108; also see 
Miller et al. 2001: 78). This impact is arguably because, as Her Majesty’s 
Inspectorate Constabulary (HMIC) 52  point out, “[t]he powers to stop and 
search people are some of the most intrusive of those available to the police” 
(HMIC, 2013: 11). Moreover, supporting a broader contextualised view of 
over-policing, stop and search has been shown to disproportionately impact 
upon ethnic minorities and socially and economically excluded groups 
(Bradford, 2015: 113; Delsol & Shiner, 2006; Goodchild, 2013: 5; HMIC, 2013: 
41; Stone & Pettigrew, 2000: 11) 
However, rather than simply point out that stop and search is a cause of 
discontent amongst excluded communities, the aim here is to understand it as 
a mechanism of disrespect that impacts at the pre-reflexive level, and feeds 
from the power relations implied in the social hierarchy. This will enable us to 
better understand the extent to which experiences of stop and search could 																																																								52	The	HMIC	is	an	independent	body	set	up	to	inspect	and	report	on	the	police,	and	produced	a	
report	on	stop	and	search	across	the	country	by	reviewing	police	procedures,	evidence	and	data	
produced	by	constabularies,	interviewing	officers,	and	performing	a	public	survey	of	individuals	who	
have	been	subject	to	stop	and	search.	
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have shaped the choice to attack police as plausible and worthwhile in 2011, 
and in turn, counter the assumptions that the riots were about ‘criminality’ and 
nihilistic “attacks on the forces of order” (Cameron, 2011b). 
The investigation will demonstrate how stop and search can constitute a form 
of disrespect and disempowerment. Firstly, the stereotype of the underclass 
enters the practice of stop and search through the prejudice and judgement of 
police officers. This is enabled by a legalistic definition and regulation of 
powers that fails to account for police culture and training, leading to profiling 
and disproportional amounts of stops on the type of individual we know to 
have been involved in the 2011 riots: young men, often black, in poor areas or 
estates. This not only creates a sense of being targeted, but also implies 
prejudicial treatment of those stopped, often leading to direct acts of 
disrespect including insults and violence.  
However, stop and search also implies being rendered powerless or impotent, 
which when experiencing aggressive or disrespectful treatment becomes a 
particularly shameful experience; in turn, as we have noted, shame is an 
aversive emotion which, without resolution, may produce anger and prompt 
violence. In 2011, when individuals attacked the police, in part, it was the 
expression of the anger and shame built up through negative experiences 
with police. By attacking the police they could reverse the power relations 
found in stop and search, and perform a new identity in which they were the 
dominant. The first call in understanding the nature of these interactions is the 
development of the power to stop and search. 
 
8.2. Stop and Search - Regulations and Reality 
The term ’stop and search’ refers to a set of powers given to the police for the 
purposes of detection and prevention of crime under different justifications 
(i.e. terrorism, violent crime) (PACE 1984, 2011). Without these powers, the 
police would officially be unable to exercise control over an individual without 
making an arrest (Delsol & Shiner, 2006: 243; HMIC, 2013: 4; PACE 1984, 
2011). Originally the powers were defined under the 1824 Vagrancy Act, 
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which gave the police the power to stop, search, arrest, and even prosecute, 
based largely on their ‘suspicions’ (leading to the informal name of ‘sus’ laws) 
or under the logic of ‘loitering with intent’ (Phillips & Bowling, 2007: 435). This 
arguably allowed the prejudices of the police to be framed as ‘suspicion’, 
leading to oppressive policing of society’s ‘other’, generally those most 
excluded and unneeded such as ethnic minorities and the working class 
(Davies, 1989; Hall et al., 1980). Despite the questionable nature of policing, 
serious public concern around the powers and their abuse did not begin 
growing until the 1970s (Delsol & Shiner, 2006: 244), before being causally 
implicated in the rioting of the 1980s (Keith, 1993; Phillips & Bowling, 2007: 
435; Waddington, 1992: 80).  
In response to growing public concern and increasing conflict with black 
communities coming to a head in the 1980s, The Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act (PACE 1984, 2011) sought to introduce safeguards against 
discriminatory use of the powers, such as removing ‘loitering with intent’, and 
defining ‘reasonable suspicion’ (Faiza & Farrell, 2005: 84). Subsequently, 
‘reasonable suspicion’ or ‘grounds’ for a stop and search was defined as an 
‘objective basis’ based on relevant ‘facts, information, and/or intelligence’, and 
which cannot be supported by ‘personal factors’ such as ethnicity, age, 
appearance, or even knowledge of previous convictions (Delsol & Shiner, 
2006: 253; PACE 1984, 2011: 5-6).  
The powers enable police to detain an individual, and perform a search of the 
suspect’s body regardless of whether the police know if the subject has 
broken the law, and forcibly detain the individual should they refuse. With 
regards to carrying out the search, the officers can check the pockets, and 
around collars and similar areas, but more serious searches such as 
undressing the suspect are not permitted, unless the suspect is taken to a 
police station or van (PACE 1984, 2011). However, despite this attempt to 
tighten regulation, stop and search was implicated in rioting in the late 1980s, 
the 1990s, was further singled by the MacPherson report highlighting 
institutional racism in the police (Delsol & Shiner, 2006; Keith, 1993), and of 
course, was implicated in the 2011 riots. To unpick these problems, we first 
need to explore exactly how the powers structure interactions. 
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8.2.1 Removing Agency 
The powers given under PACE to stop and search rely on the police’s 
“capacity to legally exercise coercive force” (Carrabine et al., 2014: 349). 
While necessary, the other side of this coin is that stop and search enacts a 
particular form of asymmetric power relation that removes the capacity of the 
subject to control what happens to them - or simply put, it removes their 
agency while subjecting them to an intrusive procedure.  
Asymmetric power-relations constitute situational dynamics that structure the 
situation to create a relation of order ‘givers’ and ‘takers’ (Collins, 2005). The 
order-givers are those that dominate the interaction, provide its direction and 
focus, and largely determine the results; order-takers on the other hand are 
required, perhaps forced, to take part. As Collins (2005: 113) points out, this 
asymmetric power structure is, in itself, potentially alienating as the order-
takers may have to pretend, or perform ‘ritualistic’ but empty, acquiescence.  
Ultimately, such situational dynamics mean the subject of a stop and search 
has extremely limited agency. The order-taker’s only tangible influence over 
proceedings is whether they submit to a search, or resist and be forcibly 
searched and potentially arrested. Problematically, as Honneth (1995: 132-3) 
points out, to deny the autonomy of an individual over their body is a 
particularly shameful experience, as it renders them impotent and the world 
threatening and uncontrollable. This issue can be particularly damaging is the 
subject of the search does not trust in the police to fulfil their role as protectors 
(see Bradford, 2015; Keith, 1993; Loader, 2006; Quinton, 2015: 75; Stone & 
Pettigrew, 2000: 11). Without trust or legitimacy there is no consent to police 
and it will be very difficult for a stop and search to be perceived as anything 
other than an oppressive and invasive act forced upon the individual (Keith, 
1993: 143; Wacquant, 2010).  
The regulations on stop and search to some extent recognise this inherent 
problem, and propose to minimise the potentially negative experience such an 
exercise of power may produce (PACE 1984, 2011: 4-6 & 20). In particular, 
PACE sets out that the officers enacting the search should identify/introduce 
themselves, explain to the suspect the reason for stopping them, and provide 
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the subject of the search with a report thus better enabling them to make a 
complaint if they feel this is necessary (Home Office, 2014). The principle aim 
is to make it a co-operative experience; the primary means proposed to 
negate the intrusiveness of the procedure is for the officers to convince the 
individual to willingly subject him or herself to the search. Consequently, the 
loss of agency and the negative experience may be negated or diminished if 
the individual feels the police are acting in a justified manner and has ‘chosen’ 
to be searched (Bradford, 2015: 111).  
Yet while these regulations may work or improve the outcome of a search in 
some cases, the nature of the interaction is particularly problematic as the 
offer clearly and logically represents a spurious choice – ‘you will choose to 
comply or we will force you’. In other words, such interactions carry an 
inherent risk of escalation and distress, particularly (as we will see later) given 
that stop and search is regularly not carried out in accordance with these 
regulations (HMIC, 2013).  
8.2.2 ‘Suspicion’ and Exclusion 
The next point regarding how stop and search structures situations takes into 
account the regulations on ‘reasonable suspicion’. This concept is particularly 
important because, as we will see, it is through this that larger society’s 
stereotypes come into play. It was argued in the last chapter that approaches 
to any form of prejudice must deal with the structural disadvantage created by 
larger society. Unless the social hierarchy and stereotypes of larger society 
change or are reduced, it is difficult to see how this cannot result in the 
aggressive over-policing of excluded groups.  
However, it is also the case that police regulation enables or allows these 
prejudices to enter into the practice of officers. In 1984 the introduction of 
PACE sought to bring in a burden of proof by defining ‘reasonable suspicion’ 
as based on actual evidence, aiming to bring an end to clear and long term 
misconduct by police (Delsol & Shiner, 2006; Faiza & Farrell, 2005: 84; Hall et 
al., 1980; Home Office, 2014; Keith, 1993: 130; ICI, 1989: 198-201). Yet 
despite this attempt to reign in malpractice, stop and search continues to 
cause discontent, and police still abuse their powers. The HMIC (2013: 6) 
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found that despite the many problems with police forces’ partial and 
problematic recording of stop and searches, 27% of all cases that year had no 
reasonable grounds to carry out searches, suggesting the figure could be 
much higher. 
The first issue with regards to PACE is that it seems police do not always 
know the regulations that define what their powers are and how to act. In 
2013 the HMIC found that many officers did not understand that the 
“establishment of reasonable grounds for suspicion, [should be] based on 
specific and not general information” (HMIC, 2013: 40), the report went on to 
note widespread malpractice and misuse of the powers. Indeed, according to 
the HMIC (ibid: 43), the majority of police officers across the country had 
received no training in stop and search powers since joining. In turn, the 
training that was received by officers focused only on how to implement the 
powers safely, but not fairly or effectively.53  
However, a more foundational problem is that the ‘legalistic’ definition 
provided by PACE fails to account for the ‘discretionary judgement’ and 
culture of the police (Bland et al. 2000: 3; Faiza and Farrell, 2005: 85). In 
1970 and again in 1989 reports into police practice noted that the legalistic 
formulation of the police’s powers was too inflexible to deal with the multitude 
of different tasks and complex situations on the streets (Bland et al., 2000; 
Carrabine et al., 2014). What was required was a more nuanced 
understanding of policing and training of police officers to enable them to 
better deal with the social complexities faced on the street: this did not 
happen. Instead PACE simply tried to resolve the prior problems of stop and 
search by providing clearer definitions.  
Problematically, the police are neither immune nor separate from larger 
society and its social and political context, including its prejudices (Keith, 
1993). Thus, while ‘discretion’ might be necessary and useful in the 
application of powers to differing situations, Carrabine et al., (2014) note that 																																																								
53 In a smaller study Faiza and Farrell (2005: 91-2) found that there was even confusion about 
what constituted ‘training’ amongst the officers they surveyed in a commuter town on the 
edge of London: 40% stated they did not know if they had received training in the last 12 
months, while only 16% stated that had received training by the published guidelines. 
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this allows malpractice to creep in. Faiza and Farrell (2005: 85) argue that 
‘discretion’, viewed as a ‘practical judgement’, creates the opportunity or 
possibility for officers to exercise their prejudices through supposedly 
pragmatic decisions. A 2001 investigation into stop and search commissioned 
by the Home Office found, in practice, what constitutes grounds for a stop and 
search is often simply the opinion of the individual officers involved (Miller et 
al., 2001: 77). In other words, through ‘suspicion’ the police often ‘police’ 
utilising society’s stereotypes about who ‘needs’ to be policed. 
The point here is that the legalistic format does not account for the nuanced 
ways in which people are socialised into prejudice built around the social 
hierarchy, or indeed, that the police might be particularly at risk of forming 
prejudices due to the fact they are often forced to deal with those stereotyped 
by society in difficult and sometimes aggressive situations (Carrabine et al., 
2014). The formulation of PACE appears to rely on the assumption that by 
simply defining the issue clearly, any problems will be resolved.  
Unfortunately, prejudice is an affective disposition and thus operates at the 
pre-reflexive level meaning it is not always recognised as such (Kurzban, 
Tooby, & Cosmides, 2001; Lieberman et al. 2003; Schreiber & Iacoboni, 
2012). By only defining police behaviour, rather than seeking to shape it 
through practice and training, stop and search allows the prejudices of society 
and thus the police, to be manifested as legitimate behaviour. Consequently, 
the police function as a structural, or repeated and patterned, means of 
exclusion and disrespect.  
8.2.3 Suspicion: Race, Class, Area, and Criminality  
Quinton (2015: 70), one of the researchers on a report into stop and search 
produced for the Home Office, 54 ⁠ argues that officers had ‘considerable 
latitude’ with regards to interpreting and applying the information at hand. For 
many officers ‘suspicion’ simply meant whether the individual fitted their 
profile of a ‘criminal’ and thus, according to many, searches were justified 
even if they found nothing on the ‘suspect’. Indeed, Keith (1993) found similar 																																																								54	Research from Miller et al., 2001; interviewing 198 officers and observation of over 565 
hours of police patrols, witnessing 58 searches and 191 stops (Quinton, 2015: 58).	
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during his ethnographic work in the 1980s in which police justified searches of 
black people even if nothing was found.  
According to the 2001 report, officers stated they were not prejudiced but 
rather making decisions based on experience and practical knowledge (Miller 
et al., 2001: 77). Yet as Quinton (2015: 73-4) notes that while they found that 
explicit racism had reduced drastically since the 1980s, they did find implicit 
and explicit racial cues being used in the generation of ’suspicion’, implying 
officers were mis-recognising their own racial prejudice. That racial prejudice 
remains in operation in the police is backed up by the HMIC’s investigation 
(2013: 40-41), quantitative data that shows for the period of 2011/12, black 
people from age 10 upwards were 6 times, and Asian or mixed ethnicity 2 
times more likely to be subject to a stop and search, and that black people 
over the age of 10 were 3 times more likely to be arrested (MoJ(b), 2013: 11-
12).55 ⁠  
Yet, to consider prejudice only in terms of race is to ignore that skin colour is 
simply one form or mechanism by which exclusion and discrimination 
operates, and by which individuals distinguish themselves as above others 
(Bulmer & Solomos, 1999: 4; Lee, 2017: 660). Without acknowledging the 
functional and arbitrary role of stereotypes, and different ways in which 
individuals are distinguished, we will miss how prejudice can change and blur 
over time.  
As we have discussed, race and class are no longer able to perform the 
function of justifying privilege and disadvantage for (neo)liberal society. 
Instead, the emergence of the ‘underclass’ as the dominant stereotype and 
excluded group has ultimately functioned to disguise privilege and 
disadvantage. Taking a more nuanced view of prejudice when considering the 
data on stop and search is revealing of how this stereotype appears to be 
operating in policing.  
Current measures of disproportionality are problematic because they tend to 																																																								55	This has been consistently an issue for many years, and indeed in 2004 similar figures 
were produced (Phillips & Bowling, 2007: 435; also see Clancy, Hough, Aust, and Kershaw 
2001: 3; Delsol & Shiner, 2006: 244-5).	
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focus on racial prejudice and miss, for instance, profiling within and across 
ethnic categories such as working class, youth, males, unemployed, 
area/estate etc. (Delsol and Shiner, 2006: 258). Indeed, the problem with 
using a ‘white’ benchmark against which to measure disproportionality is that 
it tends to prove simple racial discrimination by failing to capture those white 
groups and specific sections of ethnic minority communities that are also 
over-policed.  
As Quinton (2015) pointed out earlier, their findings suggested that police 
were profiling on what markers they saw as ‘criminality’, and racial cues 
operated as a part of this stereotype. Delsol and Shiner (2006) found from 
their research that significant numbers of white secondary school students 
were being stop and searched, and generating similar complaints regarding 
their treatment to those coming from black communities. In turn, Clancy et al. 
(2001: 3) found that gender and age were important factors in 
disproportionality, because across ethnicity it was males under 30 who were 
most consistently stopped.56 
Indeed, this is backed up by data from the Metropolitan Police57 which reveals 
that from the period from September 2016 to August, 2017, ‘men’ constituted 
over 93 per cent of all stop and searches; the age groups 15-19 and 20-24 
constituted just under 57 per cent of all searches; finally, while ‘black’ and 
‘Asian’ respectively constituted the most targeted groups in relation to resident 
population, ‘white’ made up the second highest group after ‘black’ in terms of 
total volume, constituting just under 40 per cent of all stop and searches. On 
the other hand this may vary depending on area, for instance, in a report 
examining equality in Haringey during 2012, ‘black’ then ‘white’ constituted the 
most targeted groups in relation to resident population (Goodchild, 2013: 6).  
The data supports Bulmer & Solomos’ (1999: 5) argument that the prohibition 																																																								56	Indeed, those I spoke to regarding stop and search tended to frame the problem of profiling 
in terms of young, black, and men. However, it was also acknowledged that police were 
targeting young men of other ethnic backgrounds, and profiling by style of dress and area or 
estate. In other words, those working with young people in excluded areas were identifying 
the same demographic markers found in data on rioters, as those used by police to profile 
and over-police.	57	Data taken from the Metropolitan Police’s ‘Stop and Search Dashboard’ on 20/09/2017 
https://www.met.police.uk/stats-and-data/stop-and-search-dashboard/	
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of racial categories does not mean the prejudice itself will disappear, but 
rather the affective drive will be structured through new forms of distinction. In 
other words, we need to be careful not to simply assume ‘race’ is the only 
means by which prejudice is enacted, or indeed, that skin colour or ethnicity 
are not operating as one potential, even central, marker of a stereotype in 
conjunction with dress, age, gender, and area.  
As we have seen in the previous chapter, race and class lines have been 
blurred in part through the neglect of structural relations and expansion of 
poverty and exclusion. Yet perhaps the most visible incidence of this new 
stereotype came with New Labour’s concept of NEET (Clement, 2012; 
Sammons, 2008) which functions as a formulation of the young underclass to 
justify interventions in education, employment, and the Criminal Justice 
System.  
Part of this intervention came through Tony Blair’s Anti-Social Behaviour 
Orders (ASBOs), which enabled police to target individuals under civil law, 
thus loosening the requirements of evidence and avoiding due process 
(Carrabine et al., 2014; Squires, 2006). Problematically, the “definitional 
ambiguities about what, exactly, constitutes [anti-social behaviour] may 
reinforce racist and discriminatory interpretations of youthful behaviour” 
(Squires, 2006: 160). Thus while the Ministry of Justice do not provide 
information regarding ethnicity, we can note the presence of two potential 
markers of the ‘criminality’ stereotype; between 2000 and 2013 86% (20,836) 
of ASBOs were issued to males and 21% were issued to individuals aged 
under 18 (MoJ(d), 2014: 1).58  
Moreover, while an ASBO does not constitute a criminal sentence or record, if 
an individual fails to comply with the terms of the order they can be 
incarcerated for up to 5 years (MoJ(e), 2014). This is not just in theory; from 
2000 to 2013 53% of ASBO breaches resulted in custodial sentences 
(MoJ(d), 2014: 4). In other words, not only may individuals end up in prison 
without committing any crime, it opens up certain forms of behaviour and 
types of individual to criminalisation based on stereotypes and the moral 																																																								58	The report does not distinguish between other age groups.	
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judgements of the police. 
Similarly New Labour’s ‘Respect Agenda’ brought in ‘pseudo-legal’ controls 
that, in conjunction with ASBOs, effectively repealed certain aspects of PACE 
that had sought to prevent malpractice. The Respect Agenda enabled police 
to target young people who gathered in urban spaces (Tyler, 2013: 198); 
problematically, one reason PACE was introduced was in order to remove the 
police power to arrest for ‘loitering with intent’. This power meant police could 
stop, search, and even arrest based on no evidence other than the police’s 
suspicion that the individual was in a public space and up to no good (Phillips 
& Bowling, 2007: 435). Thus New Labour affectively removed this control.  
Again, the result is the criminalisation of those stereotyped and economically 
excluded by the social order. One way the recent austerity program has had 
an impact has been to push young people in areas of poverty onto the streets. 
For instance, in Haringey, 8 out of 13 youth clubs were closed prior to 2011, 
which according to Steve, were already spread thinly over an entire borough 
(also see Cooper, 2012). The problem is manifold in impoverished areas. 
Young people not only generally lack the economic means to pay for services, 
but in such areas there tends to be a greater incidence of young people 
coming from problematic home lives. Indeed, both Steve and the youth project 
spoke of these problems amongst the young people they dealt with. However, 
cuts to public, and in particular, youth services, means more young people are 
forced onto the streets. 
Factors such as these not only increase the likelihood of young people being 
drawn into crime, they open young people up to targeting and abuse by the 
police. Steve, who regularly worked with the police, argued that they often 
profiled individuals depending on their location meaning young men, dressed 
in hoodies and tracksuits, in stereotyped estates, ticked the majority of the 
boxes. Consequently, in impoverished estates hanging out on the streets 
functions as another sign of ‘criminality’ or danger. Thus, instead of being 
‘tough on the causes of crime’ as New Labour promised, they simply became 
tough on socially and economically excluded youth (Squires, 2006: 163). 
Ultimately it seems that society’s stereotypes have shifted, and with it police 
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profiling or understanding of ‘reasonable suspicion’. Thus, today, police target 
those marked as ‘criminal’ or ‘underclass’ through a mixture of gender, age, 
skin colour, dress style, and area. Indeed, this was precisely Maria’s 
experience who was searched twice when hanging around with black, male, 
friends on her estate: “for that to always happen cos of the way you dress or 
the people you hang out with”. While for Ben the further issue was that 
because the police profiled, they often targeted the ‘good kids’.  
Problematically, not only do none of the above visual markers ‘black’, ‘male’, 
‘young’, ‘estate’ necessitate ‘criminality’, the manner of dressing (hoodies, 
tracksuits, trainers) is a common style or fashion amongst young people in 
areas such as Hackney and Tottenham. In this light, the fact that 9 out of 10 
stop and searches are carried out on individuals doing nothing illegal 
becomes fundamentally problematic. Those being stopped and often treated 
as criminals and in a hostile manner are often just young people who are not 
breaking any laws, but happen to hold markers popularly associated with the 
‘underclass’ or ‘criminality’.59  
 8.2.4. Accountability 
The final structural concern I want to consider with regards to stop and search 
is not so much what it does, but what is often absent. Accountability refers to 
the extent to which the police can be held to be responsible for failures to 
achieve the required standards of behaviour of fairness, respect, and 
neutrality (Bradford, 2015). Without adhering to this standard, interactions with 
police will likely produce negative emotional responses amongst those stop 
and searched, prompting a response and that requires expression to 
overcome any disrespect experienced.  
Thus accountability is important not simply to rectify a wrong or limit police 
malpractice, but to structure the interaction so as to enable the expression of 
negative emotions, such as shame and anger. In other words, procedures of 
accountability provide an expressive mechanism by which the subject of the 
search is empowered, theoretically enabling them to overcome negative 																																																								59	Also see Bradford, 2015; HMIC, 2013; Open Society Foundation, 2013; Quinton, 2015; 
Russell, Hostick-Boakye, & Hackett, 2013: 11; Stone & Pettigrew, 2000: 15.	
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emotions within the legitimated system. Without accountability, any negative 
emotions will be repressed due to the dominant capacity of the police to 
exercise force and may seek expression outside of the system. 
To enable the accountability of the police force PACE (2011; Home Office, 
2014) requires that every subject of a stop and search to be issued with a 
copy of a report of the search, detailing, among other things, the officers’ 
name and why the stop was made. The purpose of issuing a report is to better 
enable complaints to be made regarding the police’s behaviour or if it is felt 
that the purpose of the stop was not legitimate. However, as we have already 
noted when discussing the problems of the legalistic forms of regulation, the 
police do not always follow procedure.  
The HMIC’s investigation found that 37% of those surveyed stated they had 
not been told the reason why; 51% said the officers failed to identify 
themselves; 41% said no form was filled out in their presence; and 50% said 
they were not informed of their right to have a copy of the form (HMIC, 2013: 
30). Indeed, Ben who ran the stop and search monitoring group stated that it 
was common for subjects of searches to not receive notice of the search. 
Furthermore, Ben and Bland et al. (2001: 30) found that many of those who 
had been stop and searched were not aware of their rights, nor that police 
were required to provide them with a report, suggesting that it was not 
common practice. In turn, this influences the perception of accountability and 
thus trust in the police (also see Russell, Hostick-Boakye, & Hackett, 2013: 
10; Stone & Pettigrew, 2000: 10 & 15).  
What I have demonstrated briefly in the above discussion are three key 
aspects that structure the interactions between police and the public in stop 
and searches. On the one hand, the powers provided to detain and forcibly 
search an individual mean that the police, by carrying out a stop and search, 
are disempowering the subject and thus without care may cause shame. The 
second structural consideration relates to the definition and application of 
‘reasonable suspicion’, alongside the discretion allowed to officers in the field. 
The regulation and lack of training around this issue created a mechanism by 
which broader society’s stereotypes could be exercised as ‘practical 
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judgement’, thus forming an aspect of exclusion and reproducing prejudice.  
Finally, the notion of accountability, or lack thereof, is important because it 
may counter the disempowerment created by the forced nature of searches, 
and enable individuals to expressively overcome any negative emotions 
produced by unfair treatment or profiling. Without accountability there is no 
institutionalised mechanism to release any anger and shame such 
interactions might produce. 
The implication of all this is that police seem to be heading into potentially 
invasive and embarrassing encounters with little or no institutional means, or 
understanding of how to interact to alleviate or reduce these negative 
emotional consequences, resulting in “inappropriate or, in some cases, 
unlawful practices” (HMIC, 2013: 7; also see Bland et al. 2001: 28). In other 
words, since its inception, stop and search has often been practiced in 
manners that produce unnecessary and particularly negative experiences 
amongst those subjected to it, and it is to the experiential side that we turn 
next. 
 
8.3. Experiencing Stop and Search 
The problems with stop and search have been well detailed, and indeed, so 
have the complaints made by members of the public. The purpose in 
examining the actual experience of stop and search, rather than aggregating 
or reiterating complaints and statistics, is to elaborate on what is often left 
implicit in such critiques, and demonstrate how such experiences can shape 
the disposition to attack the police. The value of this approach is not only to 
bridge the explanatory gap between the structure and agency, but in 
demonstrating the complex way causal relations affect dispositions it can 
counter the moral condemnation of attacks on the police as mindless attacks 
on the forces or order (Cameron, 2011).  
The structure of this section to some extent mirrors the structuring of 
experience. We begin with the base condition that shape experiences of stop 
and search, the removal of agency. Following this we step out and consider 
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how different factors come into play, intersect, and further impact on the 
experience, starting with legitimacy or the perception of the police, violent 
treatment, and finally prejudice and stereotypes. What I will show is that this 
form of experience shapes individual dispositions towards the police in which 
violence is not only appropriate but cathartic and constructive in overcoming 
the negative sense of self. 
8.3.1 Powerlessness and Impotence 
At its base dynamic, stop and search forces the situation in which an 
individual has either to submit to the police and an invasive search procedure, 
or is subject to a greater form of violence followed by a search or arrest. 
According to Ben (monitoring group) the sense of powerlessness is not 
uncommon amongst those stop and searched, and notably further 
exacerbated by the lack of accountability discussed above. Ben spoke of 
many people who had talked to him about their negative experiences of stop 
and search, stating that many came to him because they ‘felt helpless’ and 
did not know what to do in terms of resolution.  
Maria (stop and searched twice) felt that stop and search produces a situation 
in which the subject is potentially made to feel powerless and angry: “you’re 
gonna get frustrated […] you’re gonna want to retaliate, but obviously you’re 
not gonna want to cos you know you’ll get arrested”. As Honneth (1995: 132-
3) argues, the denial of the autonomy of the body produces a loss of trust in 
oneself to be capable of action by reducing the reliability, predictability, and 
control one has over the self in the social world.  
The result is to prevent the expectations of a positive sense of self being met, 
or in other words feelings of insecurity, impotence, and inadequacy. During 
Ben’s survey of young people’s experiences of stop and search, individuals 
commonly described how they were made to feel ‘humiliated’, ‘violated’, 
‘angry and afraid’, or a mix of these.60 While ‘humiliate’ clearly connects to 
shame, perhaps most informative is the terms ‘violate’. This connects us to 
breaking or transgressing a boundary of the self that is considered 																																																								60	For similar findings see Open Society Foundation, 2013; Russell, Hostick-Boakye, & 
Hackett, 2013; Stone & Pettigrew, 2000.	
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sacrosanct, and in turn through its etymological origins, to violence: 
something forced upon an unwilling victim.  
Thus, to be rendered powerless over your own body is not only a particularly 
negative and shameful experience, it prompts certain forms of action (through 
anger or fear, for instance) in order to meet one’s expectations of control 
required for a positive sense of self (Gilligan, 2003: 1150; Palshikar, 2005: 
5431). The problem is, of course, that with stop and search the anger has no 
way to be expressed ‘cos you know you’ll get arrested’ (Maria) or be subject 
to a greater violence. The rendering of an individual as powerless 
necessitates that shame turns to anger and ’builds up’ (Ben), either being 
repressed or seeking other routes.  
Indeed, Ben also noted, supported by Bradford’s (2015: 111-2) findings, that 
this often led to young men in particular seeking their ‘own justice’, seemingly 
as a means to exercise or overcome their feelings of powerlessness and 
inadequacy and express the repressed anger. Steve similarly described how 
this anger builds ‘until it is boiling […] like a bomb case’, making a 
compressing gesture with his hands, waiting for the right trigger to release. 
The impact of this form of interaction and outcome is particularly visible in the 
description of a black man in his 40s who had been stopped between 20-25 
times: 
all of a sudden, these people around us sprang into action and I 
was held against the wall. My wife was held. There were cars 
screeching, loads of police cars, and everything […] The impact it 
had on me was huge, huge; and it was negative. I felt that I needed 
a shower after. I felt really inadequate (non-rioter, Open Society 
Foundation, 2013: 4)61 ⁠ 
The quote reveals how the stop and search removed his capacity to act and 
respond to this threat, particularly to his family. The man clearly felt ashamed 
and ‘inadequate’ because of his inability to resolve or deal with the situation 
and would go on to describe how his sense of shame turned into anger: “I was 																																																								61 For similar finding or sentiments see (Bradford, 2015: 108; Newburn et al.(a & b), 2016; 
Prasad(c & e), 2011; Russell, Hostick-Boakye, & Hackett, 2013: 14). 
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absolutely fuming” (ibid).  
When we consider that stop and search can often be a repeat experience for 
those stereotyped it becomes easy to understand why Steve used the term 
‘boiling’, as such powerful emotions require expression. However, as noted 
the negative impact of the loss of agency can be ameliorated by ‘good 
practice’. Had the police approached the man quoted above and explained 
why they wanted to search him, it might have resulted in a very different 
experience, and perhaps he would not have felt ‘inadequate’, and later 
‘absolutely fuming’. Yet the structuring of experience does not solely derive 
from the powers given to the police, but rather how this base principle 
interacts with other factors. The first port of call is the police’s ’legitimacy’, for 
while stop and search can produce mistrust in the police, mistrust of the police 
also shapes the experience of stop and search. 
8.3.2 Legitimacy 
A number of those I spoke to highlighted the problem of mistrust and a 
disposition to resist or oppose the police. While Weber (2009: 78) assumes 
that the state ‘successfully’ exercises a monopoly on the legitimate use of 
violence, as we saw in the 1980s, this is not necessarily the case. The issue 
here is that even prior to the search occurring the police’s powers may be 
perceived as illegitimate, and thus constitute a form of violence (Arendt, 
1970). In other words, rather than the police being empowered by the people 
they police, they are empowered over them, and any exercise of power is 
likely to be perceived as oppressive and the spurious choice presented in stop 
and search is revealed for what it is. 
In other words, “[a]ny police action, sensitive or senseless, [becomes] likely to 
be opposed” (Keith, 1993: 125; also see Bradford, 2015: 109; Loader, 2006: 
208). As we have seen previously, those who are being over-policed in 
communities such as Hackney or Tottenham are often those who have come 
from communities that have a long history of conflict with the police and 
contexts of social and economic exclusion. Unsurprisingly, mistrust in the 
police remains high in these communities (e.g. Bradford, 2015; Delsol & 
Shiner, 2006; Hall et al, 1980; Keith, 1993; Quinton, 2015; Stone & Pettigrew, 
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2000). 
Displaying this cultural mistrust when discussing stop and search, Nick (black, 
male, 40s) expressed his doubt as to whether the police could act fairly 
stating he would always ‘have questions’ about who and why they were being 
stopped. Steve revealed how this context comes into play with the police 
when he, rather poignantly, highlighted a contradiction occurring in 
Tottenham. Parents are ‘protecting the next generation’ by preparing their 
children for what are seen as the realities of policing – unpleasant and 
discriminatory experiences. At the same time, this exacerbates the conflict 
between police and young people by teaching them to fear and resent the 
police.  
For Ben, part of what the stop and search monitoring group sought to achieve 
was to reduce young people’s hostile reaction to police during a search in 
order to limit the possibility of escalation into conflict and arrest. By teaching 
young people their rights and what the police could legally do, Ben thought 
the implicit hostility towards police could be focused into managing the 
encounter and achieving a better outcome. Maria, Ned, Polly, and Aisha also 
mentioned this cultural sense of mistrust or dislike of the police, which not 
only came from parents but from peers. 62  As individuals have bad 
experiences with the police, so they tell their friends weaving their 
experiences into this broader, intergenerational narrative around the police as 
hostile and a threat. This occurs to the point that, as with Nick, one does not 
even to have experience particularly negative interactions with the police to 
have serious doubts about their intentions. 
As this suggests, the narrative functions to generate expectations and prompt 
emotional dispositions, preparing individuals for negative experiences at the 
hands of police. This leads to what Quinton (2015: 75) described in Hackney 
as an ‘us against them’ mentality, in which the police were viewed as an 
‘occupying force’. In my research this disposition was made particularly visible 
for me by Nick, who not only expressed expectations of police utilising 																																																								62	Also see Delsol & Shiner, 2006; HMIC, 2013: 11; Open Society Foundation, 2013: 16; 
Russell, Hostick-Boakye, & Hackett, 2013: 14; Stone & Pettigrew, 2000: 11	
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violence unjustly, but I also witnessed him tense or tighten up and lower his 
voice as two police officers walked past us on the street, despite the fact that 
in no way could Nick have been perceived as doing something wrong or 
‘suspicious’.63  
Unfortunately, this mistrust, while justified, contributes to the vicious cycle 
where any stop and search will likely become a negative experience, and any 
negative experience with the police simply corroborates the narrative and 
perception of police. The point here is that the illegitimacy of the police implies 
a set of expectations by the subject that harm will occur through the police’s 
exercise of their powers, and that they will be exercised unfairly or unjustly 
against them. In such a context, stop and search – which relies on ‘suspicion’ 
rather than evidence – will always struggle to avoid a negative emotional 
response as the subject is rendered impotent.  
8.3.3 Violence and Violation 
As has been noted, simply because stop and search disempowers the 
subject, this does not necessitate that they are made to feel impotent. Good 
practice and trust in the police can ameliorate this negative aspect of the 
experience. Nevertheless, it does render subjects vulnerable and thus any 
negatives in the experience are likely to be amplified. Unfortunately, the 
relevance in connecting society’s stereotypes to police practice is not simply 
to show that they profile by types of individual. A stereotype implies not only 
judgement but discriminatory treatment; indeed, the purpose of negative 
stereotyping is to justify exclusionary treatment. For Maria the way police 
profiled was connected to the treatment of the profiled: 
and it happens so much where people get arrested for things they 
haven’t done, and for that to always happen to cos of the way you 
dress or the people you hang out with […] if it’s always happening 
you’re gonna get frustrated especially if police come to you with a 
bad attitude or treat you bad  																																																								63 For similar findings see Bradford, 2015; Clancy, Hough, Aust, and Kershaw 2001: 3; Delsol 
& Shiner, 2006; Open Society Foundation, 2013; Russell, Hostick-Boakye, & Hackett, 2013: 
14; Stone & Pettigrew, 2000: 30. 
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As Maria’s statement suggests the problem of profiling is more than just the 
targeting of individuals, but also the differential treatment in the interaction 
based on the perception or stereotype in play. In other words, it is not just the 
repeated stopping of certain types of individuals that we must concern 
ourselves with, but the behaviour of the police implied by the prejudice. At the 
most extreme is the use of physical force and even violence on those being 
searched. This is particularly important because it takes the loss of agency to 
its extreme conclusion – you will be physically mistreated and you have no 
power to resist. 
Two of the accounts I want to give both happened to young black men in 
north London and were relayed to me by Ben and Steve. Steve described a 
recent interaction where his son (mid 20s, black) was pulled over while driving 
home. The stop happened late at night, around one hundred meters from his 
home in Tottenham. The officers signalled for him to stop on a quiet suburban 
street, then exited their vehicle and proceeded over to Steve’s son.  
The question was asked why he was driving about late at night, but the 
assumption was apparently already made that he was doing something illegal. 
One officer grabbed the keys from the car, dragged him out and ‘threw him 
about’, before forcefully inserted fingers into his mouth looking for drugs. After 
finding nothing, rather than returning the keys, the officer threw them into the 
street. No report was given, the officers made no attempt to identify 
themselves, and did not attempt to gain consent for the search. 
Ben told me of an event during the Notting Hill Carnival where his nephew, a 
black man in his early twenties, was dancing in a crowd of festival-goers. 
Ben’s nephew was aggressively approached by a number of police, 
apparently because he had alcohol and they thought he might be violent. 
According to Ben the police were particularly hostile, and there was little 
reason to suspect his nephew as he was simply one person amongst a crowd 
of people drinking and dancing during the procession. When his nephew 
resisted the stop and search an officer punched him, knocking him 
unconscious, before handcuffing him.  
Here again, not only did the police apparently utilise unnecessary violence, 
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the reason for suspicion were perceived to have lacked any foundation in 
evidence, and again no record of the stop was made/given, although perhaps 
this is because it ultimately became an arrest very quickly. Ben was also 
threatened with arrest when he tried to intervene on his nephews behalf, 
however, he then managed to take a photo (which he showed to me) of his 
nephew unconscious, suspended by his arms, which were handcuffed behind 
his back.  
Steve was clearly upset and angry as he told me his son’s story, however, 
perhaps because Ben was present at the event his reaction was much 
clearer. Although Ben was not the subject of the police’s intervention he was 
particularly animated and angry when he described events to me. While he 
did not explicitly state it, his clear desire to prevent his nephew being 
physically abused coupled with his sense of disempowerment, 
understandably, generate a lot of anger and resentment which had remained 
with him. Indeed, his involvement in the monitoring group appeared driven by 
his need to overcome the sense of powerlessness he had experienced on 
more than one occasion, as he told me later ‘I can’t be a victim … I don’t care 
who it is, I’m not scared’. 
Unfortunately, the use of violence coupled with the situation of powerlessness 
is a particularly potent method of generating a sense of inadequacy, fear, and 
anger. Such interactions firmly establish the dominance of one side and the 
inferiority of the other, and damage the victim’s confidence in their ability to 
protect and exercise control over the external world (Honneth, 1995: 132-3; 
Gilligan, 2003; Palshikar, 2005).  
Yet perhaps this is most damaging in terms of the relation with police and 
society when it occurs to children. Indeed, it is worth noting that is not unusual 
for children to come into encounters with police: in 2012 26% of all stop and 
searches in London were carried out on 10-17 year olds (Open Society 
Foundation, 2013: 23-4). Thus, further to the above examples, I witnessed the 
pursuit of a young white boy, around 10-12 years of age, during my research 
at the youth project. I had walked past the boy and a friend earlier as I entered 
the project, at which point they were playing outside on the youth project’s 
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grounds that border the street.  
The moment itself occurred later on during an interview I was conducting with 
Carla. We had heard shouting from outside, and exited the office into the 
foyer to investigate. At this point the boy ran around the corner and into the 
foyer at speed, being chased by two police officers. The closest officer was 
shouting aggressively as he attempted to grab the boy, missing him as he 
came through the open door. The boy ran a short way into the building before 
one of the community workers, Ray, stopped him, put his arm around and 
calmed the boy, and took him to talk to the officers who had ceased the 
chase.  
The police stated they were present because there had been some ‘trouble’ in 
the area (although they did not state what this ‘trouble’ was) and had asked 
the boy what he was doing. The boy stated he ran because he thought the 
police would Taser him, while the police stated they had just tried to talk to 
him. It would seem strange for the boy to run simply because the police asked 
him a question, nevertheless, it was unclear how the initial interaction had 
played out, but there are some useful points to take from this.  
Whatever instigated the chase, it led to a situation in which a young boy was 
clearly frightened by the police, and such experiences are likely to make the 
boy fear future encounters with police and perhaps resent them for the fear 
they produce in him. Secondly, it was clear he already did fear the police, 
suggesting the role of either previous experiences with them, or supporting 
the notion of an anti-police narrative.64 Given that he mentioned that he 
thought the police would Taser him, it could have been that he had heard 
accounts of police using Tasers. This might explain, if it was the case that the 
police only asked a question, why he had run from them.  
While what further struck me at the time was the aggressiveness (shouting, 
facial expressions) with which the police pursued the young boy who was 
clearly scared, and what might have occurred had the youth worker not been 																																																								64 Although when I asked Ray he did not know if the boy had prior negative experiences with 
the police, he did think it might be due to stories about negative experiences that he had 
heard. 
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there to calm the situation down and prevent a forceful apprehension. The 
effect of these sorts of experiences on anyone, but especially children, is 
particularly worrying as these are the most formative periods, shaping “group 
belonging, acceptance, solidarity and social affirmation” (Robertson, 2002: 
73).  
Even with Ray’s intervention, the experience of the boy shapes expectations 
where a violent force can descend on him in any public space, and seemingly 
for no apparent reason. Consequently, such experiences could easily shape 
the police as a hostile threat and produce a sense of exclusion, which again 
could connect to broader society. One rioter in his 30s from London, 
corroborates this, speaking of an experience with police around the age of 12 
where he was thrown into a police van, called ‘nigger’, beaten and spat on - 
he went on to state he had not forgiven the police or gotten over his anger 
(Prasad(e), 2011).  
This last quote from the rioter reinforces the notion that the violence exercised 
in stop and search cannot be understood as distinct from the process of 
stereotyping and excluding. Negative stereotypes and affective prejudice 
enable the discriminatory and violent behaviours discussed above by framing 
types of individuals as inferior to justify their exclusionary treatments, even 
when this is a young boy. When constructed as ‘criminal’ or threatening 
violence is justified to “keep the power structure intact against individual 
challengers – the foreign enemy, the native criminal” (Arendt, 1970: 47). 
However, violence is only the most extreme act of disrespect produced by this 
process, next we turn to the ‘message’. 
8.3.4 Criminalisation 
The police are symbolically connected to the state and society, and also given 
the power to speak for the state and society (Wacquant, 2009). Thus, one 
side of this coin means a message is potentially sent to the individual being 
searched that the police believe they are ‘criminal’ and not wanted as part of 
society. While the other side implies that a message is also potentially sent to 
‘society’, or any observers, that this individual, and perhaps this type of 
individual, is dangerous and criminal (Bradford, 2015; Hall et al, 1980; Loader, 
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2006).  
On the one hand then, a stop and search potentially constitutes a form of 
disrespect by symbolically refusing and inhibiting social recognition. While on 
the other, it sends a message that individuals like the one being searched are 
dangerous, contributing to the reproduction of the self-same stereotypes and 
exclusions. Indeed, those being targeted for stop and search recognise this 
and experience it as a symbolic refusal of worth. One complaint from the 
monitoring group’s survey was that police failed to give any or adequate 
reasons for the search, which many took to mean they were stopped because 
of their appearance.  
Indeed, one reason has become so overused by police that it is almost a 
cliché: ’you fit the appearance of a suspect’. Not only is this found in many 
reports (e.g. Open Society Foundation, 2013; Russell, Hostick-Boakye, & 
Hackett, 2013; Stone & Pettigrew, 2000), commonly mentioned during my 
research, it was also common knowledge to myself prior to carrying out any 
investigations. Indeed, some time ago in my mid-twenties a group of friends 
and myself were subject to a stop and search, albeit a very amicable one, for 
that very reason. Our perception was that the likelihood of our group fitting a 
description of suspects was small, and thus the officers had used it as an 
excuse to stop a group of men late at night. The problem is that such a reason 
is now never believed, as a student from Tottenham noted: “The description 
always fits me” (Russell, Hostick-Boakye, & Hackett, 2013: 10).  
This is particularly important because society’s stereotypes and hierarchy are 
also reinforced and transmitted through the police’s behaviour, whether it is 
violent actions, assumptions of guilt, insults, or the sense of moral superiority. 
The affective impact of this is to shape they way in which you perceive 
yourself within society, and the way society looks at you. Nick described the 
treatment of black people by police throughout his life as making him realise 
he was a ‘second class citizen’. Subject also highlight similar in their 
descriptions of stop and search: 
They get cocky with you. They get like they think they’re a lot 
higher than you (Stone & Pettigrew, 2000: 15). 
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They automatically think I've got a knife. How do you think that 
makes me feel? (rioter, 19, Black, Tottenham, Prasad(c), 2011).  
One 22-year-old black male surveyed by Ben who had been stop and 
searched ‘about 30 times’, stated “sometimes you get police officer who you 
can tell straight away they’ve already judged you and then they come with a 
certain attitude […] I don’t feel good”. Common complaints given about stop 
and search during the monitoring group’s survey were that police were ‘rude’ 
and ‘talked down to’ them, while what was commonly suggested by those 
surveyed as ways to improve stop and search was to ‘be polite’ or ‘friendly’, 
and importantly to be ‘respectful’.  
Through Butler’s (2011) concept of performativity, we can better describe 
what is occurring. A stop and search is a performative act that reproduces and 
re-establishes the power relations and roles of the social order. The act of 
singling an individual out, of implying negative judgement of them, and of 
mistreating them, is to perform society’s distinctions. Through the experience 
the police identify themselves as dominant and within the social order, and the 
subject is forced to identify as inferior, disempowered, and unwanted.  
Indeed, we only need to recall Ben’s account of his nephew or Steve’s 
accounts of his son being searched, the police’s treatment of them and what 
message that sent. In the case of Steve’s son, the police assumed he had 
drugs, that they could physically mistreat him, and even when nothing was 
found they threw his keys away. The message being sent by police, as the 
representatives of the social order, is that ‘you are criminal, not an equal, and 
do not belong with us.  
This aspect of assumed superiority/criminality, along with the treatment this 
tends to imply, clearly creates the potential for shame as social recognition is 
being denied. When surveying the wider research into stop and search, this 
perspective is all too common. The research carried out for the Home Office 
(Stone & Pettigrew, 2000: vi) found that accounts of more positive 
experiences of stop and search were characterised by politeness on the part 
of the officers and acceptable reasons being given for the stop as opposed to 
feeling unfairly targeted.  
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While on the other side, it is not uncommon to find sentiments such as that 
expressed by one student in Tottenham, who reported that they were made to 
feel ‘guilty until proven innocent’ (Russell, Hostick-Boakye, & Hackett, 2013: 
11), or a young male rioter who stated that his experiences of stop and search 
had made him “feel like I'm not a part of this society” (Prasad(c), 2011). 
Indeed, utilising survey data, Bradford (2015: 106-7)65 found a lower sense of 
belonging to society amongst profiled and over-policed groups, and this sense 
of alienation was found to have increased the likelihood of participation in the 
2011 riots (Morrell et al., 2011: 7).  
In other words, the targeting and mistreatment of young men during a stop 
and search appears to be leaving many feeling disrespected, stigmatised, and 
rejected by society. For Tyler (2013), the impact of such treatment on the 
dispositions of those subject to them is the creation of a contradiction between 
the need or drive for a positive sense of self, and the identity imposed through 
the performative treatment of them as something of little worth. The internal 
battle is between the shame imposed upon them and the drive to re-establish 
self worth: “[The police] call us little shits and little bastards […] I hate feeling 
like people are judging me” (rioter, Lewis, 2011). The result is anger which 
requires expression: “I hate them” (ibid). 
8.3.5 Besieging Communities 
In all the previous aspects of stop and search space and temporality, that is 
the concentrated and continued exercise of the powers, has been somewhat 
implied. However, in this section I will make it explicit, for it is not simply that it 
happens, but that it continues to happen in certain areas, and this has a 
particular impact. Research has repeatedly noted that contact generated by 
the police results in lower confidence and trust in the police, this is particularly 
notable in areas which are the focus of over-policing (Bradford, 2015: 108; 
HMIC, 2013; Miller et al. 2001: 78).  
‘Acquired space’ refers to the notion that a place takes on meaning due to the 
interactions that occur within it (Merleau-Ponty, 2005: 114). It is the 																																																								65	For similar findings see Clancy, Hough, Aust, and Kershaw 2001;	Open Society 
Foundation, 2013; Stone & Pettigrew, 2000.	
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geographic organisation of norms and expectations; thus in one sense space 
or place is a marker by which we set out possibilities and probabilities through 
affective responses. Thus, focused and long-term over-policing in areas or 
estates produces an oppressive feeling. This is particularly problematic in light 
of powers given under the ‘Respect Agenda’ and that remove requirements of 
due process, such as ASBOs (Carrabine et al., 2014; Tyler, 2013). Even more 
so when we recall that in these areas it is often young people who are already 
struggling with disrespect and disempowerment imposed by the larger social 
order, that are pushed onto the streets. 
Indeed, this was one of the most concerning things regarding the boy I 
witnessed being chased by police - he was playing on the grounds of the 
youth project, but was not safe from police intervention. On another occasion I 
witnessed a stop and search in Wood Green, a shopping area of Haringey 
that saw looting in 2011. The stop happened at a busy crossroads where four 
young, black men who were ‘hanging around’ before a police car pulled up 
and two officers got out. The officers proceeded over to the young men, spoke 
briefly and lined them up with their hands placed against the wall and legs 
spread, before performing the search. The young men were allowed to go on 
their way after the search found nothing, and I saw no record being provided 
of the stop. 
The corner on which this occurred was known at the time as a spot for drug 
dealing and had been targeted by police for operations. However, given the 
young men were not seen ‘dealing’ and the police found nothing on them, this 
appeared to be suspicion based not on ‘objective’ information, but on a 
stereotype – four young black men were present on a corner with a 
‘reputation’.  
While the police did not use excessive force during the stop and search, there 
were certainly no niceties, and the officers pushed and cajoled the men into 
position. Although I could not hear what was being said, clearly the men were 
not willing participants. Instead, they appeared to resist through a sort of 
passive non-compliance, forcing the police to manoeuvre them into position, 
as well as displaying a general disrespect to the police through their body 
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language. Ultimately, the men appeared to be doing nothing wrong, resented 
the police’s intervention in their daily life, and their behaviour suggested that 
resistance was desired and would be acted on if it was felt as plausible.  
The point to bring out of this is that even such relatively benign police actions 
make it very difficult to view the police as anything other than a threat to those 
who fit the ‘profile’. Such experiences likely reinforce the idea that each time 
you enter public space there is the risk you will be targeted and rendered 
powerless to prevent an invasive and potentially embarrassing encounter: 
“When you’re not doing anything, just hanging with your friends, any group of 
kids, they will harass them ... people don’t respect the police. (Young person, 
Tottenham, Morrell et al. 2011: 42) 
Such events are a common problem; Maria spoke of her surprise at being 
searched when she was just hanging about on her estate. The youth project 
sought to provide a place after school and during the evenings that would 
provide an alternative to hanging out on the streets. This not only was more 
likely to keep their young people out of crime, but also reduced the possibility 
that they would come into negative contact with the police, thus limiting the 
possibility of what Stone and Pettigrew (2000: 12) found – that repeated stop 
and searches ’aroused strong feelings of anger and victimisation’.66 ⁠ 
As we saw with Brixton in the 1980s, the feeling of being targeted and 
harassed leads to a sense of oppression pervading public spaces; similar 
sentiment can be found with regards to 2011, a feeling that you cannot live 
your life without concern or fear of intervention by the police: “We feel we 
can’t walk down the street. We feel it’s their [police] streets.” (rioter, 17, male, 
white, London, Newburn et al.(b), 2016: 13). Steve argued that his estate, 
amongst others, had been stereotyped as violent and criminal, and it was this 
understanding that the police operated on when entering. On the estate, 
Steve argued, police viewed almost anyone with suspicion. Thus the area 
itself becomes part of the profile or stereotype and those who live there, 
particularly young men, become aware of and have to live with the police as a 																																																								66 For similar findings see: Bradford, 2015; Carter(f) 2011; Open Society Foundation, 2013: 
30; Prasad(c), 2011.	
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potential and constant threat.  
That people become used to it obviously does not mean it becomes less 
unpleasant for those subject to a constant possibility of police intervention – in 
the USA ‘stop and frisk’ produces similar responses: “That's bad! Y'all hear 
what he said? 'We used to it'? That's like you got used to somebody trying to 
punch you in your face every day when you come outside” (Devereaux & 
Spencer, 2013). This form of policing becomes, for some, an everyday 
oppressive factor, a reminder of your exclusion, and a possibility that one has 
to some extent accept and negotiate. 
The point to take away from this is not just that the over-policing of certain 
areas implies profiling of young people on the street, or simply an increase in 
the types of negative encounters described above; but that the police become 
an everyday oppressive factor, or threat in public space. In turn this feeling of 
oppression feeds over into relations and interactions with larger society and 
its representatives. The public space itself produces a disposition in which the 
expectations implied by the anti-police narrative are brought into play each 
time a young person leaves their home or club. While of course there are a 
mixture of causes, that ‘Kids come to [the youth project] aggressive, hostile, 
and mistrustful’ (Jane) is a dispositional stance to a world where there are 
many threats, not only or simply violent ones, but existential threats to self-
worth, and one of these is the police.  
8.4. Performing Anger: Accountability or Riot  
Emotions tell us something about the situation we are in, what to expect and 
what responses are ‘appropriate’, based on prior experiences and to what 
extent our expectations were or were not met (Damasio & Damasio, 2006; 
Honneth, 1995: 136). In turn we ‘express’ or fulfil these emotions through 
actions that seek to achieve these expectations, or resolve the contradiction 
between expectations and a positive sense of self that occur in negative 
interactions.  
We do this by ‘performing’ (Butler, 2004; 2011) with power relations and roles 
in ways that seek to achieve an adequate expression. Emotional responses 
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occurring through negative interactions with the police will attach to the object 
of the police (Ray, 2016), shaping expectations of future interactions involving 
violence and disrespect, and pre-reflexively disposing or prompting certain 
forms of re-action in order that the individual can be better prepared and 
respond appropriately.  
Consequently, individuals who produce such affective body states want 
resolution; the purpose of anger or shame is to prompt forms of action that 
change or prevent the negative emotional experience (Scheff, 1988: 396; 
2000: 90). This change or prevention is brought about by the performance of 
alternative power relations and roles. Of course, this is not a possibility when 
agency has been removed, thus, as Steve put it, anger builds up until it is 
‘boiling … like a bomb case’. The point is, to expand Maria’s earlier quote, the 
expression of the negative emotion through action is suppressed:  
if police come to you with a bad attitude or treat you bad you’re 
gonna want to retaliate, but obviously you’re not gonna want to cos 
you know you’ll get arrested. So I think that whole thing [the riots] 
was retaliation to police over like what they do over years. 
Maria not only notes the connection between the emotional response of 
negative treatment and the loss of agency, she also points to what this 
prompts: ‘retaliation’. Other have argued the same:  
that riot was a release of tension. The two main things were 
obviously the killing of Mark Duggan, but also the oppression that 
led to it. The years of police just hassling us while we’re just trying 
to do our thing (black, male, Tottenham, non-rioter, Open Society 
Foundation, 2013: 30) 
The sensation of powerlessness is likely to be acutely felt during a negative 
experience of stop and search. The very moment you are being wronged, be 
it an insult or violence, and are driven to ‘retaliate’ or prevent such an 
experience, is precisely the moment when you have lost the capacity to do so. 
Indeed, Steve and Ben also thought the death of Duggan was the trigger, the 
straw that broke the camel’s back, with Steve comparing to the riots in the 
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1980s: ‘Same kind of cocktail and same trigger’. This combines with what 
Bradford (2015: 109) argues from his findings; that repeated stop and 
searches are problematic because they build up the sense of being wronged, 
and produce ‘lasting damage’ to relations with police.  
This is where accountability in stop and search and the police generally is, or 
should be, relevant because it empowers individuals. In Arendt’s (1970) terms 
it allows individuals to participate in power, to shape the social world, and to 
overcome and reorganise relations of disrespect. However, the lack of 
accountability means, as Ben had found with many he had spoken to who 
wanted to do something but did not know what or how, that the feeling of 
‘helplessness’ remains. If the individual feels mistreated, a procedure to 
rectify, or bring about ‘justice’, provides a form of resolution or agency that 
enables the negative emotions to be expressed or overcome through a 
performance of roles in which the police are not superior, but admonished for 
their actions. In other words, if the police were felt to be accountable, if there 
were feasible means to carry out complaints, and if it was felt this would make 
a difference, this may alleviate or assuage the build up of discontent and 
powerlessness, resolve shame before it becomes anger, and provide a route 
for rectification and justice, rather than retaliation. 
Unfortunately, mistrust in the police complaints system is high, perhaps 
largely due to the police being required to investigate the police (Delsol & 
Shiner, 2006: 252). Indeed, even a black police officer who had been subject 
to repeated stop and search and decided to complain, described the process 
as difficult, lengthy, and frustrating (Open Society Foundation, 2013: 6 & 14). 
Both Aisha and Ben argued that making complaints was generally ‘pointless’, 
demonstrating mistrust of the system as a whole.  
In other words, police accountability is low at best, and pre-reflexively 
excluded as a route of action at worst. Thus, without resolution through the 
justice system, all that is left to the powerless individual who seeks resolution 
and to express their discontent, is retaliation and perhaps violence. Of course, 
in everyday stop and searches and the loss of agency this implies, it 
ultimately means that this is not a realistic option. Physically, you can only 
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provide a sort of symbolic resistance to disrespect the police during the stop 
and search as I witnessed with the four young black men – being rude, 
hostile, forcing the police to work harder.  
But this is not enough to express and resolve the sense of impotence and 
disrespect. Thus the anger and desire to overturn these relations of power 
and disrespect ‘builds up’, ‘boiling’, seeking a release, an opportunity: 
Everything the police have done to us, did to us, was in our heads. 
That’s what gave everyone their adrenaline to wanna fight the 
police ... because of the way they treated us, we was fearless 
(rioter, 19, male, black, Bromley, south London, Newburn et al.(b), 
2016: 10) 
and they'll [police] rough you up [laughs], just rough you up for no 
particular reason. People were screaming out: 'This is for Mark 
[Duggan].' They were shouting it out (rioter, male, Tottenham, 
Carter(f), 2011)67 ⁠ 
8.5. Discussion 
As I have argued, the ‘opportunity’ to riot in 2011 was created by the 
perception that the police had lost control, and thus their ability to arrest and 
exercise dominant force over the rioters. This situation constituted an 
opportunity for rioters to perform alternative power relations and roles with 
police that were being repressed by the social order in the everyday 
experience. The drive to alter the organisation of power was prompted by the 
affective impact of social and economic exclusion, but focused particularly 
through personal and narrative accounts of police discrimination and brutality. 
This connection could happen because of the way in which the police operate 
on and through the social order’s exclusions and logics of distinction. The 
police, simply put, respond to, and reproduce the prejudices of the privileged. 
In the above discussions, the police have either been hostile, or utilised 
violence or excessive force, and have been perceived to do so without 																																																								67 For similar quotes see (Carter(a & c); 2011; Manchester riot, 2011, 0.57; Morrell et al. 
2011: 32; Prasad(a & e), 2011) 
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reasonable justification. Whether it is simply an aggressive and forceful 
approach or actual violence, the instances represent normative violations of 
the self. These are violations because the expectations regarding the 
autonomy of self and ability to protect yourself are not met. The result is a 
significant emotional impact, be it shame, fear, anger, or as often seems to be 
the case, a mixture of each. 
When the police lost the capacity to render subjects impotent in 2011 the 
‘opportunity’ arose, and those suppressed emotions could now be expressed 
through performative actions that reorganised power relations with police. The 
desire to overturn shameful relations with police, to take back power, to re-
produce self-esteem, and to get ‘revenge’ or ‘payback’ – to “violate [them] like 
they violate us” (rioter, in Tyler, 2013: 197), had pre-reflexively shaped the 
choice to act. Thus, the choice to attack the police was, for many, already 
reasonable and desirable, and what made August 2011 different from the 
everyday was only the context that made the choice plausible.  
As the accounts of stop and search suggest, one does not have to identify as 
‘criminal’ to have attacked the police, rather, they have simply been subject to 
experiences that prompt resentment, anger, and a desire to rectify these 
contradictions or injustices, yet are simultaneously prevented from doing so. 
Of course, to assume stop and search was the only factor involved in shaping 
this choice would be too simplistic, indeed, we might note that not all those 
who have been subject to negative stops and searches were involved in 
attacks on the police (e.g. Open Society, 2013). Rather, as has been argued, 
in conjunction with social and economic exclusion, over-policing provides a 
particularly potent mechanism that shapes one’s disposition towards the 
police, and reinforces the stereotypes of the social hierarchy. 
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9. Performative Violence:  
Overcoming Disrespect and Disempowerment in 2011 
 
9.1. Video Resistance 
The 2011 riots have been and gone, yet, with the relatively recent emergence 
and proliferation of video capture technology, and sharing sites such as 
YouTube, we now stand in a situation where we may still observe and analyse 
rioting after the fact. The benefit of a situational analysis is that provides a 
more detailed and direct means to analyse acts of rioting than other forms of 
data can. Rioters cannot rationalise or misremember their actions in video 
footage, and neither can the complexity of these acts be lost as with blunt 
quantitative data. Instead, it remains ever present for repeated viewing and 
analysis. In turn, the topics of the previous chapter can now be brought 
together and understood through these actions in order to better bridge the 
gap between structure and agency. 
Butler’s (2004; 2011) notion of performativity allows us to analyse action as 
socially structured without producing a stimuli-response or determinative 
account. Rather, performative acts, much as with Bourdieu’s (2003) notion of 
disposition, enable us to understand how power relations structure experience 
and become agency’s ‘necessary scene’ (Chambers & Carver, 2008: 45). In 
this light, the riots were not simply a response to rioters’ experiences of 
disempowerment and disrespect, rather as with any action, these drew on this 
‘past’ with the aim of creating a ‘future’, an idea which extends out from the 
now and seeks to shape what will be (Merleau-Ponty, 2005: 374-5). For the 
rioters, each act that confronts the police expresses their affective disposition 
and achieves an idea of themselves in relation to the police that is repressed 
in the everyday.  
By examining these actions through the notions of performativity and 
expressive action, the problematic and moralising divide of political/criminal 
action can be avoided. We can connect and support the structural 
experiences developed in previous chapters through rioters’ responses to the 
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police actions, and what they seek to achieve in their own. Thus, while rioters’ 
actions may not have expressed themselves in the normatively acceptable 
terms of ‘politics’, this is not due to a lack of disempowerment and disrespect. 
Rather, the particular development of structural forms of exclusion previously 
discussed has inhibited the adequate functioning of democracy through 
producing individualised forms of resistance. 
 9.1.1. Carrying out the Situational Analysis  
I begin with Tottenham and the emergence of rioting out of a protest over the 
shooting of Mark Duggan by police. Unfortunately, there is minimal useful 
footage available of the initial day of rioting on the 6th of August, and none of 
the days between the shooting and the riots. The principle source is a report 
that sought to assess police actions and strategy, by the Metropolitan Police 
Service (MPS, 2012).68 Following Tottenham, we will move onto the rioting in 
Hackney to examine how the riots emerged there and the form it took. During 
this discussion I will also move away to consider footage of events in other 
areas where this connects with what we are seeing in Hackney.  
The core analysis here examines events in Hackney that occurred on the 8th 
of August leading up to, and during the violence. Much of the footage I could 
locate came from this area, often involved conflicts or encounters between the 
public and police, and of all the footage viewed provided the best opportunity 
for a rough chronological ordering. The majority of the footage can be found 
on YouTube, either from news organisations such as Vice, or posted by 
members of the public who either filmed, or more likely, compiled the footage 
as many seem to utilise a selection of footage from different cameras. 
The partial examination of Tottenham and the development of events in 
Hackney establish the causal relevance of the police both to the possibility of 
rioting emerging, and relatedly, the immediate development of the conflict. 
The chronological account in Hackney enables a more nuanced 
understanding of how the police’s actions connect back to experiences of 																																																								68	The Metropolitan Police Service report was conducted by a police review panel, which 
gives an account of the events on the 6th of August, the police’s understanding of the situation 
in the days leading up to the riots, and some reports from officers on the ground. 
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disrespect, prompting anger and resistance. We also examine acts of looting 
as taunts to the police and direct confrontations with police emerging in 
Hackney, but also in a number of other locales. These acts of resistance are 
driven by the expressive nature of anger and shame, and function as a means 
to overcome or reverse power relations with police. In reversing these power 
relations rioters demonstrate to themselves and the police that the relation is 
no longer one in which they are inferior. 
We further examine a common form of gesture made by rioters to police that 
functions in the same way as physical acts of resistance; this leads us into a 
discussion of the individualistic form of resistance we are seeing. For while 
the multiple forms of resistance to police feed from relations of 
disempowerment and disrespect, these aim at a personal resolution to 
discontent, ‘revenge’ and displaying their superiority, rather than any 
structural change.  
 9.1.2. Qualifications 
Before beginning, we must first acknowledge the potential partiality of footage 
in terms of what those recording chose to capture, ignore, and post. One 
obvious concern is that those events filmed or selected for posting would 
likely be the most dramatic. This in turn, raises questions as to what was 
excluded through this process. Unfortunately, the extent to which this impacts 
on the footage is unknown, nevertheless, this does not mean such evidence is 
useless.  
Firstly, the footage from Hackney enables us to provide a rough chronological 
account meaning that rather than viewing isolated and dramatic incidents, we 
can see multiple events in the same area and the progression of the situation 
towards violence. When discussing footage beyond Hackney it will be, in part, 
to reveal that there exist multiple accounts of similar forms of action and 
behaviours, indicating their relevance. Furthermore, the footage discussed are 
arguably not the most dramatic moments, but rather the milder end of 
confrontations with police; for instance, the police report being attacked with 
petrol bombs, knives, and machetes on multiple occasions, none of which we 
will see here (MPS, 2012: 41-3 & 86).  
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The major qualification that needs to be made is that in this chapter I am 
seeking to highlight and explore certain common actions and expressions of 
rioters when attacking the police. The aim is not to explain the totality of 
violent action against the police, nor the totality of possible intersecting factors 
or dispositions to do so. Rather the point is to ‘make sense’, or bring together 
in the moment, the broader structural forces and dispositions into the action of 
the riots.  
In this sense the chapter both functions as evidence as to the validity of 
previous discussions, as well as developing and advancing a fuller account of 
the violence. Thus, in contrast to Collins (2008) and Nassauer’s (2011) 
notions of situational analysis, it is important to note this chapter does not 
stand alone as an argument or evidence. Instead, it seeks to demonstrate 
how the context of the everyday inheres in the moment of violence against 
police, constituting a ‘performance’ and a process of identification through 
resistance. It is through this analysis that we can overcome the problematic 
de-Politicisation that sought to represent rioters as immoral, mindless 
criminals. 
  
9.2. Setting the Scene: The Build Up to Rioting in Tottenham 
The evidence deployed here pertains to the days between the death of Mark 
Duggan, a black man, on the 4th of August, and the beginning of the rioting on 
the evening of the 6th in Tottenham, and how these events were interpreted by 
people in the local community. Rather than analysing events and behaviours, 
as there is little footage to enable a useful observation of behaviours, the main 
purpose is simply to the set the scene and to provide evidence of the context 
from which the riots initially emerged.   
In the moments leading to his death, Duggan was travelling in a taxi near his 
home of Broad Water Farm, Tottenham. He had been targeted for a police 
operation under the belief that he was carrying a gun (MPS, 2012: 20). Armed 
police stopped the taxi, Duggan seems to have got out, and moments later 
the police fired at him, resulting in his death later at the scene (Vasagar, 
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2011).  
As we have noted, the death of Mark Duggan constituted an ‘iconic’ event to 
the community of Tottenham, rather than a simple ‘trigger’ of violence, in that 
his death at the hands of police symbolised or “encapsulate[d] all that leads 
people to become disaffected, [and] angry” (Reicher & Stott, 2011: 38%). 
More than just another example of police abuse of black people, Duggan’s 
death connected to the broader historical context in which disrespect is visited 
upon black people, by demonstrating that their value is such that they can be 
abused and killed by the police.  
In this historical context, the police’s failure to clarify and adequately 
communicate to the public what occurred seems to have exacerbated the 
situation and built tension between the police and local community. It was 
misreported that Duggan had fired upon police first, leading to a return of fire 
as the cause of death – which appears to have been widely disbelieved by the 
community. 69  Furthermore, the police had also failed to officially inform 
Duggan’s family of his death, resulting in their discovery through a newspaper 
article, which would ultimately motivate the original protest (IPCC, 2011; 
Israel, 2011; HAC, 2011: 5-7; RCVP, 2011: 11; Vasagar, 2011). In turn, later 
reports in newspapers on the 4th and 5th contradicted earlier accounts, stating 
that Duggan had been held down and shot (MPS, 2012: 24 & 29). 
As a consequence, public anger towards the police in Tottenham was 
reported to have increased following the death of Duggan (MPS, 2012: 29; 
RCVP, 2011: 41). Some expressed the view that he had been ‘executed’ by 
police, and others claimed that the gun found at the scene had been planted 
by police (IPCC, 2011; Israel, 2011; MPS, 2012: 29). Signs of resentment 
towards the police and increasing tension began to emerge, with the 
Metropolitan Police Service reporting that on the 5th and 6th of August officers 
near or at the scene of Duggan’s shooting experienced insults and veiled 
threats from the public (MPS, 2012: 34). The Metropolitan Police review board 
stated that police reports from this period “gave a clear indication of raised 																																																								69	This disbelief would be corroborated after the rioting when it was revealed that the bullet 
found wedged in a police radio supposedly fired by Duggan, was a police issue bullet.	
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tensions and anti-police sentiment.” (ibid), however, it was decided that level 
of tension could be addressed by “local police working with the community” 
(ibid: 28).  
On the 6th of August a protest march, motivated by mistrust over Duggan’s 
death and specifically the failure of police to contact the family, walked from 
Duggan’s home on the Broadwater Farm estate to Tottenham High Road 
Police Station, around one mile away (Guardian & LSE, 2011: 16-7; HAC, 
2011: 5-7; MPS, 2012: 22). The march, led by Duggan’s family, friends and 
community representatives, arrived at 17.23 with the Metropolitan Police 
Service estimating around 100 people present; the family left at some point 
around 20.00 hours, shortly before the violence began (Morell et al., 2011: 14; 
MPS, 2012: 32 & 37). However, the initial numbers would increase 
significantly. 
In this context certain interactions occurred between the police and the public 
that seem to have escalated tensions. For instance, during the protest the 
Metropolitan Police did not seek to refute the story or clarify that the narrative 
in the article – that Duggan had fired first – was not their position (MPS, 2012: 
24). Furthermore, those leading the protest perceived that the ranking officer 
at the scene was not senior enough to deal with their complaint (Israel, 2011; 
MPS, 2012: 32; RCVP, 2011: 40). No higher-ranking officer would arrive 
before the family left, leaving protesters feeling disrespected and ignored. 
During the protest barriers were also erected by police outside the station, 
according to police to ‘provide protesters with a designated area’ (MPS, 2012: 
28). However, it is unclear if this was communicated to the protesters. In 
addition, later on police officers would form a line outside the station (RCVP, 
2011: 41), and at some point during the protest riot police took position on 
Tottenham High Road (Reicher & Stott, 2011: 51%).  
Located in the broader context of mistrust and disempowerment of the local 
community, the anger over current situation,70  protestors appear to have 
interpreted these actions as disrespect, resulting in raised tensions. One man 																																																								
70	For	instance,	see	BBC	news	interview	with	two	community	leaders	involved	in	the	protest:	
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZlpSZgy03bE	
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present stated: “still no answers have been delivered. And now it seems like 
the whole objective of today is for [the police] to defend that police station” 
(25, male, black, Tottenham, Newburn et al., 2016b: 7; also see Reicher & 
Stott, 2011: 51%). 
Finally, one seeming situational trigger for the emergence of wide scale 
violence (not acknowledged by the MPS’ report) came when the police 
apparently struck a young woman who was either confronting the police line 
or not moving as the police tried to clear the crowd (Morrell et al. 2011: 15; 
RCVP, 2011: 41; Reicher & Stott, 2011: 51). Although it is not clear at what 
time the police struck the woman, or whether it was only a rumour, news 
spread throughout the crowd and it does seem to been the final catalyst 
enabling rioting to emerge.71  
As with the death of Duggan, this likely formed another act that demonstrated 
the disempowerment of and disrespect shown to the community (in that the 
police could and would exercise violence with legal impunity). Once Duggan’s 
family left the Metropolitan Police report that the situation then escalated 
quickly, and at around 20.20 riot police were under missile attack. The senior 
officer at the scene described his officers as facing “unprecedented levels of 
violence that developed without warning” (MPS, 2012: 42). Of course, what is 
lacking in this discussion is the analysis of actions; for it is here that the power 
relations, experiences, and dispositions are brought into play. 
 
9.3. Starting the Riots in Hackney 
The rioting in Hackney saw large amounts of anti-police action (Kay. 2011; 
Reicher and Stott. 2011: 64%), yet the violence did not emerge from the 
particular context of a protest as with Tottenham. Rather, it seems to have 																																																								
71 Footage of riot police attacking a young, apparently black woman (she is not visible) in 
Tottenham does exist, during which a crowd are shouting at the police to stop. However, it is 
unclear if this was the same incident. Or moreover, when this happened, as it may have 
occurred after the rioting had begun. The reason to suspect this it is nighttime in the footage, 
and the rioting is thought to have started around 8pm, which, in August, should be still 
daylight. See 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YX9qZVsMQP8&oref=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.co
m%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DYX9qZVsMQP8&has_verified=1 
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occurred between police who attempted to close down public access to 
Hackney’s principle high street, Mare Street, and the locally based public who 
were present (MPS, 2012: 64). Thus here we have the case whereby violence 
occurred against the police without any prior group mobilisation over a 
specific issue, providing a different angle at which to examine the perception 
of police, their actions, and the resistance of rioters.  
The majority of violence occurred on the 8th of August in Hackney, north 
London - the third day of the riots (MPS, 2012: 15-7). Although the 
Metropolitan Police state that on the basis of intelligence received violence 
was expected in Hackney, with the exception of some skirmishes, the 7th 
seems to have seen relatively little disorder (MPS, 2012: 52).72 On the 8th 
however, wide spread violence would occur after the Metropolitan Police put a 
strong police presence in the central area of Hackney. Mare Street is similar 
to Tottenham High Road, in that it forms a long and major thoroughfare 
through the centre of Hackney, as well as the principle high street of the area. 
The map below provides the chronologically ordered locations of all the major 
incidents discussed on Mare Street. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
72 The police also cancelled a carnival in Hackney on the 7th located near the youth project. 
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9.3.1 Map of Mare Street Conflict 
 
 
1. The general area where the police assemble and organise, carry out the stop and search, 
and where riot police begin to push south. 
2. First resistance to police by a group of young men. 
3. Vandalism of police cars. 
4. Resistance of young man on side street, direction rioters are pushed who break into a 
Tesco store. 
5. Large crowds display anger and resist police; JD Sports is broken into; first explicit 
clashes between rioters and police. 
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 9.3.2. Confronted by Police 
Although the Metropolitan Police make no mention of their tactics in Hackney, 
for the 8th of August others report the use of: “Aggressive stop and search 
operations in Mare Street, Hackney, on the Monday afternoon, [which] led to a 
confrontation between crowds of commuters and shoppers and riot police” 
(Kay, 2011). We begin with footage of one of these searches and which 
seems to have contributed to the emergence of rioting in Hackney, where a 
group of around 6-8 white police stopped and searched, and apparently 
arrest, two black men in the street (video 1 & 2). 
 
(Video 1 – the stop and search of two black men on Mare Street – point 1 on map) 
 
We join the event after the initial stop has occurred, and can hear and see 
that there are numerous onlookers around as both men are forcibly 
handcuffed and searched. In other footage of the same event, a black man 
passing by stops briefly and accuses the police of already ‘assassinating’ one 
man, referencing the death of Mark Duggan (video 2). The detained men are 
agitated, aggressive, and express what would seem to be exasperation and 
anger towards the police. While the conversation between police and the two 
men is not clear, we hear one man stating: “Arresting me for what? What’s 
your reason for arresting me?” Although we do not know the reasons the 
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police provide for the detainment, it is clear that the men do not understand 
why, believe they are being treated unfairly, and provide partial resistance by 
non-compliance, forcing the officers to cajole and physically move them.  
Here then we see Nassauer’s mechanisms for building tension, ‘spatial 
struggles’, whereby one group is perceived to have unjustly transgressed on 
the other’s space, building tension (2012: 33). Mare Street is both a public 
space, and a place where the men would see themselves as justified in 
utilising. Consequently, the police’s actions serve to refuse them free access 
and demonstrates both their disempowerment and functions as an act of 
disrespect.  
Moreover, space requires social meaning to make transgression possible and 
the response of the black men reveals this meaning. Understood as 
performative, the men’s resistance functions as a refusal of the identity 
imposed upon them – they do not accept the situation of inferior, or the 
police’s capacity to control them in this space. Yet at the same time the 
police’s dominant capacity to exercise force inhibits a fuller achievement of 
their expectations of a positive sense of self – they can reject the ‘authority’ or 
legitimated power of the police, but they cannot overturn the relations by 
which they are dominated.  
 9.3.3. Confronting the Police 
We now move on to an event more directly related to the emergence of 
rioting, which seems to occur principally as a result of the strategy of police 
and the public’s resistance to this. Video 1 shows footage of police gathering 
and organising, some in full riot gear, before beginning to close off Mare 
Street. At this point there seems to be no violence or resistance, however, 
there are plenty of onlookers visible. We then observe riot police pushing 
forward in what seems an attempt to clear the street.  
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(Video 1: The police begin to close off Mare Street – point 1 on map) 
 
Rather than clear the street however, the police end up facing a line of young, 
mainly black men, dressed largely in hoodies and tracksuits (also see video 
2). An ensuing standoff occurs with some taunts from the men; when the 
police try and push forward the men give ground, but not without resistance 
and cajoling. We see some stand, or brace against the riot shields. One of the 
men is seen in brief conversation with a riot officer (see picture), and while the 
conversation is inaudible, the man’s manner is derisive, he nods and agrees 
with what the officer has said in an apparently sarcastic manner.  
 
(Video 1: What appears to be the first confrontation between the police and the public – point 
2 on map) 
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Following this, one officer pushes out sharply with his shield causing most to 
react aggressively but back away slightly. The exception to this is one man 
who stands forward from the others, stating ‘stop pushing me’. He stands 
directly facing the police, bracing against shoves from riot shields. At this 
moment something is hurled at the police from the back of the group causing 
a momentary separation of the two sides. When the police move forward 
again the same man refuses to move whereupon he is struck with a shield.  
 
 
(Video 1: A man resists the push forward by riot police – point 2 on map) 
For Butler (2011), actions are performative in that they constitute a process of 
identification, an act of being that signifies one’s identity to the self and others. 
The police’s actions constitute a performance of the everyday power relations, 
much as we saw occurred with stop and search. Indeed, as with the stop and 
search earlier that day, the police have sought to take control of the space 
and again, the body language of the men who confront the police line, is not 
simply charged, but expresses resentment, hostility, and a lack of fear. These 
power relations and concomitant identity are beginning to be refused. 
These men blur the line between non-compliance and violent resistance, 
particularly the one who ‘squares’ his body to the police shield and accepts 
the aggressive thrust by police. There can be little doubt they are rejecting the 
authority of the police, but they are also beginning to resist the physical 
domination of the police. The police have entered Hackney and sought to take 
control of public space, and have met with those who are beginning to 
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challenge their power. This is a performance of, on the one hand, the rejection 
of an identity in which the young men are compliant, inferior subjects, and on 
the other, of a bubbling up of a positive identity that cannot be expressed in 
everyday relations with police. 
Later footage (video 1) of events at the railway bridge, 100 meters north from 
the confrontation between the men and the riot police, reveal the next step in 
this emerging resistance. This film documents the vandalism of two 
unmanned police cars by a number of men.  
 
(Video 1: The destruction of two unmanned police cars – point 3 on map) 
 
All of those involved in the destruction are again, young men, both black and 
white, dressed in tracksuits and hoodies, some with their faces partially 
covered. One aspect of this video that is interesting is the element of display 
in the vandalism. Although the police are not in shot, it is highly likely, given 
their heavy presence in this area, the two police cars, and their later re-
emergence in this space and beyond, that they were observing.  
The rioters do not quickly and efficiently destroy the cars, but relatively 
unhurried kick and strike the cars with bricks, sticks and dustbins, whilst some 
jump on and kick at the parked car. One implication of this event is that the 
rioters were performing, taunting, and expressing their anger towards the 
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police. The acts of vandalism are also accompanied by cheers from the on-
looking crowd, and at one point in Hackney someone from the crowd shouts 
‘cover you faces’ suggesting a broader support for opposition towards the 
police.  
This is not the only footage of its kind; video 12 show a remarkably similar 
scene that related to the emergence of rioting from the protest in Tottenham, 
and reveal the same casual destruction (MPS, 2012: 32). As in Hackney, we 
see the same demographics and displays, and support from the observing 
crowd. 
 
 
(Video 12: The destruction of an unmanned police car in Tottenham) 
Instead of human targets, in both Tottenham and Hackney police vehicles 
become the first victims of concentrated violence by rioters. These incidents 
occur early on when the emerging rioters still perceive the police as the 
dominant force, and thus are unwilling to challenge them directly. Importantly, 
these form the first performances that do more than demonstrate their 
resentment of authority, but enable the rioters to overcome the sense of 
inadequacy and inferiority produced in their everyday life. The leisurely 
destruction not only refuses power relation, it displays a lack of fear of the 
police. 
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 9.3.4. ‘We Ain’t Moving!’ 
Returning to Hackney, (video 1 & 4) we observe a situation that seems to 
occur both temporally and geographically close to the vandalism of the cars. If 
the chronology is correct, this event occurred after the police retook control of 
the space where the cars were vandalised.73 In this footage, after a charge 
forward by police, followed by officers shouting commands at the public to 
move away, a black man,74 perhaps in his early-to-mid twenties, seems to 
want to fight the riot police.  
 
(Video 1: A man aggressively approaches the police closing off access to Mare Street – point 
4 on map) 
 
The man purposefully approaches the police who have closed off Mare Street 
forcing the public into a side street and is clearly aggressive, walking towards 
them with a threatening posture, before his friend and another man, who tells 
him that it is ‘not worth it’, pull him away. To this the man replies ‘I got 
nowhere to fucking go, blud’. He then turns knocks aside the camera we are 
viewing events through, telling the cameraperson to stop filming him, and 
walks out of shot. 
The next scene (videos 1 & 4) captures two black men, seemingly in their 30s, 
peacefully resisting the closure of part of Mare Street and attempts to move 
them and the crowd. The footage seems to capture the moments after the 																																																								
73 The bus in the background of the picture sits next to the vandalized cars, while we look on 
from a side street. 
74 To the right of the picture, dressed in a black jumper and cap. 
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police had regained control over the area in which two police cars had been 
vandalised, and have now closed off that area of Mare Street, but not long 
before the emergence of wide scale rioting. At one point (video 4) we hear 
someone say to the police: “Do you live here? So, how about we go to your 
ends [area]?”  
After a brief scattering resulting from a push by a police line across Mare 
Street, crowds of people stand around close to the now largely stationary 
police line. The clear impression is that, as with the last clip, they are 
opposing the police closing off the street. Some gesture and large amounts of 
noise is heard from the crowd, while one or two angrily remonstrate with 
officers. At points the video focuses on the two black men who speak to police 
in the line, apparently trying to reason with them, with one putting his hands 
up to reveal his non-violent intent and even offers a hug to an officer. 
 
(Video 9: A man shows his non-violent intentions to a line of riot police on Mare Street – point 
5 on map) 
 
The footage is cut and shows small numbers of police making short charges, 
briefly scattering the crowd. There are no visible attempts to engage in 
violence by the crowd, nevertheless, there is a sense that those in the crowd 
are upset. At some point later in the day, once the rioting has begun, we see 
both men on what seems a side street resisting the police who are attempting 
to clear the street with police dogs. The men are being jostled, pushed, and 
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occasionally struck with shields (videos 1, 2, 3 & 4). The scene is cut and we 
re-join with one of the men alone speaking to the camera. He complains about 
being hit with a truncheon, stating ‘that’s how they is dealing with us down 
here. We ain’t moving!’  
We see the two men in a later scene, now re-united, but more agitated and 
refusing orders by the police to move. They stand in front of a police officer 
and dog ordering them to move, one shouts: ‘Tell me to move! Tell the white 
man to move!’, gesturing towards the (presumably white) cameraman we are 
viewing events through. After being pushed up the street by another officer 
who joins to help, one of the men again complains to the camera that the 
police told them to move and then ‘set the dogs on us’ stating that he has 
been bitten four times as well as hit by the police. The other, at another point 
(video 3) states: 
Half the people in this community have all got a story to tell about 
the fucking police and individual brutality […] So when they come 
out on our streets and try and tell us we must do what we’re told, 
and we’re all together, what the fuck they expect? We ain’t going 
nowhere.   
 9.3.5. Why Resist the Police? ‘what the fuck they expect?’ 
The police, by turning up en masse, by stop and searching the public, and by 
taking formation and pushing forward along Mare Street, not only utilise force 
but perform the everyday power relations and identities with the public. 
Because of this the police repeatedly come up against resistance from the 
public. Ostensibly they were there to prevent a riot; instead they triggered 
one. The question is then, why resist the police’s attempts to take control of 
Mare Street? And why vandalise the police’s cars? Rather than retreat to 
naïve individualistic accounts, we need to understand how the choice to resist 
became plausible and desirable. 
It is important to understand that Mare Street is not just a geographic space, 
but has meaning in relation to the police’s exercise power within that space. 
Space functions implicitly as part of the structure of what can(not) and 
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should(not) be done, and by whom (Merleau-Ponty, 2005: 88; Rizzolatti & 
Sinigaglia, 2008: 70). In other words, ‘acquired’ space upon which we operate 
– as opposed to its geographic foundation – is an expression and outcome of 
social process (Merleau-Ponty, 2005: 114). Its social relevance comes only in 
performative action and the norms expressed through it – who has the right to 
be here, what can be done here, and to whom. The almost immediate, albeit 
partial, resistance from the public in Hackney then, suggests that the police 
should not have been there, and should not be exerting force – this was not 
their ‘ends’ and the role performed by the police, ostensibly to maintain the 
social ‘order’, is refused. 
Indeed, recall the individual who stated to the police ‘how about we go to your 
ends?’ Or similarly, one of the black men refusing to move: ‘they come out on 
our streets and try and tell us we must do what we’re told.’ While we could not 
analyse the situation fully in Tottenham, it is worth noting a piece of footage 
(video 15) that captures a similar resistance by crowd of people hurling 
missiles and chanting ‘Whose streets? Our streets!’ to a line of riot police on 
Tottenham High Road. The perception of many clearly seems to be that the 
police are not legitimate representatives of residents, are keeping an ‘order’ 
that they reject, and have no right to control them in their ‘ends’.  
What this evidence indicates is that it was the police’s presence in 
communities that have rejected their authority, that appears to have 
generated anger and prompted the rioting. Indeed, both Steve and Nick noted 
on seeing the footage that if the police had wanted to prevent rioting – 
assuming it was going to occur – they should not have gone themselves. 
Steve thought they should have sent youth workers, Nick simply questioned: 
“If the police fucked off, would people have gone home?”. 
Of course, it is not just that the police were present, but that their actions are 
performative of identities and power relations. Thus, we must also consider 
the message being sent by the police’s actions. As noted, the police turned up 
en masse, armoured, carried out stop and searches, and preceded to 
forcefully attempt to close off Mare Street prior to any violence occurring. This 
appears to have re-enforced to the residents of Hackney, that the police saw 
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them as morally open to the exercise of force, and were being treated 
unequally: ‘tell me to move, tell the white man to move’ (video 3). 
As we have seen previously, this approach whereby the police act as if 
individuals with certain markers (skin colour, dress style, location) are morally 
open to violence is not uncommon. The police were performing the everyday 
identities, but these everyday roles were those that bring disrespect and 
disempowerment. Watching these interactions, Steve criticised the police 
generally for not being patient and understanding the ‘massive history’; Nick 
stated his concern was for reprisal against the public resisting, that he was 
willing them to get out of the way of the police. When I asked him why, he 
thought that many officers saw ‘these people’ as ‘not part of any society they 
want to belong to’.  
 9.3.6. Build Up and Release 
Simply put, the police’s presence in Hackney was enough to get a negative 
response because of the way people feel they are treated and viewed. In 
addition, the police’s actions reinforced this; performing the disempowered 
and unequal state of residents in their space and constituting another instance 
of ‘disrespect’ by normatively violating of how residents felt they should be 
treated (Honneth, 1995). Thus, the attempt of police to forcefully take control 
of Mare Street, functioned in much the same way as an iconic event – 
connecting back to prior experiences with police, and extending forward 
through an idea of how they felt relations should be.  
Once this connection had been made, each action of the police seemed to 
increase the emotions and energy building up tension, drawing on the 
reservoirs of unresolved emotion and discontent. For instance, recall that 
initially the two black men seen in location 5 resisted the police, but did so in a 
friendly manner. Later they are agitated and angry as each new act of 
disrespect builds and draws on prior experiences of disrespect: ‘Half the 
people in this community have all got a story to tell about the fucking police’ 
(video 3). This is the context that Steve referenced whereby the broader 
context of disrespectful policing and exclusion by society, mixes as instances 
of unfair treatment and inequality, producing anger, ‘building up […] like a 
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bomb case’.  
In other words, this is not ‘criminality’ and it is by no means simple. Rather 
individuals were connecting back to the shame and anger generated through 
instances of social and economic exclusion, and of over-policing. The build of 
emotion that desires action constitutes reaching for a future in which these 
occurrences cannot occur, in which the relations with police are reversed. Of 
course, retaliation cannot come in the everyday ‘cos you know you’ll get 
arrested’ (Maria).  
However, once the first group of young men were not arrested, it was no 
longer ‘the everyday’. The legitimated social order was creaking under the 
pressure of the discontent and anger it produced. As the tension and 
emotional energy built, urging expression, each act of resistance that did not 
end in arrest opened up the pathways for action. The fear of reprisal from the 
‘biggest gang’ was diminishing; the would-be rioters were drawing on their 
anger and becoming empowered.  
In this light, the unmanned police cars enabled the cathartic expression and 
release of the energy implied in shame and anger, through violence. It is this 
moment that the Bourdieusian ‘dispositions’ (2000: 150) produced in the 
everyday social order can be actualized. By vandalising the cars the rioters’ 
resistance rupture the skin of the social order through a subversive 
performance (Butler, 2011) that played out, for the first time, the new social 
order.  
Similar to Ray’s analysis of looting in which “the performativity of violence 
[functions as a] moment of emancipation from shame and the release of 
emotion and energy” (2014: 133), the rioters expressed their anger through 
violence, and in doing so began to articulate a new social hierarchy in which 
the police were below them. Thus the violent destruction of the vehicles was 
performative of these police-public relations more clearly than any other form 
resistance we’ve seen so far. The vandalism explicitly stated to the police, to 
the onlooking crowd, and most importantly to themselves: ‘you cannot control 
us; you have no power over us; and you are not better than us’. Of course, the 
violent resistance did not end with police cars. 
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9.4. The Riot Begins: Looting Against the Police 
The area of Mare Street captured in much of the footage discussed above, as 
far as can be told, is where the widespread rioting in Hackney begins75 
(Reicher & Stott. 2011: 59%). This area, where much of the contention over 
who can legitimately control the space occurs, seems to provide the trigger 
from which violence spreads around Hackney.  
Returning to video 1 & 4, riot police carry out a charge close to the vandalised 
cars on Mare Street, forcing a scattering of the crowd. At some point after this, 
rioters begin to break into a high street store, JD Sports around fifty meters 
away from the police line. Similar to before, all of those actively trying to break 
in are young, male, similarly dressed, and contain both white and black 
individuals.76 
 
(Video 4: Rioters attempt to break into a store on Mare Street in view of riot police – point 5 
on map) 
 																																																								75	Specifically, point 5 on the map appears to be where the resistance finally shifts from 
refusals to move and destruction of vehicles, to violence against the police.	76	Although it is not possible to be certain, the individual in the grey hoody at the front (see 
photo above) appears to have been one of those vandalising the police cars, and also 
present in the first confrontation between a group of young men and riot police.	
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Of course, this does not constitute an act of violence against the police, but to 
assume this is irrelevant potentially misses signs as to why some rioters may 
have attacked police. Vice News (video 2) notes that the police charge split 
the public into two groups. Some are pushed off east into a side street (point 
4), which leads to the local Tesco, and others were pushed south on Mare 
Street (point 5). Both groups ended up breaking into stores. In the footage 
covering JD sports we see the man in the grey hoody take a stool from the 
store and hurl it at police, while those who broke into Tesco were calling for 
individuals to get missiles to attack the police. 
With regards to JD Sports, the police are looking on and the rioters are clearly 
aware of this as they repeatedly look to the right of the frame to where the 
police are positioned. It seems to be the case that they were concerned for 
their own safety from violence or arrest and perhaps a desire to gain material 
goods; however, the danger in not examining actions as expressive and 
performative reveals itself here. For if it was simply pragmatic action aimed at 
material gain, why do it in front of the police?  
One possibility is that the act of breaking the law in direct view of the police, 
constitutes, as McDonald (2012: 20) argues, a symbolic act or a challenge to 
the power and ability of the police to control them. It utilises law, that is the 
rules that constitute the social order, to reveal their rejection of that and 
perform their identity as outside and against it. Thus the act means potentially 
‘you cannot control us’, but perhaps more importantly, ‘we reject your rules 
and order’. 
Indeed, moving outside of Hackney we see other similar examples whereby 
the act of looting is mixed up with confrontations with police. The first piece of 
footage (video 8) covers one end of a narrow high street in Ealing, West 
London, and is filmed from a window situated above the shops. The scene 
begins with perhaps eighteen to twenty rioters walking or slowly jogging about 
the street.  
No police are in shot at this point but it is likely that they are visible to the 
rioters. A number of the rioters seem to occasionally turn their focus as if they 
are checking something, and also shout insults – although it is difficult to tell 
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with the high levels and multiple sources of noise. In particular, one rioter 
seems to shout ‘1,2,3,4,5 cops...’, while another rioter can also be seen 
carrying something (maybe a bottle) out of the frame of the video, when he 
reappears it is gone, seemingly thrown at the police.  
Six rioters then congregate and wait around a high-end electronics retailer 
while one of them begins to strike and kick the window. As the others join in 
kicking at the glass we hear shouting, followed by seven police, some with riot 
gear, charging up the street. The rioters disperse, throw some missiles, and 
keep a safe distance until the charge slows. We see two men perform a 
gesture of raising the arms to their side and shouts of ‘What? What?’ The 
implication of this gesture seems to be, if verbalised, something along the 
lines of ‘What are you going to do about it?’. However, the rioters continue to 
back away and concede the street with little meaningful resistance. 
Video 9 presents a similar scene in which rioters wait and taunt riot police who 
have blocked off a high street in Camden, north London. Superior numbers of 
rioters wait at the crossroads, seeming to want access to the high street, and 
the same gesture of arms raised to the side are made repeatedly. After a 
short while the police make a charge scattering the rioters across the junction, 
however, as before rioters do not ‘flee’ but keep a safe distance. Banging is 
then heard and the camera pans round to the street below our vantage point 
where a number of rioters are attempting to break into a shop, perhaps a 
hundred meters from the police. The attempt does not last long however, as 
the police continue their push and the rioters retreat again.  
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(Video 9: Rioters challenge riot police in Camden) 
 
 9.4.1. Performing Empowerment 
The above examples where rioters attempt to break into high street stores in 
view of the police, also in Clapham (video 10) where riot participants stand 
beside a shop with smashed windows and a few sporadically engage with the 
police, and similar scenes in Birmingham (video 11) 77  reveal the often 
interrelated nature of violence against police and acquisitive acts.  
Interestingly, in all these videos where looters confront the police we see the 
same demographic markers we found with the stereotyping and profiling. 
Almost all are young, male, principally black and white, and wearing hoodies, 
tracksuits and similar. In contrast, a brief view of footage showing acts of 
looting where the police are not present often reveals a greater variety in 
terms of gender, age, and ethnicity.78 In turn, this distinction in demographic 																																																								
77 Birmingham reveals an apparent parallel with Hackney. The rioting appears to start with 
police en masse attempting to clear a central shopping area, resulting in instances of 
resistance through non-compliance, and later in clashes with police and damage to shops. 
78 For example see footage:	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jx-OGUWN_Zo	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ed0QJJL9sYQ	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xsS8kTQkjfE	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1g6lt4UAuOE	http://www.theguardian.com/uk/london-riots+content/video	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i5sqf10GSls	
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markers also is present in terms of type of action performed. Those smashing 
windows, breaking doors, and being the first to enter into shops, generally 
seem to have the same demographic markers as those attacking the police; 
whereas those who seem to wait until others have broken into shops before 
looting, again, often constitute a more demographically mixed group.  
Despite the fact that the primary activity in these clips seems to have been to 
acquire goods, not only were the police attacked with missiles in some, in 
videos 8 and 9 gestures which challenge and offer violence (which we will 
discuss later) are employed. Ultimately alongside breaking the law, these 
gestures – through the offer of violence – signify a lack of fear and reject the 
claimed legitimacy of the police and their use of force (Cloward & Ohlin, 1969: 
2; Hayward & Young, 2007:111).  
To emphasise the police here is not to diminish the importance of the 
motivations to loot, rather, at minimum, what these scenes show is that the 
police were normatively powerless – that the rioters did not care about 
breaking the law. Yet the question arises: if the sole aim was to obtain goods 
then why confront the police at all? Or why attempt to break into shops meters 
from them, and not make an easy escape as soon as they show up? Thus, we 
might go further and argue that the rioters were expressing anger, dislike, and 
derived positive emotions from taunting and challenging the police. In other 
words, by displaying the police’s inability to stop them, and through breaking 
their rules in front of them - in essence, rubbing their faces in it. 
However, we should also recall the police practically and normatively 
representative of the social order that has disempowered and disrespected 
those in communities such as Hackney. The law which the police keep is what 
constitutes the social order in the first instance; thus to challenge the police 
and to break the law, is to perform one’s rejection of that social order. Indeed, 
it is worth noting that around London targets included public buses, private 
cars, media vans, and commercial premises from which looting could not 
occur, such as ‘rich’ boutiques and cafes, carpet and furniture stores, and 
more (Kay, 2011; Moxon, 2011; Reicher & Stott, 2011 64-8%).  
At minimum, what we can say is that in Hackney Tesco and JD Sports were 
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morally irrelevant when it comes the permissibility of violence, and perhaps 
functioned as a preferred target. While motivations may have been pragmatic, 
the rioters also overturned the everyday power-relations in which they are the 
weaker and treated as inferior, and through that action becoming who they 
believe they should be (Butler, 2011; Cloward & Ohlin, 1969: 2; Hayward & 
Young, 2007:111; Honneth, 1995; Merton, 1983; Ray, 2014). 
Importantly, as we have seen in multiple instances of, and data on stop and 
search, rejection of education and its representatives, and of those who hold 
the markers of legitimated society such as myself, this process of resistance 
and identification is performed in the everyday. However, the power relations 
of the everyday, that is the social order, mean this can often only occur to a 
limited extent. Those who take this resistance furthest outside of the rioting, 
are those who identify as criminal and perform crime as a means of 
overcoming disrespect through the rejection of the imposed identities. 
Thus, even when we have those identifying as ‘criminal’ this cannot be 
understood morally and is certainly not ‘simple’, but intertwined with power 
and exclusion, where to break the law produces a positive identity and sense 
of self: “I am here ’cos I’m a criminal man, fucking, that is what I do.” 
(Treadwell et al. 2013: 10). In line with the notion of Butler’s (2011) subversive 
‘performance’, Hayward (2004: 149) argues that deviant behaviours function 
for the agent as liberating, a means of ‘self-transcendence’. The disposition 
produced by exclusion from the social order, but repressed by that order, is 
released from its shackles.  
Their actions reconstruct and demonstrate the new relations of power 
between the two sides, the new social order. Through this performance the 
stigma visited through the everyday, and imposed upon them by police, is 
thrown off as rioters acquire a new and ‘successful relation-to-self’ (Honneth, 
1995: 136). Thus by breaking the law or vandalising property rioters 
performed their empowerment, gain status and self-esteem:  
I am 23, never had no job, been in care […] I got fuck all to lose 
man, fucking Babylon [police] can’t do shit anyway, fuck them. We 
run this town now, not them pricks man, I am gonna take as much 
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as I can get. (looter, in Treadwell et al. 2013: 11) 
When you go down the Jobcentre, they give you this look … It’s 
this sick look. And now I’m like: ‘You think you rule? Look who’s 
ruling now’ (looter in Ray, 2014: 129) 
 
9.5. Violence Against the Police  
9.5.1. Anger and Pleasure 
We now move on to explore the direct use of violence against the police. In 
videos 5 and 6 (both capturing events in the same area and time period)79 we 
see a continuation of the violence in Hackney, however, the rioting has spread 
beyond Mare Street and we find ourselves in a residential estate. The scene 
(video 5) begins with crowds of people milling about a street with some 
vehicles burning and assorted rubble strewn about. Again we see a similar 
demographic make up – principally young men, a mix of black and white 
individuals, and a common style of dress incorporating hoodies and tracksuits. 
As the scene progresses we observe a running and sporadic engagement 
between police and the rioters. The riot police that are present seem to be 
attempting to gain control of a street by employing a tactic where they enact a 
shield charge, back away, before returning charge again (see video 6).  
However, rather than clearing the streets, the rioters seem to toy with police, a 
bit like a game of cat and mouse. The general feeling coming from the scene 
is that the rioters are enjoying it, there is cheering, whooping, and even 
laughing directed at the police. As the police pull back after a charge, the 
rioters respond by enacting their own mock charges. One man places his 
arms in the air either as an offer of violence, or perhaps a sort of celebration 
of victory as the police back away, and we hear applause from some of the 
crowd.  
																																																								
79 Video 14 also captures moments of events in the same area, and the wide spread damage 
caused by confrontations between police and rioters. 
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(Video 6: Rioter raises his arms as the police back away) 
 
In this scene there is little sign of tension, instead, the rioters seemed relaxed 
given the context, and tellingly seem to be enjoying taunting the police. 
Although they are retreating from the police charges, this seems not to be due 
to fear, but is part of the ‘fun’ as they retreat before returning to taunt, cheer, 
and throw missiles. In other words the police’s tactic is ineffective, and the 
rioters seem to be enjoying revealing the police’s impotence.  
Yet we should not assume this is simply about pleasure, indeed given the 
presence of aggressive shouting directed towards police, the use of bricks, 
bottles and similar as missiles, its seems positive emotions are being derived 
from the cathartic expression of discontent or anger. Honneth (1995: 136) 
argues negative emotions such as anger, are produced through the failure in 
interactions to meet normative expectations; conversely positive emotions, 
such as joy, relate to the exceeding of expectations or desires through 
interactions.  
The build up of anger and shame creates or increases the potential for 
positive emotions if the performance can adequately express these drives, 
and in doing so exceed one’s previously negated normative expectations over 
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how you should be treated. Indeed, we see both forms of emotion in relation 
to each other suggesting an ‘existential pursuit’ that overturns prior or 
everyday oppressive relations and conditions (Fenwick & Hayward, 2000: 34). 
By avoiding the police’s charges before returning to taunt them, the rioters 
perform the police’s disempowerment and return the disrespect, releasing 
anger and overcoming shame: “for once they felt like we felt.” (Rioter quoted 
in Tyler, 2013: 197). Through these acts the rioters were no longer the 
underdogs, but dominant: they were “breaking up the police when normally 
the police break us up. Taking shit, we was taking shields from them and 
taking shit. Everyone was happy, I was happy” (rioter in Ray, 2014: 130).  
 9.5.2. Escalating the Violence 
In the next piece of footage we will see a glimpse of a sudden and serious 
escalation in violence. Video 7 captures events at what seems a large junction 
in Hackney, connecting perhaps three roads, again in a similar residential 
area. Although we cannot know for certain, that the police appear in greater 
numbers and in more control, suggests this occurs after the above clashes. 
As we join the shot, an isolated police officer deflects a missile thrown by a 
rioter at close range. In the background numerous other riot police are 
advancing. Bins are overturned in the street and jeering can be heard from 
crowds of observers/rioters in the background and out of shot.  
Again there is the suggestion that riot participants are also experiencing 
pleasure and excitement, although it is not so clear as in videos 5 and 6. As 
the police advance the rioters run, unwilling to directly engage the police, they 
employ missiles and attack or taunt from safe distances, giving the impression 
of a running battle. Unlike the previous scene, with the police now in the 
ascendency the rioters seem unable to play and taunt in the same way. Thus, 
that the rioters keep their distance seems more directly related to staying out 
of harms way. Nevertheless, we should also note that in all these selections 
the rioters are fighting an opponent who is both better armed and less 
manoeuvrable thus suggesting this tactic may be defined by the context, as 
well as concerns for their own safety.  
One interesting incident during this footage occurs when an isolated officer, 
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perhaps unaware of his/her colleagues advancing from behind, makes a dash 
to the right of the camera shot. We hear cheers and laughter the camera pans 
sharply right to reveal that the officer has fallen to the ground. Riot 
participants quickly surround the officer and, from another source of footage 
(video 2), we see the officer was attacked, tripped and kicked while on the 
ground, before being protected by arriving police resulting in the rioters 
dispersing. Unlike the previous scene where rioters only taunted and hurled 
missiles, here we see the clear indication that at least some of the rioters are 
willing to engage in close quarters violence, given the opportunity.  
 
(Video 2: An isolated officer is tripped and attacked while on the ground)80 
 
To note similar scenes, this appearance of vulnerability and escalation in 
violence is also visible in other footage taken outside of Hackney. Video 7 (an 
unknown area) reveals another attack on the police that, while still employing 
missiles alone, feels much more personal and ferocious than the previous 
account. As the police retreat from the attack, missiles are hurled. The body 
language of the rioters in shot also suggests much more adrenaline and 
aggression, and enjoyment and laughter is not observed. We hear shouts of 
‘get at them’ and ‘fuck you’, although it is difficult to understand which group 
they come from. While we do not view the start of the charge, or whether the 																																																								80	The	poor	quality	image	is	due	to	the	camera	moving	quickly	in	video	2,	while	in	video	7	this	
incident	is	only	captured	as	the	officer	is	rescued.	Consequently,	this	was	the	clearest	image	I	could	
garner.	
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police were retreating as a tactical decision or because of the attack, it is 
noticeable that the police are attacked until their retreat ends, at which point 
the attack loses momentum. 
Similarly, in Woolwich, South London (video 12) we also see a police retreat. 
Again, we are at a junction, this time at a major crossroad leading to the 
principle shopping centre of Woolwich; however, unlike the previous footage 
the situation largely seems calm, with the exception of a small number of 
rioters taunting the police. Eight riot police form a line preventing access to 
the road that we, as the viewer, are positioned above. Further past the police 
are a significant number of people occupying the junction.  
Perhaps what is most interesting in this clip is that the dynamic suddenly 
changes when the police begin an unforced retreat whilst holding a line 
formation. Clearly energised by the police’s actions we hear sudden and large 
increase in shouting from rioters, accompanied by the arrival from off screen 
of even more riot participants, perhaps thirty to forty in all, hurling planks of 
wood, road signs, and metal objects at the hugely outnumbered police.  
 
(Video 12: The retreating police suddenly come under attack) 
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 9.5.3. Violence as Politics 
As with the failure of police to arrest those resisting in Hackney prior to the 
rioting, the fall and retreats make violence a plausible path to release their 
anger and overcome shame, as the rioters realise the police’s capacity to 
exercise dominant force is diminished. As Ray argues, rioters enacted 
“performative violence [in order] to produce [a] social transformation by 
staging rituals of confrontation” (Ray, 2014: 128).  
The fall or weakness of the officer creates a sudden shift or escalation that 
can be utilised to achieve an end that otherwise remained elusive. As they 
kicked the fallen enemy, chased the retreating police, rioters sent the 
message and realised themselves that they were stronger, that they could 
hurt the officer: “now I’m like: ‘You think you rule? Look who’s ruling now’ 
(rioter in Ray, 2014: 129). Thus the opportunity is not mindless violence or 
immoral ‘criminality’, but a performative act (Butler, 2011) that re-establishes 
self-worth through demonstrating to the ‘biggest gang’ that they are no longer 
on top. 
The rioters’ resolution utilises violence because, on the one hand, long-term 
disempowerment and disrespect has shaped other routes, such as political 
action, as irrelevant to ‘social transformations’. While on the other, violence 
not only enables the release of energy tied up with anger, it achieves 
domination over another individual and thus “cures the oppressed of their 
ingrained feelings of inferiority” (Palshikar, 2005: 5431). In other words, with 
action within the legitimated political or social spheres pre-reflexively 
excluded, to express and overcome their discontent, violence becomes the 
only ‘effective means of struggle’ (Lapeyronnie, 2009: 38). 
However, without the articulation of Politicised identities and projects that 
seek to re-organise power, this form of resistance can only be temporary. 
Indeed, that rioters did not follow through on retreating police once they 
halted, may be related to the fact that these acts, while collective, constitute 
individualised forms of resistance. The violent display had achieved what 
each individual was driven to – a position of dominance and control of the 
space – while any further attack against a better-armed opponent risked 
	 281	
injury, the loss of dominant position and identity, and thus shame. 
 
9.6. Gesturing to the Police 
The notion of performativity posits that “everyday gestures are [cultural 
performances] because they signify everyday identity to others and for 
ourselves” (Chambers & Carver, 2008: 43). While actions are practical but 
have symbolic meaning, gestures directed at the police are explicitly 
communicative of their meaning. Thus, gestures perhaps can be even more 
informative of the relational identities and power relations being acted out in 
that moment. Indeed, as we have noted, in all the above footage where rioters 
clash with police, we see gestures being made as taunts. While these 
gestures take different forms, the meaning is generally the same. For 
instance, we often see rioters raise their arms and use their fingers to beckon 
the police to ‘come on’; similarly we also see rioters more specifically make a 
boxing stance when facing the police, although they do not then attack 
(videos 6 & 7).  
Yet perhaps the most telling gesture is where a rioter raises their arms to the 
side making a cross shape with their body and shouts “What? What?’. In each 
of these gestures the meaning functions to challenge the police to come and 
try to stop the rioter. In Hackney (video 6) rioters gesture and taunt the police, 
we hear shouts of ‘What? What? What?’, and we see one briefly make a 
cross with their body. Once the police commit to a short charge the rioters 
move out of range, and then continue to taunt the police.  
In video 7,81 one man faces off directly in front of the police line, repeatedly 
makes a partial raising of the arms,82 bouncing on his feet and shouting 
‘What? What?’. He is also observed later, alone in front of the now advancing 
police, making a boxing stance before running at the last minute. In Ealing, 
west London (video 8) two rioters make this gesture but keep their distance 
from the slowly advancing police, again shouts of ‘What? What?’ is heard. In 																																																								81 This is an unknown location in London.	
82 The partial raising of the arms appears to be due to the close proximity to the police, and to 
expose himself too much would truly make him vulnerable. 
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Camden, north London (video 9) we see a number of rioters make a similar 
gesture as the police block off the high street. In Woolwich, south London 
(video 12) two individuals raise their arms and taunt the police line whilst 
keeping just out of striking range and again the same shout is heard. Later, 
once the police retreat slows, the rioters slowly drop off and one rioter again 
makes the gesture to the police.  
 
(Video 7: A rioter mimics a boxing stance to advancing police) 
 
When I asked Nick and Steve what this gesture meant they indicated it was 
an offer of violence and a challenge to ‘come and have a go’. However, while 
it might be employed to start violence, we can point out that these gestures or 
displays constitute taunts or challenge the police to ‘stop me if you can’. As 
Nick pointed out, they were ‘taking the piss’. In each case the rioter does not 
confront the police but backs away or stays just out of range, likely because 
the latter is better armed and organised. Thus, there is recognition that the 
rioter cannot completely overturn the power relations, but the gesture does 
reveal the police’s inability to utilise their dominant position.  
The gesture further performs the rioter’s lack of fear of the police83 – thus 
referencing back to prior relations in which fear and thus dominance is the 
norm. Intertwined in this, the gesture also functions as an act of disrespect 
																																																								
83 Running from the police, of course, may indicate that they are actually afraid, however, the 
important point is not whether rioters actually felt fear – which we cannot know – but that they 
are seeking to display a lack of fear.  
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towards the police, both diminishing the police’s power and authority, and 
saying – despite the refusal to engage in close quarters violence – ‘you are 
not better than us’. In other words, the gesture is not simply an offer of 
violence or a challenge. Rather, like the game of cat and mouse we saw 
earlier, it is a performative act of overcoming the police by displaying a lack of 
fear and the police’s disempowerment.  
 9.6.1. This is Personal: Performative Resistance in 2011 
Importantly, this functions as an individualised form of resistance because the 
change achieved is momentary and for the self. Indeed, we can better 
understand this through a contrast with a similar, but Politicised action from a 
different riot/protest. The woman pictured below is being hit by a water 
cannon, taken from the Taksim protests in Turkey,84 while the photo next to 
her portrays a rioter from 2011 making the now familiar gesture. 
 
(A female protester in Turkey and a rioter in Ealing (video 8) make a similar gesture towards 
police) 
In both these pictures we see the same cross shape being made, but the 
performative meanings contain important differences. In each case the offer of 
the body for violence is made, implying that the individual resisting does not 
fear the police, and that their authority is de facto, rather than de jure. 
However, the woman accepts the violence of the police; on the other hand, 
the man is in the process of backing away from the police (just out of shot).  
																																																								
84 Taken from The Times of Israel: http://www.timesofisrael.com/turkish-police-retreat-from-
gezi-park-as-protesters-pour-in/ 
			
Image Removed 
due to 
copyright.bmiss 
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The purpose with the woman’s display is Political. It appears the aim is to 
contrast the police’s use of violence with her non-violent stance, and thus she 
opens her body to physical harm. Her gesture functions as a symbolic 
challenge to be read by society. It calls for social and political change by 
revealing the domination in the social order; and it exposes the police as 
oppressors through their illegitimate use of violence. On the other hand, the 
man, as with the other rioters described, seems to use the gesture as a form 
of disrespect by issuing a challenge to the physical power of the police. He 
does not accept harm to himself for the symbolic meaning this generates, but 
offers his body to perform their inability to exercise force or control over him. 
In other words, while the woman’s action seeks long-term change to the 
power relations that will impact others than her self, the man seeks change in 
his personal relation to the police and to cause emotional harm to the police.  
Consequently, while the origin of the discontent in both cases is clearly 
Political as they both challenge the legitimacy of the power being exercised 
over them, the difference seems to be that the rioters’ gesture in 2011 
contains no Political message or purpose. This suggests that for the rioters 
there is no ‘semantic bridge’, no race or class based identity, that adequately 
enables the expression of their affective drive, or cognitively connects the 
discontent of the different actors to create a collective identity (Honneth, 1995: 
163). Of course, the apparent paradox is that this individualised resistance 
came through collective acts of violence. 
9.7. Individualisation and Proto-Politicisation  
As we have seen in the discourses of rioters there was a collective identity or 
an ‘us’ emerging through a common opposition to the police in 2011. 
However, what is largely absent in contrast to the 1980s riots is a pre-existing, 
structural based and collective identity. That is while there were some 
mentions of being ‘black’ or ‘working class’, these did not appear to function 
Politically, and did not unify rioters around a common cause and complaint. 
While these individuals shared common socio-economic positions and thus 
experiences of exclusion, particularly of negative interactions with police, the 
collective identity appears to have emerged and overcome other divides 
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through the revelation of a common anti-police position. This can be 
supported by footage where we see evidence for an emerging social identity 
through a realisation of a common cause.  
Indeed, we can view the emergence of the social identity through the 
development of the situation in Hackney. The small group of young men 
(video 1) provides the first recorded instance of collective resistance, 
however, most people present are simply observing the spectacle. Later, a 
large crowd gathers to observe the vandalism of the police cars. Some are 
journalists and we might suppose some are there for the spectacle, however, 
some of whom are now beginning to vocalise support for the vandalism.  
After the police push forward and re-take this space we see more individuals 
resisting and remonstrating with police; again this largely appears as 
individualised resistance from those wishing to express their anger. 
Nevertheless, there are more and more people joining in the resistance. At 
point 5 on the map particularly, we see large groups beginning to line up in 
front of the police line. The people present appear to be realising their 
common opposition and numbers, facilitated by more and more individuals 
displaying their opposition and anger. In turn, as it becomes clear with each 
instance that the police are not in control, so more individuals become 
emboldened as the possibility of opposing the police becomes increasingly 
plausible.  
Videos 5 & 6 taking place after the outbreak of violence in Hackney show a 
large number of people who have joined together in a common opposition to 
the police. It would be reasonable to expect that this larger group is made up 
from smaller friend groups; nevertheless, given the size it is likely that many 
are strangers to each other. During the conflict we can hear shouts or 
snippets of conversation from the crowd, such as calling the police ‘fucking 
wankers’ and ‘fuck the feds’, along with a few more strategic statements such 
as ‘push them back’, and ‘... if everyone comes together ...’.  
Yet despite the common aim and common perception of the police, and the 
strategic statements from the crowd, the tactics of the rioters seem to be 
largely uncoordinated. Instead, the nature of the resistance appears to be 
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defined by the actions of the police and the individuals’ pleasure in taunting 
them. No serious attempt is made to push the police out of the area or 
overrun them; rather the rioters enjoy taunting and avoiding the police 
charges, before returning to hurl missiles and repeat. Indeed, in no other 
footage I observed did rioters push their advantage. Instead, the interaction 
serves to satisfy the expressive and performative needs of the rioters’, which 
could be achieved without risking injury through close combat. 
Indeed, contrasting the development of events of 2011 to accounts from the 
1980s is revealing. The actions of the rioters could be more organised, driven, 
and purposive. In Bristol in 1980 (Ball, 2012) rioters actually succeeded in 
running the police out of the area. While in Brixton’s first riots in 1981, rioters 
built barricades and fought off police advances, preventing them taking control 
of the central area (Waddington, 1992: 82).  
Perhaps most telling, however, is the ease and regularity with which collective 
resistance emerged. Unlike the gradual build up in Hackney in 2011, Keith 
(1993: 29 & 130) notes that in the 1980s resistance in Brixton would often 
occur if the police were pursuing a subject through the area or carrying out a 
stop and search. Similarly, in Hackney in the 1980s, police raids, a heavy 
police presence, stop and searches, and arrests all ran the risk of generating 
conflict with residents, with the police often losing those they are seeking to 
arrest to the hostile crowd (ibid: 143). Ball (2012: 236) similarly reports that 
crowds regularly formed in St. Paul’s to protest police arrests, and sometimes 
intervening. 
What made this spontaneous and collective form of resistance possible was 
the pre-existing and structural identity that grouped potential strangers 
together. Through a notion of ‘black’ identity and common cause, particularly 
in relation to an oppressive police force, individuals knew what side they were 
on before anything had happened. It was the clear situation of racist 
discrimination and domination that shaped race as a modality of resistance 
against racism (Hall et al., 1980: 347).  
As we saw in Sheldon Thomas’ (2012) individualised acts of resistance, the 
awareness of racism enabled rival gangs to join together quickly when the 
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chance to attack the police was presented to them. Thus, in 1980s Hackney 
the ‘common sense’ position was ‘blue versus black’ the police were 
oppressive of the black community and ‘in a conspiratorial alliance with the 
malevolent state’ (Keith, 1993: 124 & 38). In 2011, the common sense 
position seems to have been the police were a malevolent force, but the 
unification of groups and individuals against the police was something 
surprising and inspiring, constituting the formation of a proto-Political moment: 
I also remember clearly people ‘Stick together, stick together' 
against the police … It was like people didn't know each other but 
they were in a team. (Mother, 22, London, Prasad(f), 2011) 
no one was really concentrating too tough who's going through the 
ends, who's that or where this persons that's from, they just 
concentrating on the feds, that's all. Unity, yeah, that's what I'd call 
it, unity (Newburn et al. 2011). 
In other words, the violence seems to have revolved around a shared 
disposition to overturn relations with police and get ‘revenge’, rather than a 
Political understanding or cause. As with the game of cat and mouse in 
Hackney, and the destruction of police cars in which rioters demonstrated the 
impotence of the police, any Political goal was lacking. The performance was 
for themselves and the police; to overturning relations of disrespect and 
disempowerment and, if only for a moment, be on top of the hierarchy. 
However, as each individual performed this resistance the symbolic message 
was transmitted: ‘unity’. Rioters began to realise the their common cause, of 
belonging, and the possibility of empowerment through “acting together in a 
way that they rarely can’” (Arendt, 1970: 83). 
 
9.8. Conclusion 
While some have argued that a situational analysis can explain violence in 
itself, this can only result from a neglect of the complexity of structure and its 
role in creating agency. Rather, what I have sough to do is utilise the situation 
of the riots to support and advance the perspective developed through 
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evidence on the riots and the broader social processes and context that this 
led us to.  
The first and clearest finding was that in Hackney, Tottenham, and in some 
other locales, the police were not simply in the way of rioters, but a focus of 
anger and violence. In Tottenham the conflict emerged from the context of the 
death of Mark Duggan, and mistrust of the police. While in Hackney, the 
police’s arrival and actions were interpreted as hostile and illegitimate, and 
resulted in escalating tensions and anger. Such interpretations and acts of 
resistance cannot be understood by labels of criminality, nor can they be 
framed as consumeristic, but as we have shown require an understanding of 
how experiences of disempowerment and disrespect shaped the plausibility 
and desirability of violent action. 
Situating the police and rioters’ actions in this context, the resistance became 
comprehensible as performative acts that drew on reservoirs of discontent. 
Rioters displayed a rejection of the police and their authority, challenged 
power relations, and further opened up the plausibility of violent resistance. 
Whether it was the destruction of police property, the transgression of law in 
front of the police, taunts and challenges to mock the police, or direct uses of 
violence against them, rioters sought to reverse the social order’s organisation 
of power. 
This resistance was driven by emotions that stretched backwards into a 
history of social and economic exclusion and police profiling, through the 
moment in 2011, and reached forward to a state of relations and a sense of 
self, in which the shame could no longer occur. Rather than criminality this 
was Political. Anger from unresolved shame drove individuals to resist, to 
carry out acts that were both cathartic and performative.  
One of the most telling signs during the riots was that of a common gesture of 
making a cross with the body. As a performative act, the gesture played on 
the power relations it emerges from; the police as formally dominant were 
offered the body of the rioter precisely because the police were unable to stop 
the rioters who hurled missiles and kept out of range of the less mobile police.  
However, rather than seeking to reorganise the social order in the long term, 
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and to make a Political claim against the police as the Turkish protester did, 
rioters in 2011 only sought to demonstrate the police’s impotence. Thus, as 
with the game of cat and mouse and the use vandalism to taunt the police, 
what was achieved was a momentary experience, in which power roles were 
reversed for the individual. 
Importantly, this is not to criticise the rioters. Rioters’ were not immoral or 
mindless, but disposed to act in a subjectively rational way to overcome the 
disrespect experienced. In much the way those empowered engage in the 
political sphere to achieve a desirable state of relations. Firstly then, this 
analysis demonstrates that as with all forms of resistance, Political and even 
political, each instance emerges from discontent generated through the 
organisation of power. Similarly, each draws on these prior experiences and 
seeks to bring about a desired ‘future’. The difference then, is not in the moral 
permissibility imposed by those in power, but in possibilities of action found in 
the necessary scene of agency, and in the effectiveness and impact of these 
particular forms of action.  
Moreover, the ineffectiveness of individualised resistance in realising a more 
permanent reorganisation of power is, like shame and anger, something 
produced by the social order. Responsibility, if we are to locate it, lies with 
those who seek to maintain and expand their privileges, and with it the 
disadvantages that produce so toxic a result. For if individuals are unable to 
understand the structural cause of their discontent, they unable to challenge 
the privileged. This may be an advantage for those empowered, but it signals 
the death knell for democracy. 
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10. Resisting Neoliberalism: 
The Youth Project in Hackney 
 
10.1. Learning through Success 
Thatcher’s moral condemnation of rioters in 1981 and Cameron’s remarkably 
similar statement of ‘criminality, pure and simple’ (Cameron, 2011) three 
decades later, represent a problem that permeates modern British society. 
The discussion thus far has been to bring together the contribution of this 
thesis in extrapolating the relations that are both concealed and shaped by 
neoliberalism’s individualistic logic and practice, and providing an alternative 
account of why individuals have been attacking the police.  
The task of exposing and understanding the causes of resistance to the social 
order is the first step in resolution. However, as the complexity of topics 
discussed in the thesis suggests, this problem is not one that is easily 
resolved. The benefit of an improved understanding of riotous actions as 
symptoms of social breakdown can only come through the understanding it 
enables of alternative forms of resistance.  
I had originally sought out the youth project in Hackney as a means to 
understand why young people had engaged in rioting. However, the project 
did not connect me to rioters, and while it did teach me of the social and 
economic context of rioters it did more than just reveal the impact of 
exclusion. Instead, insight gained at the project often came due to the 
observation of their successes. Through these successes I began to 
understand not only the problems the youth project sought to deal with at an 
affective level, but how these might be overcome. In other words, the project 
revealed the social failure through its successful resistance to it. This is not to 
say the project has created the perfect means of resisting exclusion, for 
through engagement with the types of resistance occurring in the riots, I also 
began to see what the project lacked to develop their form of resistance 
further. What follows constitutes a preliminary discussion on practical 
solutions revealed by the research. 
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10.2. The Affective Project, School, and Home 
Improvements in relations between the police and excluded groups would 
clearly benefit society and those over-policed. However, the conflict with 
police is an effect of power; without resolving the underlying exclusions this 
method will only limit the damage caused. Disempowered and disrespected 
groups will likely always clash with the police in some form due to the cyclical 
relations of exclusion, stereotyping, and resistance. Rather, as we have seen, 
the two key areas in which change could be made are education and 
employment. This is of course, nothing new, but it is how the youth project 
approaches the problem that is both most telling and constructive. 
The youth project states in its pamphlet that they aim “to bridge the gap 
between disadvantage [sic] youth and the rest of society”. While the project 
does not spend much time seeking to explain or articulate this ‘gap’ in 
anything other than a rudimentary form, through my observations of their 
practice it is clearly relates to the affective disposition to engage. In other 
words the project seeks to take young people, often from the difficult 
underprivileged backgrounds we have discussed, and produce the disposition 
(Bourdieu, 2000), that is the value in and capacity, to engage in the 
legitimated practices of education and employment.  
The education of young people has for a long time, and arguably still is, 
conceptualised in terms of knowledge accumulation by students who are 
understood as passive receptacles, while emotions as both underpinning 
knowledge and creating motivation have been neglected (Beckmann & 
Cooper, 2005: 485; Fobes & Kaufman, 2007; Race, 2006: 5-9).  
Many of those who attended the youth project were young people who had 
not only disengaged from, but were actively rejecting education due to 
repeated experiences of disrespect. As we have seen previously, this 
disadvantage begins at home when parents lack the educational capital or 
time to help their children, or indeed, involve more serious issues that result in 
neglect. Thus the youth project cannot afford to simply be a youth club, but 
must also take over some functions of education and the home if it is to 
successfully help young people ‘bridge the gap’.  
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Although the project articulated its goals in direct and simple terms, the 
workers’ knowledge and practice constituted a nuanced understanding based 
on experience with excluded and angry young people. In Bourdieusian terms, 
what the project aimed to develop were legitimated forms of cultural capital 
(drive to, and achievement of, ‘good’ educational practice and qualifications); 
in Butlerian (2004) terms, the project sought to reposition individuals in 
relation to the social order’s power relations, that they may take on and 
perform identities through them, rather than in opposition. Simply put the 
project seeks to empower the young person, to give them agency to achieve 
for themselves, and by doing so shape the individual to and through positive 
affective experiences in education and employment. 
 10.2.1. Security & Safety 
Outside of the project, many of the young people experienced situations in 
which they felt judged as inadequate, either in school, at home, by police, or 
even in the competitive world of the streets whereby small missteps or failures 
to respond in the appropriate manner, may result in a loss of reputation. 
However, shame not only impacts during the negative experience, but as 
argued, we also develop a pre-emptive response whereby actors anticipate 
and avoid situations that might cause shame (Scheff, 2000: 97).  
If one’s experiences with authority figures or representatives of the legitimated 
order are repeatedly negative, then each new interaction with one of these 
individuals represents a possibility for shame, disposing them to close down. 
Thus, young people at the project become defensive and mistrustful, as was 
evidenced by their reaction to my researcher identity as a white, middle class 
man from a university. When I was present at the project young people, 
particularly the elder teens, repeatedly displayed suspicion and mistrust. Early 
on I drew suspicious whispers – ‘who’s that guy with the big hair’ – and looks 
and saw young people withdraw in my presence.  
In one instance, I played a game of pool with a young black boy of around 11-
12, who would not speak to me for the entire game. Indeed, he had not really 
wanted to play me but the system was ‘winner stays on’, and he was next in 
line. The impression I got was that the young people were worried that 
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refusing to play against me might reflect badly upon them, by suggesting they 
were afraid of me. Whatever the case, the young people closed down in order 
to avoid any potentially problematic interactions, were unsure of my purpose, 
and based on prior experiences and narratives, expected negative judgement 
from me. This not only limited potentially shameful interactions, but by 
performing their rejection of me they were displaying my inability to make 
them feel shame and thus disempowering me before I could do so to them.  
What was particularly interesting for myself, despite the difficult context, was 
that I was essentially experiencing a role-reversal of my time in compulsory 
education. My experience was different, growing up as I did in a white working 
class area in the Midlands. Nevertheless, I did see parallels. For instance, I 
recall closing down and refusing to engage in class, because if I tried I might 
look stupid, but if I refused the teachers’ ability to judge me, ‘took the piss’ and 
acted up, it became my choice to fail and I could gain esteem from peer 
approval. Thus I acted out, insulted teachers and broke the rules in order to 
disempower those adults who might shame me, and to establish self-worth 
through accessible and plausible practice. 
As we have seen, this mistrust and insecurity inhibits engagement in the 
legitimated forms of practice and capital. Yet, despite the young people’s 
reaction to me the youth project had managed to diminish this tendency to 
shut down and instead enable young people to engage. The first step was 
providing a feeling of security. When talking to Steve about his youth work in 
Tottenham, he thought that the first and most important role was simply to 
provide a safe space for young people where they can socialise off the 
streets. Once this is achieved, ‘then you can think about education and other 
things’.  
Part of providing a safe space is to simply give young people somewhere 
away from the dangers and temptations young people face on the street, but it 
also is about producing a feeling of security that removes the anticipation of 
shame, and thus underpins and enables achievement of a positive sense of 
self. The youth project in Hackney did just this in the small property it utilised. 
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As with Steve, Lim85 explained that “the first thing you gotta realise is that [the 
project] is a youth club, so it’s like a place where everyone just come together, 
talk to each other, just play games together, interact with one another”.  
The project’s main room was a simple space where young people hung out 
with their friends. They could play on the X-Box, pool table or table tennis, sit 
and play board games, or simply talk and hang out. Indeed, this space was 
almost always a hive of activity when I was there as young people ran about, 
shouted and laughed, and sometimes argued. What was clear in the chaos 
was that they were relaxed. 
Unlike the streets (and for some even the home) where there exists the 
potential for violence and shame,86 first and foremost the project enabled 
young people to feel free to express themselves. There was no threat of 
violence or signs of tension during my time there (other than relating to myself 
or other outsiders). In part, this was likely due to the no-nonsense, but caring 
attitude of the workers, particularly Jane and Ray who were among the elder 
workers. However, it was also due to working with the young people and 
showing them that you can interact without shame forming an ever-present 
and unspoken threat. 
Jane told me young men often act aggressively when they first attend, 
seeking to assert their dominance. The problem, according to Jane, is that 
dominance and aggression is used to cover insecurity and prevent attacks on 
the self. By seeking to establish dominance, the individual is performing the 
power relations and identity that protects them and disempowers others. The 
first call for Jane or the workers is to stop the behaviour by talking or spending 
time with the individual. What is stressed is not simply that they will not 
tolerate that behaviour,87 but that it is not needed, as no one will seek to harm 
them. The point is to make the individual feel safe, realising that, on the one 
hand aggressive behaviour does not achieve dominance, but also that they 																																																								85 Lim: Black male, early twenties, former attendee, now volunteered at the project and 
worked as a music promoter, had been in gangs when younger. 86 Such as from the police, drug related or area/post code related feuds. 87 Although this depends on the individual in question - for those most aggressive and angry, 
rules are not set down hard and fast as this tends to prompt resistance.  
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are not under threat at the project.  
Indeed, the success of building this sense of security is found in the reference 
to the project being like a family, which came up a number of times, or Jane 
being called ‘aunty’. The project also functioned to replace some roles and 
provisions normally supplied by nuclear family structure. The most obvious 
was that of cooking a hot meal each evening for any that wanted it. This 
provision functioned to support working parents who may not have the time, 
and for more serious situations where young people could not always get this 
at home due to issues such as drug addiction, or simply a lack of money. 
10.2.2. Trust and Support 
Similarly, the youth workers provided advice and support for any personal 
issues the young people might face. In part this functioned pragmatically to 
give help to young people who might have nowhere else to go, or prevent 
unnecessary involvement with crime and violence. However, tied in with this 
was the cultivation of positive relationships and emotional connections 
between worker and attendees. Young people felt comfortable coming to 
them and saw them as someone who would listen and respect them. From 
what I saw during my time at the project, the fact that the young people were 
taken seriously was a part of what translated the workers’ power in that space 
into legitimate authority. 
For instance, I repeatedly saw young people speak to selected workers about 
issues they had. On one occasion some of the teenage boys had an issue 
with another boy at school over an issue of disrespect. Although it was 
unclear as they were not speaking to me, from what I could grasp violence 
was expected from the young man, and the group thus felt they should 
retaliate first. This is potentially a serious issue due to the possibility of an 
escalation in the seriousness of the violence.  
Not only did the project run classes that sought to show how such escalation 
might occur, during my time living in Haringey I have overheard on more than 
one occasion, young men talking of ‘shanking’ or stabbing others for similar 
acts of disrespect. While I cannot comment on whether the young men I 
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overheard had real intent or were simply talking, the important point to note is 
that this call to utilise violence, sometimes deadly force, in response to 
disrespect is common. However, the boys at the project took this issue to Lim 
to discuss how to handle it, because they trusted and respected him. As far as 
I was aware, the issue was resolved without violence. 
Similarly, Jane has also attended court, dealt with police, and spoke on behalf 
of a number of young people who had been arrested, including Mark.88 The 
reason young people could go to Jane was because the combination of 
strength, support, and respect she treats them with:  
They feel comfortable approaching her, cos she can tell them, ‘look 
what you done is right, what you done is wrong. I’ll help you out, 
I’m not against you, however, try to fix your problem’. And she’ll 
show them how to (Lim speaking of Jane) 
Problems may also be relatively ordinary, but for disadvantaged children 
these can escalate due to the lack of adults willing or able to help the children. 
When young people have more serious on-going issues and troubles, for 
instance at home, the project also takes up the role of social worker. The 
project will assign one of the workers as a ‘mentor’, who will focus on that 
young person and give them someone to talk to, visit them at home, and 
importantly, in contrast to the state, provide a trusted adult to intervene or 
mediate for them.  
The point in noting this is not to simply highlight that young people had access 
to advice and assistance from experienced individuals, sustenance they might 
otherwise lack, or indeed simply a place off the streets. What is important to 
highlight is the affective impact of these relations and provisions; that the 
young people felt cared for, secure, and had positive relations with adults. The 
result is two-fold: firstly, such relations resist the disrespect felt from 
legitimated society, but also opens the possibility that self-worth can be built in 
spite of the disadvantages these young people faced.  
  																																																								88	Mark: black, male, early twenties, former attendee, later volunteered at the project.	
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10.2.3. Self-Esteem and Positive Identities 
The project operated on this logic: that the feeling of being cared for, 
emotionally rewarded, and respected is foundational to any attempt to prevent 
the rejection of legitimated society. If young people are able to let their guards 
down, to open themselves to judgement from adults without fear of shame, 
and thus receive rewards for success, they can begin to build aspirations and 
positive identities through legitimated society.  
This is perhaps the simplest, but paradoxically most neglected, point in the 
passive understanding of education. The youth project enabled young people 
to have what Robertson (2002: 76) calls ‘mastery experiences’. This is the act 
of carrying out a practice and generating a sense of achievement through, on 
the one hand being socially rewarded; and on the other, a feeling they are 
good at something. And so it is through the affective responses to good 
practice that a sense of self-worth and a positive identity can be attached to, 
and generated through the legitimated social order. 
My time at the youth project demonstrated the importance of this relation 
through to the visible success they were having. This positive and affective 
reinforcement was observable in simple interactions, such as workers helping 
attendees with homework. The workers sought to empower the young person 
to achieve the goal themselves, guiding them with the process and enabling 
them to achieve it themselves. Furthermore, the young person was not put 
down for failing or struggling but encouraged to continue, and was rewarded 
with praise for their achievement.  
However, perhaps the most telling incident I observed came when I was 
standing in the foyer chatting to Lim and Polly. A young white woman, aged 
around 16, walked in and proclaimed excitedly ‘I got an A’. Both Lim and Polly 
reacted with genuine excitement and pleasure, much like one might expect 
from a parent, and hugged and congratulated her. The young woman then left 
to tell others in the project, at which point Polly turned to me smiling and told 
me that when the young woman had first come to the project she had been 
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failing in school and was getting involved in drugs and gangs.89  
Simply put, the fact that adults were showing they cared, giving emotional 
reward for achievement, while at the same time not shaming young people if 
they struggle, was developing aspirations within the legitimated society. 
Education was being shaped as something not simply ‘boring’ and potentially 
shameful, but enabling a process of positive identification through ‘good 
practices’ and self-esteem. 
More than simply facilitating social reward and respect, by enabling young 
people to carry out educational practice themselves workers at the project 
were also empowering young people by enabling them to act and generate 
mastery experiences. While Arendt’s notion of power is to ‘act in concert’, this 
is underpinned by the capacity to act (Arendt, 1970: 44). The belief in one’s 
capacity to act is essential for self-worth and a fundamental aspect of a sense 
of achievement; without it one can have no confidence in the self-in-the-world. 
In other words, the distinction between teaching, on the one hand as the 
passive absorption of knowledge, and on the other as enabling the student to 
act efficiently, is one that relates to empowerment and the self-esteem and 
shame nexus.  
The joy of the young woman was not simply a factor of social esteem 
provided by the workers, but a joy stemming from her own capacity to act in 
ways she thought not possible. She had gone from failing in educational 
practice, to succeeding – an act of performance by which she became 
someone in control, someone capable. It is through this process that the 
youth project was enabling young people to have aspirations within the 
legitimated system: “we try to build that confidence up for them to actually say 
to themselves, ‘yes I wanna do this’” (Lim).  
 10.2.4. Role models 
As we have already noted with the youth workers, and particularly Jane, the 																																																								89 From what Polly mentioned, this appeared to be the young girl Lim had spoken about in 
our interview who had given up on education, due to pressures at home and school, and 
begun to get involved in crime. However, I did not seek to confirm this with Lim as he had 
been unwilling to identify her previously. 
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adults provided role models for the young people who were within the 
legitimated system. Similarly, for Steve there was a general absence of adults 
within the legitimated system for young people to look up to. Instead, as we 
saw previously, drug dealers who can afford fast or flashy cars are often the 
ones admired and emulated. 
Yet workers at the youth club were clearly admired and respected by the 
young people there. This was visible in the behaviour of young people in the 
examples already provided, such as by seeking them out for advice, and 
telling workers of their successes and thus seeking their approval. Simply the 
fact that all the workers were from Hackney, many also attended the project, 
and grew up in similar contexts, also makes it easier for young people to 
identify with them. Simply put, unlike representatives of the system, such as 
teachers, the police, or myself, the workers were ‘like us’. 
However, a role model is obviously not just someone you can identify with, but 
someone you aspire to emulate. One particular example occurred as I 
observed the aforementioned boxing class. During the class a number of the 
young men did not want to participate and paid little attention to the instructor. 
Although disguised, the young men’s resistance appeared to be due to a fear 
of looking weak in front of their friends. On noting this Lim joined in and, by 
going first, joking with, and encouraging the younger men, he managed to get 
each one to at least give it a try. As some found they were good at it, they 
willingly took part. 
Lim’s relationship with these young men was in part produced by his 
experience of gangs and violence, which the young men could understand 
and appeared to make him a figure of respect. Nevertheless, it was not 
something he simply achieved by who he was or what he had seen. Rather it 
was the effort he put into these young people, and the willingness to give 
them his time and attention that shaped him as someone they felt affection 
for, respected, and gave his actions legitimacy in their eyes. This was also 
what I saw with Jane; her position as a dominant but also caring figure made 
her admired and respected, and her actions achieved credibility because of 
this. In other words, these workers performed their identities within the power 
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relations of society, and in doing so opened up the possibility of young people 
identifying within the legitimated system 
The point is that these people to some extent functioned like a bridge between 
the world of exclusion and legitimated society, having their feet in both worlds 
and demonstrating to the young people that they can cross this gap, and by 
playing a positive role in these young people’s lives, gave legitimacy and 
value to doing just that.  
 10.2.5 The Project versus Neoliberalism 
People like Jane, Steve, and Ben are those who have come to realise the 
damage being done to young people through disempowerment and 
disrespect. Each have decided to work within and resist the structure, by 
seeking to mitigate and overcome the dispositions to reject the social order. 
Thus, each of these individuals have sought to empower themselves in order 
to empower young people to resist the disrespect and low self-worth imposed 
upon them.  
Observing the youth project’s methods and successes in keeping young 
people on ‘the straight and narrow’ (Carla), gave insight into how structural 
exclusions were intersecting in the experience of young people and 
generating individualised resistance. However, as we have discussed above, 
the project also revealed how it was managing to counter the increase in 
disempowerment and disrespect produced by neoliberal policies and 
individualistic ontology.  
Although unformulated, the project functioned on a radical model of education 
in which emotion or affect is central. This may have been almost accidental in 
that the project simply sought to provide what they felt young people lacked. 
But in doing so, they have managed to reverse the aversive response 
produced by repeated instances of shame. Simply put, by offering security the 
defensive barriers erected to avoid shame can be lowered, and the young 
people can now express themselves without fear. The positive impact of 
praise and esteem meant young people found educational practice rewarding 
and built confidence. Similarly, by empowering young people to achieve tasks 
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or goals themselves, they could have mastery experiences and perform 
positive identities through legitimated forms of practice. 
It was by these forms of interactions that the youth project had helped send a 
number of young people to university, two of whom had previously been 
involved in gangs. It was by these factors that the young woman who 
achieved an A had turned her educational performance around and begun to 
positively identify herself through the legitimated social sphere.  
However, it was not simply through practice that the project provides 
resistance against neoliberalism, but also by what it displays. Simply put, the 
youth project demonstrated the fallacy of ‘criminality, pure and simple’. The 
success with young people from difficult backgrounds provides strong 
evidence against the notion that it is the morality of the individual that push 
them into crime. Instead, their ‘morality’, so called, is an effect of power, a 
consequence of the disrespect and disempowerment imposed upon the 
individual.  
Unfortunately, rather than recognising the value of these projects and local 
expertise, we are seeing a reduction. Again, we find neoliberalism at the core. 
The youth project itself used to have three bases around Hackney in the mid-
2000s, the largest of which had around 70 young people attending. By 2014 
the site I conducted research at was the only one, and serves around 30 
young people in total. The project also used to run a number of weekend 
activities, which had now been reduced or stopped. For instance, there had 
been a reduction in coach trips/holidays the project had offered around or 
even out of the country. The project still runs, albeit at a reduced rate, a 
weekend program called ‘mixing postcodes’, where young people from 
different areas/estates are brought together in an attempt to remove/diminish 
the cultural conflict lines that generate violence.  
Polly explained the reduction of what they could offer came with a shift to a 
neoliberal model of funding, or ‘Big Society’. While previously the project had 
been funded principally through the council, today they had to compete with 
other organisations for private funding. Indeed, prior to 2011 the cuts that 
were imposed by Cameron’s coalition government imposed a massive 
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reduction in youth services, impacting heavily on areas which need them most 
(Cooper, 2012: 21).  
The ‘Big Society’ or neoliberal model, as Atkinson, Roberts and Savage 
explain, “is nothing but a giant Trojan horse for precisely the kind of 
individualism [Thatcher] espoused – that is, it is not for the state to provide 
support, care or education for people; it is up to individuals themselves to look 
after their own interests” (2012: 10). Of course, precisely what is lacking in 
these communities are the economic and cultural capitals to do just this.  
Thus, rather than Big Society’s’ claimed products of ‘community cohesion’ and 
‘growth’, what we have been seeing is an increase in the exclusion and an 
escalation in disrespect, in part caused by the crippling of valuable enterprises 
such as the youth project. However, as the reader might have noted, the 
discussion of the project has lacked one of the key issues discussed 
throughout this thesis. Indeed, this focus is one which might provide 
resistance to neoliberalism’s monopolisation of power and capital – that of 
countering individualisation through Politicisation. Here we find the limits of 
the youth project. 
 
10.3. The Limits of Resistance 
Mark’s experiences highlighted the limits of the youth project in dealing with 
the structural disadvantage imposed by the social order. Mark was the youth 
worker at the project who had expressed an individualised outlook, blaming 
racism in the police on the individual officers. When I interviewed him he 
spoke briefly of prior involvement with gangs and crime at a younger age. This 
again, was the fault of himself and bad choices. However, with the help of the 
youth project he had ‘got out’.  
Whether or not he was telling the truth, a few months after I had finished my 
research, Mark was arrested for carrying large amounts of cocaine, and then 
tragically a few days later shot and killed in a drug related argument. Given 
Mark’s reticence during the interview, we cannot know the extent to which his 
continuation or return to criminal activity was driven by status, economic need, 
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the failure to find either in legitimated society, or a mixture of these. Of the 
adults at the project, Mark was the most resistant to me. His agreement to be 
interviewed was clearly because Polly had asked him, and the impression I 
received was that he neither trusted nor saw value in speaking to me.  
In turn, in contrast to Lim, for instance (who came from a similar background 
of gangs and crime), Mark did not seem to be achieving within legitimated 
society. When speaking of getting out, he did not, as others had, mention 
what he was doing now, and the only mention of his personal life to me 
related to having his first child. Thus his return or continued involvement in 
drug dealing may have related to economic and status concerns.  
The lack of details regarding Mark’s life means we should not employ this as 
strong evidence, but rather indicative of the limits of the project’s approach. 
The example of Mark did suggest that the failure to engage in legitimated 
society was related to both an anger and mistrust towards the system, and, 
continued social and economic exclusion. Thus the example of Mark points us 
to a number of issues, firstly, the limits of the reach of the project and of the 
resistance it can provide, and secondly, the lack of Politicisation going on in 
these communities and broader society.  
 10.3.1. The Limits of Education 
Despite the successes the project may have in generating dispositions to 
engage, it cannot counter the structural disadvantages altogether. While 
individuals may generate aspirations and identities within legitimated society, 
it does not necessitate that these will be fulfilled and may simply delay or 
diminish the impact of the inevitable exclusion. One issue is that while the 
disposition or drive to engage may be produced by the project, and they may 
enable young people to overcome the initial lack of knowledge or knowhow; 
they cannot counter the lack of middle-class cultural capital, nor can they be 
expected to provide an education equivalent to that which privileged schools 
offer.  
Indeed, the project is not, nor can it be, a school, but should be understood as 
‘picking up the slack’ left by society’s failure of these young people. Unless 
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the education system begins to acknowledge the complex ways in which 
structural disadvantage can impact on young people, society will continue to 
reproduce its own failure. If the education system does change, then 
organisations such as the youth project can provide an invaluable service in 
supporting those areas in which long-term exclusion has embedded the 
problem. 
 10.3.2. The Limits of Employment 
Moreover, we should note that despite the difficult task the project has, they 
will still send young people out into a hostile employment environment. 
Employment opportunities offer little in the way of economic and social 
reward. As we saw in Hackney and Haringey, not only are there high levels of 
unemployment meaning higher competition for all positions, in recent years 
low-paid work has been on the increase as neoliberal regulation has again 
weakened the position of labour in favour of business.  
While, even if we ignore structural disadvantage, across the board higher 
levels of aspiration amongst young people in general are not matched by 
available positions, with an over subscription of “about three ambitious young 
people for each job” (Croll, quoted in Yates et al., 2011: 7). The neoliberal 
logic that the ‘solution’ to ‘the underclass’ or ’NEETs’, is to overcome ‘low 
ambition’ through focusing on the individual (Avis, 2014: 64), or through the 
‘right training’  (Yates et al., 2011: 2) simply put, does not just miss the point, 
but misses the target.  
Better training requires a willingness in the individual to engage, and this will 
not be achieved through the penalisation and stigmatisation imposed upon 
these communities. The youth project works with individuals and its 
successes are generated through the practices which replace penalisation 
with patience and care, enabling an individual to learn to generate self-worth 
through legitimated practices. Secondly, and most fundamentally, this 
neoliberal logic blatantly ignores that no matter what ‘improvements’ may be 
made to an individual, these individuals remain excluded by the social and 
economic structure.  
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Unless the manifold means of generating disrespect are at least diminished, 
and genuine opportunities for economically and socially worthwhile 
employment are created, the impact of even genuine attempts, such as the 
youth project, will at best be to limit the damage being done, not to fix the 
problem. However, this leads us further down the rabbit hole for why, given 
the discussion so far, should we expect the structure to change? Is it not in 
order to protect the social hierarchy that logics of exclusion emerge in the first 
instance? Thus, it would seem that the problem that emerged in the 1980s, 
the shift to individualised resistance, is neoliberalism’s tour de force, for what 
it achieves is the prevention of meaningful forms of resistance coming from 
below. 
 10.3.3. Individualisation and the Death of Democracy 
The project functions to overcome that which neoliberalism and its 
individualised logic hides. It responds to the exclusion concealed by the 
meritocratic logic and aims to put young, socially and economically excluded 
individuals on a closer footing to those higher up the social hierarchy. 
However, it does not seek to overturn or counter this logic, and thus fails to 
articulate or produce a means by which the structure could change. Simply 
put, while they may help out individuals who have been impacted by 
exclusion, they are not attempting to prevent that initial exclusion. 
This should not be taken as a criticism against the project for two reasons; 
firstly, individualised logic permeates much of society and there is no reason 
to expect better from the project; and secondly, they cannot be held 
accountable for not solving all of society’s problems – to do so would be to 
return to the blame game, similar to that of ‘criminality’, and ignore the 
impressive resistance they provide to the problematic social order. 
Nevertheless, we must consider the emergence of individualised resistance 
and what this implies for the larger failure in society.  
As the easy acceptance of the ‘criminality’ explanation in 2011 demonstrates, 
if substantial change is to be brought about it requires Politicised resistance 
that will contest neoliberal framings. This not only makes the repeated 
discursive framing of ‘rioters’ by the dominant classes more difficult, it creates 
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actors who will offer alternative framings, such as we saw in the 1980s. As 
Honneth (1995) argues, Politicised and collective forms of resistance require 
identities that connect the experiences of disrespect of the individual with 
others, through an understanding of the structural cause and injustice of their 
conditions. They also require a means to articulate and overcome the anger 
and disrespect through a means that is understood as plausible and 
worthwhile. 
By doing so individuals, such as Mark, might have understood their 
experiences of disrespect, as not being rejected due to inferiority or being a 
problematic individual, but being rejected due to injustice. This is of course, 
not a simple thing. Without the positive role of workers at the project, this 
acknowledgement might generate a similar rage, low self-worth, and use of 
violence that we saw in Sheldon Thomas in Brixton 1981: “Why does 
everyone hate blacks?” (2012: 117). Thomas would later be guided and 
supported by Bernie Grant, enabling him to build a positive sense of self and 
with that constructive resistance through working with gangs. Thus, these two 
factors together seem to offer the possibility of turning disrespect and 
disempowerment into their opposites through meaningful collective identities 
and resistance. 
Unfortunately, this notion of Politicising through education was lacking in the 
project and elsewhere during my research. Indeed, despite those from the 
elder generation (over 30) that I spoke to focusing on racism and the broader 
context of exclusion, none were explicitly attempting to pass on a notion of a 
struggle or a collective identity, or seeking to educate young people in a 
Political manner. The classes that the project offered were about developing 
the individual, or about preventing issues related to violence, crime, or conflict 
with police. Indeed, as previously noted, when looking around at charities who 
do similar work with excluded young people, the discourses were all very 
individualistic, focusing on notions like ‘leadership’ and personal skills. 
This was much as Nick described how he saw the problem: previously the 
exclusion and explicit racism had made the black community ‘tighter’, but 
‘ownership of the battle’ had never been passed on. Thus we see the paradox 
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that as explicit logics of exclusion shrink from the scene, collective identities 
necessary to constructively resist disempowerment and disrespect disappear. 
With this loss, so do we lose the capacity to reorganise power relations that 
seek to protect and reinforce themselves. 
Indeed, while democracy, due to space, has not been an explicit focus of this 
thesis, the reader might recognise its presence just beneath the surface of the 
discussion. For a functioning democracy we need a Politicised population, not 
simply to prompt engagement, but to contest growing inequality and ossifying 
concentrations of power. The youth project gets us halfway by producing 
individuals willing to engage, rather than simply turning away. However, alone 
it is not enough, and without Politicisation and the retreat of individualisation, 
disempowerment and disrespect will be expanded. The drive to action 
inherent in shame and anger will be unable to be expressed through the 
legitimated system, and the cause of these emotions will go unresolved. The 
anger and discontent will build, bubbling below the surface, waiting for an 
iconic moment that enables it to breach in acts of violence. 
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11. Conclusion 
 
11.1. Power and Criminality 
The thesis began by noting the complex and multiple roles of power 
implicated in rioting and the need to reconceptualise how we go about 
thinking and analysing such aggregations of event. The response of power to 
the acts involved in rioting often functions to delegitimise rioters, and protect 
and maintain the current social hierarchy. In 2011 and in the 1980s 
Cameron’s and Thatcher’s ‘criminality’ were just such acts of power.  
Analyses of riots that have sought to counter such perspectives have often 
engaged in a debate by arguing rioters’ actions are actually ‘political’, and 
thus represent a claim for justice (e.g. Penny, 2011; Reicher & Stott, 2011). 
Yet, while riot actions may be political, as we saw, the spontaneity and 
socially excluded experiences of the rioters means that political action is often 
pre-reflexively excluded as plausible or worthwhile. Moreover, whether the 
actions are political or seek justice or not, has little to do with whether there is 
genuine discontent and society is failing to reproduce its conditions of 
production.  
Arguing against criminality and for political action is to engage on the terms 
set by the politicians who wish to delegitimise. It plays into the hands of 
proponents of the criminalising discourse because often rioters’ actions are 
clearly not ‘political’ or claims for justice. Whether an individual can or cannot 
articulate themselves ‘politically’ is irrelevant to the social problem that 
underpins the resistance. The lack of political action is only relevant because 
it is indicative of the extent to which the agent has been excluded from the 
practices of power. The less ‘political action’ is occurring, the greater the 
extent of individuals who have given up on the social order as a means to 
overcome or resolve their anger and shame. 
By framing rioters as immoral, politicians in the 1980s and 2011 sought to 
remove any questions regarding the state and social order’s role in producing 
the rioting. By arguing that the riots represent political action, we only fail to 
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step outside the language of legitimation, and thus accept the ontology of the 
powerful, rather than subvert it epistemologically. The problem was then, that 
we could not counter ‘criminality’ and explore the violence through these 
terms.  
Instead of engaging in the political-criminal debate, we should step outside 
through the concept of the ‘Political’. The capitalised Political refers to the 
organisation of social life and the social hierarchy, rather than simply action. 
Thus the term highlights the power relations within society, the distribution of 
resources, and importantly, how the social hierarchy is shaped and 
maintained by power, such as the discourse of criminality. In this light, all riots 
are political because they respond to and reorganise power relations within 
society. 
11.1.1 ‘The Riot’ 
To critique criminality, we also needed an approach that could incorporate 
power relations that the discourse sought to exclude. In other words, we 
needed to reconceptualise the notion of a ‘riot’; a concept produced through 
practice and the need to compartmentalise, simplify, and in some instances, 
to condemn. ‘The riot’ as a concept has many problems for analysis. Most 
obviously it aggregates what is potentially a multitude of different types of 
acts, individuals, and motives, into one singular event and actors. The result 
can only be a loss of nuance and homogenisation. 
The term also imposes unnecessary temporal and spatial limits. ‘The riot’ is 
not just a single, but singular event. This is problematic because there is no 
particular reason to draw a line according to immediate events, other than that 
our attention moves away. Thus the 1980s saw ‘riots’ and 2011 saw a single 
‘riot’, despite a remarkably similar spread to the 1980s. That it was simply 
social media that enabled a quicker spread is generally left unrecognised.  
Indeed, that the 1980s and 2011 saw notable similarities in terms of iconic 
events, locations, demographics, and the targeting of police, is not 
acknowledged. Rather because we examine ‘the riot’ rather than the problem 
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of which riot actions are a symptom, these strikingly similar series of events 
are considered distinct. 
Finally, like ‘criminality’, the emphasis of ‘the riot’ is implicitly on the actions of 
the rioters; this is not to say that any analysis that utilises the concept of the 
riot will ignore the social structure, but rather attention is directed to a greater 
extent to the individuals. What is lacking is a fuller understanding of the 
complex ways in which structure – as a set of repeated and patterned 
interactions – connects to, and makes agency’s ‘necessary scene’ (Chambers 
& Carver, 2008: 45). 
What the notion of ‘the riot’ achieves then, is to remove the actions from the 
social order in which they occur. Thus rather than explain this process, we 
seek to explain the ‘the riot’. By rejecting ‘the riot’ as the object of analysis, 
and reconceptualising a riot as a symptom of social breakdown, we could 
move beyond these limitations.  
 
11.2. Bridging the Gap: Shame and Self-Esteem 
11.2.1 The Importance of an Affective Theory of Resistance 
The value in developing a theory of action/resistance in contrast to ‘the riot’, is 
to avoid the unnecessary limits imposed by the latter concept, and to enable 
us to embed riotous actions, or resistance, within the processes of power that 
constitute the social order. Moreover, to counter the discourse of criminality 
would require revealing the structural causes of agency in a way that could 
explain why we were seeing apparently ‘apolitical’ behaviour. Theories of riots 
tend to fail to adequately develop this connection, leaving an explanatory gap 
or assumption, which results in problems.  
Keith’s (1993) analysis of the 1980s riots provides a more nuanced and 
insightful account of rioting than many ‘riot’ approaches, by examining in detail 
the relations and interactions between black communities and the police. 
Despite this, the gap manifests. Without explicitly incorporating emotion, 
specifically shame and self-esteem, Keith fails to realise the impact of broader 
	 311	
power relations between the dominant white groups and super-exploited black 
groups. What Keith does not recognise is the impact these exclusions and 
mistreatments might have upon dispositions towards white authority, and 
therefore the police. Subsequently, without examining the impact of these 
broader exclusions, Keith also fails to understand how society’s stereotypes 
and hierarchy are implicated the over-policing he analyses so well. 
Simply put, without considering affect in a theory of action/resistance we will 
always struggle to escape the terms set by the discourse of criminality or 
indeed, ‘the riot’. This is because emotion is what gives social structure 
meaning or relevance, and thus explanations of why social structure produces 
resistance will be unable to understand the nuanced and indirect ways in 
which it impacts upon and inheres in agency.  
 11.2.2 Disrespect, Disempowerment, and Resistance 
Research at the youth project was particularly informative in bringing out role 
of emotion. As we saw, the project was enabling young people to resist the 
disrespect of the social order in a myriad of ways, each of which operated 
through generating a positive sense of self. Consequently, it became apparent 
that if we are to connect resistance to the larger power relations of the social 
order, this must occur through emotions as the drive and ‘necessary scene’ 
for agency (Chambers & Carver, 2008: 45).  
However, this required a further development that enabled us to understand 
power as shaping the possibility or form of affective expressions. Indeed, if we 
are to understand how the social order shapes behaviour, of which resistance 
is just one sub-type, we must do so by understanding power as, in part, a 
form of influence that operates on and through affect.  
This connection between structure and affectively driven resistance came in 
two interconnected forms: firstly, emotional responses of shame and self-
esteem, and secondly, the repeated and patterned acts of disrespect and 
disempowerment that produce these emotions. Emotions underpin rationality 
and choice at the pre-reflexive level as they both inform us about what we are 
experiencing, and dispose us to respond to it in certain ways.  
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How we respond to situations is not a matter of free will, but of the ontology 
that shapes certain types of action as plausible and worthwhile. These are 
both shaped by the structure in two ways; first, in how it impacts upon us, and 
second, in how we can utilise those structural relations to express affect and 
perform action. Thus we act from a certain subjective position in relation to the 
social structure that shaped us. 
We began with Bourdieu’s (2000; 2003) general structural framework and 
notions of dispositions, but developed the possibility of resistance through 
Scheff’s (2000) theorisation of shame and Honneth’s (1995) notion of 
expressive action and disrespect as the source of struggle. However, while 
Scheff speaks mainly of shame, and Honneth tends to avoid this language in 
favour of structural acts such as ‘disrespect’, a fuller theorisation required self-
esteem as shame’s necessary contraposition. In other words, we could not 
understand disrespect and disempowerment as simply a negative experience 
– shame – but as an absence of a positive – self-esteem. In turn Butler’s 
(2004; 2011) notion of performativity complimented Honneth’s expressive 
understanding, and provided greater nuance in the understanding of how 
power relations or structure function not just to shape experience but to create 
the possibilities of action. 
By merging these theoretical perspectives, we can say that social structure or 
acts of power shape our experiences, which in turn produce emotional 
responses. These responses say something about the experience in relation 
to our expectations of self, and how we should and feasibly can, respond to it. 
With regards to resistance, a shameful experience is to feel that the self is 
judged inadequate and unvalued; it constructs approaching interactions that 
are similar as potentially shameful and thus disposes us to avoid or alter such 
interactions. If we cannot avoid them by ‘fitting in’, an individual may reject the 
authority of those judging them, while shame that cannot be overcome 
produces anger, prompting action to re-establish self-worth and re-organise 
relations of power. 
From a structural perspective, disrespect functions as an interaction in which 
an individual is devalued in some form. Disempowerment is similar in that it 
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removes the individual’s agency, thus functioning to demonstrate the 
inadequacy of the individual as a human, and removes the capacity to 
generate self-worth through action. Thus acts of disrespect in conjunction with 
disempowerment function potently to produce shame and inhibit the 
resistance and overcoming to this within the legitimated social order.  
By building this approach, rioting and riot acts are removed from their reifying 
and delimiting constructs. Instead, analysis reveals how resistance is 
generated as individuals seek to counter disrespect and overcome 
disempowerment in order that they can develop a positive sense of self. 
However, through forms of disempowerment the legitimated social order 
refuses this possibility, thus emotions seek expression outside of, or by 
reorganising the power relations that inhibit this. Consequently, expressive 
resistance is achieved through performing with power relations in acts that 
reposition the self in relation to the social order, and function as a form of 
identification. Politicised resistance for instance, seeks to reorganise the 
social order in prevent relations of power that produce disrespect, understood 
as ‘injustice’ (e.g. equal pay). 
11.2.3. Criminality or Individualised Resistance? 
However, while this enables us to understand how resistance is generated, it 
cannot explain how similar experiences may manifest as different forms of 
resistance. As Honneth (1995) pointed out, how resistance manifests in 
behaviour is not determined by emotion alone but by forms of identification. 
The difference between collective forms of resistance and individual was 
found in whether Politicised identities were operational.  
Politicised forms of identity incorporated structural understandings of the 
social order, and thus enabled individuals to understand the origins of any 
disrespect experienced. By realising the structural origins of disrespect 
through Politicised identities, cause can be located outside of the self and 
discontent can be formulated as ‘injustice’. Through this understanding of 
being wronged, the excluded group have the potential to articulate an 
alternative ‘future’ and act in ways that not only seek to bring it about, but 
collectively reassert their self-worth through the performance of agency and 
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positive identities. Consequently, shame can be limited or overcome through 
rejecting valuations imposed by the legitimated social order as unfair, and 
developing alternative forms of positive identification (e.g. black power). This 
is possible due to potential for social valuation, empowerment, and thus self-
esteem and belonging generated by those grouped in similar positions.  
Individualised forms of identity, on the other hand, while performative and 
expressive of the same socially structured position, lack structural or 
Politicised understandings. Disrespect is felt but its origins are not recognised 
in the same way. Instead the blame inherent in disrespect is accepted and 
internalised as a feature of the self. Without the understanding of structural 
origins, so resistance will struggle to articulate change to the social order. In 
turn, lacking a project or notion of injustice by which to re-articulate identity, 
only violence is left as a means by which to re-articulate power relations and 
overcome shame and release anger. 
The value in this theoretical development is that, in contrast to the immoral 
individual in ‘criminality’ whose actions demonstrate they are only out for 
themselves, here we see how it is that riots, politicised or not, are always 
about resistance to power. ‘Criminality’ or violence purged of their normative 
and moral connotations, are ‘politics’ for those who have no other means by 
which to overcome and express shame and anger. It may be argued to be 
ineffective, but individualised resistance derives from the same structural 
production of disempowerment and disrespect as any other form of 
resistance. In other words, ‘criminality’ is Political. 
This is also fundamentally important for understanding what collective 
violence is, and the problem that underlies the symptom. Violence as a form 
of resistance to power is reserved for those who are disempowered and 
disrespected (Arendt, 1970). Unable to articulate discontent as injustice, 
unable to create a project and collective identity to resist the shame and low 
self-worth, the excluded turn to other means that adequately express or 
overcome the shame and anger. For some this might be an engagement in 
crime and the possibilities of a positive identity this offers. Yet, even for those 
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who do not engage in crime, violent acts may offer the most effective way to 
overcome their discontent.  
 11.2.4. Education and Employment 
This understanding of individualised resistance countered Keith’s (1993) 
argument that attacks on the police meant over-police was the only or primary 
cause. Because Keith had not theorised how power and exclusion impacted 
upon individuals, he failed to consider that behind the clear target selection, 
other relations of disrespect and disempowerment were generating 
resistance. These relations were spilling over through a general repressed 
anger, and through the rejection of the authorities of the legitimated and white 
social order and hierarchy. Thus we could make sense of the data that 
revealed in both the 1980s and 2011 we had an over representation of 
excluded groups. These were not individuals rioting because everything was 
fine but for the oppressive policing, rather the police formed the tip of the 
iceberg – the most tangible and obvious form of disrespect. 
Disempowerment and disrespect come in many forms for super-exploited 
groups, and shame and anger does not stay within easy and clear categories 
related to particular experiences. Thus we found that in both the 1980s and 
2011 there was a context of disrespect in everyday life occurring through 
education and employment. It was not simply the negative impact, but the lack 
of possibility of self-worth in these practices that was generating rejection and 
resistance.  
Thus we saw how social and economic exclusion might produce experiences 
of disrespect and disempowerment through disadvantage and stereotypes in 
educational practice and employment opportunities. This was facilitating a 
rejection or stereotyping of those who held markers of legitimated society. In 
particular, this was demonstrated through the response of young people and 
some workers to my researcher identity (white, middle class appearance, 
researcher) in which a lack of trust was clearly displayed. This adapted 
approach emphasises not only that to understand resistance we need to 
expand beyond what appears immediately present in actions (or ‘the riot’), but 
that to prevent the reoccurrence of these symptoms we need to 
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reconceptualise how we think about and practice the reproduction of the 
social order.  
11.3. Situational Analysis 
In addition to arguing for a shift away from the notion of ‘the riot’ to an 
affective theory of resistance, the thesis sought to incorporate a relatively 
novel method of analysing situational dynamics through video footage. 
Despite the usefulness of the approach developed by Collins (2008) and 
Nassauer (2012), their notion of situational analysis is undercut by their 
theoretical grounding, which argues for treating all violent actors as universal 
subjects and seeking explanation in the situation alone.  
The thesis, however, re-appropriated this method as a means to provide a 
counter-narrative and connect social structure in action. The above theoretical 
approach marries well with the notion of situational analysis. ‘The riot’, rather 
than a thing in itself, becomes analytically understood as a series of 
‘situations’. The dynamics of these situations are performances and affective 
expressions of the social structure which the analyst can ‘read’ or utilise as 
evidence of the construction of agency.  
Thus, connecting with the broader theory, the actions or resistance of rioters 
are expressive (Honneth, 1995) and performative (Butler, 2004; 2011) acts 
that respond to the organisation of power and the construction of self-worth 
and shame that this produces. By developing an account of the role of the 
Political in the actions of violence against the police, we could ‘make sense’ of 
riotous actions in a way that other forms of qualitative and quantitative data 
cannot alone achieve. By utilising emotional displays, body language, and 
questioning who the individuals are interacting with, how, and to what end, the 
analyst can tie in a broader understanding of social structure, power, and the 
produced experiences of rioters with the particular actions. And in particular, 
we can show how naïve individualism is not only wrong, but was implicated in 
2011. 
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11.4. Mapping out Society’s Failure 
We now turn to the discussion of the substantive contribution of the thesis. 
While it has been noted that rioting is always connected to the organisation of 
power and social hierarchy, the thesis sought to explore the context related to 
the emergence of violence in 2011, specifically that directed against the 
police. This was chosen in part because the police function as part of the 
social hierarchy’s apparatus of power, and in part because this form of 
resistance had been pushed into the background by the discourse of 
criminality.  
The theory of resistance applied to violence against the police necessarily 
drew attention to the 1980s due to the similarities in action, location, and 
socio-economic context. However, it became apparent that the emergence of 
the intentional targeting of police as an act of resistance, beginning in the 
1970s, also revealed a particular historical process of change resulting in 
differences in the resistance. Most obviously was the shift in the role that race 
and racism were playing, alongside a movement from Politicised to 
individualised resistance. This particular historical moment or process could 
be labelled neoliberalism. 
11.4.1. Neoliberalism: The Expansion of Disempowerment and 
Disrespect 
Coinciding with the emergence of collective attacks on police, and also the 
increase in individualised resistance, neoliberal means of regulation emerged 
in the 1970s, and arrived as the dominant social and economic ideology 
particularly in the 1980s with Thatcher’s Conservative government. As we saw 
the regulation of the market removed the possibility of an empowered white 
working class by regulating in favour of business. The impact was to 
disempower labour through the destruction of unions, increase the ‘flexibility’, 
or vulnerability of those who sold their labour, and thus expand the super-
exploited class.  
Thus, the white working class were having the rug pulled out from under 
them, but the super-exploited black group had yet to even reach the rug. 
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Changes in the market shifted the material and power relations, thus 
expanding the super-exploited group through an influx of the white poor. 
While perhaps too early to have a significant impact on the ethnic make-up of 
the 1980s riots, this explains the expansion of white rioters in 2011.  
However, it does not explain why, despite the still disproportionate 
involvement of black individuals, notions of black identity seemed largely 
absent. Nor can it alone explain why the manner of resistance appeared to be 
changing. What emerged from this period of change was an increasingly 
individualised ontology, which connects with the rioting in two ways: by 
changing the stereotype or modality of exclusion, and by changing the way 
individuals understood themselves within society. 
 11.4.2. From Black to Underclass: A Coherent Logic of Exclusion 
Alongside and within neoliberalism’s changes to the market and education, a 
broader epistemological shift occurred that functioned to consolidate changing 
conditions. Neoliberal policies created individually competitive systems where 
failure was attributed to the ‘free’ individual unencumbered by social structure. 
In other words, neoliberalism produced an individualised logic or ontology that 
diminished structural understandings. One way this impacted was in the 
changing form of stereotypes, or the modality of distinction by which the social 
hierarchy is justified. 
The modern (neo)liberal state justifies itself through the notion of a 
meritocracy; no individual should be impeded from achieving their potential by 
structural factors. As we saw logics of exclusion that reference structural 
factors, such as racism or class, become a moral contradiction in the 
meritocratic society. This meant that racism was becoming increasingly 
frowned upon. However, attempts to prevent racism, such as Racial 
Awareness Treatment, all handily ignored the problem that sat behind and 
produced racism – inequality.  
Logics of distinction that are utilised to exclude groups of individuals do not 
simply exist because of individual prejudice, but emerge to justify exclusions 
that maintain the social hierarchy. Indeed, as we saw inequality was not 
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decreasing but expanding. Thus, the repression of racism only inhibited the 
form of expression, and ignored what creates prejudice – the drive to maintain 
and justify one’s situation of privilege, and thus the other’s disadvantage. 
As neoliberal policies did not remove inequality but expanded it, a new form of 
stereotype was required that corroborated the narrative of meritocracy and 
individualism, rather than contradicting it. At the same time this new logic 
would have to justify the social and economic position of the super-exploited 
group. Thus emerged the ‘underclass’, the ‘chav’, or as we saw the 
legitimated and apparently morally neutral category of the ‘NEET’. These 
concepts all focus on the individual and their behaviour, and seek to hide the 
structural cause of the individual’s social position. 
Thus while prior to the 1970s British society clearly had a social hierarchy and 
exclusion, justified through notions of race and class, in the neoliberal ‘society’ 
the position of the super-exploited group has become a matter of poor choice, 
of not working hard enough, and of the individual’s immoral nature. It is not a 
coincidence that this logic is the very same found in discourses of politicians 
post-riot: “These riots were not about race […] government cuts [… or] 
poverty […] this was about behaviour” (Cameron’s, 2011).  
 11.4.3. Changing Stereotypes, Logics, and Resistance 
Vulnerability, disempowerment, and poverty may create a situation where 
individuals are encouraged to compete against others in similar positions of 
insecurity, lose faith in collective political action, and resist in individualised or 
‘criminal’ forms. However, neoliberalism and individualism exacerbates this by 
hiding the structural relations that produce these conditions. 
Tied into the new ‘underclass’ stereotype, a further way in which this 
individualised ontology had an impact was in how individuals understand 
themselves within the social order. Critiques of neoliberalism tend to assume 
that because it argues individuals are self-interested actors, it produces actors 
that are simply self-interested (Barnett, 2010). However, the affective theory 
of resistance provides a more nuanced account, enabling us to understand 
how the individualised logic interacts with shame and shapes the possibilities 
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of action.  
In a world where class, race, or poverty no longer ‘impact’ upon your 
opportunities, but where education and market based relationships are 
increasingly competitive; where self-worth is established through personal 
achievement and the display of material goods in a universal consumer class, 
the self becomes understood as the origin of cause and thus inadequacy. 
Without a structural understanding shame and social judgement is more 
difficult to resist because there is no cause or resolution outside of the self. 
Rather than simply increasing self-interest, individualism increases ontological 
insecurity. This may of course, manifest in increasingly competitive or egoistic 
behaviours, but it may also manifest in anxiety or increasing rejection of the 
legitimated social order and its authorities. Coupled with this increased 
difficulty in overcoming shame, is the loss of Politicised identities with which to 
perform resistance. 
‘Race’ and ‘class’, as structural concepts, had functioned both as forms of 
distinction and exclusion, but also as modalities of identification and thus 
resistance. Because it was by ‘race’ that black people were excluded, so 
resistance to disrespect and disempowerment could be generated around and 
through positive notions of ‘blackness’, through collective ‘black’ movements 
and organisations, and through a different source of social valuation and 
belonging.  
However, neoliberalism’s shift to a meritocratic justification resulted in 
disguising the structural logic of distinction in a moral cloak and removing all 
structural referents. Of course, how can one resist against something that one 
cannot see? Thus, in 2011 we saw some acknowledgement that people were 
being harassed by police because they were black, but as Mark argued, this 
was because of racist individuals, not systemic discrimination. Moreover, 
despite the profiling of black youth refers to a relatively recognisable, tangible, 
and acknowledged act, the system remains relatively un-implicated. Or what 
about disrespect in school or employment? Rather than inequality and 
injustice, the individualised ontology experiences this as failure of the self.  
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In other words, neoliberalism corners the excluded in a double-bind: firstly, the 
structural exclusions that oppress them no longer arrives in the recognisable 
form, but as we saw with the police, profiling arrives as the ‘experience’ of the 
officer, or disadvantage as the ‘failure’ of the student. Secondly, not only is 
disrespect more difficult to recognise, the individualistic and meritocratic 
ontology inhibits the framing of disrespect and disempowerment as an 
injustice.  
The impact of these shifts meant that collective or Political identities 
increasingly failed to offer a plausible means to perform with power relations 
in way that would resist the imposed stigma and feelings of powerlessness. 
Thus, as we saw in the 1980s, there was the beginnings of a shift from 
Politicised rebellion to individualised violence, and by 2011 we almost 
exclusively seemed to see the latter. 
11.5. Attacking the Police: The Tip of the Iceberg 
Thus we return to attacking the police. It is not coincidence that the police 
were harassing excluded communities in both the 1980s and 2011. As 
Wacquant (2010) put it, the police constitute the final ‘buffer’ between them 
and the social order. It is through the police that the ‘threat’ posed by the 
super-exploited group to the social hierarchy, is kept under control. 
The first broader relation to highlight is that through the production of 
stereotypes of ‘criminality’, super-exploited groups are positioned as 
dangerous and need to be ‘policed’. The police in both periods operated on 
the stereotypes of the day and functioned to keep (the social) order. Thus the 
police tend to focus on the individuals stereotyped as a threat to that order, 
and public spaces in which they move.  
Relatedly, the mainstream responses to the rioting in which the penal system 
is viewed as the only resolution to the immoral nature of the rioters, is also not 
coincidence. Rather, without any structural cause or resolution, the discourse 
of ‘criminality’ requires over-policing and logically forwards harsh penal 
responses. Simply put, in the 1980s the stereotypes of black communities, 
particularly of young men in estates and areas of concentrated poverty, led to 
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invasive and oppressive policing. In 2011 the same process was occurring in 
many of the same areas, however this time the operational lines were drawn 
along the looser and unspoken notion of the underclass.  
Thus, whereas previously skin colour had been the core marker by which 
distinctions were drawn, more recently, we see a shift in emphasis whereby 
skin colour remains important but not core, and a greater emphasis is placed 
on youth, and style of dress. Again, it is not coincidence that the changing 
forms of exclusion generated by the social order are those the police operate 
upon. 
The place or geographical area that police focus on is also important with 
regards to stereotyping and the experience of exclusion, and indeed, forms a 
key mechanism by which over-policing and broader exclusions operate 
together. The impact of social and economic exclusion, of course, means that 
young people with no economic capital are forced onto the streets in order to 
have fun, be with friends, or simply avoid issues at home already generated 
through a cycle of disrespect and deprivation.  
It is in this space that those who have likely experienced rejection, failure and 
exclusion through the social order’s stereotypes, are further criminalised and 
targeted by police. Interactions with police in these circumstances contribute 
to the sense of shame and low self-esteem produced in broader relations, and 
are often understood as insulting and degrading through the judgement, 
hostility, and even violence young men experience. Moreover, it is during a 
hostile stop and search that disempowerment takes its most extreme form, as 
the individuals loses control over their own body.  
 11.5.1. Violence as politics  
In other words, the police constitute the final, physical, and thus most tangible 
means by which individuals are disrespected by the social order. As a result, it 
should not be surprising to find that attacking the police functions as an 
obvious and tangible means by which shame can be overcome and anger can 
be expressed. Indeed, in both the 1980s and 2011 we saw the same sense of 
release and anger as rioters overturned relations with police.  
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In both periods the use of violence against police was ‘politics’ by other 
means. Individuals attacking the police were disempowered to the extent that 
no form of legitimated action presented itself as a reasonable and effective 
means by which they could resist disrespect. They were disempowered by the 
individualistic ontology, excluded from legitimated practice, and disrespected 
by a system that for many has repeatedly reinforced the notion that they are 
not good enough. Simply put, ‘political action’ as a possibility was 
meaningless and absent; however, the possibility of overturning relations with 
the police through violence offered a plausible and effective means to 
overcome and release their discontent.  
By reversing those power relations, by putting the police in the position the 
rioters inhabit in the everyday, by ‘violat[ing], just as they violate us’ 
(Prasad(c), 2011) they were able to cleanse themselves of the sense of 
inferiority and release their anger: “we felt really good like we’d just achieved 
something” (ibid). As the video footage revealed, rioters were able to express 
the repressed anger that had been pushing for action and resolution. Once 
the ‘opportunity’ presented itself, rioters could perform the power relations as 
they desired in the everyday, experiencing pleasure through the release of 
anger and performing beyond their expectations of a positive sense-of-self.  
Importantly, not all those who attacked the police in 2011 appear to identify 
themselves as ‘criminals’ or were criminals. However, both criminal acts and 
opposition to police – in the everyday and the riots – constitute acts of 
individualised resistance. By violating the police as they had felt violated, by 
breaking their rules in front of them, by damaging their – or society’s – 
property, rioters drew on the anger and discontent generated through and 
beyond relations with the police, and demonstrated the new power relations in 
which they were dominant, they were superior. 
In turn, with an increasing number of individuals resisting and expressing 
anger, the realisation of common cause and the possibility of collective action 
and empowerment was realised. Rioters then united to reverse power 
relations with police, and establish their position of dominance through 
performing the new power relations. Albeit only for a moment, the super-
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exploited group acted “together in a way that they rarely can’” (Arendt, 1970: 
83).  
11.6. Discussion: The Affective Social Order 
The thesis here has sought to offer a new approach and understanding of 
rioting that enables us to better understand these acts as an indication of a 
failing within the social order. Of course, this was not a complete explanation 
of why so many individuals chose to attack the police and there are other 
ways in which this research could be expanded. More focused ethnographic 
approaches to certain issues could get to the meat and gristle of shame 
producing interactions, and develop greater nuance to the thesis’ broader 
discussion. 
In particular, issues such as gender and masculinity, given the predominance 
of male rioters, would usefully expand the affective perspective developed 
here. In particular, masculinity’s commonly associated norms of dominance 
and control seem relevant when considering disempowerment and disrespect. 
Indeed, the theorisation of resistance through shame and self-esteem would 
seem to fit well with the notion of gender identity, and could also contribute to 
Butler’s (2004; 2011) theorisation of gender performance. In particular, it 
would be interesting to explore the extent to which the emphasis on the self 
implicit in many Western conceptions of dominant masculinity, inhibits the 
understanding of injustice and thus connects to violence. Yet while there were 
indications of such a concept of masculinity in my research, a combination of 
insufficient evidence to develop this explanation and the complexity of other 
factors, this was set aside.  
Nevertheless, the thesis has sought to bridge the gap between social 
structure and action, and more specifically resistance, as a means of 
exploring the social order’s production of its own breakdown. In doing so I 
have examined the functioning of the social order on an affective level. 
Indeed, core to the argument here is that the failure or success of a social 
order, depends on the extent to which it offers the possibility of achieving the 
fundamental existential concern, that of self-worth.  
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To disrespect and disempower individuals is to exclude them from generating 
subjective value in the legitimated social order, and ultimately to generate the 
affective drive which might result in the rejection of that social order. 
Opportunities for economically worthwhile and socially valued forms of 
employment are fundamentally important if individuals are to continue to 
engage. It is not a matter of laziness or poor choice; these are at best effects 
of power. It is a matter of creating the dispositions to engage, of creating the 
possibility of performing positive self-worth through practice.  
Moreover, the affective and performative theorisation of action and resistance 
enabled a fuller understanding of the way in which social and economic 
exclusion functions as part of the social hierarchy and impacts upon 
behaviour. Structural inequality generates prejudice which functions to seek to 
maintain these relations of privilege and disadvantage, by justifying the 
position of the exploited group. There is nothing objective about racism, nor is 
it necessarily tied to certain markers like skin colour; racism is about the need 
to put the other down. Or simply put, it functions to maintain the social 
hierarchy. By understanding this we can understand the shift produced by 
neoliberalism and individualism from a predominantly black super-exploited 
group, to an expanded multi-ethnic super-exploited group. 
 11.6.1. The Paradox of Individualised Resistance and the Breakdown 
of the Social Order 
Indeed, it is neoliberalism’s individualised ontology and the production of 
individualised resistance that provides the greatest threat to the social order 
and democracy. For the paradox of individualised resistance produced 
through the re-arrangement of the market, education, and the emergence of 
consumerism, is that the more individuals are excluded the less the social 
order pays attention to them. To put this another way, in the neoliberal 
language of ‘politics’ and ‘criminality’, only those who speak in the language of 
the dominant can even begin to make a claim for justice. 
Those disempowered by the neoliberal order have not simply been excluded 
from the practices of power, but pre-reflexively or ontologically disempowered 
by removing the possibility of understanding the causes of their discontent. 
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Thus, these individuals cannot speak in the language of the powerful because 
it does not make sense, and has never been a plausible means by which to 
express anger and resolve shame.  
The use of violence against the police is inherently Political because rioters 
responded to and sought to reorganise the power relations of the social order 
in the only way that made sense. We do not have to valorise such actions as 
the new revolution to acknowledge their origins. Indeed, the relevance of their 
inability to articulate anger in ‘political’ terms does not relate to their ‘nature’, 
rather it reveals the dire failure of democratic society to create a system and 
populous that can alter problematic and ossifying power relations. The 
paradox of neoliberalism is that individualised resistance should function as a 
dire warning of the system’s failure; yet instead it is this form of resistance that 
is ‘criminality, pure and simple’. 
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